

















# *Renaissance and Reformation*

# *Renaissance et Réforme*



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
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# Past/Present: Leonardo Bruni's *History of Florence*\*

GIUSEPPE BISACCIA



The importance of historical consciousness in the Renaissance is a fact generally recognized by scholars of the period. From Petrarch on, it is possible to discern a growing awareness of the past: "men became more and more conscious that all sorts of things—buildings, clothes, words, laws—changed over time."<sup>1</sup> As Panofsky puts it, men "were convinced that the period in which they lived was a 'new age' as sharply different from the medieval past as the medieval past had been from classical antiquity."<sup>2</sup>

This heightened sense of the past is itself one of the manifestations of a long civilizing process that still remains to be fully investigated. Some of the forces at work in shaping historical consciousness are to be identified in the progressive differentiation of social functions, which in turn favours the gradual spreading of literacy among laity.<sup>3</sup> Already in the 13th and 14th centuries the new demands of the communal civilization had redirected cultural activities toward more marketable professions: alongside theologians, canonists, poets, physicians and scientists, we see more and more jurists (particularly those versed in Roman law) notaries, lay clerks and accountants—all people particularly sought out by the political leading class and by the entrepreneurial and manufacturing classes.<sup>4</sup>

To meet the demand created by this progressive differentiation of social functions, the Florentine society of the time, composed, as it was, mainly of craftsmen and businessmen, sees to it that its children receive their education through commercial practice. On the other hand, travels to distant lands, contacts with different kinds of people, and lastly the mental habit acquired through recording commercial transactions in time will lead those very merchants to put down in writing much more than mere figures. Thus the transition from simple ledgers to "libri segreti," "ricordanze," diaries, annals, and chronicles, which record in a neat and orderly fashion events chronologically arranged in a well defined space. The place is Florence, and particularly the milieu of the merchant's family; the time

\* A version of the first part of this paper was read at the meeting of the Canadian Society for Renaissance Studies, held at Dalhousie University, in Halifax, in May 1981.

is a quantifiable one, according to the daily, monthly or yearly human activity, which is now more precisely measured by the city's mechanical clocks. Thus the universal and eternal dimensions of earlier medieval chronicles are no longer to be found in the Florentine "ricordanze" of the end of the 14th century. The recital of the Florentine merchant-chronicler unfolds rather like a sequence of contemporary, or relatively recent, economic and social events, centred in the family's or city's life, and occasionally interspersed with ethical considerations.<sup>5</sup>

The Florentine humanist historiography of the early 15th century moves instead on a different plane. According to Alberto Tenenti, there are similarities, but also marked differences in the way the merchant and the humanist, respectively, approach and write history: namely, the former writes chronicles, the latter *historiae*; the former easily accommodates in his narrative God and the Divine Providence, the latter excludes both; the former deals prominently with economic and social issues, the latter disregards them altogether and deals, instead, mainly with political and military matters, on a quite different level.<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, Tenenti, strongly disagreeing with Christian Bec and indirectly even with Yves Renouard, rejects the notion of these two scholars that there is merely a difference in degree between the humanist and mercantile cultures. He contends that, while it cannot be denied that at a certain time there was in fact a meeting of minds in Florence between merchants and humanists, it still remains to be fully investigated how and why this meeting of minds took place and which group was most affected, positively or negatively, by the other.<sup>7</sup>

The following pages on Leonardo Bruni's *History of Florence* are intended to help to bring into focus some modes of humanist thought, the level on which humanists operated, and more specifically the way in which Bruni himself related to the past.

\* \* \*

While chroniclers seem to be content with recording in the vernacular the mere sequence of the family's or city's life without trying to grasp its underlying rationale, Leonardo Bruni writes instead in Latin and for a selective audience, in a more detached way aiming above all at reconstructing events.<sup>8</sup> He is quite aware of the difficulty of the task, "But writing history requires a method continuously applied to so many things at once, and calls for an explanation and judgment of each single fact."<sup>9</sup> In Bruni's *History of Florence*,<sup>10</sup> the scope of the narration has gained breadth compared with that of diaries and even most chronicles. No longer limited to city events, it also embraces the Italian and transalpine scene insofar as the internal affairs of Florence are considered intertwined and connected to those of other states.

Bruni's narrative, in addition to expanding beyond the city walls, also



goes beyond the boundaries of individual memory, which was the source and object of diaries, annals and most chronicles:<sup>11</sup> "As far as I am concerned, I have decided to write not only the present history, but also the past history of this city, going as far back as memory allows."<sup>12</sup> Thus personal memory and written memory are essential to the reconstruction of the past; Bruni sees this task as an important civic duty too often shunned in the past.<sup>13</sup>

Bruni, therefore, is about to weave the strands of the past, from which lessons spring for the present and the future, and relies upon archival documents whenever other sources—chronicles, annals or commentaries—are unconvincing or incomplete. As far as more recent events are concerned, Bruni's main sources are obviously personal reminiscences and those of his contemporaries, on the one hand, or archival documents, on the other. The events narrated and handed down to posterity through written memory are, therefore, those concerning the people of Florence, more precisely the internal and external strife and other noteworthy peace and wartime developments, along two separate lines set by the author himself.<sup>14</sup>

Indeed the annalistic framework of Bruni's *History* is traditional, as is the selection of historical facts, according to a long-established historiographic criterion going back to Thucydides that dictates that only noteworthy civic and military achievements should be narrated. Nonetheless, following the example set by 14th-century Florentine chroniclers, other episodes and phenomena affecting in one way or another the life of the city are also recounted. The description of the "Whites' " processions, which took place at the very end of the 14th century, stands out for its effectiveness and sobriety. It was a spontaneous manifestation of popular piety originating in France and spreading to Italy, and it was all the more striking both for the author and the Florentines of the period because it marked, so to say, a natural pause in the middle of the struggle against Giangaleazzo Visconti. Swarms of men and women, garbed in white, went in procession from one city to the other, calling for peace and mercy and swelling their ranks with new proselytes. Yet Bruni's description assumes in the course of the narrative a rhetorical function; it marks a pause—as was the case in the historical reality—between two phases of the war: "As long as the religious fervor lasted, warfare and its dangers were on nobody's mind, but soon after that fervor ceased, things got once again back to the previous cares of the mind."<sup>15</sup>

We can say that such an ebb and flow of human behavior, which is equally present in the alternation of internecine conflicts and external struggles, of war and peace, of unity and disunity, runs through Bruni's narrative and indeed constitutes the rhythm of historical time:

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The external front had hardly quieted down when internal strifes, as never experienced before, disturbed the city.

The following year everything was quiet on the external front, but inside serious disturbances arose, and the citizens took up arms for the reasons we are about to tell.

I think therefore that, after the barbarians ceased to constitute a threat, for a while peace prevailed among our cities; but pretty soon, as these cities were no longer threatened from the outside, they started to grow in power, and were beleaguered by envy and rivalry.<sup>14</sup>

Turning now to the theme of liberty and tyranny that underlies Bruni's narrative, we find that the yearning for liberty becomes a tropism on a universal scale: whenever liberty remains stifled, all life consequently languishes; whenever it finds new space, life blossoms again:

As larger trees hamper the growth of young plants growing close to them, so the overwhelming power of Rome in no way could tolerate that another city would grow to be greater.

... little by little the Italian cities began to turn their eyes to liberty ... finally ... they started also to grow, flourish and regain the former authority.<sup>17</sup>

If we consider now the rôle of classical models in Bruni's *History*, we notice that for certain aspects their presence is more immediately discernible, namely in the few explicit references to ancient Rome and to some specific sources (Cicero, Sallust, Vergil and Livy), in the prominence of battle descriptions, in the use of fictitious orations (e.g. Thucydides, Livy, Polybius), in the annalistic framework and in the texture of language—both derived from Livy—in the *brevitas* of the style, and finally in the selection of facts worthy of memory, which should be of great utility to the readers of the *History*:

And all these events seem to me particularly worthy of being preserved in writing; and the knowledge of those facts, I thought, should be greatly useful both to statesmen and private citizens.

This entire story deserves indeed to be recorded, both as a lesson to citizens, and as a warning to princes.<sup>18</sup>

The presence of classical models in Bruni's *History* is at times less conspicuous and obvious, as is the case for some reminiscences of Sallust's *Bellum Catilinae* and *Bellum Iugurthinum*.<sup>19</sup> Such a presence becomes even more elusive whenever the ancient ethos finds itself in agreement with the present to the point of being absorbed by it.

As far as the history of the communal period of Florence is concerned,



Bruni clearly outlines how far the people of Florence had progressed in the previous two centuries, and invariably highlights the strife that had torn the city apart and those instances where Florence, in spite of her ineptness, had had *Fortuna* on her side. But it is the mercantile spirit and values that clearly emerge from Bruni's pages. In 1329—and let us keep in mind that Bruni was writing those pages precisely one hundred years later, when Florence's designs on Lucca were once again manifest—the Florentines were presented with the opportunity of purchasing Lucca from a garrison of German mercenaries for 80,000 golden florins; but, in the end, the citizens could not come to an agreement and nothing came of it. Through Pino della Tosa, who supports the decision to purchase Lucca before the "consiglio del popolo," Bruni voices the legitimate ambitions of a mercantile society, which with its industriousness had brought prestige, power and honour to the city. The rationale of ever-increasing gain, prominent in Pina della Tosa's address, exactly reflects the mentality of that society:

Indeed, as one who is familiar with communal life and customs, so I must confess that I can't help being moved by all things which are commonly regarded as good: *broadening territorial boundaries, increasing power, exalting the glory and magnificence of one's city, providing security and profit*: now, if we do not agree that these things should be sought after, then the caring for the republic, the love for our native land and indeed our whole way of life would be subverted . . . Our ancestors, the Romans, would never have dominated the world if, *content with their lot*, they had shirked any new military venture and relative expenses. On the other hand we certainly cannot say that the end of public and private life is the same one. Indeed the end of public life is *magnificence*, which consists of glory and greatness; the end of private life consists of *modesty and frugality*.<sup>20</sup>

Such a mercantile cast of mind, operative on the socio-political level, surfaces in a palpable way even elsewhere in Bruni's *History*. In each case the assumption is identical: in pursuing a policy of growth or aggrandizement, one must have a great quantity of money that can be accumulated and gradually increased only by virtue of the spirit of initiative, the boldness, and the providence that are peculiar to a merchant. In the following passage, the *Bolognesi* apologize in 1390 to the Florentines for not being able to sustain any longer the common war effort against Giangaleazzo Visconti:

The fact is that neither are our men endowed with the kind of *ingenuity* which would make them particularly *industrious* in earning money, nor do they travel over France and England for the purpose of trade; they are rather simple men, *content with their lot*, happily enjoying what they have at home. We can hardly say that such a style of life is conducive to *wealth*, which is accumulated by *industriousness*, and increased by *diligence*.<sup>21</sup>

That the spirit of gain and love for daring also permeate the speeches of Florentine orators shows how fully aware are the Florentines of their legitimate claims. In 1273, for instance, the Florentines refuse to readmit into the city the exiled Ghibellines as requested by Gregory X, rebutting one by one the Pope's arguments. Directly addressing the Pope, they say at a certain point,

Please, do not bind us to a too strict and rigorous norm of life: the rules governing earth are not the same as those governing heaven . . . And that we stood firm by the Church can be proved not only by facts, but also by various *letters* of previous popes, filled with exhortations and commendations, which are kept in the *public archives*.<sup>22</sup>

The actions of the past, committed to the written memory of the archives, once again acquire a precise meaning in the context of the relations between the Church and the Florentine Republic.

Almost one hundred years later, in 1376, Florentine orators Alessandro dalla Antella and Donato Barbadori, speaking to Pope Gregory XI, will defend their city from the accusation of having helped in more than one way the people of Città di Castello, Perugia, Spoleto, Todi, Gubbio, Forlì, Ascoli, Viterbo and Bologna to throw off the yoke of the apostolic delegates. There is indeed deference for the papal office, though tinged somewhat by ostentation, but there is also full awareness of what is at stake, namely the defense of civic liberties, which in turn implies the defense of the economic interests and of the political and cultural heritage of Florence. Particularly cutting, in contrast to the generally conciliatory tone of the oration, is the following remark: "All the more your Holiness must lend a very impartial ear to us, because, being so far from the scene, you didn't think fit either to see with your own eyes or to listen with your ears to your delegates' wrong doings."<sup>23</sup>

In conclusion, Bruni's background is broad and composite. He was particularly familiar with Cicero, Livy, Polybius, Thucydides, Plutarch, Plato, Aristotle, Xenophon, Dante, Petrarca and Boccaccio; he had done extensive translation work, particularly from Plutarch, Aristotle and Plato, and had acquired intellectual and political experience while he was part of Salutati's circle and as a papal secretary and head of the Florentine Chancery. All these elements contribute to his intellectual formation, but equally so do his contacts with the Florentine mercantile milieu. We can say, therefore, that an osmosis between the system of values of the mercantile culture and that of Bruni's humanistic culture enhances those values. Later on, Alberti will propose them as ideal norms governing everyday life. The merchant's mind, being so centered on profit and increasing gain, was rather inclined to exalt "utilitas," "ratio," "industria," "ingenium," "diligentia," "magnificentia," "modestia," and "frugalitas," all values that are



particularly prominent in Bruni's *History*, and that he holds to be peculiar to man as actor and master of his earthly fate. In this connection, one should also keep in mind that the Florentine mercantile class was considered the supporting framework of the Republic by many of Bruni's generation. Since the mercantile culture is a constitutional part of Bruni's ethical horizon, it is hardly surprising to find it reflected in his *History*, and more explicitly so in some of the fictitious orations. Furthermore, while in the diaristic ("ricordanze") prose the data of memory are arranged on the same level in a sort of unidimensional representation, in Bruni's *History* they are arranged in a relation of interdependence and of cause and effect, placed on different levels, in a deeper temporal dimension. The selection of historical data is effected through a critical evaluation of past chronicles, as he chooses the more plausible accounts, or resorts when necessary to archaeological and documental material. Bruni focuses not only on Florence's internal and external affairs, but also on the social dynamics and the partisan passions that stir it, leading to a "tyrannical" or "free" regime, and on the origin and development of those civic institutions whose effects are still felt in the present.<sup>24</sup> The systematic exploration and reconstruction of the past actually serve to justify the present configuration of the Florentine world.

The historiographic criterion of truth/impartiality adopted by Bruni in his *History* does operate in more than one way: in his rigorous research and evaluation of sources; in his caution before reaching conclusions, whenever the evidence is less than sufficient; and in his willingness to point out the ineptness and relative good fortune of the Florentines. How far we are from the spirit of panegyric of the *Laudatio florentinae urbis*! Bruni himself consciously distinguishes between the two genres: history is quite different from panegyric; history "must closely follow truth" ("quidem veritatem sequi debet").<sup>25</sup>

It is also necessary to emphasize the narrowly political and mundane perspective through which the Church and its relations with Florence are regarded. Ethico-religious considerations are almost entirely missing in the *Historiae*.<sup>26</sup> Bruni goes on with his story to the year 1375 before incidentally remarking that since 1342 the popes had been French and residing in France, and the only reason he mentions this fact is to expose the maladministration of the apostolic delegates in Italy.<sup>27</sup> In short, nothing is said about the uneasiness that the faithful might have felt because of the remoteness of the Pope. On the other hand, Bruni does not fail to claim impartially privileges and prerogatives of Florentine ecclesiastics and citizens.<sup>28</sup> Liberty and tyranny, oppression and civic life: these are in the final analysis the poles in Bruni's historical narrative.

Further discussion of some aspects of Bruni's work will show to what extent he availed himself of the analytical tools common to his social and intellectual milieu, and to what extent, conversely, he forged his own analytical tools through the very process of reconstructing the past. In short, was he altogether conditioned by the political and social norms prevailing in the Florence of his day, to the extent of not being able to see the past except through the eyes of the present; or was he, instead, able to perceive the distance separating the former from the latter, so that he actually obtained a *binocular*, rather than a *monocular* view of past and present events? I think that, while dealing with past events in the framework of time and space relationships, Bruni got closer and closer to the specific conditions of the time in which such events were rooted, and consequently gained a better understanding of the present Florentine socio-political situation. For instance, the Florentine Guelfs' decision to abandon their city without resistance as a result of their party's defeat at Montaperti in 1260 is for Bruni perfectly understandable, given the precise circumstances, and not reprehensible as others had thought because of unfamiliarity with those very circumstances.<sup>29</sup> Similarly, according to him, the final outcome of the same course of action might be determined by different circumstances, as when in 1280 Cardinal Latinus was able to accomplish what only a few years before had eluded Pope Gregory X.<sup>30</sup> Summing up: though Bruni's historical perspective is obviously determined and shaped by present concerns, his evaluation of past events is based on his appreciation of the precise circumstances that affected them. On the other hand, past events are not considered by Bruni solely for their significance at the time they occurred, but also as starting points of an evolutionary process (for instance, an institutional change whose impact is still felt in the present social and political situation).<sup>31</sup>

This interplay between past and present, which cast light on each other, enables Bruni to grasp among other things the increasing inadequacy of a *popular* Florentine regime that still relied on obsolete communal political structures when confronted with the twofold problem of domestic stability and external expansion. The issue of competence in public office and effectiveness in the executive surfaces over and over again in the recounting of past failures. Looking backward, Bruni could indeed fully appreciate the cumulative effect of recurring malfunctions in past Florentine governments.<sup>32</sup> It is fair to say that his very ideal of civic liberty was as much affected by his consideration and reconsideration of the past as by the present political mutations in Florence. His cognitive powers were certainly enhanced and his consciousness heightened by the gradual realization of the varied causes that had produced certain effects. Toward the end of his work, while Bruni was writing about the valiant Florentine resistance to Giangaleazzo Visconti's hegemonic bid in Northern and Central Italy, more and more things started to fall into place and the significance of those



years became clearer and clearer, offering him a better understanding of present-day Medicean Florence.<sup>33</sup> It was no longer a question of whether political decisions, especially those concerning foreign affairs, should be the direct expression of the wishes of all citizens, but rather of how an efficient state could better provide for the needs and aspirations of a city that aimed at acquiring a larger territorial basis.<sup>34</sup>

In the process of drawing up his *History of Florence*, Bruni continued to read the ancient authors over and over again, and also to take part in his city's intellectual and political debate. Both discourses, that with the past and that with the present, certainly helped to shape and refine his analytical tools and also to weaken or strengthen some of his ideas. As far as the dialogue with ancient authors was concerned, the reading of Thucydides must have been for him particularly illuminating.<sup>35</sup> Though the differences between Athens in the Peloponnesian war and Florence in its present struggles are in more than one way significant, still there was one striking similarity: both cities were quite conscious of their means and of their aims, while facing similar political realities. For instance, both cities needed to secure large sums of money to wage wars that would allow them to broaden their sphere of influence and at the same time guarantee the preservation of their cherished liberties, and both encountered, at times, the same obstacle—the reluctance of the citizens to contribute to the expenses. In either case, the citizens, in order to be persuaded, needed to be reminded of what was actually at stake, namely their cherished liberties, the very basis of their wealth.<sup>36</sup>

In this connection, the great prominence Bruni gives to wealth in the *History of Florence* needs to be emphasized. The almost inexhaustible ability of the Florentines to make and provide money for the sundriest enterprises at home and abroad becomes a *leitmotiv* in the narrative and a parameter of historical interpretation as well.<sup>37</sup> Bruni the historian, obedient to his set criterion of impartiality, recognizes that the greatness of Florence cannot be accounted for without taking its wealth into proper consideration. Conversely, he cannot help noticing that many past shortcomings of the city were the result of the incompetence of its public officers;<sup>38</sup> hence, his implicit comment that only qualified men should be charged with public responsibilities.

The emphasis Bruni places on wealth and the use of qualified men in relation to the growth of Florence, pushes into the background the substantial rôle that a communal force like the guilds, for instance, actually played in the development of the city.<sup>39</sup> Oddly enough, even the activity of trading, *per se*, is discounted by Bruni as a significant factor in such a growth.<sup>40</sup> Merchants are mainly seen by him as purveyors of money,<sup>41</sup> lacking the political or military experience necessary to carry out public duties.<sup>42</sup> In a way, their function is absorbed by the State.<sup>43</sup>

The dialectics between past and present that underlie Bruni's historical

interpretation also reflect the kind of political debate that gradually developed in Florence after 1406, as shown by the protocols of the “pratiche.”<sup>44</sup> The fact that the speakers of the “pratiche” would repeatedly re-evoke events of the past and point to their significance in relation to the present situation in order to lend more weight to their arguments is a demonstration of how broad and well-articulated the political discourse had become. Ideas that had until then been aired primarily in restricted intellectual circles like Salutati’s or in writing<sup>45</sup> could now be verified in the larger forum of public debate: their applicability to a concrete political situation was thus tested on the basis of a past experience adapted to present circumstances. A connection was established between theory and practice, and this in turn infused new blood into the intellectual and political discourse. But most noteworthy is that the exchange of ideas and opinions among people of diverse background and experience stimulated and refined their analytical faculties, so that new contents found new modes of expression. In the “pratiche” a genuine need arose for each speaker to persuade his audience as well as he could, which made it necessary for him to construct his speech in an orderly, logical, and suggestive manner.<sup>46</sup> Some of the orations in Bruni’s *History of Florence* point directly to this style and to the actual stimuli that prompted it in the Florentine “pratiche”:

#### ORATIONS<sup>47</sup>

I – “Please, let’s put aside such pompous rhetoric; let’s get, as I said, to the *substance* of the matter!”

II – “As long as I can remember, time and again, in various occasions, because of our tendency to *act slowly* and take things lightly, we failed to *make decisions and implement them at the right time.*”

III – “As a matter of fact it is *not proper* that issues concerning so many people be *decided by a few*, nor is it *safe* for the few who decide.”

#### “PRATICHE”<sup>48</sup>

–The speaker is Gino Capponi: “The proposal presented by Piero Baroncelli was very nice but lacking in *substance.*”

–The speaker is Sandro Altoviti: “Issues under consideration demand no long speeches but prompt action.”

–The speaker is Filippo Corsini: “As Sallust recounts in his *Catilinaria*, following Caesar’s elegant oration, Cato said: ‘Present circumstances admit *no delay: prompt action* is vital to our success.’ And because the Romans delayed their action, Hannibal overtook Saguntum.”

–The speaker is Agnolo Pandolfini: “It is *neither proper nor wise* to ignore decisions made by and concerning so many people; in any case, it is worse to follow *the advice of the few* than the advice of the many, even when it is demonstrated that the implementation of the decision might result in some inconvenience.”



In each case the preoccupation seems to be the same: (i) the oration of the Florentine who recommends that the exiled Ghibellines not be readmitted into the city (year 1323) is a logically well-constructed and straightforward speech, aiming at the substance of the matter ("*ad solidum*") as much as Capponi's and Altoviti's speeches in the "pratiche"; (ii) the oration of Rinaldo Gianfigliuzzi in 1399 reveals a concern for prompt and substantive action similar to the one expressed by Filippo Corsini; (iii) finally, the oration of the old Florentine citizen in 1351 advocates the overall advantages of a broadly based decision process, as does Agnolo Pandolfini in the "pratica" held in April 1423. Thus it can be said that, in the composition of fictitious orations, Bruni was following not only an ancient model but also a present one, recapturing through the latter the ethos that pervaded the former. It can be added that the audience of the "pratiche" would have easily recognized in Bruni's *History of Florence* the common conceptual frame of mind and the common disposition to present different opinions. Bartolomeo Orlandini refers to such method of procedure in the "pratiche" when he says that "... all opinions should be expressed and aired in a large assembly of people, as has been the case so far. . . ."<sup>49</sup> Bruni, on the other hand, presents, in binary orations, the opposing views of disputing parties.<sup>50</sup> In addition, toward the end of his work, he transcribes from documents two speeches uttered by Viscontean and Florentine orators in 1401, and invites the reader to use his own judgment in evaluating them: "I shall submit the arguments of our adversaries along with our own reply, so that the reader might judge by himself."<sup>51</sup> Both Bruni and the interlocutors of the "pratiche," whether politicians or businessmen or lawyers or humanists, furthermore never seem to lose sight of the fact that without concrete social and financial support their personal aspirations, no matter how noble, are bound to founder. This heightened civic consciousness, which is wary of fumous projects and stands on the more solid ground of individual and collective claims, finds its expression in some of Bruni's fictitious orations examined in the first part of this paper.<sup>52</sup> That, in public affairs, the case should rest on solid arguments rather than on theory was also the opinion of Agnolo Pandolfini, who said in a "pratica," "The administration of public affairs may not be conducted on the basis of theoretical knowledge, since it primarily requires specific data."<sup>53</sup>

After having considered the effects that education, reading, translating, writing and participation in political life had on Bruni's historical outlook, only a few remarks remain to be made on his private life, vis-à-vis his intellectual and civic concerns. As we know, he was a *civis novus* in Florence, and consequently his steady effort through the years was to reach a status that would allow him to feel at ease in his adopted home town. The pursuit and attainment of honorary citizenship and of excep-

tional fiscal exemptions, his marriage with a woman belonging to a wealthy and prestigious Florentine family, his profitable investments, and his ability to walk a political tightrope when necessary, together with his intellectual talents and scholarly achievements, offered Bruni, at least to a certain extent, that material and psychological security also eagerly sought by many other Florentines of his day. In many ways Bruni was much less of an outsider in Florence than was Giovanni Cavalcanti, for example, who, though a native Florentine and of noble descent, felt little at ease in his city—indeed he felt like an outcast.<sup>54</sup> At the opposite ends of the social ladder, both were vying for social recognition, attainable in their time mainly by entering the orbit of local influential families and by accumulating a substantial patrimony. On the other hand, Bruni was certainly not speaking casually, but showing awareness of what the privilege of being a Florentine citizen precisely implied, when he proudly wrote in a letter to a friend of his toward the end of 1416, “. . . ego, qui novus Florentinus civis sum . . .”<sup>55</sup> Such a privilege represented a stepping stone toward a further climbing of the social and political ladder. Bruni was much better equipped than Cavalcanti for the ascent: he had a superior culture—the kind in tune with the times—and legal, administrative and political experience, accumulated through the years. The two were actually far apart in more than one way, but both wrote a history of Florence (Cavalcanti’s covered a short period and only contemporary events) and both bore witness to their times, though to a different extent and from a different point of view. Looking at them together also helps to bring forth what links them together, namely a common culture and common civic concerns, though by no means an equal vision of reality. Cavalcanti, cut off as he was from any direct participation in public life and rather immersed in self-indulgent grief, could hardly develop a broader view of things. Bruni could instead derive from his involvement in intellectual and political life a better comprehension of past and present realities. On the other hand, any Florentine who kept minimally in touch with present realities had quite a clear notion of what was absolutely needed to succeed in private affairs and public life: personal, intellectual and political talents, strong ties with powerful families,<sup>56</sup> and last but not least, a substantial patrimony to start with. Cavalcanti, echoing an old Florentine saying, said that “where prosperity is wanting, friendship is missing too.”<sup>57</sup> With the help of Juvenal, Bruni saw broader implications in this deficiency: “Indeed wealth may be considered useful, whenever it brings prestige to those who have it and enables them to practise virtue. In fact, we may agree with our poet when he says that ‘those whose talents are impeded by family poverty have a lesser chance to prove themselves in life.’”<sup>58</sup>

In conclusion, one can see that Bruni’s discourse in the *History of Florence* is permeated by various elements of the mercantile culture,



particularly by the logic of utility, which is applied to public life or private affairs or foreign policy. This cast of mind at first simply equipped Bruni with certain conceptual tools and values operative in the social and political life of his day. It goes to Bruni's credit that, by continuously testing those tools inside and outside the political arena, and by repeatedly interrogating the past and the present, he was then able to place those ordinary values in the context of a long tradition, thus heightening their function in Florentine culture. Through the systematic exploration and reconstruction of the past, the present configuration of the Florentine world became clearer and clearer to him. That this was also the case for contemporary readers is doubtful. They might indeed have shared with Bruni the same conceptual frame of reference, but could not—as he had done—seize the full implications of the reconstruction of the past. They simply had not gone through the same experience of connecting and weaving together the strands of an entire tradition.

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#### Notes

- 1 P. Burke, *The Renaissance Sense of the Past* (London: E. Arnold, 1969), p. 39. (The assertion is supported by quotations from primary sources, on pp. 39-49.)
- 2 E. Panofsky, *Renaissance and Renascences in Western Art* (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1960), p. 36.
- 3 For the progressive differentiation of social functions, see N. Elias, *The Civilizing Process* (Vol. 1: New York: Urizen Books, 1978; Vol. 2: New York: Pantheon Books, 1982). For the high level of literacy in a city like Florence around 1400, see D. De Robertis, "La prosa familiare e civile," in E. Cecchi and N. Sapegno, eds., *Storia della letteratura italiana* (Milano: Garzanti, 1966), III, 377-384.
- 4 For the contents of this page, I rely heavily on A. Tenenti's chapter "L'umanesimo italiano del Trecento e Quattrocento," in R. Romano and A. Tenenti, *Il rinascimento e la riforma (1378-1598)*, (Torino: UTET, 1976), II, 349-352.
- 5 On "ricordanze" literature see P.J. Jones, "Florentine Families and Florentine Diaries in the Fourteenth Century," in P. Grierson and J.W. Perkins, eds., *Studies in Italian Medieval History, presented to Miss E.M. Jameson* (London: British School at Rome, 1956), pp. 183-205; V. Branca, "Ricordi domestici nel Trecento e nel Quattrocento," in *Dizionario critico della letteratura italiana* (Torino: UTET, 1974), III, 189-192; F.W. Kent, *Household and Lineage in Renaissance Florence* (Princeton: Princeton U.P., 1977), pp. 272-278; F. Pezzarossa, "La memorialistica fiorentina tra Medioevo e Rinascimento" in *Lettere italiane*, 31 (1979), 97-138; F. Pezzarossa, "La tradizione fiorentina della memorialistica," in G.M. Anselmi, F. Pezzarossa and L. Avellini, *La "memoria" dei mercatores: tendenze ideologiche, ricordanze, artigianato in versi nella Firenze del Quattrocento* (Bologna: Pàtron, 1980), pp. 41-91. On the broader subject of historiography, see A. Tenenti, "La storiografia in Europa dal Quattro al Seicento," in *Nuove questioni di storia moderna* (Milano: Marzorati, 1964), D. Hay, *Annalists and Historians: Western Historiography from the Eighth to the Eighteenth Centuries* (London: Methuen, 1977), and E. Cochrane, *Historians and Historiography in the Italian Renaissance* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981).
- 6 Above I have in part paraphrased and in part translated what A. Tenenti says on p. 1327 of his critical note "Les marchands et la culture à Florence (1375-1434)," in *Annales E.S.C.*, 23 (1968), pp. 1319-1329.

- 7 "Or, on ne saurait contester qu'à un certain moment il y ait eu à Florence une rencontre et parfois un accord entre mentalité et sensibilité marchande et humanisme. Mais plutôt que de célébrer cette alliance sans plus, il fallait préciser comment et pourquoi elle s'était effectuée, et surtout jusqu'à quel point, avec quels gains et pertes de part et d'autre" (Ibid., p. 1325). In his critical note, Tenenti reviews Christian Bec's book, *Les marchands écrivains: affaires et humanisme à Florence, 1375-1434* (Paris-La Haye: Mouton, 1967). Yves Renouard's ideas on the rapport between mercantile and humanist culture in Italy, and particularly in Florence, can be read in his *Les hommes d'affaires italiens du moyen âge* (Paris: Colin, 1968), pp. 217-247.
- 8 Cf. Tenenti's chapter "Le culture nazionali e la storiografia," in R. Romano and A. Tenenti, *Il rinascimento*, II, 568.
- 9 "Historiam vero, in qua tot simul rerum longa et continuata ratio sit habenda, causaeque factorum omnium singulatim explicandae . . .," in L. Bruni, *Historiarum florentini populi libri XII*, ed. E. Santini, in "Rerum Italicarum Scriptores" (Città di Castello: Lapi, 1914), t. XIX, part III, p. 3; cf. Bruni's letter to Poggio Bracciolini (from Florence, Jan. 2, 1416): "Exegi librum meum . . . sed tantus est labor in quaerendis investigandisque rebus, ut jam plane me poeniteat incepisse," in *Leonardi Bruni Arretini Epistolarum libri VIII*, ed. L. Mehus, (Florentiae: Ex Typographia Bernardi Paperinii, 1741), part I, pp. 110-111. (All the English translations from Latin appearing in this paper are mine.)
- 10 On Bruni's *History of Florence*, see: E. Santini, "Leonardo Bruni Aretino e i suoi 'Historiarum florentini populi libri XII,'" in "Annali della R. Scuola normale superiore de Pisa" (1910), XXII, 3-173; B.L. Ullman, "Leonardo Bruni and Humanistic Historiography," in his *Studies in the Italian Renaissance* (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1955), pp. 321-344; D.J. Wilcox, *The Development of Florentine Humanist Historiography in the Fifteenth Century* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U.P., 1969), pp. 1-129; N.S. Struener, *The Language in the Renaissance: Rhetoric and Historical Consciousness in Florentine Humanism* (Princeton: Princeton U.P., 1970), pp. 101-143; R. Fubini, "Osservazioni sugli 'Historiarum florentini populi libri XII' di Leonardo Bruni," in *Studi di storia medioevale e moderna per Ernesto Sestan* (Firenze: Olshchi, 1980), I, 403-448. Fundamental is Hans Baron's work on Bruni and his time, particularly *The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance* (Italian revised edition: Firenze: Sansoni, 1970) and *From Petrarch to Leonardo Bruni* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968).
- 11 Cf. R. Romano and A. Tenenti, *Il rinascimento*, Vol. 2, p. 569.
- 12 "Ego autem non aetatis meae solum, verum etiam supra quantum haberi memoria potest, repetitam huius civitatis historiam scribere constitui," in L. Bruni, *Histor.*, ed. cit., p. 4.
- 13 "Ita dum quisque vel quieti suae indulget, vel existimationi consulit, publica utilitas neglecta est, et praestantissimorum virorum rerumque maximarum memoria pene oblitterata," ibid. This deeply felt public duty to transmit in writing the events of one's time goes back to the conversations held in Salutati's circle and echoed by Vergerius: "Memoria etenim hominum, et quod transmittitur per manus, sensum elabatur, et vix unius hominis aevum exsuperat. Quod autem libris bene mandatum est . . . Nam sunt litterae quidem ac libri certa rerum memoria, et scibilibus omnium communis apotheca," in P.P. Vergerius, *De ingenuis moribus et liberalibus studiis adolescentiae*, ed. A. Gnesotto, in "Atti e Memorie della R. Accademia di scienze, lettere ed arti di Padova," n. s. 34 (1918), p. 120.
- 14 "Nam, cum duae sunt historiae partes et quasi membra, foris gesta et domi, non minoris sane putandum fuerit domesticos status quam externa bella cognoscere," in L. Bruni, *Histor.*, ed. cit., p. 78.
- 15 "Dum religio tenuit animos, de periculis belli nihil cogitabatur; sed postquam finis fuit dealbatorum fervori ad primas rursus curas animi redierunt," in L. Bruni, *Histor.*, ed. cit., p. 279.
- 16 "Externam pacem intestinae confestim discordiae subsecutae, quantum numquam antea civitatem turbaverunt," ibid., p. 224; "Proximo dehinc anno quies fuit ab externis bellis; domi autem seditiones insuper coartae graves, et a civibus arma sumpta ex huiusmodi causa," ibid., p. 101; "Atque ego puto per prima illa tempora post barbarorum cessationem inter civitates nostras concordiam viguisse; mox vero, ut crescere coeperunt, vacuas ab externo metu, invidia et contentione transversas agere," ibid., p. 25. See also following passage: "Secuta deinde quies ex pace aliquot menses hominum curas emit . . .," ibid., p. 191.



- 17 "Ut enim ingentes arbores novellis plantis iuxta surgentibus afficere solent, nec ut altius crescant permittere, six romanae urbis moles sua magnitudine vicinitatem premens, nullam Italiae civitatem maiorem in modum crescere patiebatur," *ibid.*, p. 7; "civitates Italiae paulatim ad libertatem respicere . . . denique . . . crescere atque florere et in pristina auctoritatem sese attollere coeperunt," *ibid.*, p. 23.
- 18 "Haec mihi perdigna literis et memoria videbantur, ac earumdem cognitionem rerum utilissimam privatim et publice artibrabar," *ibid.*, p. 3; "Res enim digna est quae literis annotetur, vel pro admonitu civium, vel pro castigatione regnantium," *ibid.*, p. 163.
- 19 Cf. A. La Penna, "Il significato di Sallustio nella storiografia e nel pensiero politico di Leonardo Bruni," in his *Sallustio e la rivoluzione romana* (Milano: Feltrinelli, 1968), pp. 409-431.
- 20 "Equidem, ut ista communi vita moribusque hominum utor, ita illa me moveri fateor quae bona apud homines putantur: extendere fines, imperium augere, civitatis gloriam splendoremque extollere, securitatem utilitatemque asciscere: quae nisi expetenda dicamus, et cura reipublicae et pietas in patriam et tota pene haec vita nobis fuerit pervertenda . . . Populus romanus parens noster numquam orbis imperium nactus esset, si suis rebus contentus nova coepta impensasque refugisset. Nec sane idem propositum est homini publice et privatim. Nam publice quidem magnificentia proposita est, quae in gloria amplitudineque consistit; privatim vero modestia et frugalitas," in L. Bruni, *Histor.* ed. cit., p. 140.
- 21 "Non enim eo ingenio sunt homines nostri, ut industria multa in acquirendo utantur, nec ulli per Galliam et Britanniam negotiaturi discursant; simplices magis homines ac suis rebus contenti, eo quod habent domi laetis animis perfruuntur. In huiusmodi autem moribus, opulentia non fit, quam industria parit, diligentia exauget," in L. Bruni, *Histor.*, ed. cit., p. 251.
- 22 "Noli, quaeso, nos ad hanc scrupolosam vivendi normam vocare: aliter enim coelum, aliter terra regitur . . . Atqui stetisse nos pro ecclesia, praeterquam facta, literae quoque pontificum, quarum infinitus pene numerus in publicis servatur archiviiis, cohortationum et commendationum plenae, testantur . . .," *ibid.*, p. 62.
- 23 "Quo enim longius abes, ac minus vel oculis inspicere malefacta gubernatorum tuorum, vel auribus percipere voluisti, eo magis debet tua sanctitas aures aequissimas nobis impertiri . . .," *ibid.*, p. 212.
- 24 Speaking of the institution of the "collegia" in 1266, Bruni concludes: "Ea res quamquam *parva* primo visa, tamen populum a dominantibus ad libertatem traducebant, arma capere et ad suum quaque locum iubens," *ibid.*, p. 48. Referring to the first hiring of mercenary troops in 1351, he decries that decision for its dire consequences: "... *parvis* ab initio erratis permagna deinde parient detrimenta," *ibid.*, p. 186. Bruni also marks down the momentous creation of a consolidated public debt in Florence, in 1344: "Eadem anno maximum est reipublicae fundamentum, *parvo* ex principio iaci coeptum . . . Quantitatis vero ipsas in unum coacervatas a similitudine cumulandi vulgo *Montem* vocavere; idque in civitate postea servatum . . .," *ibid.*, p. 171. See also: for the change in the electoral system in 1323 and its impact on the political structure of the city, *ibid.*, pp. 121-122; for the institution of the priorate in 1282, *ibid.*, p. 67; and for the institution of the Gonfalonier in 1289, *ibid.*, p. 79.
- 25 L. Bruni, *Epistol.*, ed. cit., part II, bk. VIII, ep. IV, p. 112.
- 26 The indignation for the lack of responsibility displayed by the cardinals during the long vacancy of the papal chair, from 1269 to 1272, and for the despicable behavior of the antipope in 1328, is scarcely reflective of a genuine piety. (Cf. L. Bruni, *Histor.*, ed. cit., pp. 60, 135).
- 27 Cf. *ibid.*, p. 210. Elsewhere, in relating the events of the year 1351, Bruni simply mentions the fact that the Pope and his court were in Avignon, when Florentine emissaries were sent to him (cf. *ibid.*, p. 186).
- 28 "Principio insequentis anni [1345], crescente in potentiores odio, leges duae ad populum latae sunt: una in clericos iniqua, per quam omnibus eorum privilegiis derogabatur; altera in cives . . .," *ibid.*, p. 171.
- 29 "... potius illorum conditionem temporum non satis notam reprehensoribus puto," *ibid.*, p. 40.
- 30 "His de causis factum est, ut longe faciliorem viam ad res componendas Latinus haberet, quam dudum eadem in causa atque re Gregorius habuisset," *ibid.*, p. 66.

- 31 Cf. supra n. 24.
- 32 "Video enim, quantum ipse memoriam teneo, nos semper omnibus in rebus, ob tarditatem et negligentiam nostram, providendi agendique tempora ignaviter perdidisse," Rinaldo Gianfigliuzzi says in 1399, and then adds: "... nos autem post res perditas remedia cogitamus" (L. Bruni, *Histor.*, ed. cit., p. 277)—the same sad conclusion already voiced by an old citizen in 1351, while addressing the deliberative council during the war with Pistoia: "... vos autem (quod bona venia dictum est) post rem actam consilium postulatis" (ibid., p. 175). Especially in foreign affairs, where time factor and secrecy are paramount in any decision, "popular" regimes show their weakness: "Res enim plerumque celeritatem et silentium poscunt, quibus decreta multitudinis inimicissima sunt" (ibid., p. 277); "Civitates enim quae populariter reguntur neque celare sciunt quod factum est neque possunt: quippe multorum deliberatione et conscientia in singulis decretis opus est" (ibid., p. 236).
- 33 In 1439, while working on the last part of his *History of Florence*, Bruni outlined for a friend the constitution of the Florentine Republic. In this writing he is quite aware of the fact that in Florence there had been for a while a mixed form of government, partly democratic and partly aristocratic, that the process of change from a full democracy to a mixed form of government had gradually started in 1351, when mercenary soldiers were for the first time hired by the Republic, and that consequently the city relies now more than ever on the wisdom of the aristocrats and on the financial resources provided by rich citizens. In this connection see H. Baron, *The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance* (Italian rev. edition: Firenze: Sansoni, 1970, pp. 464-465), and supra, n. 24. Once again the analogy between Periclean Athens and Medicean Florence must not have escaped Bruni: both cities could no longer be considered *pure* democracies: a first citizen had emerged, few qualified citizens held the most prestigious offices—or at least it was meant to be so—while a certain equality among citizens still existed (cf. Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, II 37, 65).
- 34 Cf. L. Bruni, *Histor.*, ed. cit., pp. 276-278 (Rinaldo Gianfigliuzzi's oration), and supra n. 32.
- 35 Cf. B. Reynolds, "Bruni and Perotti present a Greek historian," in "Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance," XVI (1954), p. 112; R. Fubini, "Osservazioni . . ." cit., p. 425, n. 69. Cf. also supra n. 33.
- 36 In 1390 the Florentines exhort the *Bolognesi* to continue to be their allies in the war against the Milanese tyrant: "Sunt enim pergraves omnibus belli sumptus, sed praesertim populis ac multitudini, quae futura pericula non discernunt . . . Amissa enim libertate, in potestatem victoris omnia transmigrant et insuper dedecus et infamia servitutis adest quae etiam morte est a generosis hominibus repellenda . . . Enimvero, non valet bononiensis populus onera belli perferre? at longe maiora feret, si libertatem amittet: quae enim nunc gravia videntur, tunc levia fuisse putabuntur," in L. Bruni, *Histor.*, ed. cit., p. 252 (cf. Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, II 62).
- 37 Remembering how much money Florence had spent in the period extending from Charles I of Anjou to Charles II, Bruni comments "... inexhausta quaedam pecuniarum materia Florentia illis fuit; ut, si quis a Carolo primo Siciliae rege ad hunc alterum quem modo diximus Carolum pecunias numeret, supra fidem supraque modum videatur populum unum tantis oneribus suffecisse" (in L. Bruni, *Histor.*, ed. cit., p. 138). And again, recounting Florence's endurance and the amount of military forces and financial resources employed in the war against Giangaleazzo Visconti, he concludes: "... ut admirandum sit populum unum ad tantas res gerendas vel magnitudine animorum vel opibus suffecisse" (ibid., p. 246).
- 38 "Haec et huiusmodi permulta rerumpublicarum a gubernatoribus imperitis committuntur . . .," ibid., p. 186.
- 39 Cf. J.M. Najemi, "'Arti' and 'Ordini' in Machiavelli's 'Istorie fiorentine'," in S. Bertelli and G. Ramakus eds., *Essays presented to Myron P. Gilmore* (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1978), I, 164-168.
- 40 "Mercaturae quoque, si quis forte eam partem ad incrementum civitatis attinere quidquam existimet, non alibi per id tempus quam Romae commodius exercebatur," in L. Bruni, *Histor.*, ed. cit., p. 7. See also R. Fubini, "Osservazioni . . ." cit., pp. 417, 428-429.
- 41 "Societates Florentinorum permultae et maximae in Roberti Regno et Galliarum partibus . . . fidem abrumperere coactae sunt cum incredibili damno civitatis," in L. Bruni, *Histor.*, ed. cit., p.



- 160; "Ea res inopinata et gravis, cum multorum patrimonia afflisset, traxit post se ruinam minorum societatum . . . Decoquentibus itaque permultis, *inaestimabilem iacturam civitas subivit*, fidesque angusta in foro omnia perturbatur", *ibid.*, p. 171 (in both instances, in 1342 and 1345, the bankruptcy of medium and small trading companies greatly reduces the influx of money into the city). See also the oration of the Bolognese envoys, exalting the entrepreneurial talents of Florentine merchants active in France and in England (*ibid.*, p. 251).
- 42 "... scientia enim rei militaris vix illis qui tota nihil aliud meditati sunt contingit, ne dum homines plebei et otio mercaturisque assueti illam possideant," *ibid.*, p. 200.
- 43 On the other hand, as we will see toward the end of this paper, wealth is deemed indispensable by Bruni for the success of an individual, in private and public life.
- 44 Cf. G. Brucker, *The Civic World of Early Renaissance Florence* (Princeton: Princeton U.P., 1977), pp. 283-302, especially pp. 289-295, 299-302.
- 45 Cf. supra n. 13.
- 46 Cf. G. Brucker, *The Civic World* . . . cit., pp. 299-300.
- 47 "Mitte, quales, hanc verborum pompam, ad solidum, ut ita dixerim accede," "Video enim, quantum ipse memoriam teneo, nos semper omnibus in rebus, ob tarditatem et negligentiam nostram, providendi agendique tempora ignaviter perdidisse," "Nam ea quae multorum sunt, a paucis determinari nec honestum est, nec illis ipsis qui determinant tutum" (in L. Bruni, *Histor.*, ed. cit., pp. 120, 277, 176).
- 48 "Consilium Pieri de Baronellis fuerat pulchrum sed parvum substantiae," "Sermones longos proposita non requirunt sed executionem citam," "Ut recitat Salustius in Catilinario, post ornatam orationem Caesaris, Cato dixit: 'Tempus non esse dilationem adhibere, sed cito ad rem, unde salus procedat venire.' Et propter dilationes Romanorum, Anibal Saguntum vincit," "A consultis tam unite discedere et pro tot non debemus nec convenit et quamvis ostensum sit quod id sequendum, inconveniens sequi posset, tamen peius esse consilium paucorum sequi quam multorum." (In G. Brucker, *The Civic World* . . . cit., p. 286 n. 188, p. 293 n. 217, p. 307 n. 274. The original passages are to be found in Firenze, Archivio di Stato, CP, 39, f. 117r, *ibid.*, 43, f. 15r, *ibid.*, 42, f. 124r, *ibid.*, 45, f. 101r.)
- 49 "Quod opinionis est ut omnia dici et exprimi debeant in numero copioso populi ut ad presens . . ." (in G. Brucker, *The Civic World* . . . cit., p. 307 n. 277: original passage in Firenze, Archivio di Stato, CP, 45, f. 8v.)
- 50 Some of these binary orations are: Gregory X addressing the Florentines and the Florentines' reply (year 1273); the Ghibellines in exile addressing the Florentines at home and a Florentine adviser's reply (year 1323); altercation between Castruccio Castracani and Guido Tarlati in the presence of Louis of Bavaria (year 1327); the Perugini complaining with the Florentines and the Florentines' reply (year 1336); Alessandro dalla Antella and Donato Barbadori addressing Gregory XI and Gregory's reply (year 1376); the Bolognesi addressing the Florentines and the Florentines' reply (year 1390); the Venetian ambassadors addressing the Florentine ambassadors and the Florentine ambassadors' reply (year 1401).
- 51 "Subiciam vero quae tunc obiecta ab adversariis et quae responsa sunt, ut iustitiae causa a legentibus examinari possit" (in L. Bruni, *Histor.*, ed. cit., p. 284).
- 52 They are the orations of the Florentines addressing Gregory X in 1273 (*ibid.*, pp. 62-63), of a Florentine citizen in 1323 (*ibid.*, p. 120), and of Alessandro dalla Antella and Donato Barbadori addressing Gregory XI in 1376 (*ibid.*, pp. 211-214).
- 53 "Gubernacula rerum publicarum per scientiam haberi non possunt, cum particulariter requirant determinationes . . ." (in G. Brucker, *The Civic World* . . . cit., p. 290 n. 204: original passage in Firenze, Archivio di Stato, CP, 42, f. 103r.)
- 54 For Bruni, see L. Martines, *The Social World of the Florentine Humanists, 1390-1460* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton U.P., 1963), pp. 117-123, 165-176. For Cavalcanti, see my article "A proposito delle 'Istorie florentine' di Giovanni Cavalcanti," in *Quaderni d'italianistica*, 1 (1980), 171-181.
- 55 In L. Bruni, *Epistol.*, ed. cit., part I, p. 117. At a certain point (year 1340), in his *History*, Bruni makes the remark that the punishment reserved to citizens for their misconduct should never be so

severe that one easily forgets that after all they are citizens: "Cives enim sic odendi sunt, ut tamen cives illos esse meminerimus," in L. Bruni, *Histor.*, ed. cit., p. 158.

- 56 For the family in Italy and in Florence, see R.A. Goldthwaite, *Private Wealth in Renaissance Florence, a study of four families* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton U.P., 1968); E. Sestan, "La famiglia nella società del Quattrocento," in *Convegno internazionale indetto nel V. centenario di Leon Battista Alberti* (Roma: Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, 1974), pp. 235-258; F.W. Kent, *Household . . . cit.*; G. Brucker, *The Civic World . . . cit.*, pp. 14 and ff., 28, 29; and D. Kent, *The Rise of the Medici Faction in Florence, 1426-1434* (Oxford: Oxford U.P., 1978), pp. 15, 16-17. The social and political support that bonds—not only among close relatives but also among friends—could provide for the individual is a reality quite familiar to Bruni. In his reconstruction of the past (year 1291), he does not fail to see the negative aspects of such coalitions: "Homines longis stipati clientelis, et multis, ut par erat, propinquitatibus subnixi, imbecillos honesta veluti servitute premebant; *frequentes ab his pulsatos mediocri fortunae homines, frequentes bonis spoliatos, praediis ejectos fuisse constatabat*" (one can almost hear G. Cavalcanti's similar complaints concerning other families' and his own predicament: cf. my article "A proposito . . ." cit., pp. 178-179 and notes 16, 17), in L. Bruni, *Histor.*, ed. cit., p. 81.
- 57 "dove manca la prosperità l'amicizia non si trova," in G. Cavalcanti, *Istorie fiorentine XIII* 10, ed. G. Di Pino (Milano: Martello, 1944), p. 380.
- 58 Bruni's quote is from Juvenal, *Satira* III, 164. The entire passage is taken from the preface to the Latin translation of the pseudo-Aristotle's *Economics*, addressed in 1420 to Cosimo de' Medici: "*Sunt vero utiles divitiae, cum et ornamento sint possidentibus et ad virtutem exercendum suppediunt facultatem*. Prosunt etiam natis, qui facilius per illas ad honorem dignitatesque sublevantur. Nam 'quorum virtutibus obstat res angusta domi, haud facile emergunt', ut poetae nostri dictat sententia," in L. Bruni, *Humanistisch-Philosophische Schriften*, ed. H. Baron (Leipzig: Teubner, 1928) pp. 120-121. Bruni rehearses the same argument concerning the possibility of enhancing one's virtue, and more specifically "magnificentia" by means of wealth in a letter to Tommaso Cambiatiore (from Florence: 1420/28): "Nam de ornamento quidem non bene accipis. Nam enim de spintere, aut fimbria, neque de histrionis auro, sed de *magnificentia* diximus. Haec enim virtus ad ornatum pertinet, adeoque *divitias exigit, ut pauper magnificus esse non possit*. Miror igitur, quid in me reprehendas, cum et ob id utiles esse scripserim, quia *ad virtutem exercendam facultatem* praeberent, et *prodesse natis* eadem ratione, *ne illorum virtutibus rei familiaris obstaret angustia*," in L. Bruni, *Epistol.*, ed. cit., part II, p. 14.



# Littérature politique et exégèse biblique (de 1570 à 1625)

PIERRE-LOUIS VAILLANCOURT

## Le recours à la Bible

A la fin de la Renaissance, la Bible n'est plus au coeur de la pensée politique, mais elle reste l'instrument de sa justification. Les traités politiques se réclament sans cesse de la Bible pour confirmer la valeur de leurs théories. Même si la Bible est présentée comme la source apparente de celles-ci, elle sert plutôt à garantir leur validité. Les premiers écrivains de la Réforme, Luther, Zwingli, Calvin et Melanchthon avaient contribué, dans la première partie du seizième siècle, à redonner à la Bible une autorité éminente dans l'élaboration des concepts même sociaux et à assurer sa prépondérance sur les instances usuelles de la vérité: la tradition, la papauté, l'Eglise, la scolastique. Parole directe de Dieu, la Bible redevient la pierre de touche de tout savoir, le lieu de résolution de toutes les controverses. Si Luther a accordé la priorité au Nouveau Testament, Calvin et Zwingli mettront sur le même plan Ancien et Nouveau Testament, comme "règle unique de vraie et parfaite sagesse" (*unica perfectae sapientiae regula*).<sup>1</sup> Très tôt, les dangers de cette orientation apparurent, et les paysans révoltés, rappelant à Luther qu'ils ne trouvaient pas dans la Bible la dîme du bétail à payer, obligèrent celui-ci à accorder l'inspiration divine et le contexte social. L'entreprise de la Réforme détermina cependant un respect prononcé pour la Bible qui s'étendit aux scolastiques catholiques, entraînés à répondre à la lettre des arguments de leurs adversaires par d'autres puisés au même fonds, et aux penseurs les plus laïcs, soucieux de réconcilier l'influence antique, les faits contemporains et l'enseignement biblique. Le rétablissement marqué avec éclat de la Tradition et de la Vulgate au Concile de Trente, témoigne *a contrario* de l'audience acquise par le livre sacré, sous l'impulsion des Réformés habitués à l'utiliser pour la recherche de toute vérité, religieuse ou politique.

Cette primauté reconnue astreint à de subtiles adaptations les auteurs de toutes tendances, mais en particulier ceux dont les principes temporels semblent l'emporter sur les spirituels. Il n'est pas aisé, ni possible, de juger erroné ou sans fondement une leçon biblique, comme pourrait l'être un

jugement d'Aristote. La Bible impose une direction d'interprétation. Discutant de la punition des attentats commis contre François I<sup>er</sup> et Henri II, Bodin termine sa démonstration par ces mots: "Et à fin qu'on ne die point que les hommes ont faict ces loix, & donné ces arrests, nous lisons en la sainte Escriture, que Nabuchodonosor . . . ." <sup>2</sup> Le texte biblique toujours appelé à corroborer une opinion ne peut jamais être explicitement contredit. Aussi Bodin dresse-t-il une liste des tyrans de la Bible envers lesquels les prophètes ont recommandé la soumission et ajoute: "Il n'ya rien de plus frequent en toute l'escripture sainte, que la defense, non pas seulement de tuer y attenter à la vie ou à l'honneur du Prince: ains aussi des Magistrats, ores (dit l'Escriture) qu'ils soyent meschans." <sup>3</sup>

Les partisans de la Réforme témoignent évidemment d'un attachement plus vif encore. Lorsque Bèze s'interroge à son tour sur les devoirs des sujets envers un roi devenu tyran, il passe en revue les prérogatives des citoyens de Rome, d'Athènes, du Danemark, d'Ecosse, de Lacédémone, d'Angleterre, de Pologne, de Venise, d'Espagne, en citant le rôle de différents corps pour limiter l'arbitraire du pouvoir, mais l'exemple également évoqué d'Israël commande un traitement particulier et plus élaboré. <sup>4</sup> Il ne présente pas uniquement des exemples mais discute longuement des textes de la Bible consacrés aux monarchies divine et temporelle. Tous les théoriciens réformés partagent cette considération. Ainsi Buchanan multiplie les nuances sur les concepts de l'autorité séculière dans le Nouveau Testament. <sup>5</sup> Languet, cherchant s'il est légal de résister à un prince qui viole la loi divine, énonce les principes qui le guident: "si nous nous en tenons au dire de l'Escriture sainte, elle nous en resoudra." <sup>6</sup> Lorsque plus tard Jacques I<sup>er</sup> d'Angleterre désire tout au contraire prôner l'obéissance inconditionnelle et non pas la résistance conditionnelle, c'est au moyen de divers extraits de la Bible qu'il défendra le pouvoir des rois. <sup>7</sup> Autre écrivain inspiré par la Réforme, Althusius utilise plus souvent la Bible que toute autre source parce qu'il croyait en la supériorité de l'organisation étatique juive. <sup>8</sup>

Bien que plus liés à l'enseignement de l'Eglise et des Pères, les théoriciens scolastiques subissent l'influence de cette vénération. Juan de Marquez, religieux de l'ordre de saint Augustin et prédicateur de Sa Majesté catholique, donne ce titre éloquent à son traité: *L'Homme d'Estat Chretien, tiré des vies de Moyse et Josué Princes du peuple de Dieu.* <sup>9</sup>

Et Suarez, une des gloires de la Compagnie de Jésus, apologiste des Pères et de la pédagogie ecclésiastique, apporte volontiers les diverses interprétations d'un passage biblique, pour les commenter, les réfuter ou en proposer de nouvelles. <sup>10</sup> Absolutistes, monarchomaques huguenots et scolastiques exigent tous de la Bible une sanction favorable à leur parti pris.

Il est possible que tous les auteurs de cette époque n'aient pas eu une



conscience vive des rôles multiples et parfois contradictoires que jouaient les références bibliques mais cette situation n'a pas échappé à la clairvoyance d'un Du Perron, par exemple, qui souligne, mais sans ironie, la difficulté d'asseoir une position ferme et nette sur la Bible, car elle est brandie par tous les partis.

Et donc quel article de foy ne sera point arraché du tribunal de l'Eglise, & exposé en proye à la présomption des heretiques, s'il suffit de dire qu'il est si clair dans l'Ecriture qu'il n'y eschet ny dispute ny jugement? A la vérité cela auroit quelque apparence, si ceux qui tiennent l'une des propositions alleguoient l'Ecriture pour eux, & que les autres ne l'alleguassent point. Mais tant ceux que tiennent l'affirmative, que ceux qui tiennent la negative, argumentent par l'Ecriture, répondent par l'Ecriture, & repliquent par l'Ecriture.<sup>11</sup>

Mais du Perron tombe à son tour dans cette habitude lorsque, discutant de la forme des gouvernements dans les premières cités humaines, il écrit: "Mais vray dire nul auteur gentil en peut avoir parlé avec certitude laquelle nous tirerons des saintes escriptures."<sup>12</sup>

### La Bible devant l'état

Nombreux sont les textes qui dans les deux Testaments entretiennent un rapport plus ou moins étroit avec la constitution des sociétés, mais aucun n'avance une théorie spécifique sur l'origine des communautés. La Chute et sa conséquence, la nature déficiente de l'homme, ont servi à justifier la nécessité d'un ordre politique mais ont aussi alimenté la méfiance augustinienne à l'égard d'un ordre établi par une faute et dans la violence: la cité d'Enoch ayant été fondée par Caïn, un fraticide.<sup>13</sup> Cette carence théorique permet à saint Thomas d'intégrer les idées aristotéliennes d'une tendance innée au lien social chez les hommes et d'une finalité bénéfique du pouvoir, supposant, pour sa formation et son maintien, l'intervention de Dieu comme *causa remota*.<sup>14</sup> La Bible ne présente pas non plus la théorie, chère à Bodin, d'une croissance naturelle de l'état à partir de la cellule familiale. Elle ne précise pas si les premiers rois de l'humanité ont été choisis ou se sont imposés par la violence. *La Genèse* mentionne brièvement que le premier potentat a été Nemrod, vaillant chasseur qui fonda un empire composé des villes de Babel, Ereq et Akkad.<sup>15</sup> Seul est décrit en détail dans le *Livre de Samuel* l'établissement de la monarchie en Israël.

S'ils ne présentent pas, sauf dans *Samuel* une conception élaborée de la société et du pouvoir, les textes sacrés comportent cependant maints faits à valeur exemplaire, notamment les tribulations des Israélites, dans le désert et en exil, et de nombreux conseils, en particulier sur le comportement du chrétien à l'égard des autorités civiles dans les textes des apôtres Pierre et Paul. Par leur caractère limité et souvent conjoncturel, ces éléments se

prêtent plus aisément qu'une théorie organique à des manipulations idéologiques.

### Choix des textes et conditions historiques

Les emprunts faits à la Bible par la littérature politique, de Bodin à Grotius, sont déterminés par les bouleversements en cours. La croissance des monarchies séculières, au détriment des autorités impériale et pontificale, la fin des particularismes locaux, l'émergence des états nationaux modifient l'horizon politique général. D'une façon plus particulière, la St-Barthélemy et l'avènement d'Henri IV en France, les dominations successives de souverains catholiques puis protestants en Angleterre et en Ecosse, avaient amené au centre des préoccupations l'obéissance ou la résistance des sujets en matière de conscience et de pratique religieuses. En ébranlant l'état, les guerres de religion avaient aussi fait naître en France un parti, celui des Politiques, voué aux intérêts de la monarchie temporelle contre les empiètements de la religion. Contesté ou renforcé, le pouvoir temporel devait se définir à l'égard du pouvoir papal. Ce fut le problème d'Henri IV, mais bien plus celui de Jacques I<sup>er</sup>, lors du serment d'allégeance réclamé à ses sujets après la Conspiration des Poudres. D'éminents scolastiques comme Bellarmin et Suarez prennent la plume, à l'incitation de Rome, contre ce roi polémiste et ses partisans. Les variations, d'un règne à l'autre, entraînent l'échange des théories. Le climat de camps retranchés dans lequel vit l'Europe de l'Ouest et du Nord est fort propice à l'effervescence théorique, comme l'indiquent la prolifération des pamphlets, l'abondance (et la longueur) des traités politiques. Chaque camp pouvait trouver dans la Bible matière à contentement ou à préoccupation.

Les premières oeuvres marquantes de cette période furent écrites par les monarchomaques, tels Buchanan, Hotman, Bèze, Mornay, Languet et par les auteurs anonymes des textes publiés dans les *Mémoires de l'Estat de France*.<sup>16</sup> Les monarchomaques, ouvrant une brèche à la désobéissance civile, se heurtaient, dans la Bible, aux appels à la soumission des apôtres Pierre et Paul. Dans un texte clair et précis, saint Paul demande que chacun se soumette aux autorités en charge, en soulignant que toute autorité vient de Dieu.<sup>17</sup> Toute rébellion est un rejet de Dieu. L'autorité étant instituée comme un instrument de justice, il convient de se soumettre tant par motif de conscience que par crainte du châtement. Ce message se trouve renforcé par deux textes, l'un apparaissant dans une épître de saint Pierre,<sup>18</sup> l'autre dans l'Ancien Testament, lorsque Jérémie demande à son peuple d'obéir à Nabuchodonosor, malgré les torts de ce dernier envers les Juifs qu'il déporta et réprima.<sup>19</sup> Néanmoins il est appelé le serviteur de Dieu et Jérémie presse son peuple d'ignorer les injonctions faites par les faux prophètes de ne pas se considérer assujettis au roi de Babylone.



Bien sûr, l'épître aux Romains est l'un des textes les plus commentés, non seulement par les monarchomaques, mais par des absolutistes comme Jacques I<sup>er</sup> et P. de Belloy, qui trouvent là un langage inespéré pour leur cause. La Bible est cependant tissée de contradictions; chaque allégation peut être confrontée à sa contradiction ou atténuée par diverses réserves. Un fragment d'une épître aux Corinthiens servira par exemple d'échappatoire.

L'Ancien Testament procure son contingent de textes. Des épisodes du livre de Daniel s'avèrent particulièrement propices à affaiblir la portée du message paulinien de l'obéissance "par motif de conscience." Outre sa théorie séduisante des quatre royaumes, ce livre raconte le refus de quatre jeunes Hébreux d'adorer la statue d'or érigée par Nabuchodonosor.<sup>20</sup> Ils furent jetés dans une fournaise de feu ardent et en sortirent indemnes. Sous Darius le Mède, Daniel fut jeté dans la fosse aux lions pour avoir transgressé un édit de pratique religieuse.<sup>21</sup> Ces épisodes renforcent la thèse de la résistance à des ordres impies. Althusius y verra même une leçon de gouvernement pour les pays à confessions religieuses multiples. Le code deutéronomique contient de nombreuses prescriptions, morales, religieuses, sociales et rituelles, pour le peuple juif. Une section est consacrée aux devoirs du roi, dans laquelle Yahvé interdit à ce dernier de multiplier le nombre de ses femmes, son or et son argent.<sup>22</sup>

Le texte le plus propre à soulever des controverses est celui du prophète Samuel sur l'établissement de la monarchie. A une époque où l'autorité monarchique occupe tous les esprits, où la contestation vise le détenteur, et parfois la forme, de ce pouvoir, l'épisode narré soulève de graves difficultés pour les consciences chrétiennes favorables à ce type de régime.

Insatisfaits des fils de Samuel établis comme juges, les Anciens d'Israël réclament un roi, à l'instar des autres nations. Cette requête déplaît à Yahvé, qui se sent rejeté, mais il commande à Samuel de satisfaire à leur demande, tout en les avertissant de ce que sera "le droit du roi qui va régner sur eux":

#### **Les inconvénients de la royauté.**

Samuel répéta toutes les paroles de Yahvé au peuple qui lui demandait un roi. Il dit: "Voici le droit du roi qui va régner sur vous. Il prendra vos fils et les affectera à sa charrerie et à ses chevaux et ils courront devant son char. Il les emploiera comme chefs de mille et comme chefs de cinquante; il leur fera labourer son labour, moissonner sa moisson, fabriquer ses armes de guerre et les harnais de ses chars. Il prendra vos filles comme parfumeuses, cuisinières et boulangères. Il prendra vos champs, vos vignes et vos oliveraies les meilleures et les donnera à ses officiers. Sur vos cultures et vos vignes, il prélèvera la dime et la donnera à ses eunuques et à ses officiers. Les meilleurs de vos serviteurs, de vos servantes et de vos boeufs, et vos ânes, il les prendra et les fera travailler pour lui. Il prélèvera la dime sur vos troupeaux et vous-mêmes deviendrez ses esclaves. Ce jour-là, vous pousserez des cris à cause du roi

que vous vous serez choisi, mais Yahvé ne vous répondra pas, ce jour-là!"

Le peuple refusa d'écouter Samuel et dit: "Non! Nous aurons un roi et nous serons, nous aussi, comme toutes les nations: notre roi nous jugera, il sortira à notre tête et combattra nos combats." Samuel entendit toutes les paroles du peuple et les redit à l'oreille de Yahvé. Mais Yahvé lui dit: "Satisfais à leur demande et intronise-leur un roi." Alors Samuel dit aux hommes d'Israël: "Retournez chacun dans votre ville."<sup>23</sup>

Le livre d'Osée apporte un écho à ces propos, car la colère de Dieu devant la demande des Juifs est évoquée.<sup>24</sup> Les malheurs prédits par Yahvé arrivèrent dès le règne de Saül mais aussi sous d'autres rois de Samarie et de Judée, comme Achab, qui s'empara de la vigne de Naboth, Jézabel, Athalie, Jéroboam Ier.<sup>25</sup>

Le passage de Samuel soulève déjà des difficultés dans son contexte. Comme il est précédé par la victoire de Samuel sur les Philistins, il semble que les motifs invoqués par les Juifs soient nuls. La version apparaît alors anti-monarchiste. Mais un passage ultérieur fait état du danger représenté par les Philistins et de la nécessité d'un chef militaire, d'où l'élection de Saül par Dieu pour défendre les Juifs alors affligés et persécutés par leurs ennemis. Cette version, pro-monarchiste, contredit certaines vues de la première. Pour expliquer ces contrastes, des théories de deux ou même de trois sources ont été avancées. A la Renaissance, seule la version défavorable à la monarchie est retenue, sans doute à cause de l'impossibilité d'ignorer cette vive désapprobation. La volonté exprimée par les Juifs est regardée par Dieu comme une véritable apostasie. L'affront subi par Samuel se transforme en offense à Dieu lui-même. Son courroux révèle une préférence pour un modèle théocratique de société. La monarchie constitue une punition infligée aux hommes pour avoir rejeté ce système. Aussi imploreront-ils en vain un retour à la situation antérieure. Mais la surdité divine et la vanité des implorations humaines plaident paradoxalement pour l'inutilité de toute rébellion et de toute résistance, une fois cet ordre instauré.

Le texte biblique aborde indirectement d'autres aspects de la royauté. Les inconvénients annoncés constituent-ils une liste de pouvoirs ou d'abus? Tel est l'enjeu central. Les méfaits décrits sont-ils approuvés, ou voulus? L'absence apparente de limites aux exactions royales estompe la frontière séparant la monarchie de la tyrannie. Le texte indique le rôle du peuple dans ce changement. Les anciens d'Israël formulent la demande. Celle-ci manifeste la double finalité du pouvoir: régir, à savoir juger, puis conduire aux combats. La requête subit aussi l'influence d'un contexte, celui de "toutes les autres nations." La suite du livre précisera les modalités de sélection du roi. Saül est à la fois choisi par Dieu et élu par le peuple, si l'on considère les deux sources ensemble.

Malgré l'importance des textes de saint Paul et de saint Pierre, nous



limiterons cette étude à l'influence du texte de Samuel dans les écrits politiques à la fin de la Renaissance, réservant pour un autre moment les interprétations des passages du Nouveau Testament.

### **La tradition critique sur le texte de Samuel: Le Moyen Age**

Déjà au Moyen Age, ce passage de la Bible avait retenu l'attention des Pères de l'Eglise. Saint Grégoire le Grand le commente longuement.<sup>26</sup> Il estime qu'à cette occasion, les Juifs ont rejeté la domination spirituelle au profit d'une domination séculière.<sup>27</sup> Il montre que le déplaisir qu'eut Samuel à cette demande lui vint de ce qu'il anticipait le déplaisir de Dieu.<sup>28</sup> Pour Grégoire, le discours de Samuel tendait à décourager les Israélites;<sup>29</sup> ils auront donc bien mérité ce sort, par leur entêtement. Mais ce discours ne signifie pas que les rois doivent tous se conduire de cette façon et Grégoire rappelle l'épisode de la vigne de Naboth pour le démontrer. Néanmoins, comme il s'agit d'un régime où triomphe l'esprit charnel contre le spirituel, il n'est pas étonnant que les rois cherchent à satisfaire leurs appétits,<sup>30</sup> à oublier les vertus, à perdre leur intégrité. Et parce qu'ils ont maintenu leur demande après avoir été prévenus de ses conséquences, les Israélites ont perdu tout recours contre cette dépravation, tout moyen de revenir en arrière. En même temps, ils ont rejeté l'intermédiaire de Dieu car Samuel était un adjuvant humble et soumis, qui rendait bien la justice et qui leur avait donné la victoire, alors que les rois n'auront pas le même bonheur dans leurs guerres. Semblable rejet attend parfois les fidèles pasteurs ou prélats de la sainte Eglise, car cette audace d'aller contre leur volonté et leurs saints conseils se retrouve encore. Ainsi Grégoire, tout en utilisant la version anti-monarchiste de la Bible, notamment par la mention des victoires remportées par Samuel, ne cherche ni à contester la monarchie ni à légitimer le droit des rois. Le passage de Samuel marque plutôt, comme l'indique la fréquence des termes, un moment historique aux conséquences effroyables, celui d'un passage du spirituel au charnel.<sup>31</sup> Le rejet de Dieu par les hommes répète l'épisode de la *Genèse* et entraîne une autre forme de châtement. Parce qu'elles n'apparaissent pas liées à des situations politiques contemporaines, les explications conservent une saveur académique. Les quelques allusions retrouvées chez d'autres Pères de l'Eglise manifestent des préoccupations toujours marginales, dans le prolongement des idées de Grégoire. Chez Cyprien, saint Ignace et saint Chrysostome et dans les *Constitutions des Saints Apôtres*, le passage sert à illustrer les difficultés que rencontrent parfois les prêtres et les évêques, à cause de l'ingratitude et de l'hostilité des fidèles.<sup>32</sup> Si l'insulte est parfois leur gain, ils doivent se consoler de ces afflictions à la pensée que Dieu s'irrite et se venge lorsque ses prêtres sont flétris. Comme chez Grégoire, Samuel est traité à l'égal d'un prêtre et la supériorité des prêtres sur les gouvernants s'en trouve confirmée.

Saint Augustin reste muet sur ce passage dans sa *Cité de Dieu*. Mais saint Thomas s'en sert pour montrer que la royauté, théoriquement à considérer comme le meilleur régime, peut aisément dégénérer en tyrannie, qui est sa déformation. Saint Thomas signale donc que "dès l'institution, le Seigneur a investi le roi d'un pouvoir tyrannique."<sup>33</sup>

Les Juifs étaient particulièrement cruels et enclins à la rapacité, et c'est par ces vices surtout que les hommes versent dans la tyrannie. C'est pourquoi le Seigneur ne leur assigna pas dès le début un roi revêtu de l'autorité souveraine, mais un juge et un recteur qui veillât sur eux. C'est plus tard, à la demande du peuple et sous le coup de la colère, qu'il leur accorda un roi, disant clairement à Samuel, comme on le lit au premier livre des Rois (8,7): "Ce n'est pas toi qu'ils ont écarté, c'est moi, ne supportant plus que je règne sur eux."<sup>34</sup>

Le texte apparaît à saint Thomas comme une simple tentative de dissuasion de la part de Samuel:

En fondant l'institution, Dieu ne donnait pas au roi un tel droit. C'est plutôt l'annonce du droit inique usurpé par des rois dégénérés en tyrans et en spoliateurs de leurs sujets. La suite du texte (I Rois 8,17) ne permet pas d'en douter: "Et vous serez leurs esclaves"; c'est le caractère même de la tyrannie, puisque les tyrans traitent leurs sujets en esclaves. En parlant ainsi, Samuel voulait donc dissuader le peuple de réclamer un roi; on lit d'ailleurs un peu plus loin (8, 19): "Mais le peuple refusa d'écouter la voix de Samuel"—Malgré tout, il peut arriver, même à un bon roi exempt de tyrannie, d'emmener les jeunes gens, de désigner des chefs de mille et des chefs de cinquante et d'imposer force contributions à ses sujets, en vue d'assurer le bien commun.<sup>35</sup>

Saint Thomas en déduit la supériorité d'un régime monarchique tempéré d'aristocratie, car la situation en Israël prouve que "les dispositions de la loi n'étaient pas satisfaisantes."<sup>36</sup> Celles-ci font pourtant partie du *Deutéronome*, dont il reprend les idées essentielles pour conclure que les méchants rois supporté par Israël servaient à châtier les révoltes fréquentes du peuple.

Abravanel, humaniste juif né au Portugal en 1437, livre le commentaire le plus exhaustif de ce morceau.<sup>37</sup> Il l'utilise pour contredire la position des commentateurs bibliques juifs, lesquels estimaient que la Bible contenait des prescriptions impératives pour établir une monarchie.<sup>38</sup> Abravanel adopte une position assez proche de saint Thomas et il tire de la Bible une leçon défavorable à la monarchie absolue.

### Luther et Calvin

Le renforcement des structures nationales coïncide avec la montée de la Réforme. Le soutien ou la condamnation de celle-ci par les autorités temporelles obligent Luther et Calvin à amorcer une réflexion sur l'ordre



civil. Les positions de Luther à l'égard de l'état ont fait déjà l'objet de nombreux commentaires.<sup>39</sup> Rappelons qu'elles ont varié selon les impératifs stratégiques du moment. Par sa théorie des deux glaives, Luther se désintéresse en principe de l'autorité séculière, car le royaume d'ici-bas est disqualifié par rapport à l'au-delà, et il se contente de prôner une obéissance qui n'engage pas l'âme. Les révoltes des paysans, les débordements radicaux de ses disciples, en particulier des anabaptistes, le besoin de la protection des princes l'amènent à préciser sa doctrine, en cinq textes principaux. Intéressé surtout au *Nouveau Testament*, Luther maintient au cœur des principes régissant les rapports du chrétien à l'Etat l'enseignement de l'épître de saint Paul aux Romains dont il a fait un commentaire. Toutes les admonestations et tous les appels de saint Paul et de saint Pierre à l'obéissance sont confirmée et renforcés, notamment dans son commentaire de l'épître de saint Paul.<sup>40</sup> Luther néglige le texte de Samuel alors que Calvin, qui traite longuement des gouvernements civils dans le vingtième chapitre de son *Institution* le cite au moment où il s'interroge sur le meilleur régime.<sup>41</sup> Il observe qu'il est "bien vray qu'un Roy, ou autre, à qui appartient la domination aisément décline à estre tyran,"<sup>42</sup> ce qui lui fait favoriser une direction multiple. Comme ses prédécesseurs, il estime qu'un "mauvais Roy est une ire de Dieu sur la terre (Iob, 34, 30; Isa, 3, 4; Osée, 3, 11; Deut. 28, 29.)"<sup>43</sup> Les exhortations de Jérémie de prier pour Nabuchodonosor et pour la prospérité de Babylone servent à faire valoir l'honneur dû à un roi même "pervers et cruel."<sup>44</sup> Abordant les méfaits prévus par Samuel, Calvin les explique ainsi:

Certes les Rois ne pouvoient faire cela justement, lesquels par la Loy estoient instruits à garder toute tempérance et sobriété (Deut. 17, 16 ss.). Mais Samuel appelloit Puissance sur le peuple, pourtant qu'il luy estoit nécessaire d'y obéir, et n'estoit licite d'y résister. Comme s'il eust dit: La cupidité des Rois s'estendra à faire tous ces outrages, lesquels ce ne sera pas à vous de réprimer, mais seulement vous restera d'entendre à leurs commandemens, et d'y obéir.<sup>45</sup>

Le respect gardé par David envers Saül témoigne du caractère inviolable de la majesté. "Nous devons tous à noz supérieurs, tant qu'ils dominent sur nous, une telle affection de révérence que celle que nous voyons en David, mesme quelsqu'ils soyent."<sup>46</sup> Calvin maintient en somme les mêmes exigences de loyauté que Luther, mais à l'aide de références à l'Ancien Testament. Ces longues exhortations à la patience s'achèvent cependant sur un ton ambigu et menaçant, par l'évocation des cas où le meurtrier du roi est l'instrument du châtement divin et par l'approbation des résistances organisées par les magistrats inférieurs.

### L'exégèse du texte de Samuel entre 1570 et 1625

Afin de conserver le fil dans le labyrinthe des variations exégétiques autour du texte de Samuel, il conviendrait d'en présenter les données les plus significatives, en tenant compte des intérêts et des factions de l'époque. La première démarche consistera à reconnaître les positions extrêmes (et non pas extrémistes), c'est-à-dire celles qui s'opposent point par point les unes aux autres et, à partir de ces données, dresser une ligne médiane. Globalement considéré, le texte de Samuel apparaît comme un désaveu par Dieu de la monarchie. Cette position de contestation aurait pu être adoptée par les monarchomaques; elle ne le fut pas. Mais leurs écrits nous permettent de retrouver le camp qui l'adopta. Dans les *Mémoires de l'Estat de France*, un auteur anonyme tente de définir une position raisonnable en s'attaquant à deux abus présumés: celui des anabaptistes, s'autorisant de ce texte pour rejeter la monarchie, et celui des absolutistes, liant les droits des rois aux conséquences prévues par Samuel.<sup>47</sup> Ce renseignement précieux compense faiblement la perte des nombreux écrits des anabaptistes mais il confirme l'existence, autrement hypothétique ou à inférer logiquement, d'une opposition radicale aux énoncés des absolutistes. Mais l'opposition entre les deux interprétations se situe à des niveaux différents. Dans un cas, la désapprobation est déduite de la considération de tout le texte de Samuel, dans l'autre, de la partie intitulée *Inconvénients de la monarchie*, où Samuel présente comme des droits les malversations exercées par le roi et termine sur l'impossibilité dans laquelle seront les Israélites de se plaindre ou de revenir en arrière. Dans cette perspective, il appert qu'un roi même tyrannique mérite une obéissance sans conditions. Selon l'argumentation anabaptiste, la plus contestatrice, un roi, de l'avis de Dieu, sera toujours un tyran (roi=tyran; toujours et partout). Bodin attribue à Melanchthon un énoncé de ce principe et lui reproche d'avoir tiré cette conclusion du texte de Samuel: "En quoy Melanchthon s'est mespris, qui a pensé que les droits de la majesté soyent les abus & tyrannies que Samuel dit au peuple en sa harangue."<sup>48</sup>

Bodin semble avoir tiré cette réflexion des commentaires de Melanchthon sur les *Politiques* d'Aristote. Dans ce passage, il est écrit:

Dans les *Histoires des Rois*, où le droit des rois est décrit par Samuel, les formes les plus acerbes de commandement sont approuvées, ornées de ce titre: que cela soit le droit des rois. L'esprit saint signifie ainsi que le pouvoir légitime, même s'il est dur, est approuvé de Dieu.<sup>49</sup>

Melanchthon se contente donc d'affirmer que Dieu a approuvé les formes les plus pénibles du pouvoir légitime. Son ouvrage contient d'ailleurs des incitations analogues à celles de Luther et de Calvin pour le respect des pouvoirs établis. Il y soutient les distinctions habituelles du tyrannicide




commis par des magistrats en fonction, ou par des particuliers. L'opinion des anabaptistes ne trouve certes pas sa source chez ce théologien, auteur précisément d'un traité *Contra Anabaptistas*.<sup>50</sup> Mais les accusations de Bodin s'imposeront plus que les nuances de Melanchthon et Marquez les reprendra sans vérification: "Cete interpretation, comme dit Bodin, est de Melanchthon, & partant suspecte."<sup>51</sup>

Selon les argumentations de caractère absolutiste, Dieu recommande plutôt, dans ce texte comme dans d'autres, d'obéir même à un tyran. Donc à plus forte raison faut-il se soumettre à un bon roi (roi et/ou tyran). Les conséquences de ces interprétations sont aux antipodes. La désapprobation de Dieu d'une forme toujours tyrannique commande son rejet, selon les anabaptistes. La description des droits des rois implique au contraire une obéissance inconditionnelle, selon la thèse opposée. Cette dernière position pourrait être imputée à des absolutistes comme Bodin. Mais dans sa forme extrême, elle est surtout défendue par Jacques I<sup>er</sup>, par W. Barclay et par Adam Blackwood, défenseur de Marie Stuart contre Buchanan. Bodin, tout comme vraisemblablement le parti des Politiques qu'il représente, apporte deux réserves. S'il admet qu'on doive respect même à un tyran, il refuse de considérer la liste de Samuel comme celle des droits et encore moins des habitudes d'un roi et il estime qu'il s'agit d'une liste d'abus d'un tyran. Cette position rejoint celle de la plupart des auteurs catholiques.

Comment se définit la place intermédiaire? Elle est d'abord adoptée par les monarchomaques réformés, conformément à leur situation ambiguë entre le respect et la contestation du pouvoir temporel, selon les circonstances. Confiants en la dignité et en la valeur de l'autorité séculière mais parfois forcés de s'y opposer, les monarchomaques jouent sur les deux tableaux et n'excluent aucune partie du texte. Les anabaptistes les obligent à expliquer la colère de Dieu. Et les inconvénients annoncés ne leur paraissent pas des droits reconnus, mais de simples menaces faites par Samuel pour dissuader les Hébreux. Le texte révèle à la fois la facilité avec laquelle un roi devient un tyran (roi → tyran) et l'habitude des rois de cette époque et de cette région, l'Asie, de se comporter en tyran (Roi → tyran, alors-là). Les monarchomaques en déduisent la nécessité d'un contrôle, d'une Loi ou d'un système capable de brider les rois, comme les Etats. Les monarchomaques catholiques reprennent, quand ils s'intéressent à ce texte, ce qui est rare, cette ligne médiane d'une opposition à certains monarques plutôt qu'à la monarchie.<sup>52</sup> Ils défendent, à l'instar des scolastiques, les avantages d'une monarchie tempérée, non par les lois fondamentales, comme le souhaitent les Réformés, mais par celles de Dieu et de l'Eglise. Guillaume Rose, dès son premier chapitre, insiste sur la supériorité de la monarchie et renoue ensuite avec la version de saint Cyprien, à l'effet que le passage de Samuel contient des prédictions de ce que Saül

allait faire, non des prescriptions de ce que les rois peuvent faire.  
 Le schéma suivant illustre l'éventail des points de vue:



Bien qu'en général fidèles à ces grandes lignes, les interprétations de détail peuvent varier et les catégories sont moins étanches que ne le suggère le schéma.<sup>53</sup> Rien n'empêcherait par exemple les anabaptistes de relever la propension des rois à devenir tyrans. Les absolutistes de leur côté ont intérêt à reprendre à leur compte l'explication historique souvent présentée chez les monarchomaques et à attribuer la colère de Dieu à des facteurs circonstanciels, ce qui atténue la portée du désaveu. Telle est bien l'argumentation développée par Belloy:

Dont toutefois Dieu ne se courrouça pas contre son peuple; par ce qu'il ne ratiffiast & n'approuvast l'Estat Royal, mais pour le peu d'assurance & deffiance des Israélites, comme si sa Majesté divine n'eust peu bien disposer de leur Estat, sous autre police que sous la Royauté: ainsi qu'ils se mescontentoient de Samuel qui s'estoit monsté fidelle serviteur de Dieu & du public.<sup>54</sup>



L'explication est reprise par Jacques I<sup>er</sup>.

La place des scolastiques catholiques reste à déterminer. D'une façon générale, ils pouvaient sans difficultés reprendre l'enseignement des Pères et prendre leurs distances à l'égard de la monarchie. Or la plupart étaient plus favorables à la monarchie, système bien établi, qu'à tout autre régime. A la suite des changements d'allégeance religieuse des souverains, ils durent passer bien contre leur gré dans le camp des ennemis de la royauté, devant la menace d'un roi huguenot en France et sous le règne d'Elisabeth en Angleterre. Leur opinion rejoint alors, même s'ils n'en ont pas toujours conscience, celle des monarchomaques, c'est-à-dire une opposition dirigée bien plus contre la personne du roi que contre la monarchie. Marquez soutient par exemple que les calvinistes utilisent le texte de Samuel pour attaquer la monarchie, ce qui n'est le cas, on l'a vu, que des anabaptistes. La position des scolastiques varie aussi selon la situation géographique des auteurs. L'italien Bellarmin relève simplement qu'il n'a pas plu à Dieu d'accorder un roi à son peuple. Les espagnols Marquez et Ribadeneyra, ardents partisans de la monarchie, adoptent à peu près la solution de Bodin et des monarchomaques, et considèrent le texte comme une série de menaces, non de droits, s'appuyant pour cela sur les arguments de saint Grégoire le Grand. S'opposant à des monarques mais non à la monarchie, ils font valoir les avantages d'un système régi par les lois de Dieu et de l'Eglise. Le jésuite Nicholas Sanders en Angleterre et l'évêque Guillaume Rose en France abondent dans le même sens.

Le livre de Samuel suscite enfin quelques commentaires marginaux. Lipse et Parsons se contentent de relever que la monarchie y est décrite comme la forme de gouvernement la plus répandue, "la plus ordinaire."<sup>55</sup> Surtout les modalités décrites d'accession au pouvoir par Saül servent certaines causes. Enfin, le rôle de Samuel envers le peuple et envers Dieu n'est pas négligé.

### Examen détaillé des diverses thèses

L'argumentation anabaptiste représentée dans le *Politique* comporte trois motifs pour l'exclusion de la royauté: le refus de Jésus de devenir roi, l'origine violente de la monarchie avec Nemrod,<sup>55</sup> la colère de Dieu dans *Samuel* et *Osée*. Un passage de l'*Epître aux Corinthiens* incitant les chrétiens à régler entre eux leurs différends sans d'adresser à des juges couronne cet exposé.

La conviction monarchiste atténuée des monarchomaques est également illustrée dans *Le Politique*. A l'appui de la thèse reconnaissant la monarchie comme le meilleur des régimes sont citées les opinions des philosophes anciens, les discussions des sages de Perse et de Venise, un extrait de la *Genèse* sur la domination d'Adam comme modèle d'économie domestique. Les excès sont cependant blâmés, et à propos du droit des

rois, il est dit que Samuel a été mal interprété "car ce n'est pas une ordonnance, mais une menace, que le peuple aurait au lieu de Roys des superbes tyrans."<sup>57</sup> Cela s'est vérifié par les règnes d'Achab et de Jézabel. S'intéressant à l'interdiction faite par Jésus à Pierre de tirer son glaive, l'auteur du *Politique* expose la thèse courante qu'un simple particulier, comme l'était alors l'apôtre Pierre, n'a pas la "vocation légitime"<sup>58</sup> de résister et de prendre les armes.

Bodin s'intéresse peu au texte de Samuel. L'essentiel se trouve déjà exprimé dans sa *Méthode*.<sup>59</sup> A son avis, dans les paroles de Samuel "ce n'est pas la royauté, mais bien la tyrannie qui est visée, n'en déplaît à Melanchthon."<sup>60</sup> Bodin a tout intérêt à se démarquer d'un texte si négatif à l'égard des monarques. Dans sa *République*, il le mentionne surtout pour des problèmes fortuits, comme l'élection ou la succession, les devoirs des rois pour la justice et la guerre; il souligne la popularité du régime attestée par ce passage.<sup>61</sup> Pour Bodin, Dieu se sent rejeté lorsque ses lieutenants sur terre, rois ou princes, comme l'était Samuel, sont repoussés.<sup>62</sup> Ses objurgations à l'obéissance enchâssent plutôt des extraits de Jérémie sur Nabuchodonosor.<sup>63</sup> Il cite le respect de David pour Saül et ajoute:

Il n'y a rien plus frequent en toute l'escripture sainte, que la defense, non pas seulement de tuer, ny attenter à la vie ou à l'honneur du Prince: ains aussi des Magistrats, ores (dit l'Ecriture) qu'ils soyent meschans.<sup>64</sup>

La prudence compréhensible de Bodin lui est dictée par son désir de légitimer une monarchie puissante sans en évoquer les risques.

Blackwood, polémisant contre Buchanan, illustre mieux la position des absolutistes. Il s'élève contre la "maligne interprétation" de l'Écossais et ironisant sur les détours de l'exégèse de cet érudit pourtant grave et expérimenté, il rappelle que les Israélites ont bien demandé un roi, non un tyran, et qu'on ne saurait donc considérer le texte comme une liste d'abus tyranniques mais bien comme des droits royaux légitimes, accordés par Dieu.<sup>65</sup> Bien sûr, selon Blackwood, cela ne veut pas dire que les rois doivent faire tout cela, mais qu'ils peuvent le faire, quand les temps et les circonstances difficiles le commandent, et il n'y a rien dans cette formulation qui s'oppose aux prescriptions du *Deutéronome*. Pour Blackwood, le peuple a demandé un roi, Dieu a agréé cette demande et ceux qui régnèrent sur Israël furent des rois, non des tyrans. Ce qui veut dire qu'il faut également supporter des pouvoirs qui ont dégénéré car ils ont reçu l'aval de Dieu.<sup>66</sup> Blackwood pousse l'interprétation dans un sens si favorable à la monarchie qu'il utilise ce texte pour attribuer au roi la propriété des choses; leur usage et leur possession seuls revenant aux particuliers.<sup>67</sup> Une telle prétention fait contre elle l'unanimité à cette époque, aussi bien des Politiques que des scolastiques et des monarchomaques, réformés et catholiques.



Languet, Marquez, Du Perron, l'auteur du "Politique" dans les *Mémoires de l'Estat de France* et Guillaume Rose sont fort explicites la-dessus.<sup>68</sup> Ce dernier par exemple s'indigne qu'une seule phrase de Samuel ait pu laisser croire que les rois pouvaient disposer des biens de leurs sujets, alors que l'indignation du Prophète lorsqu'Achab et Jézabel s'emparent de la vigne de Naboth illustre une situation toute opposée.

P. de Belloy, dans son plaidoyer en faveur d'Henri IV, tombe dans l'ornière absolutiste. L'institution de la royauté chez les Juifs signifie à son avis l'approbation divine de ce régime. Cette institution avait d'ailleurs été annoncée bien avant, lorsque Dieu avait promis à Abraham et à Sara que leurs descendants porteraient le sceptre. William Barclay, autre adversaire déclaré des thèses de Buchanan, suit de très près les énoncés de Blackwood. Il ne voit pas de contradictions dans la Bible, mais une différence de niveau: Samuel montre ce qu'un roi peut faire, le *Deutéronome* ce qu'un roi doit faire.<sup>69</sup> Surtout, la réponse du peuple et l'acceptation de Dieu indiquent bien le caractère irréversible de l'institution et l'impossibilité d'échapper aux contraintes parfois dures de la royauté. Barclay consacre plusieurs pages au passage de Samuel, s'élevant notamment contre l'intention de Buchanan de voir dans cette description uniquement des abus, à cette époque de rois généralement bien plus mauvais. Pour Barclay, les rois de ce temps étaient pourtant légitimes et le texte contient le droit royal tel que prescrit au peuple.<sup>70</sup> Jacques I<sup>er</sup> partage évidemment sans scrupules, en raison de ses fonctions, cet avis et il présente dans le *Basilikon Doron* une perspective carrément absolutiste.<sup>71</sup> Ecrivant en 1599, il a pu connaître les opinions des monarchomaques et il aborde l'argumentation historique. Comme toute l'Ecriture est inspirée, cela signifie que les paroles de Samuel ne lui sont pas dictées par l'ambition de se maintenir au pouvoir en noircissant les rois, Samuel ne fait pas non plus une prédiction de ce que sera le règne de Saül, puisque ce dernier a été désigné par Dieu pour ses vertus et qu'il n'a commis ensuite aucune action vraiment répréhensible. Il s'agit donc, dit-il, d'un discours pour préparer les peuples à obéir et à ne pas résister même aux tyrans intolérables, car Dieu seul a le pouvoir de faire et défaire les rois. Dieu prévient en effet le peuple qu'il ne servira à rien de murmurer, de rechigner car le renoncement est irréversible. Après ces énoncés généraux, Jacques I<sup>er</sup> s'attache au détail des points de justice et d'équité qu'un roi peut transgresser impunément. Si le peuple, après ces avertissements a continué à réclamer un roi, c'est qu'il acceptait ces divers inconvénients pour les avantages retirés au chapitre de la justice et de la guerre. Le texte présente donc l'étendue des pouvoirs possibles du roi, en comparaison desquels ceux des rois chrétiens s'avèrent fort modérés. Donc leur sujets ont encore moins de motifs légitimes pour se rebeller. Jacques I<sup>er</sup> complète sa démonstration par les témoignages de respect affichés par David, par les appels de Jérémie, et par une longue

exposition de l'*Epître aux Romains*.

*Le Politique* résume assez bien les différentes thèses en présence et propose la version soutenue habituellement par les monarchomaques. Ceux-ci, tels Goodman, Buchanan, Bèze et Languet, accordent pour la plupart une attention aussi grande que Jacques I<sup>er</sup> au passage de Samuel. Goodman, compagnon d'exil de John Knox à Genève, le cite au complet. Il estime qu'il présente des menaces de punition pour avoir rejeté le règne direct de Dieu:

Wherefore to avoyde the daungers upon both partes, it is more than necessarie that bothe be subjecte to that Rule, and with all diligent care, labour to reteyne it, wherby both maye learne their duetie, and be constraind justly to execute the same.<sup>72</sup>

Bèze développe la thèse historique à peine esquissée chez Goodman. Au commencement, "l'Eternel seul lui-mesme . . . a esté le Monarque."<sup>73</sup> Malgré leur chance d'avoir un roi "qui ne pouvoit jamais devenir Tyran,"<sup>74</sup> les Israélites demandent un roi, alors que l'histoire enseigne qu'il n'y a point de roi qui n'ait abusé de son état:

Le Seigneur, justement irrité contre son Peuple et lui voulant enseigner ce qui lui devoit advenir de ce fol appetit qui les menoit, leur predict par Samuel ce qui est nommé en ceste histoire là, le droit du Roi couché en termes merveilleusement estranges, et portans en somme, que le Roi feroit tout ce qui lui plairoit tant des personnes que des biens de ses sujets: chose vraiment tyrannique et non point Roiale.<sup>75</sup>

Or, selon Bèze, Dieu seul peut exiger quelque chose de sa volonté sans avoir à se justifier, mais la volonté des hommes et des rois doit plier à la raison et être guidée par de bonnes et saintes histoires.

Ceux-là donc se trompent grandement, qui prennent ces parolles de Samuel comme si elles autorisoient les Rois en tout ce que bon leur semble, suivant l'exécrable parolle de ceste villaine incestueuse, *Si libet, licet*, qui n'a esté que trop souvent pratiquée de nostre temps. Ains il faut entendre les parolles de Samuel, comme s'il disoit à Israël, "Vous ne vous contentés point que Dieu soit vostre Monarque, comme il a esté jusques à present d'une façon speciale et particuliere, et voulez en avoir un à la façon des autres peuples. Vous en aurez un donc, mais voici la belle justice qu'il vous fera, et tout le droit duquel il usera envers vous."<sup>76</sup>

Bèze y voit enfin la preuve que les magistrats sont issus du peuple et choisis par lui. Quant aux relations entre Saül et David, il reconnaît le déference de ce dernier mais rappelle qu'il s'était armé légitimement, l'onction du Seigneur l'établissant comme "Officier du Roiaume":



Ce neant moins il appert que son intention a esté de se garantir, voire mesmes par les armes, à l'occasion que dessus. Car autrement, pourquoi se feust-il accompagné de gents de guerre?<sup>77</sup>

Buchanan mène conjointement l'analyse des textes de Paul and de Samuel. Amateur de distinguos, il pose ainsi les cadres de son analyse:

I desire you to consider first, what the people requested of God; next, what their reasons were for a new request; and lastly, what was God's answer?<sup>78</sup>

Leur requête, celle d'avoir un roi, était fondée sur la corruptions des fils de Samuel et sur leur désir d'avoir un juge et un chef de guerre. A cette époque régnaient en Asie, sur des peuple à l'esprit plus soumis, des tyrans non limités par les lois. Une telle situation augmenta la colère de Dieu. Le texte décrit les pratiques tyranniques en usage alors, et non les droits des rois, lesquels sont présentés dans le *Deutéronome*. Et cette dernière liste contredit l'énumération de Samuel. Buchanan balise de la même façon le texte de Jérémie, où "the prophet does not command the Jews to obey all tyrants, but only the king of the Assyrians. Therefore if, from a single and particular command, you should be inclined to collect the form of a general law, you cannot be ignorant . . . of what an absurdity you will be guilty."<sup>79</sup> Car un conseil spécifique ne saurait fonder une loi générale. Enfin, si les Israélites n'ont jamais renversé leurs rois, c'est que Dieu, les établissant, conservait le privilège de les destituer. En d'autres circonstances, les lois et les coutumes des royaumes doivent être respectées. Cela permet à Buchanan de motiver la déposition de Marie Stuart par la noblesse écossaise.

Languet s'arrête avec encore plus de minutie aux éléments du texte et sa synthèse est la plus achevée. Tous les voies ouvertes par les monarchomaques se retrouvent:

- la propriété des biens: non autorisée par le texte.
- le motif de la requête: corruption des fils et exemple des nations voisines.
- l'argument historique: le gouvernement direct de Dieu, indirect par Samuel. Le rejet de Samuel comme rejet de Dieu et sa colère.
- les rôles respectifs du peuple et de Dieu dans le choix du roi: à Dieu l'élection, au peuple l'établissement. Le scénario se répète pour le choix de David, désigné puis confirmé. Cet aspect longuement développé permet l'amalgame des deux sources bibliques contradictoires.
- les buts poursuivis dans l'institution de la royauté: justice et guerre.



- le recours au texte du *Deutéronome* pour distinguer droits et abus;
- l'affirmation d'une propension naturelle à la tyrannie.<sup>80</sup>

Languet reconnaît franchement les difficultés posées par cette description d'un roi tyrannique. Déplorant à son tour les interprétations qui légitiment les injustices, il propose la solution habituelle: le peuple ingrat s'est mérité un avertissement.

En somme c'est comme si Samuel eust dit, vous avez demandé un Roy à l'exemple des autres nations, lesquelles pour la plupart sont mastinees par des tyrans. Vous desirez un Roy qui vous administre justice: mais plusieurs d'entre eux estiment tout ce qu'ils veulent leur estre loisible. Cependant vous delaissez de gayeté de coeur le Seigneur Dieu, la volonté duquel est l'infailible reigle de justice.<sup>81</sup>

### Les scolastiques

Quant aux interprètes fidèles de la tradition scolastique, ils auront plutôt tendance, comme le rapporte J.A. Maravall pour la période contemporaine à notre étude, à esquiver le texte de Samuel, en raison de leur attachement à la monarchie.<sup>82</sup> En Espagne, l'un des plus illustres d'entre eux, Suarez, ne s'y intéresse pas. Quant à Mariana, il ne s'y attarde guère, et se contente de dire qu'on aurait tort de s'appuyer sur ce texte pour préférer le régime démocratique au monarchique. Mariana pousse l'esquive à un point rarement atteint, soutenant qu'il en est des formes de gouvernements comme des goûts en matière de vêtements, de chaussures et d'habitation: les meilleures choses plaisent aux uns et déplaisent aux autres. Il conclut que les meilleurs raisons l'inclinent à favoriser le gouvernement d'un seul.<sup>83</sup> Quelques années auparavant, Ribadeneyra avait été plus sensible aux difficultés inhérentes du texte, en particulier sur le droit de propriété. En s'appuyant largement sur les commentaires de saint Grégoire et de saint Jean Chrysostome, il conteste vigoureusement cette prétention, notamment, comme il est d'usage, par l'exemple de la vigne de Naboth. Il reprend aussi l'argument que certains rois, ainsi que le furent Sennacherib, Nabuchodonosor, Attila et Tamerlan, sont des fléaux de Dieu et les instruments de sa colère, comme le dit le prophète Osée, contre les péchés du peuple.<sup>84</sup> De tous, Marquez sera le plus prolix, sans cependant innover beaucoup. Comme Ribadeneyra, il rejette la théorie du droit de propriété des rois sur les biens de leurs sujets en s'appuyant encore sur saint Grégoire mais également sur Bodin, pour lequel le texte relève les abus et non les droits des rois. Plus loin, il justifie la colère de Dieu selon l'argument habituel d'un gouvernement direct de Dieu. Marquez attribue les interprétations abusives d'abord aux courtisans flatteurs, puis dans son second livre, aux calvinistes comme Melanchthon, les premiers se servant de Samuel pour renforcer les pouvoirs du roi, le second pour

attaquer la "monarchie ecclésiastique," c'est-à-dire de "calomnier la souveraine puissance du vicaire de Jésus Christ."<sup>85</sup> Marquez représente ainsi le double tranchant du texte, à la fois utile et néfaste à la monarchie. Il fait enfin une recension érudite de tous les penseurs favorables à la monarchie.<sup>86</sup>

En France, le cardinal Du Perron renoue avec une perspective de l'interprétation grégorienne, celle qui consiste à assimiler Samuel à un prélat, ce qui lui permet d'affirmer les droits du pape à déposer les rois.<sup>87</sup> Mais le détail du texte retient moins l'attention de Du Perron que la généralité des événements et leur similitude avec d'autres dépositions, faites par les prophètes, de Roboam et d'Achab. Cette question du statut "ecclésiastique" de Samuel sépare les absolutistes des scolastiques. Bodin présente toujours Samuel et les Juges comme des magistrats temporels, remplissant des fonctions qui passeront ensuite aux rois. Barclay parlera du mandat extraordinaire de Samuel, qui n'était pas prêtre, argument que Du Perron se sentira obligé d'examiner.<sup>88</sup>

Enfin d'Italie parvient une troisième voix officielle de l'Eglise, celle du cardinal Bellarmin, la plus détachée des controverses et des querelles qui agitent la période étudiée. Bellarmin lit dans toute la Bible une réserve générale de Dieu à l'égard du pouvoir temporel. "Nous devons premièrement remarquer, que dès le commencement, il ne luy plût pas que ses fidelles eussent charge des hommes hors de leurs familles, mais seulement du bestail, à cause peut estre du danger qu'il y a de gouverne les peuples."<sup>89</sup>

L'attribution du pouvoir à des Juges, et non à des rois, confirme cette méfiance. Aussi lorsque les Israélites demandèrent un roi, Dieu "leur fit parestre en plusieurs façons, qu'il n'avoit pas agreable la resolution qu'ils avoient prize de se soumettre tous à la volonté d'un seul, ainsi que les autres nations avoient fait."<sup>90</sup> Dieu leur fit aussi connaître "combien étoit difficile à supporter le joug que les Roys avoient accoutumé d'imposer à leurs sujets."<sup>91</sup> Et Bellarmin de conclure: "Tout cecy montre évidemment que Dieu n'eust pas agreable que son peuple eust des Roys absolus, ainsi que les infidelles en avoient," car "Il prévoyait qu'ils abuseroient de leur puissance."<sup>92</sup> Bellarmin estime que les avertissements de Dieu n'étaient pas vains, comme le prouve le petit nombre de rois élevés à la sainteté (environ 20) depuis l'établissement de l'Eglise, en proportion de celui des évêques (environ 900). Bellarmin, proche des anabaptistes sur l'interprétation générale, ne tire cependant aucune conclusion et n'invite pas au rejet des régimes en place. Par sa simplicité et sa proximité de la Bible, son témoignage apparaît paradoxalement comme le plus radical, si bien qu'il aurait été qualifié d'hérétique s'il avait été rendu par une autre personne.



### La fortune du texte

Bien que courte, l'interprétation de Grotius marque un tournant qui achève le cycle des transformations subies par le texte de Samuel. Maravall signale pour la période postérieure à notre étude que les penseurs espagnols du 17<sup>e</sup> siècle ont prolongé l'interprétation réservée et plutôt défensive des scolastiques, afin de sauvegarder leur adhésion au régime monarchique. Grotius, quant à lui, inaugure une présentation davantage légaliste:

A l'égard des paroles de Samuel, touchant le *droit du Roi*, si l'on examine bien le passage, on trouvera, qu'il ne faut l'entendre ni d'un véritable droit, c'est-à-dire, du pouvoir de faire quelque chose honnêtement & légitimement (car dans l'endroit de la Loi, qui traite des Devoirs du Roi, on lui prescrit une toute autre manière de vivre); ni d'un simple pouvoir de fait (car il n'y auroit-là rien de singulier, puisque les Particuliers se font aussi très-souvent du tort les uns aux autres): mais qu'il s'agit d'un acte, qui, quoi qu'injuste, a quelque *effet de droit*, je veux dire, qui emporte l'obligation de ne pas résister. C'est pour cela que le Prophète ajoute, que, quand le Peuple feroit opprimé par les mauvais traitemens du Roi, il imploreroit le secours de Dieu; comme n'ayant alors aucune ressource humaine. C'est donc un *droit*, dans le même sens qu'il est dit que le *Préteur rend justice, lors même qu'il prononce un Arrêt injuste*.<sup>93</sup>

Il se situe entre ceux qui ne voient dans ce texte qu'une annonce de malheurs et ceux qui prétendent qu'il s'agit d'une liste des droits. Cette voie moyenne est nouvelle, car si elle atténue ou rejette les prétentions juridiques à une puissance illimitée, elle n'en couvre pas moins ses effets et élimine les velléités de résistance à des contraintes fondées sur une légitimité précaire. L'euphémisme "effet de droit" n'empêche donc pas le retour à la vision de Jacques I<sup>er</sup>. Au siècle suivant, Pufendorf situera sa position dans la foulée de Grotius et en accentuera les conséquences. Samuel avait eu raison, dit-il, de prévenir les Hébreux car un roi, pour son train royal, peut et doit prendre les garçons pour en faire des soldats, les filles pour en faire des cuisinières, parfumeuses, boulangères; il peut aussi s'emparer des champs, des vignes, et des oliviers s'il est pressé par des besoins d'argent. Le discours de Samuel est encore une fois réduit à une paraphrase:

En un mot, si vous voulez avoir un Roi, il faudra que vous l'entreteniez d'une manière convenable à sa dignité & que vous lui assigniez pour cela certains revenus. Mais, si dans la suite vous venez à trouver ces charges trop pesantes, vous aurez beau souhaiter d'en être délivrés, vous ne pourrez point le détrôner, parce qu'en le choisissant pour votre Souverain, vous lui aurez donné un droit, dont il ne vous sera plus permis de le dépouiller sans son consentement.<sup>94</sup>



Les seules bornes de ces droits sont la loi ou le droit naturel, ou les conventions établies par les sociétés.

La distribution des résultats de l'interprétation selon un axe délimitant des extrêmes et un centre, illustre l'éventail des exégèses possible entre 1570 et 1625, et des médiations opérées. Mais les versions moyennes, selon le tableau, n'offrent pas de garanties plus sûres de vérité et cette questions de pertinence ou de justesse ne mérite pas d'être posée. Seule compte la présence des variantes et des invariants d'interprétation. L'écart obtenu et les compromis effectués nous dévoilent la dépendance de l'exégèse des conditions idéologiques globales et historiques particulières. La véritable dichotomie ne se situe pas dans les oppositions de thèses mais entre la volonté invariablement proclamée partout de respecter l'enseignement biblique et cette autre volonté, moins prononcée, parfois occultée, d'accorder le sens de la Bible à des intérêts politiques précis. Révélatrice d'une mauvaise foi inconsciente, cette dichotomie illustre bien la difficulté qu'il y a à accorder un crédit illimité à un texte dont on néglige souvent le propre contexte historique et social. Elle manifeste aussi les obligations faites aux auteurs d'ajuster leurs perspectives ou de défendre leurs intérêts en fonction des contraintes du milieu et de l'évolution, alors accélérée, des conditions politiques. Cet écartement porte les germes d'un progrès car il oblige le lecteur étonné de toute ces divergences à s'interroger sur la capacité d'un livre, dont on prône unanimement le respect le plus total, à régir en détail l'activité humaine. L'influence directe et immédiate de la Bible, comme arbre de vérité, peut se trouver en apparence affaiblie par tous ces courants interprétatifs, mais cet affaiblissement peut renforcer la position de ceux qui sont plus attentifs à l'esprit qu'à la lettre et qui recherchent moins dans la Bible un code qu'une inspiration.

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#### Notes

- 1 Paroles de Calvin citées par Samuel Berger, in *La Bible au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle. Etude sur les origines de la critique biblique* (Genève: Slatkine Reprints, 1969), p. 38. (Réimp. de l'édition de Paris, 1879).
- 2 Jean Bodin, *Les Six Livres de la République* (Lyon: du Puys, 1580), p. 303, (1<sup>e</sup> éd: Paris, 1576).
- 3 *Ibid.*, p. 305.
- 4 Théodore de Bèze, *Du droit des magistrats*, Intr. et notes de Robert M. Kingdon (Genève: Droz, 1970), p. 24 et ss, (1<sup>e</sup> éd: Genève, 1574).
- 5 George Buchanan, *De jure regni apud Scotos: A Dialogue concerning the Rights of the crown in Scotland*, publié au sein de l'ouvrage du Rév. S. Rutherford, *Lex, Rex, or the Law and the Prince* (Edinburgh: Ogle & Oliver & Boyd, 1843), p. 268, (1<sup>e</sup> éd: Edimbourg, 1579).
- 6 Hubert Languet, pseud. Etienne Junius Brutus, *Vindiciae contra tyrannos*, trad. franç. de 1581, édition de A. Jouanna et alii (Genève: Droz, Coll. Les classiques de la pensée politique, 1979), p. 46. Le titre de la traduction française est *De la puissance légitime du Prince sur le peuple et du*

peuple sur le Prince. Longtemps considéré comme l'oeuvre de Duplessis-Mornay, le fameux *Vindiciae* a été attribué à Languet dans cette édition. Sur la série des diverses attributions, consulter la bibliographie de Myriam Yardeni, *La Conscience nationale en France pendant les guerres de religion (1559-1598)* (Paris-Louvain: E. Nauwelaerts, 1971), p. 91 et ss. L'article le plus récent sur cette question est de M.P. Raitière, "Hubert Languet's authorship of the *Vindiciae contra tyrannos*," in *Il Pensiero politico*,<sup>14</sup> (1981), (1<sup>e</sup> éd: Bâle, 1579).

- 7 Cf. *The Political Works of James I*, Intr. de Charles Howard McIlwain (New York: Russel & Russel, 1965).
- 8 Johannes Althusius, *Politica Methodice Digesta*. Intr. de C.J. Friedrich (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1932). (1<sup>e</sup> éd: Groningue, 1603).
- 9 Trad. D. Virion, Nancy, J. Garnich, 1621 (1<sup>e</sup> éd: Pampelune, 1615).
- 10 Francisco Suarez, *Selections from three works*, Ed. par J. Brown Scott, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1944), I, 688 et ss.
- 11 Jacques Davy, cardinal Du Perron, *Harangue faicte de la Part de la Chambre ecclésiastique, En celle du tiers Estat, sur l'Article du Serment* (Paris: Antoine Estienne, 1615), p. 65. Discours prononcé le 27 octobre 1614 devant le Tiers Etat.
- 12 *Ibid.*, p. 23.
- 13 "La Genèse", 4: 17, in *La Sainte Bible*, traduite en français sous la direction de l'école biblique de Jérusalem (Paris: Ed. du cerf, 1961). Toutes les références et citations ultérieures renverront à cette édition.
- 14 Cf. Otto Gierke, *Political Theories of the Middle Ages*, Trad. F.W. Maitland (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1951), p. 89.
- 15 *La Genèse*, 10, 9-10.
- 16 *Mémoires de l'Estat de France sous Charles neuvième* (Meidelbourg: H. Wolf, t. I, 1576-1577; t. II, 1578; t. III, 1578-1579).
- 17 Saint Paul, *Epître aux Romains*, 13: 1-5.
- 18 *Première épître de saint Pierre*, 2: 13-17.
- 19 *Livre de Jérémie*, 27: 1-11.
- 20 *Livre de Daniel*, 3: 1-51.
- 21 *Ibid.*, 6:1-25.
- 22 *Le Deutéronome*, 17: 16-19.
- 23 *Premier livre de Samuel*, 8: 1-22.
- 24 De la royauté.  
Je vais te détruire, Israël;  
qui te pourra secourir?  
Ou donc est-il ton roi, qu'il te sauve?  
tes chefs, qu'ils te protègent?  
ceux-là dont tu disais:  
"Donne-moi un roi et des chefs."  
Un roi, je te l'ai donné dans ma colère  
et, dans ma fureur, je te l'enlève. *Osée*, 13, 9-11.
- 25 L'épisode souvent cité de la vigne de Naboth apparaît au *Premier livre des Rois*, 21: 1-16.
- 26 Saint Grégoire le Grand, *Primum Regum Expositiones*, L. IV, chap. I-II, pp. 217-233, in *Patrologiæ Cursus Completus, Patres latini, Series prima*, t. 79, 1849. Le texte de Samuel permet à saint Grégoire de faire de nombreux exposés sur des sujets connexes, comme la distribution des châtimens et des récompenses selon les mérites des hommes, le rôle du Christ dans la rédemption depuis le péché d'Adam, etc.
- 27 "His autem, qui vivebant sub spiritali regimine, regem petere quid aliud est quam eandem spiritalem praelationem in saecularem dominationem transferre gestire." *Op. cit.*, p. 219.
- 28 Grégoire souligne qu'il n'est pas écrit "dispicuit sermo Samueli," mais bien "in oculis Samuelis." *Ibid.*

- 29 "Pro reproba voluntate male petentes populi, petitus rex conceditur pro vindicta." *Op. cit.*, p. 221.
- 30 "... quia dum reprobam vitam laudant, carnalem mentem tyranne ad exercendam pravitatem roborant." *Op. cit.*, p. 227.
- 31 Le terme *carnalis* et ses dérivés sont très souvent utilisés par saint Grégoire.
- 32 Cf. *The Anti-Nicene Fathers* (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1925). Saint Ignace (I, 60), saint Cyprien (V, 340, 366, 373), *Constitutions des Saints Apôtres* (VII, 412). Et *The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, First Series, saint Chrysostome (XIII, 481).
- 33 Saint Thomas d'Aquin, *Somme théologique. La loi ancienne*, t. II, Ia IIae, Q.105, art. 5. (Paris-Tournai-Rome: Desclée et cie, 1971), p. 238.
- 34 *Ibid.*, p. 243. La Bible hébraïque comprenait le livre de Samuel et celui des Rois, alors que la version grecque de la Septante intitulait les deux textes *Règnes*, amalgame repris par la Vulgate latine, citée par saint Thomas, sous le titre de *Rois*. Les versions modernes retiennent la division du texte hébreu. (Renseignements gracieusement communiqués par le professeur Jean Calloud de Lyon, dont les remarques ont également influencé la présente conclusion.)
- 35 *Ibid.*, p. 246.
- 36 *Ibid.*, p. 238.
- 37 Abravanel, *Commentary of the Bible*. Texte traduit par Robert Sacks dans *Medieval Political Philosophy. A Sourcebook*, éd. par R. Lerner et M. Mahdi (Toronto: Collier-Macmillan, 1963), p. 262 et ss.
- 38 Il écrit: "All of them accepted the notion that there was a positive commandment laid upon Israel to ask for a king. But I am not of this opinion." *Op. cit.*, p. 265.
- 39 Consulter notamment L.H. Waring, *The Political Theories of Martin Luther* (New York: Kenikat, 1968); Joël Lefebvre, *Luther et l'autorité temporelle* (Paris: Aubier Montaigne, 1973); Pierre Mesnard, *L'Essor de la philosophie politique au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Paris: Vrin, 1951), pp. 181-235.
- 40 Martin Luther, "Commentaire de l'épître aux Romains," 1515-1516, in *Luther's Works*, éd. par F. Sherman (Philadelphia: Fortress Press), vol 47: "The Christian in Society," p. 109.
- 41 Jean Calvin, *Institution de la religion chrétienne* (Paris: Vrin, 1961), t. IV, Livre IV, chap. XX: "Du gouvernement civil," pp. 510-511. Sur la pensée politique de Calvin, voir aussi Marc-Edouard Chenièvre, *La Pensée politique de Calvin* (Slatkine Reprints, 1970), 383 p.; André Biéler, *La Pensée économique et sociale de Calvin* (Genève: Librairie de l'Université, 1959), 562 p.; Pierre Mesnard, *op. cit.*, p. 235 et ss.
- 42 *Ibid.*, p. 512.
- 43 *Ibid.*, p. 530.
- 44 *Ibid.*, p. 532.
- 45 *Ibid.*, p. 531-532.
- 46 *Ibid.*, p. 533.
- 47 "Le Politique. Dialogue traitant de la puissance, autorite, & du Devoir des Princes . . . , in *Mémoires*, t. III, 1578-1579, pp. 69-70.
- 48 J. Bodin, *op. cit.*, L.I, chap. X, p. 212.
- 49 "In Historis regum, ubi Samueli jus regni describitur, probatur acerbissima forma imperii, ornatur hoc titulo, quod jus sit regum. Significat enim spiritus sanctus legitimum imperium, quamvis durum sit, tamen Deo probari". Philip Melanchthon, "In Aristotelis aliquot libros, (Philippi Melanchthonis) Commentaria," in *Philosophiae Moralis Epitome* (Lyon: Apud Seb. Gryphium, 1538), p. 60. La traduction est de nous.
- 50 Melanchthon s'oppose dans ce texte aux thèses des anabaptistes sur le baptême. Il partage l'opinion de Luther sur l'autorité civile et cite deux fois dans les *Loci communes theologici* l'épître aux Romains. Il fait cependant suivre le passage de saint Paul d'un extrait des *Actes des Apôtres* (5, 29), disant qu'il faut obéir à Dieu plutôt qu'aux hommes.
- 51 J. Marquiez, *op. cit.*, p. 156.



- 52 Cf. par exemple Guillaume Rose, *De Justa Reipub. christianae in reges impios et haereticos autoritate* (Anvers: J. Keerbergium, 1592), pp. 8 et 103.
- 53 Les interprétations des scolastiques et de Bodin seront expliquées plus loin dans le texte.
- 54 P. Belloy, *op. cit.*, p. 19
- 55 Juste Lipse, dans ses *Conseils et exemples politiques*, écrit dans le chapitre "De la principauté" (L. II, I): "Qu'elle est la plus ordinaire. – Pour le temps passé, les histoires sacrees le monstrent, là où les Juifs demandant un Roy, parlent en ceste sorte: Pourvoiez nous d'un Roy, comme TOUTES les nations en sont pourvuës." (Paris: J. Richer, 1606), p. 766. Cette constatation constitue aussi le seul commentaire du texte de Samuel fait par Robert Parsons, jésuite écrivant sur la succession d'Elisabeth, dans *A Conference about the next succession to the crowne of England*, (s.l.: R. Doleman, 1594). "When the children of Israel did aske a kynge at the hands of Samuel, which was a thousand years before the coming of Christ, they alleaged for one reason that al nations round about them had kings for their governours, and at the very same tyme, the chiefest cyties and commonwealths of Greece," (p. 16).
- 56 "Le Politique," in *Mémoires*, t. III, p. 78 et ss. Bodin aussi estime que Nemrod fut le premier qui "assubjectif les hommes par force & violence." (*Op. cit.*, p. 69). Il soutient deux autres fois dans sa *République* l'origine violente de la royauté, toujours à l'aide de ce fragment (p. 504 et 511). Pourtant, il est seulement dit dans la Bible que "Kush engendra Nemrod, qui fut le premier potentat sur la terre. c'était un vaillant chasseur devant Yahvé, et c'est pourquoi l'on dit: "Comme Nemrod, vaillant chasseur devant Yahvé." Les prémices de son empire furent Babel, Ereq et Akkad, villes qui sont toutes au pays de Shinéar." *Genèse*, 10, 10. L'interprétation de Bodin est déjà contredite dès cette époque par Marquez, qui rappelle que la Bible qualifie Nemrod de vaillant chasseur et de fondateur de villes, "meu du désir de profiter à tous." *Op. cit.*, p. 23.
- 57 *Op. cit.*, p. 79. L'auteur du *Politique* continue ainsi: "Vous tiendrez pour flatteurs (comme dire le vray ils semblent bien en tenir) ceux qui alleguant le droit du Roy recité par Samuel . . ." Il est difficile de savoir qui sont ces "flatteurs" favorables aux droits illimités des rois sur les héritages, le bétail, les personnes mêmes, car les écrits de Blackwood et de Jacques I<sup>er</sup> sont postérieurs à ce texte.
- 58 *Ibid.*, p. 125.
- 59 J. Bodin, *La Méthode de l'histoire*, Trad Pierre Mesnard (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1941). (1<sup>e</sup> éd: 1572).
- 60 *Ibid.*, p. 275.
- 61 J. Bodin, *La République*, pp. 610-611, 970, 988.
- 62 *Ibid.*, p. 212.
- 63 *Ibid.*, p. 303-304.
- 64 *Ibid.*, p. 304-305.
- 65 A. Blackwood, *Adversus Georgii Buchanani dialogum, de jure regni apud Scotos, pro regibus apologia* (Pictavis: Apud Franciscum Pagaeum, 1581), pp. 229 et ss.
- 66 "Nam quae disputantur eo loci, toleranda regum imperia significant, quamvis in tyrannos degenerant, & benignitate numinis, a quo potestatem acceperunt abutantur." *Ibid.*, p. 238.
- 67 "Regum enim onia sunt dominio, singulorum usu. Regum sunt omnia proprietate, singulorum possessione." *Ibid.*, p. 232.
- 68 Cf. surtout H. Languet, *op. cit.*, pp. 162, 174-176; les *Mémoires*, p. 78; G. Rose, *op. cit.*, p. 101.
- 69 "Moyses quid debeat Rex facere, Samuel quid posset enunciat." W. Barclay, *op. cit.*, p. 64.
- 70 "Utrumque jus regni est, & iisdem Regibus, populoque prescriptum." *Ibid.* p. 63.
- 71 Jacques I<sup>er</sup>, "Basilikon Doron," 1599, in *op. cit.*, pp. 213 et ss.
- 72 Christopher Goodman, *How Superior Powers Oght to be obeyed of their subjects, and Wherin they may lawfully by God's Worde be disobeyed and resisted* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1931), p. 151. (1<sup>e</sup> éd: Genève, 1558).
- 73 T. de Bèze, *Du droit*, p. 28.
- 74 *Ibid.*, p. 29.

- 75 *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30.
- 76 *Ibid.*, p. 9.
- 77 *Ibid.*, p. 22.
- 78 G. Buchanan, *op. cit.*, p. 268.
- 79 *Ibid.*, p. 270.
- 80 H. Languet, *op. cit.*, pp. 180-183.
- 81 *Ibid.*, p. 182.
- 82 José-Antonio Maravall, *La Philosophie politique espagnole au XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle dans ses rapports avec l'esprit de la Contre-Réforme*. Traduit et présenté par Louis Gazes et Pierre Mesnard (Paris: Vrin, 1955), pp. 135 et ss.
- 83 P. Juan de Mariana, *Del Rey y de la institucion real*, in *Bibliotheca de autores españoles* (Madrid: Ed. Altas, 1950), t. 31, p. 471.
- 84 Pedro de Ribadeneyra, *Traité de la Religion que doit suivre le prince chrestien et des vertus qu'il doit avoir pour bien gouverner et conserver son Estat. Contre la doctrine de Nicolas Machiavel & des Politiques de nostre temps*, trad. Antoine de Balinghem (Douay: Jean Bogart, 1610), pp. 480 et ss. (1<sup>e</sup> éd: Madrid, 1595).
- 85 J. Marquez, *op. cit.*, pp. 141-142.
- 86 "Philon juif, Platon, Aristote, Seneque, Plutarque, Isocrate, Herodote, Xenophon, Saint Justin martyr, S. Atanaze, S. Cyprian, S. Hierosme, S. Thomas, Bartole, Dion Crisostome & autres innombrables." *Ibid.*, p. 141.
- 87 Du Perron, *op. cit.*, pp. 64-65.
- 88 W. Barclay, *op. cit.*, p. 381. Un autre absolutiste, Belloy, pour montrer que Dieu s'irrite lorsque les rois sont méprisés, cite l'exemple de sa colère lorsque Samuël fut rejeté. *Op. cit.*, p. 45 b.
- 89 Robert Bellarmin, *Le Monarque parfait ou le Devoir d'un prince chrétien*, trad. Jean de Lannel (Paris: Sebastien Cramoisy, 1625), pp. 299-300.
- 90 *Ibid.*, p. 301.
- 91 *Ibid.*, p. 302.
- 92 *Ibid.*, p. 305.
- 93 Hugo de Groot, dit Grotius, *Le Droit de la guerre et de la paix*, trad. J. Barbeyrac (Basle: E. Tourneisen), t. I, p. 174, (1<sup>e</sup> éd: Paris, 1625).
- 94 Samuel de Pufendorf, *Le Droit de la nature et des gens*, trad. J. Barbeyrac, (Amsterdam: Pierre de Coup, 1734), t. II, p. 369.

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## The Way of Caution: Elenchus in Bacon's *Essays*

K.J.H. BERLAND

It is idle to expect any great advancement in science from the superinducing and engrafting of new things upon old. We must begin anew from the very foundations, unless we would revolve forever in a circle with mean and contemptible progress.

—Francis Bacon, *Novum Organum*

Bacon employs three literary modes or strategies of what he would call Tradition (i.e., transitive knowledge) in his prose: the Expository or Didactic, the Parabolic, and the Dialectic. The first of these modes is, of course, the conventional method of teaching. Much of Bacon's larger works, including *The Advancement of Learning* and most of the *New Organon*, consists of orderly sequences of investigations and definitions. Tradition here is straightforward, because Bacon's language is explicitly referential and pragmatic.

The Parabolic mode consists of any literary effort in which the literary form is designed consciously to conceal (at least partly) the content of meaning beneath an initially acceptable literal level of meaning. Since the degree of concealment can vary enormously, interpretation is often tricky: "Parables have been used in two ways, and (which is strange) for contradictory purposes; For they serve to disguise and veil the meaning, and they serve also to clear and throw light upon it."<sup>1</sup> Thus, all hieroglyphic forms, such as emblem, aphorism, similitude, and fable, add the pleasure of discovery to the satisfaction of knowledge gained, in that the form must be "opened" to be complete. The literal husk conceals a kernel of essential communication; knowledge cannot simply pass like a bubble from one mind to another; rather, it must emerge from the respondent's active involvement, a combined action of imagination and intellect. Bacon himself states that knowledge should be delivered "as a thread to be spun on" (*Advancement*, 124).

The enigmatical method of parabolic Tradition masquerades as a protective screen for esoteric knowledge, but it actually serves to furnish a



reward for solving puzzles. Bacon explains that the assumed disguise is really a kind of challenge: "The pretence whereof is, to remove the vulgar capacities from being admitted to the secrets of knowledges, and to reserve them to selected auditors, or wits of such sharpness as can pierce the veil" (*Advancement*, 124-5). In the earlier works, when Bacon is busy developing his program of inductive science, he regards the Parabolic mode with suspicion, although later (especially in *The Wisdom of the Ancients*) he employs it because it encourages individual discovery.<sup>2</sup> "Discoveries are as it were new creations" (*Novum Organum*, 300). Bacon frequently refers to Solomon, the scriptural exemplar of wisdom, as the model discoverer, emphasizing what that great king chose to celebrate: "The glory of God is to conceal a thing; the glory of a king is to seek it out" (*Novum Organum*, 300).

The Dialectic mode is not so easily defined. The task is immediately complicated by the fact that in the seventeenth century the term "dialectic" was understood to refer to the art of classifying information in spoken or written discourse.<sup>3</sup> Ramus, for instance, considered it practically synonymous with "logic": "Dialectic is the art of discussing well and is also called logic."<sup>4</sup> The particular use of this art was pedagogical, and it was turned to the discovery of probable explanations; Bacon's adversaries, the schoolmen, were dialecticians in this sense. The similarity of this dialectic to its sister art, rhetoric, rests in the common standard of success—a plausible, convincing effect.

However, the process of seeking definitions ought to be accompanied by a parallel process of rejecting insufficient or fallacious material. Melancthon thus included both elements in his definition of dialectic as "the art or way of teaching correctly, perspicuously, and in an orderly fashion, which is achieved by correctly defining, dividing, linking true statements, and unravelling and refuting inconsistent or false ones."<sup>5</sup> The last part of this definition is particularly important if we are to consider dialectic as more than a mere subcategory of rhetoric. Dialectic is a mode of *inquiry*. The model is Socratic discourse, the starting point of which is a negative, antithetical movement, designed to attack those stubborn opinions which impede the progress toward wisdom. Certainly Bacon's end is radically different—Socrates directed his respondents toward an inward discovery of immanent, potential truth, while Bacon secularizes and inverts the Socratic process, preferring external evidences. Nonetheless, at least one major component of Bacon's method draws on the Socratic method.

Bacon's great debt to the Platonic Socrates is in his adoption of the *Elenchus*, the systematic reduction of false knowledge. Bacon seeks to replace both false information and the fallacious methods of attaining this so-called knowledge. He maintains that the forms of logic employed by the

schoolmen are excessively self-justifying: syllogistical arguments owe their structure and their outcome not to any verifiable connection to the subject at hand, but to codified logic, the very set of conceptual tools initially designed as aids to discovery. Logic has become a kind of decorum, and the "invention of arguments" has supplanted true discovery. Because syllogistic logic establishes purely verbal premises, it depends for whatever truth it contains upon what is known already. Bacon's writings abound with censures of those who succumb to the temptation of easy victory, such as the syllogism can afford: "Some in their discourse desire rather commendation of wit, in being able to hold all arguments, than of judgment, in discerning what is true, as if it were a praise to know what might be said, and not what should be thought" ("Of Discourse," 775). Bacon considered such established methods of discourse to be part and parcel of the Idols that block the way of progressive certainty.

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The Doctrine of Idols is to the interpretation of Nature what the Doctrine of the Refutation of Sophisms is to common Logic.<sup>6</sup>

There are three ways of overcoming Idols. The ideal method, of course, is to start out right—that is, to *begin* by applying the inductive method: "The formation of ideas and axioms by true induction is no doubt the proper remedy to be applied for the keeping off and clearing away of idols." Should it already be too late for preventive measures, however, attempting to understand and name the idols is the next best thing: "The formation of ideas and axioms by true induction is no doubt the proper remedy to be applied for the keeping off and clearing away of idols. To point them out, however, is of great use" (*Novum Organum*, 164).

The third option is more complex; it is the antithetical movement of dialectic, the *elenchus*. The original Socratic discourse (of which *elenchus* is a part) is essentially ironic. Pretending to complete ignorance, Socrates addressed his respondents, questioning them about received notions of virtue and wisdom that they prided themselves on knowing. He had an uncanny eye for fallacious reasoning, and undermined arguments on their own terms until they collapsed under the weight of their own absurdity. Richard Robinson defines the process:

"Elenchus" in the wider sense means examining a person with regard to a statement he has made, by putting to him questions calling for further statements, in the hope that they will determine the meaning and truth-value of his first statement. . . . The whole essence of the *elenchus* lies in making visible to the answerer the link between certain of his actual beliefs and the contradictory of his present thesis. This link must be visible to the questioner before the process begins.<sup>7</sup>



Because of its attritional nature, elenchus has often been criticized as a purely negative tactic; nonetheless, the ultimate purpose of elenchus is usually constructive. Robinson explains how this operates for Socrates:

Of two ignorant persons . . . the one who knows that he is ignorant is better off than the one who supposes that he knows; and that is because the one has, and the other has not, a drive within him that may lead to real knowledge. The elenchus changes ignorant men from the state of falsely supposing that they know to the state of recognizing that they do not know; and this is an important step along the road to knowledge, because the recognition that we do not know at once arouses the desire to know, and thus supplies the motive that was lacking before. Philosophy begins in wonder, and the assertion here made is that elenchus supplies the wonder.<sup>8</sup>

Socrates, then, used the elenchus to produce a catharsis of humility, a purgation of false knowledge, and a desire for true knowledge. Such a process, which simultaneously demolishes old opinions and their methodologies, and stimulates the wonder that drives philosophical inquiry, must have been immeasurably attractive to Bacon. It is clearly an ideal weapon in the battle against the Idols, in that it works explicitly against inherent contradictions in fallacious opinion. Indeed, Bacon's commitment to elenctic tactics is everywhere apparent, and he discusses his use and advocacy of elenchus on numerous occasions:

I begin the inquiry nearer the source than men have done heretofore, submitting to examination those things which the common logic takes on trust. ("The Plan of the Work", *The Great Instauration*, 250)

The "common logic" is used too often to bolster up the opinions of those who suppose they know. Bacon insists that the old must be cleared away to make room for the new:

And therefore that art of Logic coming (as I said) too late to the rescue, and no way able to set matters right again, has had the effect of fixing errors rather than disclosing the truth. There remains but one course for the recovery of a healthy and sound condition; namely, that the entire work of the understanding be commenced afresh, and the mind itself be from the very outset not left to take its own course, but guided at every step, and the business to be done as if by machinery. (Preface, *Novum Organum*, 256)

To commence afresh, it would seem, requires a sweeping change:

The entrance into the kingdom of man, founded on the sciences, being not much other than the entrance into the kingdom of heaven, whereunto none may enter except as a little child. (*Novum Organum*, 274)



Bacon's program of preparatory negative guidance involves both elenctic means and dialectical end. His most complete acknowledgement of elenchus comes in the section of *The Advancement of Learning* that deals with the Art of Judgment. After he has questioned the value of syllogistic, he notes that Judgment may be divided into two parts, the first of which he calls "the way of direction," including analytic logic and exposition. The second part, "the way of caution," is elenchus; it will be useful to quote Bacon's account at length:

The second method of doctrine was introduced for expedite use and assurance sake; discovering the more subtile forms of sophisms and illaqueations with their redargutions, which is that which is termed *elenches*. For although in the more gross sorts of fallacies it happeneth (as Seneca maketh the comparison well) as in juggling feats, which, though we know not how they are done, yet we know well it is not as it seemeth to be; yet the more subtile sort of them doth not only put a man beside his answer, but doth many times abuse his judgment.

This part concerning *elenches* is excellently handled by Aristotle in precept, but more excellently handled by Plato in example; not only in the persons of the Sophists, but even in Socrates himself, who, professing to affirm nothing, but to infirm that which was affirmed by another, hath exactly expressed all the forms of objection, fallace, and redargution. And although we have said that the use of this doctrine is for redargution, yet it is manifest the degenerate and corrupt use is for caption and contradiction, which passeth for a great faculty, and no doubt is of very great advantage . . .

But yet further, this doctrine of *elenches* hath a more ample latitude and extent than is perceived; namely, unto divers parts of knowledge; whereof some are laboured and others omitted. For first, I conceive (though it may seem at first somewhat strange) that that part which is variably referred, sometimes to logic, sometimes to metaphysic, touching the common adjuncts of essences, is but an *elenche*. For the great sophism of all sophisms being equivocation or ambiguity of words or phrase, specially of such words as are most general and intervene in every inquiry, it seemeth to me that the true and fruitful use (leaving vain subtilties and speculations) of the inquiry of majority, minority, priority, posteriority, identity, diversity, possibility, act, totality, parts, existence, privation, and the like, are but wise cautions against ambiguities of speech. So again the distribution of things into certain tribes, which we call categories or predicaments, are but cautions against the confusion of definitions and divisions. (*Advancement*, 117-118)

Elenchus may be carried out with little or no apparent connection with a parallel positive movement; even Socrates has been misunderstood to imply that knowledge is not actually attainable. Bacon is clearly concerned that his readers should not similarly mistake his intention when he uses elenchus to expose ambiguous and confused language. He is careful to point out that the suspension of judgment he encourages in his readers and followers is not *Acatalepsia*, "a denial of the capacity of the mind to comprehend Truth," but *Eucatalepsia*, a "provision for understanding

truly" by means of induction (*Novum Organum*, 299).

Bacon's dialectic moves *through* the antithetical reduction of elenchus toward a positive synthesis. He is confident that the purgation of Idols will result in the recognition of the superiority of induction, and in significant advances in learning and in the conditions of daily existence. There can be no doubt that he believed in the ameliorative power of his philosophy. He projects a happy conclusion after the elimination of the Idols, celebrating the new age which will follow the *comus* marking the integration of man and universe:

All that can be done is to . . . lay it down once for all as a fixed and established maxim that the intellect is not qualified to judge except by means of induction, and induction in its legitimate form. This doctrine then of the expurgation of the intellect to qualify it for dealing with the truth is comprised in three refutations: the refutations of the Philosophies; the refutation of the Demonstrations; and the refutation of the Natural Human Reason. The explanation of which things, and of the true relation between the nature of things and the nature of the mind, is as the strewing and decoration of the bridal chamber of the Mind and the Universe, the Divine Goodness assisting; out of which marriage let us hope (and this be the prayer of the bridal song) that there may spring helps to man, and a line and race of inventions that may in some degree subdue and overcome the necessities of humanity. ("Plan of the Work," *The Great Instauration*, 251)

Bacon's grand scheme is laid out in all its breathtaking optimism. It is surely of the utmost significance that Bacon assigns such an important place to the three refutations, here emphatically linked to the preparations for the visionary marriage of mind and universe.

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The *Essays or Counsels* combine all three modes of literary presentation, but they are fundamentally dialectical, and particularly elenctic. That is, they involve all three of the refutations, and operate upon the reader very much like aphorisms, which (Bacon explains) represent "a knowledge broken," that invite "men to inquire further." Bacon contrasts this with logical systems, which "carrying the show of a total, do secure men, as if they were at furthest" (*Advancement*, 125).

Stanley Fish points out that aphorisms, for Bacon, are "seeds" as words are for Plato: "Their function is heuristic rather than expressive or mimetic and part of an effort to bring men 'to the highest degree of happiness possible' by putting them in direct touch with reality."<sup>9</sup> Fish goes on to argue that Bacon's dialectic is severely limited because it only prepares man for truth about, not above, the phenomenal world (p. 153). He concludes that the limitations implicit in Bacon's insistence upon fine distinctions as a path to empirical verification must be judged in the light of



other philosophers and poets, for whom the empirical is merely something to be transcended.

The error here is that Fish attempts to judge the success of Bacon's efforts by a standard that Bacon himself strove to render irrelevant. The higher truth for which Fish correctly notes that Plato, Augustine, and Donne all sought, is available only to those who subscribe to a traditional vision of cosmic order and unity. Bacon, on the other hand, after he has nodded toward the First Cause, turns toward the fragmented phenomenal world that he suspects is to be found after the concept of the cosmos originating in desire for order, not observation, has been shown to be an Idol, has been exposed and purged. Bacon's dialectic is designed for this purpose: "The human understanding is of its own nature prone to suppose the existence of more order in the world than it finds . . . The human understanding is no dry light, but receives an infusion from the will and affections; whence proceed sciences which may be called 'sciences as one would.' For what a man had rather be true he more readily believes" (*Novum Organum*, 265, 267).

It is Fish's contention that the effect of Bacon's *Essays* on the reader is largely superficial, because it does not effect the kind of mystical transcendence Fish (on his own hobbyhorse, or, to use the apposite terminology, with his perceptions coloured by his own Idols of the Cave) is accustomed to discover:

His words may be, as he terms them, seeds, living not so much in their reference as in their effects, but they will flower in other words rather than in a vision, and in words which do have the referential adequacy that is presently unavailable. For all their provisionality the *Essays* are finally objects; they . . . remain valuable as source material for future consultation, for they reflect quite accurately the partial (not irrelevant) understanding of the mind that fashioned them and of the minds that read them. (p. 154)

Bacon's "vision" necessarily differs from the other models Fish presents in *Self-Consuming Artifacts*, all of which involve a dialectic based on medieval cosmology. Bacon is *not* content to act as a spokesman for received attitudes, as Fish implies when he states that the *Essays* reflect the minds of both author and reader. To be sure, they do contain some immediately valuable insights—I have already noted that the modes are mixed, and the presence of the Dialectic by no means precludes the Expository mode. Bacon's objective is not to produce the final word, but to establish a "way." He repeatedly insists that although induction has provided true and certain results in certain areas, he has no universal theory to propose.

Despite such disclaimers, Bacon has at least an inkling of a universal theory that he expects the practitioner of induction will discover. Requisite



to the dialectic I have endeavoured to outline here is the conviction that with the application of the proper method, the necessary intellectual discipline, the respondent can make a similar discovery. That Bacon had such a faith in his philosophical tools is abundantly clear:

I am now therefore to speak touching Hope, especially as I am not a dealer in promises, and wish neither to force nor ensnare men's judgments, but to lead them by the hand with their good will. And though the strongest means of inspiring hope will be to bring men to particulars . . . nevertheless that every-thing may be done with gentleness, I will proceed with my plan of preparing men's minds, of which preparation to give hope is no unimportant part. For without it the rest tends rather to make men sad (by giving them a worse and a meaner opinion of things as they are than they now have, and making them more fully to feel and know the unhappiness of their own condition) than to induce any alacrity or to whet their industry in making trial. (*Novum Organum*, 287)

With this background, we can see why attempts to extract a coherent program of sententious content from Bacon's *Essays* are generally doomed to failure. Bacon tends to talk *around* the nominal subjects, and, rather than coming to grips with abstract definitions, he surveys a variety of human attitudes toward the subject. These he discusses from behind a mask of objectivity, but he often ironically undercuts the received notions he ostensibly wants to describe. As refutations, the *Essays* are designed to approach the problem of ambiguity and confusion of definition and division, not by replacing earlier versions, but by applying the way of caution to "sciences as one would" to make way for the advancement of learning. Fish, therefore, is completely off the mark when he maintains that "the essays advocate nothing (except perhaps a certain openness and alertness of mind); they are descriptive, and description is ethically neutral, although, if it is accurate, it may contribute to the development of a true, that is, responsible, ethics" (p. 94). This evaluation is more than a little blunted. While the *Essays* may advocate very little *directly*, they are certainly not merely descriptive. Bacon simply does not describe the most readily discernible phenomena. The very selectivity of description is heavily weighted to produce varying degrees of elenctic response in the reader. Fish provides an important piece of evidence—although he does not follow the implication through—in Bacon's cancelled dedication to the 1612 edition: "My hope is that they may be as graynes of salte, that will rather give you an appetite, than offend you with satiety" (p. 78).

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A close reading of several *Essays*, beginning with the essay "Of Truth" (736), will demonstrate the negative operation of this elenctic stage of Bacon's educational dialectic.

*"What is Truth?"* said jesting Pilate, and would not stay for an answer." It is ironic that, of all times in Christian history, the incident with which this essay (ostensibly concerned with establishing the nature of truth) begins, was the most opportune moment for a man to receive a divine answer to the question. However, Pilate only jests as he puts the question; from the very outset it is man's equivocal attitude toward truth—not truth itself—that is the object of scrutiny. Bacon insinuates, rather obliquely, that even when the means of achieving an understanding of truth are at hand, man seems to be constitutionally predisposed to turn away from it. This turning away is stylistically emphasized by the violent conflict in syntactic emphasis the first sentence makes by opening with such a strong interrogative movement, only to abandon it immediately. Man imposes his desire on the picture he allows himself to see, and Bacon attributes this to "a natural and corrupt love of the lie itself." Pilate's jest is itself a repudiation of the ordered universe accessible through understanding of truth. He is so complacent in his vision that he mocks truth incarnate—yet how could he be expected to recognize truth when he saw it?

Bacon continues, observing that the world holds truth in poor esteem. It is a "naked and open daylight," perhaps a trifle banal or vulgar, coming only to "the price of a pearl." On the other hand, Bacon compliments the lie elaborately—it can be seen "daintily by candlelights" and is likened to a many-faceted diamond or carbuncle. But the implicit opposition here is between the naturally valuable and the artificially valuable, the pearl of great price and the meretricious attraction of the stone of "varied lights."

"A mixture of a lie doth ever add pleasure." This is indeed a very curious statement, delivered as it is in almost a "deadpan" tone. The full effect, however, is incremental, and can only be understood properly as part of the continuing affective pattern of the entire essay. It depends on the ironic inversion of what is truly valuable. Bacon has just commented on the common confusion of values; thus it should be clear that although a lie may bring pleasure, pleasure is a questionable goal in and of itself. The apparent benefits of falsehood are obliquely and subtly undercut, but not too subtly for the reader to catch.

The next sentence ironically suggests the function of the essay itself: "Doth any man doubt that if there were taken out of men's minds vain opinions, flattering hopes, false valuations, imaginations as one would, and the like, but it would leave the minds of a number of men poor shrunken things?" Bacon does not intend that this should be taken to apply to the mental faculties of mankind in general; the purgation he describes here is precisely what he wishes to effect in the cases of all who are blocked by Idols. Indeed, the list of things to be removed reads like a stock definition of Idols. Unfortunately, there remains in man the proclivity to puff himself up



with the flattering lie "that sinketh and settleth in," and that can be counter-acted only by inquiry, knowledge, and the frank acceptance of truth in clear demonstrations. Bacon follows this declaration with an appeal to the authority of Scripture to provide himself with a mandate for his empirical, inductive method: just as God first created matter and then light, so for man reason must follow sense, judgment must follow perception.

Bacon next lauds the great material benefits of possessing truth, cautiously tempering the advantage of the position by advocating charity. Then, with what might seem to be a prodigious leap (or *non-sequitur*), he is suddenly weighing the pragmatic benefits of honesty on the business world, and just as suddenly he introduces the argument of the fear of God as inducement to truth-telling. The essay ends with a resonant millenarian note.

What exactly has been said? Bacon has certainly not approached the nature of "truth" itself. Rather, while maintaining the mask of discussing truth, he endeavours to establish in the reader's consciousness the difficulty—or impossibility—of the task. The reader is caught up in the tension between the promise of the nominal subject and the commentary Bacon actually delivers. A study of truth that concerns itself primarily with lying should touch a sensitive area in the reader, implying as it does that man is often most familiar with truth obliquely, in his acquaintance with its opposite.

Behind Bacon's discussion of the human tendency to embrace falsehood lies the Doctrine of Idols. The essay "Of Truth," then, is designed to undermine self-complacency, and to bring about careful scrutiny of the issues at hand by applying "wise cautions against ambiguities of speech." There is no explicit positive ethical reference within the discussion, except the moral tag at the end. Still, once the elenctic effect has come about, the respondent (or reader) should turn to a new way of looking for truth, a new way of seeing the world.

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The essay "Of Death" (737) again concerns a variety of attitudes toward the titular subject. The essay opens with a simple analogy: fear of death is like a child's fear of the dark, and Bacon demonstrates the similarity of the growth of fear in both instances. With the second sentence, the essay divides neatly in half—Bacon draws a distinction between religious contemplation of death and the weak (albeit natural) fear of death. The latter element is drawn out in a vivid passage, which purports to *allay* the fear of death by "reasoning" that the pain of accidental injury may be harder to endure than many ways of dying. Bacon "argues" that it is the "outward shows" of death, rather than death itself, which engender fear. Nonetheless, it is only through these outward shows that man can know anything



about death before experiencing it first hand. Bacon notes that other passions—love, honour, grief, fear, pity, even fastidiousness—can outweigh the fear of death.

There follows a series of *loci classici*, essentially ways in which people have turned death to suit their own purposes. The sentences that come after this return to the “rational” arguments ostensibly designed to reconcile man to death: death is as natural as birth; both birth and death may be painful; the distraction provided by the contemplation of “somewhat that is good” may diminish pain.

Bacon’s final argument is an appeal to the traditional solace of making a good end: “But above all, believe it, the sweetest canticle is *nunc dimittis*; when a man hath obtained worthy ends.” In isolation, this sentence seems straightforward enough: well-dying is a fitting and welcome completion of well-living. But the way in which Bacon’s style conditions this meaning is significant. While the rest of the essay is devoted to suggestions and assertions concerned with reconciling the reader to death’s disadvantages in a general, abstract, coolly rational manner, the interjection, “believe it,” is sudden, personal, and has the effect of isolating the concluding sentence as a matter of faith or speculation, as opposed to reason. This effect works backwards into the ostensibly consolatory parts of the essay, implying that the self-consciously careful structures of reason are not genuine. They are certainly not convincing, and the reader is left with the feeling that, after all, reason is incapable of mastering the fear of death, and that only faith can help.

Finally, however, even the gravity of this observation is undercut by the closing comment that death is the gateway to fame and posterity. The faith that supersedes fear and other passions has itself been supplanted by the passionate ambition to survive in posterity. Reason, which has been given the upper hand in most of the essay, is ultimately debunked. The reader’s complacent faith in the competence of received wisdom and traditional logic to reason away fear of death has been undermined to the point of collapse.

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The essay “Of Studies” (797) opens with a neat treble structure, which leads the reader to expect a regular and pervasive pattern. Such patterns are favourite devices of Renaissance authors, and, indeed, the 1597 version of this essay consists in a string of observations, all neatly divided in three. In the later versions, however, despite the highly stylized form that initially invites attention, there is no discernible pattern, no systematic ordering of ascent or descent. Furthermore, the triplicity of form is highly irregular:

## STUDIES SERVE FOR:

	<i>DELIGHT</i>	<i>ORNAMENT</i>	<i>ABILITY</i>
chief use:	privateness and retiring	discourse	judgment, disposition of business
excess, abuse:	sloth (crafty men condemn it)	affectation (simple men admire it)	eccentric judgment (wise men use studies)
why read?	not to confute  but to weigh and consider	not to take	not to find talk
books are to be:	tasted	swallowed	chewed and digested
or read:	partially  reading makes a whole man	casually  conference a ready man	wholly  writing an exact man

It is already clear that this last triplet does not conform to the headings or divisions used previously; the next triplet introduces a peculiar negative inversion: without reading, a man must be cunning to seem to know what he does not/without conference, a man must have wit to seem to know what he does not/without writing, a man must have memory to seem to know what he does not.

The treble pattern, already confusing, is then deliberately broken by the introduction of a fourth term in the next stage: History makes men wise, poets witty / Mathematics makes wise men subtle / Natural Philosophy makes men deep, moral, and grave / Rhetoric and Logic make men able to contend.

The effect of this stylistic disjunction is mildly disconcerting, especially if the reader has attempted to follow the pattern of division initially set out. The problem of connecting pattern and significance is further complicated by Bacon's use of an elaborate metaphor at the close of the essay. Just as "studies go to form character," so do they have a therapeutic value. Bacon draws a parallel with the therapeutic effects of various physical exercises: "Bowling is good for the stone and reins; shooting for the lungs and breast; gentle walking for the stomach; riding for the head; and the like." Each one of these applications is really an *appropriation of use* from the thing itself. Bowling, for instance, is primarily a game, and the effects Bacon describes are surely accidental and secondary, nothing to do with bowling *qua* bowling. By logical extension back into the essay, the careful reader will note that *everything* Bacon discusses is likewise an appropriation of sec-

ondary effect, in isolation from the true nature of studies. After all, though Bacon never touches upon this point, studies involve primarily a search for truth. They are only secondarily a useful discipline for improvement of character.

The essay "Of Studies" makes use of its own complex form—highly artificial, with a structure implying significance but deliberately empty and misleading—to undercut stock assumptions about the social utility of learning. The whole effect is ironically, even viciously, underscored by the extension of the therapeutic analogy:

So if a man's wit be wandering, let him study the mathematics, for in demonstrations, if his wit be called away never so little, he must begin again. If his wit be not apt to distinguish or find differences, let him study the schoolmen, for they are *cymini sectores*. If he be not apt to beat over matters, and to call up one thing and prove and illustrate another, let him study the lawyer's cases. So every defect of the mind may have special receipt.

Bacon's readers may well find the light mockery of plodding mathematicians, hair-splitting schoolmen, ingenious lawyers, and their students somewhat amusing. Less welcome, perhaps, is the way in which Bacon implicitly turns the mockery against the readers themselves: Bacon's essay is itself a form of Study, and its readers are (to a certain extent) students. To what defect of the mind does Bacon address this receipt?

\* \* \*

Thus it can be seen that a close reading of the *Essays* forces us back to the question of whether Bacon is concerned with engendering Acatalepsia or Eucatalepsia in his reader. Despite the frequent appearance of individual bursts of clear didactic statement—eminently quotable apothegms—found throughout his prose, the *Essays* do not hold together as systematically didactic or expository means of tradition, whether we consider the collection as a whole or each essay separately.

Too often this has been attributed to the history of stylistic influence, or to Bacon's intention to project a tone of muted skepticism or worldly wisdom. Accordingly, there has been too little effort to reconcile the essayist with the systematic philosopher. Did a different Bacon write with the left hand than with the right? Everywhere outside the *Essays*, Bacon is firmly committed to outlining or developing clear, verifiable systems. Surely the omission of this characteristic quality in the *Essays* ought to be sufficient in itself to place students of Bacon's method on their guard.

Further exercises in close reading will corroborate what I have undertaken to demonstrate here. The strategy of the *Essays* is founded on the Doctrine of the Three Refutations. If the intellect is truly not qualified to judge except by means of induction, what are people to do with the vast



accumulation of mere prejudices, folk-tales, received opinions, "sciences as one would," and traditional logical demonstrations—all of which they have accepted as legitimate judgments? Bacon wishes to begin anew, to initiate a real progress. Elenchus serves to reduce "the great sophism of all sophisms," ambiguity, equivocation, and confusion of important terms. His dialectic begins when he launches the negative, elenctic movement of refutation, and directs his readers along the way of caution.

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#### Notes:

- 1 Preface, *The Wisdom of the Ancients*, in *The Philosophical Works of Francis Bacon*, reprinted from the translations and texts of Ellis and Spedding, ed. John Mackinnon Robertson (London and New York, 1905), p. 823. Further references to this edition will be noted parenthetically in the text.
- 2 See Paolo Rossi's account of Bacon's changing attitude toward the Parabolic mode, in *Francis Bacon: From Magic to Science*, tr. Sacha Rabinovich (London, 1968), especially Chapter III, "The Classical Fable."
- 3 See Walter J. Ong, *Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue* (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), p. 42 *et passim*; cf. Lisa M. Jardine, *Francis Bacon: Discovery and the Art of Discourse* (Cambridge, 1974), p. 20.
- 4 *Dialectique* (1555), as quoted by Rossi, p. 63.
- 5 Jardine, p. 35.
- 6 Jardine, p. 83.
- 7 "Elenchus," in *The Philosophy of Socrates*, ed. Gregory Vlastos (New York, 1971), pp. 78, 89.
- 8 *Ibid.*, pp. 83-4.
- 9 Stanley Fish, *Self-Consuming Artifacts* (Berkeley, 1972), p. 88. Further references will be noted parenthetically in the text. My reading of Bacon owes something to Fish, in that the seeds of some of my arguments are present in his observations. We see much the same evidence, but draw very different conclusions.

## Book Reviews/Comptes Rendus

Coburn Freer. *The Poetics of Jacobean Drama*. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981. Pp. xix, 256. \$22.50

Schooling her son, Volumnia claims "Action is eloquence, and the eyes of th' ignorant / More learned then the eares." Coburn Freer would teach a very different lesson about Jacobean dramatic verse because it "bears a unique relation to the other elements of dramatic meaning" and "finally takes on the force of metaphor itself" (p. xii). Identifying that "metaphoric" capacity would be much easier, if also more mechanical, if one could construct "a prosody relating verse patterns to the dramatic contexts in which they occur," but Freer rejects that project because "interpretation of the dramatic context of any given line would depend upon one's reading of the whole play, just as interpretation of the rhythm of a single line would depend upon hearing the rhythms present in similar lines, some of which will have the misfortune to occur in very different dramatic contexts" (p. xvi). Freer thus dismisses one version of the hermeneutic circle—the mutual interplay and inter-correction of part and whole in the progressive construal of a text (or dramatic performance)—but other versions will return.

Chapter one, "Poetry in the Mode of Action," reviews previous studies (few and unsatisfactory), defines "*poetry* in the drama" (p. 7: "the ten-syllable five-stress line in all its variations"), and discusses how dramatic verse differs from narrative or lyric verse (p. 24: "a dramatic speech . . . lives among many speeches"). Several important features of Freer's argument appear: his interest in dramatic character and the way narrative demands threaten coherence (p. 17); poetry as a universal glue (p. 19: "There do seem to be many Jacobean plays that hang together chiefly in their verse"); poetry as the universal solvent (p. 26: "plot, the pattern of repetition of event as reflected in the current of the verse," for example, or "poetry as a function of physical movement").

Freer next takes up some central questions: can dramatic poetry validly be separated from other elements in a performance? Was it so separated in the Renaissance? What is the relation between the reader's experience of a printed text and the spectator's experience of a performed one? Misjudging the humor of Joseph Hall's attack on bad meter, an attack that deliberately mismatches its own meters, Freer maintains what he confesses "might seem to the modern reader a highly implausible fiction"—"that an audience could distinguish

among different metrical feet, while hearing lines from the stage for the very first time" (p. 36). This incredible claim sinks toward probability when we learn that a theatre audience could distinguish verse from prose (p. 41, a capacity happily still extant), and, later, when the "attentive playgoer" is granted the ability to hear "the verse as rhythmic, metered speech, not simply as a subspecies of formal rhetoric, or as a vehicle for theme and plot, or as a local diversion" (p. 48). On these large issues, Freer adduces three categories of evidence: dramatic discussion of dramatic speech; prefaces and puffs for printed texts; contemporary, ear-witness testimony. Hamlet's advice to the Players—"Speak the speech trippingly on the tongue" rather than mouthing it like the town-crier—leads to this generalization: "concern for the accurate transmission of the meter makes sense only if dramatic poetry is assumed to have an existence apart from performance" (p. 50). And when Hamlet tells Rosencrantz and Guildenstern (not the Players, as Freer states), "the lady shall speak her mind freely, or the blank verse shall halt for't," Freer believes "we know that the audience Hamlet imagines would be able to hear the lady's meter and tell when it was lame. If she is to "speak her mind," presumably her language will convey some agitation or disturbance; and that agitation must be very different from the agitation of halting and lame meters" (p. 34). Perhaps, but this "lady" is not Gertrude, only one of a stock collection of dramatic characters (king, adventurous knight, lover, humorous man, clown), and Dr. Johnson's note seems just: "The lady shall have no obstruction, unless from the lameness of the verse." Hamlet is here more literary critic than a student of actors and audiences.

Many authorial prefaces and friendly blurb writers testify that "dramatic poetry" has "an existence apart from performance." The very circumstances make it inevitable that an author or his friends will defend, even exaggerate, the joys awaiting the buyer. One can, therefore, invert Freer's argument and find it fairly remarkable that authors ever mention the performed play (as Chapman and Webster among others did) while trying to send the reader not to the theatre but to the study or St. Paul's, lighter by six pence or so. All this changed after the Restoration, according to Freer, when dramatists subordinated language to other qualities in a play and the reading of plays became more common. When John Dennis writes in 1702, "Tis not the Lines, 'tis the Plot makes the Play. / The Soul of every Poem's the design, / And words but serve to make that move and shine" (p. 52), he seems to reverse the equation Freer believes John Ford makes in a prefatory poem of 1632, "The Body of the Plot is drawn so faire, / That the Soules language quickens, with fresh ayre, / This well-limb'd *Poëm*." (p. 39). Earlier evidence upsets the claim for an historical change. Marston's preface to *The Malcontent* (Q3, 1604) praises playing over reading and, like Dennis, makes action the soul: he entreats that "the vnhandsome shape which this trifle in reading presents, may be pardoned, for the pleasure it once afforded you, when it was presented with the soule of lively action." We may detect some privy marks of irony, but the tenor is undeniable. From the 1647 Beaumont and Fletcher folio, Freer quotes James Shirley's remarkable lines on how readers find themselves "at last grown insensibly the very same person you read" (pp. 59-60), but Freer does not quote Shirley's preceding paragraph. There we find—obliquely and politically made—the standard concession: "And now



Reader in this Tragickall Age where the Theater hath been so much out-acted, congratulate thy owne happinesse, that in this silence of the Stage, thou hast a liberty to reade these inimitable Playes." For himself, for other dramatists, and for us, Shirley wishes the silenced stage were at liberty to perform plays, rather than the reader free to read them.

Freer gleans a thin crop of contemporary, non-professional comment on dramatic poetry. Certainly audiences took away memorable scraps and repeated them, and satirists claimed that would-be wits, poetasters, and feeble playwrights actually took their tables to the theatre. Yet Manningham at *Twelfth Night* or Forman at *The Winter's Tale* found plot and spectacle memorable, not the poetry. Indeed, E. A. J. Honigsmann has recently suggested that Ben Jonson's contemptuous attitude toward Shakespeare changed markedly when he had the chance to read (about 1623, as he prepared his Folio tributes), rather than merely to see and hear, many of Shakespeare's plays (see *Shakespeare's Impact on his Contemporaries* [1982], pp. 36-37). Honigsmann's speculation supports some of Freer's argument (dramatic poetry is separable from performance), but it works against other parts (the contention that an audience—here Jonson—grasped powerful, refined, complex poetry at first hearing). This second chapter, then, is better at uncovering difficulties with the argument than solving them (and I have omitted Freer's thoughtful consideration of several other points: the auditory base of Elizabethan education, for example, and the nature of actors' elocution).

The bulk of the book studies, chapter by chapter, *The Revenger's Tragedy*, *Cymbeline*, Webster's two tragedies, and *The Broken Heart*, and Freer considers much more than the verse alone. These five plays have been chosen because of the varying ways their verse displays "congruence with dramatic situation and characterization" (p. 201): very close in *The Revenger's Tragedy* and *The Broken Heart*; very distant in *Cymbeline*; intermittent in Webster's plays, depending on whether he was copying his notebooks or writing for himself. Careful as many readings are, they often fall into a curious circularity. For example: "These two levels of style, the metaphors and the verse, are both aspects of the chief organizing agent, Vindice's mind" (p. 79) could logically be reversed: "Vindice's mind is chiefly organized and represented as mind through two levels of style, the metaphors and the verse." Elsewhere in the treatment of Vindice (e.g., pp. 70-71), one might object that the formal, prosodic elements are simply what they are and that the critic derives his interpretation of Vindice from other sources and then regards the verse's formal properties as supporting or conveying that meaning. Bosola and Flamineo are Freer's chief subjects when he turns to Webster: "Each is endowed with a different kind of reality, and this is emphasized by the different kinds of verse they are given" (p. 137), but "emphasized" saps the primacy verse had for the interpretation of Vindice. Observing of Posthumus that he "seems continually to break off, qualify, or chop at what he has just said," Freer acknowledges, "someone who is distraught does not automatically speak blank verse with a great many pauses; the verse might just as well tumble out in long gushes" (p. 116), as indeed do the speeches of distraught characters in Shakespeare's earlier plays. If distress can take two such prosodically different forms, then the verse itself does not clearly distinguish among emotions.

The hermeneutic circle has come round again: one's interpretation of a character or a play does not usually (or perhaps ever) originate with the verse's formal properties; rather, those formal properties—if they are rigorously defined—may be seen to support and to create in an audience the predisposition to accept an interpretation arrived at by other means. Yet Freer does claim an originating power for the verse; for example, Fletcher's "control of an entire act originates in the choice of individual words" (p. 59). Although "control" is a murky word, the lines from Herrick's prefatory poem entered as evidence will not do: "Here's words with lines, and lines with Scenes consent, / To raise an Act to full astonishment." "Consent" sounds like the "perfect Harmony" Webster claimed among "Action," "decency [i.e., docorum?] of Language," and "Ingenious structure of the Scaene" (*The Devil's Law-Case*), and while "raise" may be a building image, metaphorically suiting Freer's claim, it also has "astonishment" as its object. More argument is needed before we may consent that "in verse drama as in other forms of life, ontogeny repeats phylogeny" (p. 59).

Perhaps inevitably, Freer devotes his fullest attention to the problems knotted around the word *character*. When we read that "something goes out of Vindice as a poet after he has killed the Duke" (p. 62, italics original), we may recall, for example, Peter Ure's objections to the interpretation of Richard II as a poet (Arden edition [rpt. 1966], pp. lxi and lxxi). Like Shakespeare, Tourneur uses whatever media he commands, including "poetry," to achieve the ends he requires; creating Vindice and his mind's imagined variety are among those ends, but creating a Vindice characterized as a poet is not. Elsewhere, Freer wonders "how can Webster fragment a character's consciousness enough to justify feeding into his speeches all manner of tidbits from the author's voracious reading, yet still make the character seem real enough to be a plausible factor in the play's action?" (p. 136). But why should the "tidbits" *ipso facto* disrupt a character's coherence unless (perhaps not even then) we postulate an audience as well acquainted with Webster's reading as R. W. Dent? One answer is that Freer very much prefers "verse" that grows "out of an immediate situation instead of the author's library" (p. 164; cf. p. 160). A further reason might be that formal properties of "imported" text, whether verse or prose, cannot so easily be attributed to *this* character in *this* situation, although any reader-spectator who believes some human experience to be universal would not be dismayed to find that *The Arcadia* or Florio's Montaigne could help define life and death in an imaginary Amalfi as well as in London or southern France.

Webster's characters are irregularly "deep," depending upon their engagement and their creator's resort to his library; Ford's are almost all subject to a "controlled thinness of characterization" (p. 188). While most of the cast of *The Broken Heart* are thin characters allowed only to "become more intense without having changed fundamentally" (p. 173), Bassanes and Penthea are different, and their relation "generates" the play's "most interesting poetry" (p. 184). Freer's treatment of Bassanes' verse is an admirable *tour de force* and almost always convincing, although his very first speech, called "an extraordinary poetry" (p. 185), surely derives from Jonson's Corvino, a figure far



more conventional than Freer elsewhere shows Bassanes to be. Coherence, sincerity, plausibility, "depth" of character, and speech that arises from situation are the criteria Freer usually employs to match prosodic features with character and action, but he includes *Cymbeline* to show "how far it was possible to go in exploiting the gap between a character's poetry and that character's self-awareness, or between this gap and our own sense of the relations between the characters" (p. 209). Iachimo introduces a different model of character, and Freer's *bravura* reading of Iachimo's long concluding speeches finds him "the play's chief poetic ventriloquist" (p. 135), a character, as Richard Lanham would argue, without a "central self." Posthumus and Imogen develop, Iachimo does not, and his character as well as a certain amount of "archaism" and "an older rhetoric viewed through a refracting prism" (p. 126) frame and distance the play's action.

My review has not considered any examples of what the author might well claim as his major contribution, the patient and usually sensitive record of how the verse sounds and how it might affect us in each of these plays. Critics, teachers, and students of these plays will learn much from these analyses, but the careful study they deserve and reward cannot be undertaken in a review. Nor have Freer's many fine interpretations been fully noticed: the view that "Vindice is obsessed by his own *experience* of the court" (p. 64), for instance, or that Posthumus's "own consciousness of his failings and his distinct sense of being Imogen's inferior are attitudes he must shake, and by suspecting her of being unfaithful, that whole great weight can be canceled, that sense of perpetual obligation removed" (p. 113), or that "In the beginning Flamineo seems more a character of prose comedy than a verse-speaking tragic principal. Up to the trial scene he is close to being merely a stand-up comedian" (p. 138). Instead, I have sought to trace the argument's contours, and I find it to be a prosody of dramatic character, with all the difficulties that argument entails.

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*Approaches to Sir Thomas Browne: The Ann Arbor Tercentenary Lectures and Essays.* Edited by C.A. Patrides. Columbia & London: The University of Missouri Press, 1982, Pp. 187.

Modern Scholarship on Sir Thomas Browne has tended to follow one of two traditions. The first seeks to establish Browne's credibility as a thinker, to remove any suspicion that he was not a serious and purposeful scientist. Its contributions include the great edition of Browne's works published by Sir Geoffrey Keynes (6 vols., London, 1928-31), which made available a critical text of his writings and correspondence; the essays of E. S. Merton, which evaluated Browne's experiments in plant reproduction, embryology, and digestion; the monographs of R. R. Cawley and George Yost (*Studies in Sir Thomas Browne* [Eugene, Oregon, 1965]), which underscored Browne's wide range of learning and his debt to Aristotle; and more recently, the edition of *Pseudodoxia Epidemica* or "Vulgar Errors" published by Robin Robbins (2 vols., Oxford,



1981), which recreated the historic context of Browne's most ambitious work and defined the role Browne played in the scientific world of the late Renaissance. From these and other studies, we have come to understand better the purpose of Browne's investigations in such diverse fields as astronomy, mathematics, botany, zoology, physiology, mineralogy, chemistry, and of course, medicine. Browne, we now realize, was not a Baconian empiricist, much less a systematic philosopher, but a debunker of myth and a recorder of scientific discovery, an educator determined to clear away the residuum of fantastic learning though not able to resist the attraction that certain of its elements had for him.

The second and more familiar tradition of Browne scholarship focuses on Browne the writer, the author of *Religio Medici*, *Hydriotaphia*, *Urne-Burial*, *The Garden of Cyrus*, and miscellaneous works of literary interest. This tradition, which includes Johnson and Cowper in the eighteenth century, Coleridge, Hazlitt, Lamb, Melville, and Pater in the nineteenth century, and Morris Croll, E. R. Curtius, and Jorge Luis Borges among others in our own, celebrates Browne as a craftsman and metaphysical wit. It views Browne's worth as lying not only in his style, one of the most original and brilliant in the language, but in his imagination, his half-whimsical, half-inspired genius for drawing connections between disparate phenomena. In the words of Coleridge, we "wonder at and admire his entireness in every subject which is before him—he is *totus in illo*; he follows it; he never wanders from it,—and he has no occasion to wander;—for whatever happens to be his subject, he metamorphoses all nature into it."

This volume, which consists of fifteen lectures and essays commemorating the three hundredth anniversary of Browne's death in 1682, falls squarely within the second tradition. Its contributors are for the most part literary scholars and historians, with interests in politics, art, and religious culture. This is not to suggest that there is anything monotonous about the collection. The editor, C. A. Patrides, Professor of English Literature at the University of Michigan, has wisely refrained from imposing either theme or method on his colleagues, so that a variety of perspectives emerges. As in his earlier critical anthologies on Milton and Marvell, Patrides has arranged the essays "according to an order that coincidentally advances from general studies to particular ones."

Of the "general studies," two are especially worth noting, that by Patrides himself and that by Professor Frank Warnke of the University of Georgia. Patrides's essay focuses on what he calls Browne's "strategy of indirection," his use of irony and paradox to dramatize the complexity of truth. Patrides shows that like Erasmus, Browne distances himself from his "narrator." The result is a gravity "at once intensified and tempered by a playfulness assertive of a sympathetic response to the oddities of human behavior" (p. 47). For example, in a posthumous piece entitled *Museum Clausam*, or *Bibliotheca Abscondita*, a Rabelaisian catalogue of books, pictures, and rarities whose origins and whereabouts are dubious, Browne satirizes the mania for recondite objects that in his time was preoccupying many of the learned of Europe at the expense of true scientific research. A similar strategy is apparent in *Hydriotaphia*, which exposes the vanity and absurdity of man's quest for physical permanence even

as it discourses with vast erudition of the various burial customs of men throughout the ages. In these and other works, Browne balances the solemn and the joyful, the tragic and the comic in such a way as to contrast human folly with divine wisdom.

Frank Warnke's essay is a critique of Stanley Fish's now-famous reading of Browne in *Self-Consuming Artifacts* (1972). Warnke rejects Fish's verdict that Browne must ultimately be deemed a "bad physician" because he does not challenge our assumptions or confront our values like Donne or Bacon or Milton. Warnke acknowledges that Browne dwells on the surface level of our consciousness, spellbinding us with the pyrotechnics of his verbal art. But this, according to Warnke, is not the evil that Fish makes it out to be. What Browne is concerned with is the immortality of the soul and its relation to the deity, the paradoxical and mysterious world of being. This he accomplishes, explains Warnke, by means of an indirect method that "liberates us into the aesthetic" (p. 59). For Browne, it is not the matter of the sentence that counts, but the manner or *experience* of the sentence. Attention is focused not on the meaning communicated, but on a stylistic virtuosity that convulses and thrills the imagination, shocking the mind out of common ratiocinative modes of thinking and awakening in it a sense of wonder at the extremes of human experience. Like the architectural feats of Bernini or the paintings of El Greco, Browne's prose stupefies its audience, dazzles them with a power they can only interpret as divine. Is such art good for us, Warnke asks? The answer, he submits, is yes, if we can move beyond the puritanical attitudes that continue to encumber our appreciation of literature and especially the baroque.

The essays in the volume treating of particular problems and individual works within the Browne canon are without exception stimulating, and what is unfortunately too rare in literary criticism today, readable. It is impossible to discuss all of them here, but a few might be mentioned in passing. Murray Roston presents the thesis that Browne's style was not, as Croll and others have argued, expressive of the searching, tortuous mentality of the baroque movement, with its doubts concerning the possibility of knowledge, but rather emblematic of a more resolved sensibility, of the "achieved equilibrium of spirit" associated with classical art and with rationalistic writers like Dryden. D. W. Jefferson also notes Browne's "philosophical repose," explaining it, however, not as an individual phenomenon but as part of the larger social movement that found relief from the turmoil of the English civil war in the cultivation of the intellect and in the development of professional interests. Raymond Waddington and Michael Wilding adopt a different view of Browne. Writing on the *Religio Medici*, they see him as a more politically charged writer, mounting a subtle but deliberate defence of Anglican principles and institutions against Puritan "innovation." John R. Knott, Jr., and Frank L. Huntley both write on *The Garden of Cyrus*, the former considering Browne's fascination with the figure of the labyrinth as suggestive of an admiration for the divine creation and of a self-conscious recognition of man's capacity for error, the latter illumining an aspect of Browne that has hitherto gone undetected (or at any rate unexplored)—his prophetic and millenarian anticipation of the end of history and the establishment of the kingdom of heaven. These critics have opened up what has



proved to be Browne's most hermetic work, casting new light on Browne's use of symbol, allegory, hieroglyph, typology, and numerology. The last essay to be noted is that of Marie Boas Hall, who brings a wealth of historical knowledge to bear on Browne's connections with the scientific community of the seventeenth century. Professor Hall's essay adds immeasurably to the value of the volume, as it clarifies the nature of Browne's approach to scientific problems. Hall shows how, although Browne was a careful recorder of observed fact, he never lost his humanist love of authority and of books; how, although his studies brought him into close contact with the College of Physicians and the Royal Society, he remained apart from the new science of the century, which tended to divorce its aims from those of religion. It was for these reasons that he was indifferent to or unable to grasp the significance of certain scientific breakthroughs, such as Harvey's discovery of the circulation of the blood or Copernicus's model of the solar system (he remained an adherent of the Ptolemaic astronomy throughout his career). According to Hall, Browne is best described as a "naturalist," an historian of natural and cultural facts, passing his informed judgment on all that came within his ken, but doing little to further theoretical understanding.

Given the richness of the essays here collected, it will seem a little unreasonable to complain of omissions, but two areas might have been addressed with profit. First, Browne's philology. Though not of the rank of a Scaliger or a Bentley, Browne was a respectable grammarian and scholar. In addition to his mastery of classical and modern European languages, he was a forerunner of comparative linguistics, as his fragment "Of Languages, and particularly of the Saxon Tongue," and certain passages of the *Pseudodoxia* attest. He was especially intrigued by the origin of language, noting the effects of natural, technological, and historical events on its development. An inquiry into the extent of his research in this area would contribute greatly to an understanding of his humanism, as well as provide us with insights into the sources of his diction.

The other area is biography. No effort has been made to provide any new perspective on Browne himself. Although it is widely agreed that a large measure of the interest Browne's writings have for us derives from his personality ("a fine mixture of the humourist, genius, and pedant," as Coleridge put it), little attention has been paid to Browne the man. One regrets the absence of a biographical essay reflecting the historic scholarship of this century. Much could be said of Browne's humanist education at Montpellier, Padua, and Leiden; of his friendships with Henry Power, John Evelyn, Nicolas Bacon, William Dugdale, and other distinguished scholars; and of his credulity, which had, at least on one occasion (the 1664 witchcraft trial of Amy Duny and Rose Cullender), most unfortunate consequences.

Aside from these caveats, however, *Approaches to Sir Thomas Browne* is a balanced and judicious volume. Certainly in terms of addressing the critical issues and concerns of contemporary literary scholarship on Browne it is unparalleled. Professor Patrides and his colleagues have done a splendid job in putting before us a classic of English literature, and in showing us new ways to appreciate his achievement.

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John E. Booty, editor. *Richard Hooker, "Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity": Attack and Response*. The Folger Library Edition of The Works of Richard Hooker, volume IV. W. Speed Hill, general editor. Cambridge, Mass., and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1982, Pp. li, 274. \$45.00.

Earlier volumes in the Folger Library edition of the works of Richard Hooker have provided us a solid critical edition of *The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*, including a discussion of the extraordinary textual problems and opportunities that are afforded us by Book V when we compare the carefully printed and proofread edition of 1597 with the printer's manuscript in Hooker's own hand. This present volume offers us material no less unusual and challenging, though of a different sort. It provides a contemporary commentary on the *Laws* in the form of a polemical attack and Hooker's preparations for a rejoinder to that attack. As the editor, John Booty, remarks, rarely do we find autograph notes of this sort in the controversial literature of the sixteenth century, and rarely is such controversy based on a central document of such magnitude.

Much of the present volume is taken up with *A Christian Letter of Certain English Protestants* (1599), written against Hooker by an individual clergyman or a group of Calvinist, anti-Arminian, reform-minded Anglican clerics moved by the necessity of refuting Hooker's purported errors in basic Christian doctrine. Interspersed in the text of *A Christian Letter* itself are Hooker's marginal observations, written in preparation for a more formal answer that was cut off by Hooker's death in November of 1600. The letter and its marginalia are followed in this volume by Hooker's autograph notes toward a fragment on predestination (Trinity College, Dublin, MS 364, f. 80), and three longer sections in draft form also from Dublin (MS 121) on grace and free will, the sacraments, and predestination. Together these materials make up the only recorded refutation of Hooker's *Laws*, and the basis upon which he intended to reply. William Covell did publish in 1603, evidently with the authority and encouragement of Bishop Whitgift, *A Just and Temperate Defence of the Five Books of Ecclesiastical Policie* (STC 5881), though without access to Hooker's notes and fragments and relying heavily on Hooker's own words in the first five books of the *Laws* then in print. The materials in this present volume go far beyond Covell, for they provide the outline of Hooker's own answer to his critics.

What troubles these critics especially are Hooker's non-Calvinist views on grace and predestination and his seeming tolerance of Catholic doctrine. To the author or authors of *A Christian Letter*, the two points are of course connected, for Hooker's insistence that in God's plan "all mankind should be saved, that did live answerable to that degree of grace which he had offered, or afforded them" (xxvi) suggests to Hooker's critics the Pelagian heresy of assuming that human will is itself capable of good. Hooker's doctrine thereby (in the reformers' view) encourages a Catholic emphasis on works. Hooker is of course no Pelagian, for he accepts the doctrine of original sin (as does the Catholic Church), but his allowance for some operation of human acceptance or non-

acceptance goes too far for the Calvinist or Calvinists who undertake to refute him.

These reforming divines are not extremists. John Booty ably shows the nonconformist nature of their positions, and tentatively identifies one of them as Andrew Willet, a loyal Anglican who was Calvinist in theology, anti-Roman Catholic, a protester against the Act of Uniformity, and a questioner of the soundness of Hooker's doctrines. The author or authors, whether or not Willet was one of them, base their attacks against Hooker on the Thirty-Nine Articles, together with relevant passages of Scripture and the Fathers of the early Church. They admire the style and simplicity of the early Fathers and of Cranmer, Ridley, Latimer, Jewel, and others, as opposed to the ornate formality of Hooker's style and his reliance on Schoolmen such as Aquinas. Their greatest fear is that Hooker's erroneous doctrines signal a malaise in the very heart of the establishment upon which the spiritual health of the Protestant world must depend.

Although we lack Hooker's polished response, the gist of his intended reply is fully apparent in his notes. In fact, they are so frank that they reveal to us a Hooker that the published version might have obscured. We see Hooker here as one openly contemptuous of Calvinist zealots who are never content with the authority of the Church Fathers until "they find out somewhat in Calvin to justify them selves" (3). Hooker is determined to maintain a compassionate and dignified tone no matter how much "this fellow" (1, 47) may goad him into anger. He bridles at "pettie quarrels" and at being asked to attend to "every particular mans humor" (xxix). "Ignorant asse!" he exclaims. "It is not I that scatter but you that gather more then ever was let fall" (22,24). "What bedlam would ask such a question?" (30). "You ly, sir" (41). "How this asse runneth kicking up his heeles as if a summerfly had stung him" (42). The pungent wit and asperity of Hooker's replies are prompted no doubt by the suggestion that he, "under the shewe of inveighing against Puritanes," broaches many "chiefest pointes of popish blasphemie" (7). One suspects that some of Hooker's satirical tone would have found its way into his published reply, since a reply of this sort is by its nature more directly controversial than the *Laws*, but we are still given insights by these marginal notes that are refreshingly candid.

As Booty observes, Hooker's "Notes toward a Fragment" are contained on one leaf of MS 264, Trinity College, Dublin, previously identified by P. G. Stanwood as Hooker's and transcribed in Volume III of the Folger Library edition. Their importance here is to show an intermediate process between the marginal notes to *A Christian Letter* and the drafts in the so-called Dublin Fragments. We have, in other words, Hooker's working notes at various stages of development and expansion. The Dublin Fragments are the closest we have to a completed answer, and in them the tone is more restrained. The longest of the three essays, on predestination, may actually have been drafted earlier, between 1595 and 1600, in response to Walter Travers (a leader of the disciplinary Puritans) rather than to *A Christian Letter*, though it serves its purpose here, redrafted for the present occasion, and is indeed the culmination of what Booty justly calls "the most detailed and sustained exposition of grace



and predestination in Hooker's works" (xxxvii). Together, the Fragments outline an important treatise on free will, grace, and predestination, the most vexed topics raised by *A Christian Letter*. This material is an expansion and clarification of Hooker's earlier work rather than a new departure, but it represents the cause to which Hooker fervently devoted his last energies. He clears himself especially of the charges of urging too great a freedom of the will, and of teaching the Roman Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation. He shows a reverence for Calvin along with a profound distrust of Calvin's followers who, like many Roman Catholics, make of their church an institution that professes to be above human error.

Hooker's marginal notes, at times very difficult to read, are here scrupulously transcribed with the help of two seventeenth-century transcriptions, themselves not always reliable. The sole sixteenth-century quarto of *A Christian Letter* itself poses no special textual difficulties. The copy text for the Dublin Fragments is evidently a seventeenth-century transcription. Variants between copy text and adopted reading throughout this volume are nonsubstantive, such as the correcting of obvious misprints or changing italian font to roman. An appendix records all such departures from copy text. A learned and thorough commentary deals chiefly with Church authorities and clarification of doctrinal points. The editor is sympathetic toward Hooker but without scholarly bias. The volume is handsomely and generously illustrated with sample pages, chiefly showing Hooker's careful writing in the margins and his alteration of words as he proceeded. This is an attractively prepared volume, and a fitting commentary on those that have gone before.

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*Collected Works of Erasmus, Volume 6, The Correspondence of Erasmus: Letters 842 to 992 (1518 to 1519)*. Translated by R.A.B. Mynors and D.F.S. Thomson, annotated by Peter G. Bietenholz. Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press, 1982. Pp. xxii, 448. \$75.00.

The glory of this volume is the quality of the translation, for which the Preface assigns specific responsibility to R.A.B. Mynors. Only a few of these letters have been translated into English previously, some by Francis M. Nichols (*The Epistles of Erasmus*, 3 [New York: Longmans, 1918]), by Marcus A. Haworth, S.J., (in *Erasmus and his Age: Selected Letters of Desiderius Erasmus*, ed. Hans J. Hillerbrand [New York: Harper and Row, 1970]) and by Barbara Flowers (appended to the English edition of Huizinga's *Erasmus of Rotterdam* [New York: Phaidon, 1952]). These earlier versions involve intelligent scholarship and writing. However, in comparison with them Professor Mynors' work clearly stands out as that of an exceptionally gifted English stylist, whose talent for English fluently transmits Erasmus' for Latin.

Mynors continually produces a vivacious English that corresponds to the stylistic regions through which these letters mainly range. Many sentences come fast, with syntax that (only) seems unstudied. Over four and a half centuries later, the reader feels the impulse of that "running hand which I use to keep pace with the



flow of my ideas" (letter 990: 65). The translator shares with his author a taste for breadth, raciness and vividness of diction, and Mynors reaches for drama and concreteness when he can. "Eloquentia, quam divus Augustinus non vult usquam ab hera sua [i.e. sapientia] digredi" is for Nichols "that eloquence" which is "never to be parted from" Mistress Wisdom (p. 435); for Haworth, a maid who "never wants to be separated from her mistress" (p. 131); for Mynors, a handmaid whom Augustine "wishes never to leave her mistress' side" (862: 49). Mynors exploits more than the other two the phrase's physical, imagistic possibilities, including those in *digredior*'s etymology. (The Latin, of course, is that of P.S. Allen's *Opus Epistolarum*, 3, [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913]; letter numbers in Allen and the volume under review correspond.) An even smaller variation: "hic meus labor . . . molitur mendas sacrorum voluminum"—my labor "corrects the mistakes" in Scripture for Nichols (p. 431), "removes the errors" for Haworth (p. 129)—becomes "this labor of mine . . . removes blemishes from" Scripture in Mynors (860: 55). Again, physical presence in the translations arises, in *echt* Erasmian fashion, from comprehension of all a word's meanings: "menda" is a blunder in writing for Aulus Gellius but a defect of body for Ovid (see Lewis and Short). Small choices like these, much more than renderings of developed metaphors, make Erasmus' normal epistolary text in Mynors' English what it is in Latin: a lively, peopled scene.

Mynors responds not only to Erasmus' most characteristic note but to his and his correspondents' full stylistic range (see e.g. 850, 914). Most worth quoting, Mynors can rise with Erasmus to eloquence, for instance in characterizing St. Paul:

He maintained the rights of the kingdom of heaven with heavenly weapons and fought the battles of the Gospel with the resources which the Gospel supplies. Tentmaker and pontiff, offscouring of the world and chosen instrument of Christ, who picked this sublime humility, this tongue-tied eloquence . . . to spread the glory of his name. . . . (916: 237-242)

The intelligence, and the power of figured balances in the passage not only carry over the strong Latin frame Erasmus had constructed:

Coeleste regnum coelestibus armis asservit, et Evangelicam militiam Evangelicis opibus gessit. Coriarius pontifex, peripsema mundi, sed electum organum Christi. . . .

Mynors' practice summarizes much of what English gained, from the sixteenth century on, from its writers' sharing in Latin classical tradition.

Almost the only slightly troubling feature of the edition related to the translation is the absence of systematic notice of uses of Greek in the letters. Even for the non-specialist audience whom the Toronto edition should reach, the sense of the texts' participation in a non-modern world of learning, their pastness and absence from us, needs to be suggested as well as their potential immediacy. It should quickly be said that many other aspects of the edition do help with this historical task, and the Greek is a tricky problem: regular indications in the letter introductions or footnotes might help, for letters containing substantial Greek passages. (Sometimes especially sensitive passages appear in Greek, e.g. 911: 58ff., 872: 13ff.; sometimes the footnotes indicate these. Would it be worthwhile for the editors to

Central among the activities that these letters portray is the clear sequence of tasks related to the promulgation of the Gospel. The bulk of actual revision of the 1516 New Testament text had been finished when this volume opens. The next step, equally important for the Humanist orator-in-print, was insuring that the text reached its audience in the clearest and most potent form possible. Hence the work of the summer of 1518, the trip up the Rhine to supervise the work of Froben's press whose types were "the clearest and most elegant and agreeable that one can image" (925: 20). Hence also the pursuit through several letters of a papal brief, which should undermine the new work's possible opponents (860, 864, 865, 905). Back in Louvain, while he waits through the winter for publication, and while he consider an appendix on such use of Greek for a future volume of the correspondence?)

In other respects besides the translation, this volume is adapted to the range of purposes and audiences the Toronto editors have set for themselves. The very few emendations of Allen's datings of letters and identifications of correspondents are sensible. In the notes, Professor Bietenholz does a good job of boiling down available data to what most readers need to know, but also supplements what could be gained from Allen with revised citations and cross-references and selected references to recent secondary works. He is especially strong on the historical articulation of controversies that increasingly enmeshed Erasmus in 1518-1519.

The volume could be better served by its index. Careful use of the text (not a specific check of the index) yielded about a dozen cases in which the index missed page references or gave wrong ones. The volume's two really important references to St. Cyprian (pp. 385-386, 396) are not indexed under the saint's name, but only in the listings of Erasmus' works. One wonders why Erasmus' servant Hovius goes by the name Thomas under the index entry for Maarten Lips, while everywhere else in the volume he is Johannes. About another dozen misprints similarly emerged in and immediately around the text itself. For instance, the date of Ulrich of Württemberg's conquest of Reutlingen given in a note on p. 263 clearly should be 1519, not 1518; a cross-reference in the introduction for letter 926, concerning Erasmus' stay in Mechelen, should be to letter 952, not 951.

The scholarship of Professors Mynors and Bietenholz has in this volume been engaged on letters that document continuity and a culmination in Erasmus' intellectual life, but also an early stage in the second great clearly-defined modification of its course. About twenty years earlier, Erasmus had definitely set out on his intellectual and spiritual way of choice, that of ethical and rhetorical Humanism oriented by Christ's philosophy, the Gospel. The work of publishing his revised edition of the New Testament controlled Erasmus for the first half of the period this volume reflects. He regarded the edition as his career's triumph: with Froben completing the printing, Erasmus could say "I have . . . built a monument to bear witness to posterity that I existed" (867: 293). Fulfillment was qualified in 1519, however, by some vicissitudes of fairly familiar kinds, but increasingly by the more and more distinctive impact of Luther. Change generated by Luther and his associates began to invade Erasmus' life, unlike the earlier change that had been chosen, and Erasmus began clearly to figure in his ultimate rôle as maker and subject of a complex period.



undergoes illness and is jolted by new traditionalist attacks, nevertheless Erasmus moves on to sequels and postscripts of the climactic New Testament publication: more paraphrases to simplify access to Scripture for many (916, 952, 956); further editorial work on the Fathers, guides to Scripture's meaning whom Erasmus has used and now will introduce to a wider public (844, 860, 916, 975). Perseverance with Christian Humanism's essential positive program, in spite of distractions and controversy, is Erasmus' basic course over these months—one he repeatedly advises younger scholars also to pursue (941, 967A).

Other important publications of these months were also revised editions, of the *Institutio principis christiani* and the *Enchiridion*, strengthening one's impression of this as a time of culmination and completion (853, 858). On the other hand, Erasmus for the first time tries to grapple with publication of his colloquies (909). Besides prefacing or alluding to publications, the letters also embody other kinds of Humanistic activity, notably interaction with fellow scholars. Erasmus fulfills a growing responsibility to encourage a whole movement finding inspiration in him, particularly, as Professor Bietenholz points out, to German Humanists, who receive over a third of the letters (see p. xvii). Erasmus' prestige by this time is such that men travel across Germany simply to see him. He deprecates these pilgrimages in the same terms as he did those to religious shrines: he tells the young men from Erfurt that they could see more of him in his writings than in his physical presence, just as in *Paraclesis* (1516) he had told Christians to meet Christ in Scripture instead of going to touch His relics (*LB* VI, \*4*fi*).

Although a climax for Erasmianism in some ways, however, 1518-1519 brought no resolution of conflicts between it and the older intellectual and religious forms; instead, battle on long-fought lines intensified. A surprisingly major worry was criticism from Edward Lee. Erasmus' major letter to the intermediary Lips (843) suggests little in the content of this disagreement that did not go back through the 1514-1515 exchange with Dorp (see *CWE* 3)—indeed the issues were essentially still the ones addressed in Erasmus' 1505 letter to Christopher Fisher defending Valla (letter 182, in *CWE* 2). The difference with Lee drags on through these months' letters and beyond. Early in 1519, basically more serious problems arise, a series of attacks by Louvain theologians directly or indirectly threatening the Collegium Trilingue, with which Erasmus was identified. The rather sudden upsurge of menaces could seem to make Erasmus' whole achievement insecure: repeatedly in early 1519 he portrays the good new studies as jeopardized (930, 936).

A letter of 1518 expresses a rather non-specific, floating sense that "a great change in human affairs is under way, and there must be danger in it" (855: 78). Luther's work, which was to affect powerfully Erasmus' affairs as well as Europe's, first becomes a frequent topic in this volume's letters. The complexity of Erasmus' attitude towards Luther becomes evident quickly. In the first place, Erasmus expressed support especially for Luther's early writing on indulgences, and still make favorable comments on Luther's ideas even as the latter's conflict with Rome developed greater implications (858, 872, 939, 947, 980). In May 1519 Erasmus expressed sympathy with "Luther's idea of liberty" (983: 11); as Professor Oberman has pointed out, Humanists found common ground with Lutherans in the idea of freedom from medieval ecclesiasticism, whereas the will's



bondage was later to appear clearly as the Lutheran certainty that Erasmus could not accept (*Luther and the Dawn of the Modern Era*, ed. Heiko Oberman, Leiden: Brill, 1974, pp. 46ff.).

In the 1518-1519 letters, that intellectual opposition had not explicitly developed; however, Erasmus (and Luther) already knew there was difference as well as some sympathy and overlap between their positions (for Luther, cf. Allen, introduction to letter 933). Specifically, Erasmus knew Luther's basis was not "the ancient tongues and good writing and humane culture" (939: 57, 948: 96). Luther notices that he is a stranger to the correspondences' sphere of stylistic exactness and classical learning, as he comes into it for the first time in a letter of March 1519 (933). Furthermore, Erasmus is highly critical not only of Luther's intemperate, obscurantist opponents (939, 980, 983) but also of Luther's own combativeness, because of its potential for disruption of Christendom (872, 947, 980, 983).

Beyond the sympathy and separateness Erasmus feels towards aspects of Luther's thought and strategy, however, one more factor enters into his complete response: namely, the commitment and fears for Christian Humanism that we have seen him expressing in the rest of his letters. The old interpretation of Erasmus' qualified response to Luther as merely timid (cf. e.g. Huizinga, p. 131) missed the fact that he was defending something he deeply cared for, and which he knew was not Luther's deep concern—also the fact that Erasmus' reform was potentially, like Luther's, a radical and comprehensive new theology (cf. Charles Trinkaus, "Erasmus, Augustine and the Nominalists," *ARG* 67 [1976], pp. 5032). Erasmus repeatedly expresses the fear not just that Luther will disrupt Christendom but that he will provide more opposition to all kinds of reform and thus make Erasmian work more difficult (936, 948, 967, 980)—as in fact began to happen soon after this volume's close. From Erasmus' point of view, Lutheranism was shaping up as another problem like Reuchlinism: thought about which he had reservations (like Reuchlin's interest in the Cabbala), tactics he deplored, a hazard to the large program he himself was pursuing with determination and sophistication (967). The volume ends before it had become clear that the Lutheran problem, while it would remain theoretically aligned towards Erasmus in the way outlined, would grow to have a much larger impact. We know that for Erasmus an unending difficulty is beginning.

The large categories of Erasmus' concern in these letters, with Christian Humanism and its intellectual and religious surroundings, have become the categories of sixteenth-century intellectual history. An attraction of collected letters, as Erasmus pointed out, is that in them concerns that have "gone public" are set back into their original (and, for Humanists, most genuine) context, the *ethos* of an individual (Allen, letter 1206, translated in Hillerbrand, Haworth, pp. 1-3). Undoubtedly the most entertaining letter in Volume Six is 867, in which the Humanistic career goes forward through a mass of irrelevant, lively personal experiences on the road from Basel back to Louvain. The character that may be abstracted from the letters in general is first of all a determined and an extremely energetic one. The achievements and controversies described earlier were efforts made through a "black" year of illness (887). Erasmus' pace of work was not only rapid, but unremitting: a correspondent corroborates our impression of "the indefatigable energy with which you work" (932: 14).

Part of this energy could be otherwise analyzed as unease, and nervousness and sensitivity certainly emerge here. Very little else emerges, indeed, in the long, tedious correspondence with Budé: in substance, these letters consist almost entirely of accusations about what you said about what I said about what you said. Erasmus is working out left-over severe anxiety about his disagreement with Lefevre (see *CWE* 5). Untoward anxiety is also aroused by Edward Lee, after all a very junior figure in relation to Erasmus.

Along with these symptoms of distortive nervous energy, however, there are convincing images in these letters of a much more friendly nature. The letters keep in touch with old friends, and recall happy personal scenes from years before (868). Of course they respond favorably to praise; they also respond warmly. Erasmus is not only gratified, but touched by the enthusiasm of Christoph Eschenfelder, customs officer on the Rhine, who when he discovers he is meeting Erasmus drags him home to be seen by wife, children and neighbors, and bribes the boatmen with wine to make them tolerate the delay (867: 50ff.). Erasmus writes a friendly letter back to him a few weeks after the encounter, telling a good story about the remarkable effects of Eschenfelder's wine on the boatman's wife (879).

The volume portrays not an untroubled but an ultimately positive personality. Through Erasmus' choices and in the midst of his other vicissitudes, Christian Humanism develops to an important point and begins to undergo one of its greatest stresses. Professors Mynors and Bietenholz transmit this material to us as classical *elocutio* directs, clearly, aptly and elegantly. They are excellent students and Humanistic imitators of Erasmus, and encourage us to imitate them.

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George M. Logan. *The Meaning of More's "Utopia."* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983. Pp. xv, 296. \$27.50.

In this boldly titled book, George Logan has set out to solve two of the most vexing problems in Morean scholarship. What were More's intentions in writing *Utopia*? And what kind of work is it? Despite a plethora of studies in the many relevant disciplines, More's *Utopia* has proven so resistant to even the most brilliant and rigorous analyses to which it has been subjected that there is no agreement on a solution for these (and other) problems. Professor Logan begins by telling us what the *Utopia* is not. It is neither a *jeu d'esprit* nor a mirror of normative political ideas, he claims. Nor is it to be viewed as satire, whether directed at England and/or Europe or at itself, and, more particularly, its second book and its narrator, Raphael Hythlodæus. Logan is especially adamant in attacking the latter notion. He takes issue, then, with the many literary critics (who are otherwise too diverse in the critical principles they follow to be called a school in any formal sense) who—aware of the incongruities, real and apparent, in the presentation and substance of *Utopia*—have come to see the work, in part or whole, as undermining the radical idealism that the *Utopia*, read at face value, seems to espouse. If this view is followed to its logical conclusion, indeed, the *Utopia* becomes an anti-



Utopia. But how then can we interpret the cry for justice that animates the text? For this and other reasons, Logan argues that we cannot understand *Utopia* without understanding its context, by which he means Western political theory. And he aligns himself with the "humanistic" school of interpreters, that is, those who are in some sense historical in their orientation. The most important such interpreters, for his purposes, are J. H. Hexter, Edward Surtz, S.J., and Quentin Skinner. But their assumptions and specific interpretations are often more diverse, and more at odds with one another, than Logan altogether acknowledges. Both the achievements and the limitations of his own study, then, partially depend upon the degree to which he successfully modifies and integrates such different perspectives with a more explicitly literary analysis of a text that he reads as a piece of political theory. For Logan, in short, the *Utopia* is "a serious work of political philosophy" (p. ix) that takes the strict form of a best-commonwealth exercise and "deserves a place among the most advanced and creative political writings of its era" (p. x).

Logan rightly insists upon reading "consecutively" (p. x) in developing his case, and he treats the three parts of *Utopia* in the order in which More arranged them. Chapter One is devoted to the too-frequently ignored prefatory letter to Peter Giles, viewed as an introduction to the whole work. Logan points to puzzlements with respect to chronology, etc., and sketches some of the many questions the text raises about its matter, order, style, and purpose. He also acknowledges the peculiar mode of the work, noting how the latter both calls attention to itself as fiction and mocks itself, an observation that could have been pursued, since it raises questions about the idea of *Utopia* as political philosophy that are not wholly worked out. But Logan's major concern, a crucial one, is to clarify Utopia's original audience. This is characterized as humanists, that is, "sophisticated literary scholars" (p. 23) who shared More's ideas and concerns. It follows, for Logan, that *Utopia* cannot be a *speculum principis*, for it would be absurd to imagine More offering "a disguised rehash of humanist prescriptions" (p. 26) to such an audience. The point is valid so far as it goes, but Logan's sense of audience seems to me too narrow. Most of More's fellow humanists were administrators as well as literary scholars: Peter Giles was secretary of Antwerp and the title-page of the *Utopia* identifies More as a citizen and sheriff of London. Additionally, More wrote to Erasmus in September, 1516, asking him to obtain letters of support from well-placed statesmen as well as intellectuals. It seems, then, that the *Utopia* was intended for persons with first-hand experience with problems of governance in an autocratic and power-hungry period. This is a point with far-reaching implications; for Logan, the *Utopia* is an abstract and rigorous intellectual construct, rationally following its own premises independent of the contemporaneous situation, whereas I think More expected readers who would bring a strong sense of political and social actualities to a work which impresses, in part, by its feignings and concreteness.

Logan's second chapter juxtaposes sections treating portions of the dialogue in Book I with sections where political theories are described at length. The connections between foreground and background are not always obvious, especially when the proof offered is more speculative than textual. But Logan's sense of



More's "systemic" or holistic view of society and his concern with the methods More used are salutary. Arguing that More anticipated modern model theory, he turns to Renaissance theorists in Northern Italy and to classical political thinkers to explain More's preoccupation. He divides the former into two groups, the pre-humanists, who stressed the need for the virtuous citizen, and the scholastics, who stressed the good institution and the machinery of government, and he maintains that Hythlodæus has affinities with the latter. I am not convinced by this apparent parallel, since it is not clear that *public interest* meant the same thing to both parties and since the particular system that Hythlodæus describes seems quite opposite to the political model assumed in Italy, where class structure remained and factions were controlled, not eliminated. In any case, Logan admits that there is no real evidence for More's familiarity with these Italian theorists. He does, however, argue for the influence of Greek and Roman political theorists, whom he divides into two groups: one, rhetorical, Roman, and Stoic, he portrays as influencing the early humanists; the other philosophical, Platonic, and Aristotelian, as influencing the scholastics. Asking the crucial question—what is the best form of the *polis*—this second tradition led to the city-state preoccupations of the Italian humanists. By contrast, the Northern humanists remained true to a Stoic and normative point of view. But such distinctions, it appears, are broken down in the course of *Utopia*. For Logan argues that More is trying "to fuse humanist and scholastic political theory" and to grapple with the classical works behind them (p. 94). The conclusion he draws is twofold. On the one hand, he remarks that More is less original than he is usually viewed. On the other, he grants that More significantly deviates from this classical pattern of political analysis. Unlike the Greeks, in other words, More is interested in *testing* the experiment and in the use of imaginative models. And he is preoccupied with the question of what is expedient and what is moral. These differences seem to me even more radical than they do to Logan. In fact, I think that one of the most important contributions this chapter makes is its repeated recognition of More's vital concern with the relationship between *honestas* and *utilitas*.

When he comes to Book II of *Utopia*, Logan abandons his consecutive reading, choosing instead to define and discuss the constituents of the best-commonwealth exercise that, he believes, More is both replicating and criticizing in his Utopian republic. Logan identifies four steps in this exercise, which finds its prototypes in Herodotus, Plato's *Republic* and *Laws*, and Aristotle's *Politics*, and has "at its core the conception of the polis as a system of reciprocally-affecting parts" (p. 132). Step 1 is the determination of the best life for the individual; step 2, the overall goal of the commonwealth; step 3, the elaboration of the component parts; and step 4, the forms these must take (p. 136). We could recognize this pattern immediately, Logan maintains, were it not for the form More adopted. By substituting a model for Greek dialectics and by presenting that model "as a fictional travelogue" (p. 139) More has doubly suppressed or disguised his dialectical substructure and reorganized his topics "for the rather different order (or disorder) of the traveler's tale" (p. 140). Logan subsequently recreates the "cornerstone" or step 1 of More's model, namely Utopia's moral philosophy. This philosophy of virtuous pleasure (or pleasurable virtue) is inherently paradoxical. Logan grants this, but aims to reduce it to a "logical sequence" (p. 147). It seems to me that he

has paraphrased its constituent parts instead, for as paradox it often relies on verbal sleights and errors in logic. To put this another way, not only is Utopia's Epicureanism "contaminated" (p. 155) by Stoicism; it is radically altered by concealed Platonic and Christian concepts that could lead us to ask what Epicureanism comes to mean in Utopia. I am, then, less convinced than Logan is that "purely rational considerations" (p. 180) operate here (or at those points in Book II where More seems to be creating red herrings), although I would agree that this section of *Utopia* is central to our understanding of what Utopia is.

Logan further argues that "the main aspects of the Utopian constitution" follow from Utopian conclusions about the best life (p. 182) and that *all* the substantial features of Utopia are related to the section on moral philosophy (p. 185). He insists, then, that there is no necessary connection between England (or Europe) and Utopia: only in "indifferent features" (p. 193) may the two agree, as in the case of Utopia's location in the new world. Here and elsewhere I think Logan discounts evidence, both intrinsic and extrinsic, regarding relationships (which are sometimes inverted or reversed mirror-images) between the actual world and More's fictive one. Utopia's geography is deliberately antipodean, and Erasmus' point (in his letter to Ulrich von Hutten) about More's writing *Utopia* with the English constitution in mind deserves consideration, as do the marginal glosses. But if Logan is not much interested in the details of life in Utopia or in the nature of Utopian negation, and virtually ignores the first half of Book II, he does not ignore the unpleasant aspects of this state, wrestling, for example, with the thorny problems of war and foreign policy. Admitting that these are unsolved (and perhaps unsolvable), he sees them as the logical result of More's best-commonwealth exercise. He argues, too, that More is well aware of the tensions between Utopian values and Utopian actions; national security and the need to equalize pleasure collide, as do the goals of freedom and stability (and this explains Utopia's repressiveness). His own final view of *Utopia* is double. As a best-commonwealth exercise of "unprecedented sophistication" (p. 248) it is, he says, both "a protest against the ideas of secular theorists" and "a corrective to the naive optimism" of More's fellow Christian humanists (p. 249). It is deeply indebted to classical political theory, and is preeminently a product of Renaissance humanism. But it cannot be read as prescriptive theory. Rather, it is a thoughtful critique of humanistic ideals and an attack upon *realpolitisch* tendencies.

This is an ambitious interpretation of a perplexing text, and it would be utopian indeed to expect complete agreement from any one reader. I find More's *Utopia* a much funnier (though no less serious) work than Logan does, and accordingly would interpret individual passages rather differently. I worry about his tendency to treat the fictive elements as so much sugar-coating; like other aspects of the work, the aesthetic too is unusually sophisticated and accomplished. And I would urge a much less restrictive sense of context; More's intentions, I believe, were more complex, and the resulting work more protean, flexible, and fully imagined and felt than the one portrayed here. But *The Meaning of More's "Utopia"* is a significant exploration of theoretical political aspects. Bringing an enormous amount of material to bear upon our understanding of *Utopia*, it reopens fundamental issues that much recent criticism has evaded. Logan's concern for a historical perspective and his determination to redress readings that may trivialize

or otherwise diminish a major work impress, as does his willingness to tackle the truly tough, central questions. And I would agree that a "primary purpose of *Utopia* was to stimulate political thought" (p. 252), or, more particularly, to exercise the mind, imagination, and moral sense of the reader on the question of the best commonwealth.

ELIZABETH McCUTCHEON, *University of Hawaii*



## News / Nouvelles

### **CSRS – A Call for Papers for Montreal, 1985**

At the General Meeting we decided on the following broad areas for sessions at our meetings at the University of Montreal in the spring of 1985. The deadline for the submission of papers is February 1. The subjects proposed for the informal discussions and papers are: Pierre Ronsard, The Historical Imagination, Symposia on Major Research Projects in Canada, Open Topics.

Members are urged to submit proposals or suggestions for papers, colloquia, or panels exploring different aspects of the suggested topics. In particular, suggestions are invited for sessions involving several participants who will either present position papers, or otherwise act as respondents or collaborate in their approaches to a topic. Members are also asked to make suggestions for a guest speaker who might be invited to speak on an appropriate topic. Proposals should be sent to: Robert Melançon, Études françaises et littérature comparée, University of Montreal, P.O. Box 6128, Station A, MONTREAL, (Québec), H3C 3J7

### **SCER – Un appel pour des communications, Montreal, 1985**

À l'Assemblée générale nous avons décidé d'adopter certains grands sujets pour les sessions lors de nos rencontres au printemps de 1985 à l'Université de Montréal. La date limite pour présenter des communications est le 1<sup>er</sup> février. Les sujets de communications pour nos réunions seront: Pierre Ronsard, L'Imagination historique, Symposiums sur de grands projets de recherches au Canada, Sujets divers.

Nos membres sont invités à soumettre des propositions ou des suggestions pour les conférences, les colloques, ou les tables rondes afin d'explorer les différents aspects des sujets suggérés. En particulier, nous voulons des suggestions de sessions qui impliqueront plusieurs participants. Ceux-ci présenteront des conférences ou, autrement, ils agiront de discussion. Les membres sont aussi priés de proposer le nom d'un conférencier qui pourrait traiter d'un sujet approprié. Toute proposition devrait être envoyée à:

Robert Melançon, Études françaises et littérature comparée, Université de Montréal, C.P. 6128, succursale A, MONTREAL, (Québec), H3C 3J7

### **RSA Annual Meeting**

The Renaissance Conference of Southern California will be host to the annual meeting of the Renaissance Society of America, March 21–23, 1985 at the Huntington Library, Art Gallery, and Botanical Gardens, San Marino. Seventy-five papers on the Italian and Northern Renaissance will be presented in a variety of sessions. Evening events will include a Renaissance banquet at Occidental College, Los Angeles, and a reception and gallery exhibit at the J. Paul Getty Museum, Malibu. The Conference will feature the RSA interdisciplinary panel, the Josephine Waters Bennett Lecture, and the Francis Bacon Foundation Lecture. For further information write to Wendy Furman, Secretary Treasurer Renaissance Conference of Southern California, Whittier College, Whittier, California 90608.



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NEWS / NOUVELLES

# Towards a Study of the 'Famiglia' of the Sforza Court at Pesaro

SABINE EICHE

In recent years, scholars of the Italian Renaissance have revived an interest in the social customs of the period, directed towards a better understanding and evaluation of the modes of life of the Renaissance individual. Contemporary biographies, diaries and correspondence, as well as account books and inventories, which already had greatly stimulated the curiosity of our nineteenth- and early twentieth-century predecessors in the field, are once again being assiduously studied and gleaned for insights.

Another potential tool for these investigations has been overlooked more often than not: the structure of a courtly household, the *famiglia*.<sup>1</sup> It should be said at this point that the term *famiglia* was an elastic one in the period under consideration, and that as a result its precise meaning in a given context is not always immediately clear to the modern reader. With reference to a courtly establishment such as that in Milan, Ferrara, Mantua, Urbino, Pesaro, and so forth, the title *famiglia* describes not only the family and relatives of the lord, but also the attendants, and will be used by me in the sense of all those who served the lord.

The *famiglia*, then, was composed of staff, who assisted the *signore* in the running of his state, and of domestics, whose concern was the lord's personal well-being. The size and complexity of a *famiglia* depended on the political and economic rank of the court, but a basic framework will have been common to most. From the types of *famigliari* employed we can gain an idea of the administrative policies of the ruler, of his activities and social pretensions. The relationship between the *famiglia* and the lord was effective in both directions; that is, just as they served him, so he too had certain obligations on their behalf. Therefore, by studying the household, we can also learn something about how the court, in the narrower sense of the palace, functioned as a domestic unit.

The list of *famigliari* serving at the Pesaro court in the fifteenth century was compiled by me from a variety of sources (see Appendix below). Quite different and more fortunate is the situation in neighbouring Urbino. At the



beginning of the sixteenth century, a page who had once been in the employ of Federigo da Montefeltro, made a list of the former Duke's *famiglia*, the names arranged under the headings of the appropriate offices.<sup>2</sup> Probably not all two hundred members noted by the page were in service at the same time; and the same applies to a chronicler's statement that *Lo Ill.o Signor Duca Federico Feltrio Duca d'Urbino . . . teneva alli serviti sui, bocche No. 800 . . .*<sup>3</sup> The Pesaro list covers an even wider time span than that of Urbino (the Sforza ruled in Pesaro 1445-1512; Federigo was lord of Urbino from 1444-82), and thus cannot reflect the actual structure of the court at any specific moment. It is almost certainly incomplete, since we can expect that documents which I have not yet had the chance to examine will reveal still more names. Nevertheless, for reasons pertaining mainly to the financial and political standing of the court, the Pesaro register, for the period of any one of its Sforza *signori*, will always be surpassed by that of Urbino.

Names and titles are little more than statistics until we know something about the duties of the *famigliari*. Once again Urbino enters into the picture, for there survives from the Renaissance an enlightening treatise entitled *Ordini et offitij alla corte del Serenissimo Signor Duca d'Urbino*.<sup>4</sup> The author, who remains anonymous although he must have been one of Federigo's court, painstakingly describes the responsibilities of various functionaries, mainly domestic, down to details concerning their personal hygiene. The states of Urbino and Pesaro were structured similarly and were closely linked, not only geographically and politically, but also through inter-marriages, and therefore in an examination of the Sforza court we can safely be guided by some of the instructions written down in the *Ordini et offitij* of Urbino.

Before embarking on a discussion of the Pesaro *famiglia*, it will be useful to introduce the court by way of a historical sketch of the town and its rulers.<sup>5</sup> A port on the Adriatic to the south of Rimini, Pesaro had been a free commune since the late twelfth century. From the late thirteenth until mid-fifteenth centuries, the town was ruled by a branch of the Malatesta family, first in the guise of *Podestà*, and then as Papal Vicars. In 1445 the inept Galeazzo Malatesta sold the town to Francesco Sforza on the condition that Francesco's brother, Alessandro, just married to Galeazzo's granddaughter, Costanza Varano, be installed as a ruler. The negotiation was in fact highly irregular, since Pesaro was a vicariate of the Church, and it resulted in Pope Eugenius IV excommunicating all parties to the contract. But Alessandro, determined not to relinquish his newly acquired state, persevered and in 1447 Eugenius's successor, Nicholas V, removed the ban and appointed him Papal Vicar.

Alessandro's wife, Costanza, died that same year, leaving him with two children, Battista (future Countess of Urbino) and Costanzo, who were to

be his only legitimate offspring. In 1448 he married again, choosing Sveva da Montefeltro, half-sister of Federigo, Count of Urbino. The alliance was disastrous and after a few years ended as so many did, with the wife seeking refuge in a convent.

Like his father and brother, Alessandro was a professional soldier, an occupation that denoted long absences from home. While his two consorts were at the court, they could take care of whatever matters, state or otherwise, appeared on the agenda.<sup>6</sup> By 1457 Sveva had fled, and the responsibility devolved upon Alessandro's son, ably guided during the early years by members of the staff.

Costanzo became *Signore* of Pesaro after Alessandro died in 1473. Two years later he contracted a brilliant marriage with Camilla d'Aragona, niece of King Ferdinando of Naples. Costanzo outlived his father by only ten years, and, having no legitimate children, was succeeded to the rule by his bastard son, Giovanni. Camilla, by many accounts a wise and charitable stepmother, shared the government of the town with Giovanni until he attained his majority in 1489. In May 1490, when he married Madalena Gonzaga, Camilla left the court forever, withdrawing to the estate of Torricella, near Parma.

Giovanni married three times, his second union (1493-97) being the ill-fated one to Lucrezia Borgia. In October of 1500 he temporarily lost his state to his former brother-in-law, Cesare Borgia, but with the assistance of Venice was back in power in 1503. Giovanni ruled without further interruptions until his death in 1510.

The new Lord was the infant Costanzo II, a son Giovanni had with his third wife, the Venetian Ginevra Tiepolo. According to the terms of his will, Giovanni's natural brother, Galeazzo, was to be appointed regent until Costanzo II was of age. The heir, however, died within two years of his father's demise, after which Galeazzo prepared to assume power in his own name. But Pope Julius II, long interested in Pesaro, bought out Galeazzo, and added the town to the dominions of his nephew, Francesco Maria della Rovere, for whom he had already previously (1504) managed to secure the succession to the Dukedom of Urbino.

\* \* \*

By the time Alessandro Sforza ruled the town, the government of Pesaro can be described as a co-operative effort between the commune and the lord. Two councils, the *consiglio generale* and the *consiglio di credenza* (of nobles), constituted the main bodies of communal authority. The lord of Pesaro for his part, invested with the rule as Papal Vicar, governed in the name of the Church, at least in theory if not always in deed. However, clear distinction between communal and vicarial/seigneurial power is not in fact possible since the lord, if and when he chose, could have regulated the size,



and therefore the executive potential, of the two municipal councils. Furthermore, and the situation is not peculiar to Pesaro, an officer of the commune could at the same time have been in the employment of the *signore*.<sup>7</sup> Thus it is not surprising to learn that the lord could intervene even in the appointment of municipal servants.<sup>8</sup>

When compared to the organization of the administrative offices of the Duchy of Milan, the relative simplicity of the personnel at Pesaro is clearly indicative of the court's secondary role in the political structure of fifteenth-century Italy.<sup>9</sup> The staff assisting the ruler of Pesaro in running his state was headed by three ministers: the *luogotenente*, the *segretario* or *cancelliere*, and the *referendario*.<sup>10</sup> The *auditore*, who counselled and had jurisdictional powers, also will have been an important functionary. Appointments do not seem to have been restrictive, for we read in the documents that an individual could serve in more than one high capacity simultaneously; and in at least two instances the Sforza's personal doctor performed ministerial duties: Benedetto Reguardati da Norcia was physician and *luogotenente* of Alessandro, and Giovanni's doctor, Bernardo Monaldi, was also his *segretario*, not to mention occasional agent in Venice.

Essentially the *signore's* principal representative, the *luogotenente* obviously had to be someone fully in the ruler's confidence. If satisfactory, he held his post for a long time and could survive a change of *signori*. For instance, the name of Niccolò della Palude is encountered frequently in the documents, first serving Alessandro, then Costanzo. Being one of high rank in the lord's *famiglia*, the *luogotenente* was clothed and housed by his employer.<sup>11</sup> In a debit account of Alessandro's we can read that he had paid two *lire*, ten *soldi*, to a shoemaker for Niccolò's boots, and further down in the same list is an entry amounting to twenty *lire* that he had given for clothes for Niccolò and Angelo (de Probis d'Atri, *segretario*?). Niccolò lived in a room *iuxta camera domicellarum* of the Sforza residence.<sup>12</sup> Giovanni's *luogotenente*, Dulcius, still had his quarters in the ruler's palace, but by the time of Guidobaldo della Rovere, in the mid-sixteenth century, the Duke's *luogotenente* was assigned rooms in the newly constructed Palazzo Comunale.<sup>13</sup>

*Cancellieri*, and the *segretario*, a superior *cancelliere*, handled correspondence and related matters. As the Urbino *Ordini et offitij* tells us, such officers should be *pochi, pratici, boni, sufficienti et fidelissimi quanto più se possesse dire*. The *segretario* kept the seal, which could also be delegated to a trusted *cancelliere*. Letters sent from the court did not leave without being checked by him, and he kept and filed incoming correspondence *per modo che omne una, per minima, bisognando se retrovasse*.<sup>14</sup> Giovanni, in his will, echoes some of these recommendations: *Item voglio, che tutte le expeditioni importante del Stato, passino*



*per mano de' Turricella (his segretario/cancelliere), et che sotto lui se toglia uno Cancelliero per le expeditioni occorrenti, le qual tutte si habbiano ad expedire secondo l'ordine et commissione di mio Fratello (Galeazzo).*<sup>15</sup>

The *referendario* (sometimes called *revisore*), third of the three top state officials, administered the finances.<sup>16</sup> Helping him and the *cancellieri* in the execution of their duties were the *computista*, *cassiero*, *avvocato fiscale*, *scrittore*, *depositario*, *tesoriere*, and *maestro delle entrate*.

Many of the officials engaged in state affairs had their working quarters in the palace. The *cancelleria* of the Pesaro court initially was located on the ground floor of the Sforza palace, near the entrance portico. By the early sixteenth century it had been moved to the upper storey of the residence, although still in the front wing, into the former music room. Near the ground floor *cancelleria* was the *audientia* of the *referendario*. It was most efficient to have the offices of the staff concentrated in one part of the palace, but the Pesaro residence, unlike that of Federigo da Montefeltro, was not built anew with few restrictions, and thus never achieved the ideal organization of spaces prescribed by Renaissance architectural theorists. In fact, documents reveal that in the 1450's the room of the *computista*, at that time the Florentine Giovanni Battista dell'Antella, was in the rear wing of the residence, on an upper floor, close to the private apartment of the young Costanzo Sforza.<sup>17</sup>

A courtly staff was not limited to internal functionaries; important roles were played also by the *oratori*, or ambassadors, in foreign centres. They served primarily as diplomats and informers. We know that Alessandro had a man, Roberto Ondedei, in Venice; Costanzo sent Domenico di Barignano and Giacomo Probo d'Atria to Rome as *oratori*; Giovanni as well kept ambassadors at those two courts, and also in Milan. Like the *luogotenente*, the ambassadors were men of the utmost confidence, so that when they served well, they served long. Or, as Giovanni phrased it in his will: *Item si mantenga sempre un' Ambasciadore residente in Roma il quale per essere stato fedele, et haver diligentemente servito, non mi pare, se habbia ad mutare.*<sup>18</sup>

Before turning from state to domestic officials, reference should be made to the Sforza's other occupation as mercenary soldiers. It was a profession that in time of war required the maintenance of a large retinue of men-at-arms. When Alessandro was hired by the Venetian Republic in 1467, it is said that his contract stipulated 600 calvary and 2,000 infantry.<sup>19</sup> Top officers were chosen from among the Sforza intimates. Costanzo, for instance, selected as two of his *capi di squadra* or *squadreri*, Niccolò di Barignano, his *segretario*, and Raniero Almerici, *equitis*, who in 1468 had been created Count Palatine, probably at the urging of Alessandro.

The Sforza court employed a large body of personnel, whose tasks ran

from the purely banal to the intellectual and spiritual. Household chores, for example the putting in order of rooms in the morning, were carried out by *massari*, as we can read in a letter of 1457 reporting on a domestic crisis.<sup>20</sup> Their status cannot have been too low, however, for as is written in another letter of 1458 directed by Pier Sante da Sarnano to the Duchess of Milan, the twelve-year-old Battista during her father's absence from the court was attended by numerous ladies-in-waiting and *massare da bene*.<sup>21</sup>

A variety of servants were occupied with the preparation and serving of food at court. The Urbino *Ordini et offitij* recommended separate cooks for the *famiglia*, the guests, and the lord. We cannot be certain that the Sforza followed the prescribed arrangement since the documents found to date are virtually silent on this aspect of daily life at the court. The name of only one cook, Giovanni di Pietro alias Riccio del fu Scaramuccia di Torricella parmense, serving in 1493, has come to light. The only other information we have is that the kitchens in the Sforza residence were located below ground level.<sup>22</sup> To inspect these quarters in the morning and at night was the duty of the *scalco* or *siniscalco*, who had to ensure that the lord was served according to his tastes. All matters pertaining to the lord's table were his responsibility. The *scalco* was rated superior to all other servants, with the exception of the *maestro di casa*, *ragioniere*, and *fattore generale*, this latter in charge of the numerous country estates.<sup>23</sup> Revealing for the confidential position of the *scalco* is a remark by the above mentioned Pier Sante in the same letter of 1458: for the six-month period when Alessandro was away on a mission to France and the Netherlands, Marco Monaldi, his *scalco*, was the one who had *la cura principale de Constantio ad ogni ora*. Benedetto Reguardati da Norcia confirms this when he writes, likewise in a letter of 1458 to the Duchess of Milan: *Per suo* (Costanzo's) *governo sta Marco Monaldi scalco*.<sup>24</sup> The eleven-year-old Costanzo at the same time had his own personal *scalco*, Francesco de maestro Angelo.

Assisting the *scalco* at the table was the *credenziere*, who saw to it that the silver and table linens were impeccably clean. He furthermore had to guard the silver and other precious things consigned to his care by the *maestro di casa*, *scalco* and *maestro di guardaroba*. In view of his extra duty as watchman, it was suggested that he live in a conveniently located room in the palace.<sup>25</sup>

A splendid picture of the ritual at table can be gained from the description of Costanzo's wedding celebrations in 1475. At the banquet, two *siniscalchi*, in this case the young relatives Carlo Sforza and Ercole Bentivoglio, were deputed to the head table. Each carried a golden baton to mark his elevated status among the attendants, and brought to the seated guests a golden basket filled with cutlery and napkins. Thirty *garzoni* and *servitori* helped the *siniscalchi* to wait.<sup>26</sup>



On the occasion of such great feasts, and at times also for more ordinary events, musicians, singers and dancers would entertain. Costanzo's wedding meal was enlivened by *pifferi*, *trombetti*, *tamburini*, an organist and thirty-six singers.<sup>27</sup> History has remembered the names of only two fifteenth-century *ballerini* at the court of Pesaro. Guglielmo *ebreo* was choreographer of the dances at Alessandro's wedding in December 1444, and later in 1463 he dedicated a dance treatise to Galeazzo Maria Sforza of Milan. The services rendered at Pesaro by the second *ballerino*, Giovanni Ambrogio, are not known, although a treatise by him figures in the Sforza library inventory drawn up in 1500. A letter written in 1466 by Giovanni Ambrogio reveals that shortly before that date he had come from the court of Milan to that of Naples to instruct the young Eleonora d'Aragona *alo ballare lombardi*.<sup>28</sup>

Valet of the *signore* was the *cameriere maggiore*, assisting him to dress and undress, and ascertaining that everything in the lord's room was to his satisfaction. Should the *signore* decide to wear jewels, the *cameriere maggiore* was held responsible for their safety until they were restored to their place in the *guardaroba*.<sup>29</sup>

The Urbino *Ordini et offitij* laid great stress on cleanliness and hygienics, and one of the people engaged to maintain the desired standard at court was the *barbiere*. Whereas the barber of the *famiglia* was required to be able to pull teeth and treat cirrhosis, the personal barber of the lord, *uno giovane pulito, discreto*, concerned himself with washing the hair of the pages, or of anyone else sent to him by the *signore*. He had to make sure that the cloths designated for use by the lord were kept white and clean, and the razors and other instruments in good working order. It was recommended that he have a shop in the palace, and in the case of Alessandro we know that his *barbiere* was assigned a room on the courtyard of the residence.<sup>30</sup>

The *maggiordomo*, or *maestro di casa*, oversaw the entire domestic staff. Representing the authority of his master, he had to ensure that all the lord's orders were carried out. Accordingly, he was to be given a room in the palace *in honorato loco, dove el discorso de tucto sia facillissimo*.<sup>31</sup>

Administering to the religious needs at court was the *cappellano*. We learn from the letter of Pier Sante, describing the situation at Pesaro during Alessandro's extended absence, that the young Battista and Costanzo had *el capellano che ogni dì gli dice messa in casa*.<sup>32</sup> When necessary the chaplain could also act as confessor. Regarding Alessandro, this service would not have been required after 1470 because on 29 May of that year he had been granted a *Bolla con uno breve apostolica de possere haute dui confessori religiosi apresso se*.<sup>33</sup> The *cappellano* was furthermore instructed to give the *maestro di casa* and the *scalco* two days notice of *tucte le vigilie comandate et quatro tempore et quaresima*.<sup>34</sup>



An essential member of the *famiglia* was the humanist tutor. Instead of sending his children to be educated at a foreign court, such as that of Ferrara where he himself as a young boy had attended classes, Alessandro hired grammar masters to instruct Battista and Costanzo at home. One of these was Matteo da Sassoferrato, father of the famous Pandolfo Colenuccio. Perhaps Matteo, also trained as a notary and *cancelliere*, did not possess all the humanistic skills desired by Alessandro, since in 1459 when the children had reached the ages of twelve and thirteen he replaced him with the more illustrious Martino Filetico, pupil of Guarino Guarini.

Like the Montefeltro, the Sforza of Pesaro owned a notable collection of manuscripts and employed a librarian to take care of them. Vespasiano da Bisticci, in his biography of Alessandro, wrote that he had *uno uomo dotissimo con buona provizione sopra questa libreria*.<sup>35</sup> It is the only mention I have found to date of the Sforza librarian, and not even his name is known to us. A chapter in the *Ordini et offitij* outlining the librarian's responsibilities can also serve to shed light on the Sforza man's daily routine. Besides keeping an inventory of all the manuscripts, and a record of those lent out, the *bibliotecario* was required to shelve the works according to an orderly system so that any manuscript would always be easy to locate. He should endeavour to prevent thefts, of which there was always the danger when many people (*multitudine*) thronged in the library. The manuscripts were to be guarded from the silly, the ignorant, the filthy and the disgusting. Care was to be taken that no one creased pages or turned back to the same page too often, *et, quando se mustrano a persona ignorante che per curiosità li volesse vedere, se non è di troppo auctorità, basta una ochiata*.<sup>36</sup>

Federigo da Montefeltro maintained a team of scribes and illuminators, but there is no evidence that Alessandro did the same. Probably he had to content himself with commissioning artists at foreign courts to produce the manuscripts for him. It is not until the time of Costanzo that we encounter the name of a *copista* at court, and it is still unclear if he was alone or part of a workshop.<sup>37</sup>

Housing Federigo's library in the palace at Urbino was a room of modest dimensions, located at ground level between the entrance vestibule and the stairs to the upper storey.<sup>38</sup> Also Alessandro built a library in his town palace, but it does not survive and once again Vespasiano's words remain the only reference to its appearance: *. . . fece fare uno degnissimo luogo nel suo palagio con armarii intorno dove erano per ordine tutti quegli libri*.<sup>39</sup> Further evidence for concluding that the design and organization of the Sforza library must have been admirable is provided by a letter that Vespasiano addressed to Alessandro, requesting his highly-valued opinion on a new arrangement of the Medici library.<sup>40</sup> We cannot be absolutely sure of the room's location in the Sforza palace, but I have

proposed elsewhere, on the basis of a late fifteenth-century document, that already from the time of Alessandro the library had been one of the rooms overlooking the garden near S. Agata.<sup>41</sup>

Another part of the *famiglia* was occupied with construction and repair work at the court. Under the heading of *Ingegneri, et Architetti* the Urbino list proudly includes Luciano da Laurana and Francesco di Giorgio, two names difficult to surpass in the 1460's and 1470's.<sup>42</sup> Although Alessandro sometimes requested Laurana's intervention in building projects at Pesaro, he never engaged him as court architect.<sup>43</sup> The situation changed with Alessandro's son. From 1476 until his death in 1479, Laurana, who by then had left Urbino, figures in the documents as the engineer of Costanzo Sforza. It is to him that the design of the Rocca Costanza is attributed, the most important construction underway in Pesaro during those years. Cherubino di Milano was another of Costanzo's engineers, and he continued to work for Giovanni. A document of 1492 describes him as the superintendent of all work on fortifications, bridges, roads, dams, etc.

Finally, a word can be said about the recruitment of individuals for the household. In at least two instances, that of Francesco Becci and that of Marco Citara, we know that the servants had been merchants prior to their employment at court. Although to us such social mobility may suggest an enlightened tolerance, the procedure could have been simply the most expedient way of satisfying a need. The names of the *famigliari* at the Sforza court reveal that often members of the same family continued to serve for more than one generation, or that more than one individual of the same generation was engaged. In this regard, the most prominent family was that of the Almerici, who could boast at least six *famigliari* at the court, and who remained one of the most important aristocratic families of the town long after the Sforza had died out.

\* \* \*

The purpose of this essay has been twofold. On the one hand, I have tried to indicate the usefulness of studying the organization of a noble household, in the hope of encouraging similar examinations for other Italian courts. Furthermore, with the focus on Pesaro, I have wanted to begin to remove some of the obscurity that shrouds so many aspects of Renaissance life in that town, and to stimulate the search for more documents which would broaden and clarify our picture of the Sforza court.

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## Notes

- 1 Cardinal's *famiglie*, on the other hand, have received considerable attention; see, for instance, A. Paravicini Bagliani, *Cardinali di Curia e "Familiae" cardinalizie . . . 1227-54*, 2 vols., Padua 1972, especially pp.443-516; N. Zacour, "Papal Regulations of Cardinals' Households in the Fourteenth Century," *Speculum*, (1975), pp. 434-55; K. Weil-Garris and J.F. D'Amico, *The Renaissance Cardinal's Ideal Palace: A Chapter from Cortesi's De Cardinalatu*, Rome, 1980; D'Amico, *Renaissance Humanism in Papal Rome*, Baltimore, 1983, pp.38ff. An examination of a royal household, but primarily from the administrative point of view is included by A. Ryder, *The Kingdom of Naples under Alfonso the Magnanimous*, Oxford, 1976, pp.54-90. Some stirrings of interest in the functions of a Renaissance courtly household can be found in W. Gundersheimer, *Ferrara*, Princeton, 1973, pp.51ff, 285-96. An excellent and stimulating account of noble households, but in England rather than Italy, is in M. Girouard, *Life in the English Country House*, New Haven, 1978.
- 2 Vatican Library cod. Urb. lat. 1204, *Memoria felicissima dell'illustrissimo signor duca Federico e della sua famiglia che tenea*, cc.97v ff. The author is Susech of Casteldurante. G. Zannoni published it, but not without mistakes, in *Scrittori cortegiani dei Montefeltro*, Rome 1894, pp.80-85; the errors are corrected by L. Venturi in "Studi sul Palazzo Ducale," *L'Arte* vol. 17, 1914, pp. 470-71. Also G. Ermini printed it, as the Appendix to his publication of the Vatican Library cod. Urb. lat. 1248, *Ordini et offitij alla corte del Serenissimo Signor Duca d'Urbino*, Urbino 1932. See also C.H. Clough, "Federigo da Montefeltro's Patronage of the Arts, 1468-82," *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* vol.36, 1973, pp. 131-32 and n.17. At the *Convegno di studi su Federico da Montefeltro*, Urbino 3-8 October 1982, P. Peruzzi delivered a paper entitled "Ordine et officij: lavorare a Corte," stressing the political significance of the household. A list of court officials exists also for Ferrara in the fifteenth century, contained in the chronicle of Ugo Caleffini, Vatican Library cod. Chig. I.I.4; see Gundersheimer, *Ferrara*, pp.285ff.
- 3 Clough, "Federigo," pp.131-32. The chronicle is published by G. Baccini, "Ristretto di fatti d'Italia e specialmente d'Urbino dal 1404 al 1444," *Zibaldone*, Florence 1888, p.93.
- 4 See n.2 above. All my references to the *Ordini et offitij* will be to the Ermini edition.
- 5 For what follows see my dissertation, *Alessandro Sforza and Pesaro: A Study in Urbanism and Architectural Patronage*, Princeton 1982.
- 6 See for instance Pesaro, Biblioteca Oliveriana (hereafter Bibl.Oliv.) 455, vol.1, cc.129-31: Supplica di Nofria moglie del fu Niccolò delli Balignani (*sic.*) da Pesaro a Costanza, moglie di Alessandro Sforza, che governava in assenza del marito a Roma (22 March 1447); c.190: Ordine di Sveva Sforza, in assenza del marito Alessandro, al Conte Vano dei Bonifazi da Sarnano, Podestà di Pesaro per l'appello d'una causa che verteva tra Bonaccursio di Pietro de' Monaldi e Madonna Raffaella figlia di Giovanni di Oddo di Taddeo delli Ranieri (22 April 1450); c.326: Madonna Sveva, moglie d'Alessandro Sforza, sottoscrive una supplica del Dottore Antonio Silvestri per alcuni beni comprati da forestieri (2 January 1455); 455, vol.II, cc.153-63: La Contessa Sveva dispensa della guardia per l'età Pietro Buxio (22 May 1456).
- 7 Clough, "Sources for the Economic History of the Duchy of Urbino, 1474-1508," *Manuscripta* vol.10, 1966, p.9; Gundersheimer, *Ferrara*, p.292.
- 8 For instance, on 9 December 1488, Giovanni and Camilla nominated Vincenzo de' Fedeli di Pesaro and Alberto Alberti as the *Ufficiali dei Pupilli*; see Bibl.Oliv. 376, vol.VI, c.422. On 8 March 1496 Giovanni appointed Pier Matteo Giordani as *Ufficiale dei danni*, reconfirmed in 1498, 1499, and 1503; see Bibl.Oliv. 376, vol.IX, cc.136-37.
- 9 For Milan see the excellent modern study by C. Santoro, *Gli uffici del dominio sforzesco* (1450-1500), Milan 1948, especially the introduction, pp.xv-xxxiii, where she defines the duties of the various officers. Also useful here is G. Rezasco, *Dizionario del linguaggio italiano storico ed amministrativo*, Florence 1881, rpt. Bologna 1966.
- 10 B. Feliciangeli, *Sull'acquisto di Pesaro fatto da Cesare Borgia*, Camerino 1900, p.53 n.2.
- 11 See the *Ordini et offitij*, pp.36, 37-39.
- 12 The accounts page is published in my dissertation (see n.5), pp.478-79; for the reference to Niccolò's room in the palace see my dissertation, p.483, docs. 17, 18.



- 13 For Dulcius see my dissertation, p.496 doc.70, p.497 doc.73, p.498, doc.76. For the Duke's *luogotenente* see G. Vaccai, *Pesaro*, Pesaro 1909, p.123.
- 14 *Ordini et offitij*, pp.76-80. The *cancellieri* and *segreteria* should be "few in number, capable, superior and as faithful as possible;" the *segretario* filed the letters "systematically so that they could always be easily found again."
- 15 "I want Turricella to be in charge of all important correspondence pertaining to the affairs of state, and he should have a *cancelliere* to help him, and everything must be carried out according to the orders of my brother." Giovanni's testament will be fully transcribed by me in a forthcoming study.
- 16 But cf. Gundersheimer, *Ferrara*, p.56: the *referendarius* served as head of the *cancelleria*. Giovanni's will makes it clear that in Pesaro he was in charge of the accounts: Item che 'l faccia rivedere tutti i conti vecchi da qui in dreto, et chi hà ad dare dia, et chi hà ad havere sia soddisfatto, talmente che ogni uno habbia il suo credito, et se 'l non si potesse così al presente, satisfacciati quando si potrà, purcha una volta sieno contenti, et ch'el se striga tutti li conti vecchi, et ad questo sarà buono Marco Cithera (his *referendario* and *maestro delle entrate*) per essere instrutto.
- 17 See my dissertation, pp.166, 171, 480-81 doc.5, 487 doc.31, 490 docs. 44, 46, 491 doc.50, 492 doc.51, 493-94 doc.59.
- 18 "There should always be a resident ambassador in Rome, and if he is faithful and serves diligently, it is not necessary to replace him."
- 19 G. Soranzo, *Cronaca di Anonimo Veronese 1446-1488*, Monumenti di Storia Patria, ser.3. Cronache e diari, vol.IV, Venice 1915, p.243. A very useful study, explaining *condottieri*'s contracts, is that by M. Mallett, "Venice and its Condottieri, 1404-54," in *Renaissance Venice*, ed. Hale, London 1973, pp.121-45.
- 20 A. Madiati, "Nuovi documenti su Sveva Montefeltro Sforza," *Le Marche* vol.IX, 1909, p.111. But cf. *Ordini et offitij*, pp.58-59, on the *massaro*.
- 21 Feliciangeli, *Alcuni documenti relativi all'adolescenza di Battista e Costanzo Sforza*, Turin 1903, p.9.
- 21 *Ordini et offitij*, pp.51-54; for the Pesaro kitchens see my dissertation, p.167.
- 23 *Ordini et offitij*, pp.3-6, 54-57.
- 24 Feliciangeli, *Battista*, pp.10, 13.
- 25 *Ordini et offitij*, pp.10-11.
- 26 M. Tabarrini, *Descrizione del convito e delle feste fatte in Pesaro*, Florence 1870, p.14.
- 27 Tabarrini, *Descrizione*, pp.11, 12, 13, 37; see also *Ordini et offitij*, pp.64-65. Interesting in this connection is an article by M. Mamini, "Documenti quattrocenteschi di vita musicale alle Corti Feltresca e Malatestiana," *Studi Urbinati* n.s.B, anno XLVIII, 1974, pp.115-28.
- 28 Guglielmo's treatise is in the Bibliothèque Nationale de Paris, cod. ital. 973; see G. Mazzatinti, *Inventario dei manoscritti italiani delle biblioteche di Francia*, vol.I, Rome 1886, p.172. On Guglielmo see also E. Motta, "Musica alla corte degli Sforza," *Archivio Storico Lombardo* ser.2, vol.IV, anno XIV, 1887, pp.62-63 n.2; E. Rodocanachi, *La Femme Italienne à l'Epoque de la Renaissance*, Paris 1907, p.198; F. Malaguzzi Valeri, *La corte di Lodovico il Moro*, vol.I, Milan 1913, p.539; *Arte lombarda dei Visconti agli Sforza*, exhibition catalogue, Milan 1958, p.89 no.271; E. Pellegrin, *La Bibliothèque des Visconti et des Sforza*, Supplement, Florence 1969, pp.40-41. The inventory of the Sforza library is in Bibl.Oliv. 387, see on c.36 the work entitled *Io. Ambrosio ballarino*. A. Vernarecci has published the inventory: "La libreria di Giovanni Sforza," *Archivio Storico per l'Umbria e le Marche* vol.III, 1886, see p.518. A treatise by Giovanni Ambrogio is in the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, cod. ital. 476; see Mazzatinti, *Inventario*, p.98. The letter by Giovanni Ambrogio is published by Motta, "Musica," pp.61-62; see also *Storia di Milano*, vol.IX, Milan 1961, p.814.
- 29 *Ordini et offitij*, pp.16-19. See also Susech's comment on the *Cambrieri del Duca* (as published by Zannoni, *Scrittori*, p.82): per tenere a ordine le camere e le sale et ad invitare le donne per le feste.
- 30 For a discussion of the principles of sanitation and neatness to be observed, see especially pp.20-22 of the *Ordini et offitij*; for the barber, pp.22-23. Regarding the location of the room in Alessandro's palace, see my dissertation, p.481 doc.7.

- 31 *Ordini et offitij*, pp.1-3. The *maestro di casa* should be given a room "in an honourable place, where it will be easy to discuss all matters."
- 32 Feliciangeli, *Battista*, p.10. The children had "the chaplain who says the mass for them at home every day."
- 33 "Bull with an apostolic brief allowing him to have two personal religious confessors." See the inventory of Alessandro's private papers in Bibl.Oliv. 441, c.20, but without the year; the date is given in Bibl.Oliv. 376, vol.VII, c.84.
- 34 *Ordini et offitij*, pp.63-64. The chaplain had to remind them of "all the fast-days ordered by the Church, the Ember Days, and Lent."
- 35 *Le vite*, ed. A. Greco, vol.I, Florence 1970, p.423: "a most learned man, well paid, who is in charge of this library."
- 36 *Ordini et offitij*, pp.75-76. And when the librarian "shows a manuscript to someone ignorant who wants to see it out of curiosity, if he is not an important person a quick glance will do."
- 37 See my dissertation, p.142.
- 38 After having been closed for many years, and subsequent to a thorough restoration, the library was re-opened to the public on the occasion of the *Convegno di studi su Federico da Montefeltro*. P. Dal Poggetto gave a paper discussing this among other restorations: "Nuove letture di ambienti e opere d'arte federiciane: la Biblioteca, il Bagno della Duchessa, la Neviera." See also Clough, "The library of the Dukes of Urbino," *Librarium* vol.IX, 1966, pp.101-104.
- 39 *Le vite*, p.423: "he had a noble room built in his palace, with shelves all along the walls on which the books were set in a well-ordered fashion."
- 40 A. Cagni, *Vespasiano da Bisticci e il suo epistolario*, Rome 1969, p.159.
- 41 See my dissertation, pp.179-81.
- 42 Zannoni, *Scrittori*, p.82; *Ordini et offitij*, Appendix p.v.
- 43 See my dissertation, pp.190-94.

#### APPENDIX: The Sforza 'famiglia'

##### Abbreviations:

ASF: Archivio di Stato of Florence

ASPN: Archivio di Stato of Pesaro (Notarile)

Bibl.Oliv.: Biblioteca Oliveriana, Pesaro

Cinelli: C. Cinelli, *Pandolfo Collenuccio*, Pesaro 1880

Feliciangeli, *Battista*: B. Feliciangeli, *Alcuni documenti relativi all'adolescenza di Battista e Costanzo Sforza*, Turin 1903

\_\_\_\_\_, *Costanza: Notizie sulla vita e sugli scritti di Costanza Varano Sforza*, Turin n.d.

\_\_\_\_\_, *Elisabetta: Notizie della vita di Elisabetta Malatesta Varano*, Ascoli Piceno 1911

\_\_\_\_\_, *L'itinerario*: "L'itinerario d'Isabella d'Este Gonzaga attraverso la Marca e l'Umbria nell'aprile del 1494," *Atti e Memorie della Deputazione di Storia Patria per le Marche* n.s. vol.VIII, 1912, pp.1-119.

\_\_\_\_\_, *Lettere: Lettere di Galeazzo Sforza al fratello Giovanni signore di Pesaro ottobre - novembre MDII*, Sanseverino-Marche 1915.

\_\_\_\_\_, *Lucrezia: Il matrimonio di Lucrezia Borgia*, Turin 1901

\_\_\_\_\_, *Sull'acquisto: Sull'acquisto di Pesaro fatto da Cesare Borgia*, Camerino 1900

\_\_\_\_\_, *Sveva: Sulla monacazione di Sveva Montefeltro*, Pistoia 1903

Gregorovius: F. Gregorovius, *Lucrezia Borgia*, Stuttgart 1874

Madiati: A. Madiati, "Nuovi documenti su Sveva Montefeltro Sforza," *Le Marche* IX, 1909, pp.94-142.

*Miniature*: Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, *Miniature del Rinascimento*, exhibition catalogue 1950

- Olivieri, *Appendice*: A. Olivieri, *Appendice alle memorie di Alessandro Sforza*, Pesaro 1786  
 —, *Diplovatazio: Memorie di Tommaso Diplovatazio*, Pesaro 1771  
 —, *Gradara: Memorie di Gradara*, Pesaro 1775  
 —, *Lettera: Lettera sopra un medaglione non ancor osservato*, Pesaro 1781.  
 —, *Michelina: Della patria della B. Michelina e del B. Cecco*, Pesaro 1772  
 —, *S. Tommaso: Memorie della badia di S. Tommaso in Foglia*, Pesaro 1778  
 —, *Sforza: Memorie di Alessandro Sforza*, Pesaro 1785  
 —, *Zecca: Della zecca di Pesaro e delle monete pesaresi dei secoli bassi* in G.A. Zanetti, *Nuova raccolta delle monete e zecche d'Italia*, vol.I, Bologna 1775, pp.179-246.  
 Paltroni: P. Paltroni, *Commentari della vita et gesti dell'illustrissimo Federico Duca d'Urbino*, ed. W. Tommasoli, Urbino 1966  
 Pellegrin: E. Pellegrin, *La Bibliothèque des Visconti et des Sforza*, Supplement, Florence 1969  
 Ratti: N. Ratti, *Della famiglia Sforze*, vol.I, Rome 1794  
 Rodocanachi: E. Rodocanachi, *La Femme Italienne à l'Epoque de la Renaissance*, Paris 1907.  
 Sajanello: G.B. Sajanello, *Historica Monumenta Ordinis Sancti Hieronymi Congregationis B. Petri de Pisis*, vol.II, 2nd ed., Rome 1760  
 Saviotti: A. Saviotti, "Giacomo da Pesaro," *Archivio Storico per l'Umbria e le Marche* IV, 1888, pp.73-81.  
 Soranzo, *Anonimo*: G. Soranzo, *Cronaca di Anonimo Veronese 1446-1488*, Monumenti di Storia Patria, ser.3, Cronache e Diarii, vol.IV, Venice 1915  
 Soranzo, *Cronaca sconosciuta*: "Di una cronaca sconosciuta del secolo XV e del suo anonimo autore," *Nuovo Archivio Veneto* XIII, 1907, pp.68-103  
 Tabarrini: M. Tabarrini, *Descrizione del convito e delle feste fatte in Pesaro*, Florence 1870  
 Vaccai, *Ginevra*: G. Vaccai, "Il quadro votivo di Ginevra Tiepolo," *Rassegna Marchigiana* VII, 1928-29, pp.167-72  
 —, *Le nozze*: "Le nozze di Costanzo Sforza con Camilla di Aragona," *Picenum* XIX, 1922, pp.28-37  
 —, *Le ville*: "Le ville del monte Accio e la società pesarese nel secolo XVI," *Picenum* XVIII, 1921, pp.260-68.  
 —, 1909: *Pesaro*, Pesaro 1909  
 —, 1928: *La vita municipale sotto i Malatesta, gli Sforza e i Della Rovere, Signori di Pesaro*, Pesaro 1928  
 Vernarecci, *L'incendio*: A. Vernarecci, "L'incendio della libreria di Giovanni Sforza," *Archivio Storico per l'Umbria e le Marche* III, 1886, pp.790-92.  
 —, *La libreria*: "La libreria di Giovanni Sforza," *Archivio Storico per l'Umbria e le Marche* III, 1886, pp.501-23

## Glossary

*Allevato*: one raised at the court  
*Armigero (Uomo d'arme)*: man-at-arms  
*Auditore*: a counsellor with jurisdictional powers  
*Avvocato fiscale*: magistrate of the revenue  
*Balestriero*: crossbowman  
*Ballerino*: dancer  
*Barbiere*: barber  
*Bibliotecario*: librarian  
*Cameriere maggiore*: head manservant, valet  
*Cancelliere*: chancellor

*Cappellano*: chaplain  
*Cassiero*: treasurer  
*Castellano*: commander of the fortress  
*Cavaliere*: knight  
*Commensale*: one who ate at the lord's table  
*Commissario*: commissary  
*Computista*: accountant  
*Connestabile*: constable in command of the town gates  
*Consigliere*: counsellor  
*Consulore*: counsellor



*Copista*: scribe  
*Corriere*: messenger  
*Credenziere*: head servant overseeing the table;  
 originally one who tasted all the food to be  
 served to the lord  
*Curiale*: courtier  
*Damigella* (*Domicella*, *Donna di compa-*  
*gnia*): lady-in-waiting  
*Depositario*: treasurer  
*Dispensiere*: steward of the household  
*Equitis*: knight  
*Fattore generale*: steward of the estates  
*Fornaio*: baker  
*Forniciario*: one who bakes bricks, etc.  
*Garzone*: young servant  
*Giureconsulto*: jurisconsult  
*Luogotenente*: lieutenant  
*Maestro di casa* (*Maggiordomo*): majordomo  
*Maestro delle entrate*: master of the revenue  
*Maestro di guardaroba*: master of the wardrobe  
*Maestro di stalla*: head of the stables  
*Marescalco*: farrier  
*Massaro*: domestic steward  
*Muratore*: brick-layer

#### Famigliari:

N.b. The order is alphabetical by first name. Included are members of the Malatesta court at Pesaro who continued to work for the Sforza. The dates given are those found in the documents. Where there is more than one year per entry, the archival and bibliographical references are arranged chronologically according to these dates.

Alberto Albergati da Bologna  
 1503  
*procuratore* for Giovanni Sforza, to borrow  
 money for the restitution of the Rocca Costanza  
 Feliciangeli, *Lettere*, p.41 n,20

Alessandro di Matteo dei Collenucci di Pesaro  
 1489, 1493  
*capitano* of Montelevecchie  
 Bibl.Oliv. 376, vol.VI,cc.421, 418

Alessandro Pugliano (Pogliano) de Interamna  
 (Introcinis, Introcinio) de Benevento (Rieti)  
 1464  
*famigliare* of Alessandro Sforza  
 Bibl.Oliv. 376, vol.I, cc.440v-441; Sajanello,  
 p.377; Olivieri, *Sforza*, p.LXXXIV

*Notaio*: notary  
*Oratore*: ambassador  
*Procuratore*: procurator, agent  
*Piffero*: piper  
*Ragioniere*: accountant  
*Rappresentante*: delegate, representative  
*Referendario* (*Revisore*): comptroller  
*Sagittario*: archer  
*Scalco* (*Sescalco*, *Siniscalco*): head servant  
 overseeing the meals; originally denoted a  
 carver  
*Scrittore*: official writer  
*Scudiero*: equerry  
*Segretario*: secretary  
*Sopraintendente*: superintendent  
*Soprastante*: overseer, usually of construction  
 work  
*Squadrero* (*Capo di squadra*): leader of troops  
*Staffiere*: messenger  
*Tamburino*: drummer  
*Tesoriere*: treasurer  
*Trombetto*: trumpeter  
*Vicario delle gabelle e delle appellazioni*:  
 officer in charge of taxes and appeals

Almerico Almerici  
 1464, 1470, 1490; died 1492  
*vicario delle gabelle e delle appellazioni* for  
 Alessandro; *podestà* of Pesaro; *avvocato fis-*  
*cale della camera* for Giovanni  
 Bibl.Oliv. 376, vol.II, cc.630v-631; Bibl.Oliv.  
 376, vol.I, c.442v; Bibl.Oliv. 376, vol.VI, c.412;  
 Olivieri, *Diplovatazio*, p.XI

Almoro Brandolin da Mestre  
 1500  
*oratore* for Giovanni in Venice  
 Feliciangeli, *Sull'acquisto*, pp.31-92, 32 n.1

Alo, detto Battaglino del fu Ranaldo di Arquata  
 1457  
*servo* of Alessandro  
 Bibl.Oliv. 376, vol.II, c.396

Alovisio (Aloisi, Luigi) Basicaretri

1457

*credenziere* and *dispensiere* of Alessandro  
Felicciangeli, *Sveva*, p.56; Madiai, pp.95,97

Mro Andrea di Girolamo de S. Angelo

1509; dead by 1512

*ingegnere* of Giovanni

Bibl.Oliv. 455, vol.II, c.139v; ASPN, Domenico Zucchella, vol.47, 2 April 1512, page un-numbered

Angelo de Probis d'Atri

1457, c.1463, 1467

*segretario*, *cancelliere*, *famigliare* of Alessandro  
Olivieri, *Michelina*, p.LIX; *idem.*, *Sforza*,  
p.LXXIII; Madiai, p.96; Soranzo, *Anonimo*,  
p.243 n.1

Antonello del fu Matteo Panzano

1491

*curiale* of Giovanni

Bibl.Oliv. 376, vol.VI, c.370

Antonello Picinino

1458

one of the servants named as having the care of  
Battista Sforza during Alessandro's absence  
1457-58

Felicciangeli, *Battista*, pp.10,12

Antonello da Tortona

1492

*siniscalco* of Giovanni

Bibl.Oliv. 455, vol.II, c.17

Ms Antonio

*Barbiere* of Giovanni

Cinelli, p.57

Ser Antonio de l'abbate (family came from  
Brescia to Pesaro in 1393)

1458; died 1478

*cancelliere* of Costanza Sforza, then served  
Alessandro and Costanzo; named as having the  
care of Battista during Alessandro's absence  
1457-58

Felicciangeli, *Battista*, p. 10

Antonio dalla Badia

1493

*balestriero* of Giovanni

Bibl.Oliv. 455, vol.II, c.106

Antonio da Brescia (same as Ser Antonio de  
l'abbate ?)

c.1457, 1460s

*cameriere*, *cameriere scalco* of Alessandro

Madiai, pp.94, 97; Bibl.Oliv. 374, vol.I, c.57-  
57v

Antonio Ferrarese di Francesco Forzate

1457

*allevato* of Alessandro (he carried letters back  
and forth between Alessandro and his mistress)

Felicciangeli, *Sveva*, p.17; Madiai, p.112

Antonio di Gaspare gia di Montecicardo

1498

*capitano* of Monte Gaudio

Bibl.Oliv. 376, vol.VI, c.425

Ser Antonio de Strullis da Coldazzo

1430s; died c.1460

grammar instructor to Costanza Varano

Felicciangeli, *Battista*, p.6; *idem.*, *Costanza*,  
p.17 note

Arcangelo Ayberti (d'Ayberto da Trevi)

*scalco* of Giovanni

Felicciangeli, *Lucrezia*, p.78; *idem.*, *Sull'acquisto*,  
p.47 no.3, p.72 n.1

Ser Baldo del fu Paolo di Urbino

1486

*maggiordomo* of Camilla and Giovanni

Bibl.Oliv. 376, vol.VI, c.383v

Bartolommeo dei Cavaliere da Ferrara

1493

Giovanni's *oratore* at the court of Milan

Felicciangeli, *Lucrezia*, p.32 n.1

Mro Bartolomeo di Zanno da Vigevano (M.  
Bartolo Janini de Vigena)

1463, 1470

*forniciaro* of Alessandro

Bibl.Oliv. 937, vol.IV, Sq.S, c.39; ASPN,  
Matteoli, vol.3, 13 January 1470, page un-  
numbered

Battaglino da Rieti

1457

*famigliare* of Alessandro

Madiai, p.109

Battista di Lello degli Almerici da Pesaro  
1512

*capitano* of the port

Bibl.Oliv. 455, vol.I, c.534; Bibl.Oliv. 455,  
vol.II, c.137

Battista de' Moregni di Mantova  
1490

*cappellano* of Maddalena Sforza dei Gonzaga  
in Pesaro

Bibl.Oliv. 376, vol.II, c.567

Battista Pollato  
1515

*cameriere* of Galeazzo Sforza

ASF, Urbino, Cl.III, Fa. 38, c.209

Benedetto Reguardati da Norcia  
born c.1398/99; 1453, 1457, 1458

doctor of Alessandro and Sveva; *ministro* and  
*luogotenente* of Alessandro; had the care of  
Battista during Alessandro's absence 1457-  
58

Feliciangeli, *Sveva*, p.12; *idem.*, *Battista*, p.10

Benvenuto  
died 1467

*squadrero* of Alessandro

Paltroni, p.225

Berardino Samperoli  
1458

companion to Costanzo (brother of Mattea,  
Alessandro's mistress before Pacifica)

Feliciangeli, *Battista*, p.13

Don Bernabeo di Giovanni  
1465

*sopristante* of construction on Alessandro's  
palace

Bibl.Oliv. 937, vol.IV, Sq.S, c.14v; ASPN,  
Sepolcri, vol.2, c.235v

Bernardino  
died 1510

*formaio di corte* of Giovanni

Bibl.Oliv.455, vol.II, c.161; Cinelli, p.133

Bernardino  
1515

servant of Galeazzo

ASF, Urbino, Cl.III, Fa. 38, c.209

Ser Bernardino di Ser Gaspare Fattori  
1503, 1512

*procuratore* for Galeazzo for the rendering of  
the Rocca Costanza; *segretario* of Galeazzo  
(also *cancelliere* of Pesaro)

Feliciangeli, *Lettere*, p.43 n.27

Bernardino Superchi  
1497

*tesoriere* of Giovanni

Bibl.Oliv. 376, vol.IX, c.221

Bernardo detto Abbate dei Bossi del fu Pietro  
1477

*famigliare* of Costanzo

Bibl.Oliv. 376, vol.II, c.455

Bernardo Monaldi  
1503, 1504

*segretario* and *medico* of Giovanni; his agent in  
Venice

Feliciangeli, *Lettere*, p.42 n.21; *idem.*, *Lucrezia*,  
p.43; Vaccai, *Ginevra*, p.168

Bertolda di Perugia  
1457

*donna di compagnia* of Sveva

Madiati, p.108

Blaxio  
1515

servant of Galeazzo

ASF, Urbino, Cl.III, Fa.38, c.209

Camillo Leonardi  
1500

doctor

Feliciangeli, *Sull'acquisto*, p.44

Camillo Samperoli  
1512

ambassador sent to Rome by Galeazzo

Feliciangeli, *Lettere*, p.10

Carlo del q. messer Benedetto delli Reguardati  
da Norsia  
1473

*cavaliere* of Costanzo

Bibl.Oliv. 937, vol.V, Sq.AB, c.13v



Carlo Sforza  
born c.1461; 1475, 1481  
*siniscalco* at Costanzo's wedding banquet  
Tabarrini, p.14; ASPN, Sepolcri, vol.10, c.407v

Cesare Alberti  
*scalco* of Giovanni  
Vaccai, *Ginevra*, p.172

Mro Cherubino di Milano  
1476, 1478, 1479, 1483, 1491, 1492; died  
1494/95

*muratore, muratoris ac etiam ingegnerii* of  
Costanzo; given patent of *ingegnere* by Gio-  
vanni (1491); *soprintendente di tutti i lavori*  
*di fortificazione, ponti, strade, chiuse, ecc.*, for  
Giovanni

ASPN, Sepolcri, vol.8, cc.162v, 242; vol.9,  
c.190; ASPN, Matteo Lepri, vol.10, c.138v;  
Bibl.Oliv. 384, c.229; ASPN, Sepolcri, vol.11,  
cc.137, 146; Vaccai, 1909, p.80; Bibl.Oliv.  
376, vol.I, c.64; Feliciangeli, *Sull'acquisto*,  
p.58; Bibl.Oliv. 376, vol.I, cc.258, 259v-260

Chiarelmo de Spoleto  
1515  
*segretario* of Galeazzo  
ASF, Urbino, C1.III, Fa. 38, c.208v

Christoforo delli Perusini  
1479, 1481  
*luogotenente* of Costanzo  
ASPN, Matteo Lepri, vol.10, c.138v; Vaccai,  
1928, p.202

Domenico  
1500  
*maestro di stalla* of Galeazzo  
Feliciangeli, *Sull'acquisto*, doc.VIII, p.83

Domenico di Barignano  
1474, 1481, 1490  
sent by Costanzo to the Patriarch of Aquilea to  
announce his forthcoming marriage; ambassa-  
dor in Rome for Costanzo; *procuratore* for  
Giovanni  
Bibl.Oliv. 455, vol.I, c.330; Bibl. Oliv. 376,  
vol.VI, cc.325, 325v-326, 332v-333

Ser Dominico  
1468  
*cancelliere* of Alessandro  
Olivieri, *Sforza*, p.C

Donato Stephano da Cotignola  
1500, 1515  
*cameriere* and *sescalco* of Galeazzo  
Bibl.Oliv. 387, c.38v; Vernarecci, *Libreria*,  
p.523; ASF, Urbino, C1.III, Fa.38, c.208

Dulcius  
1506  
*luogotenente* of Giovanni  
ASPN, Matteo Lepri, vol. 37, c.10; Domenico  
Zucchella, vol. 39, c.107

Ercole Bentivoglio  
born c.1461; 1475, 1481  
*siniscalco* at Costanzo's wedding banquet  
Tabarrini, p.14; ASPN, Sepolcri, vol.10, c.407v

Ercole Sforza (illegitimate brother of Costanzo?)  
born c.1461; 1475  
*cavaliere*  
Tabarrini, p.13

Factorino Picinino  
1458  
one of the servants who had the care of Battista  
during Alessandro's absence in 1457-58  
Feliciangeli, *Battista*, p.10

Federico  
1476  
*cameriere* of Costanzo  
ASPN, Sepolcri, vol.8, c.156

Federico del fu Ser Gualtiero di Bartolomeo da  
S. Angelo in Vado  
1485  
*siniscalco* of Camilla and Giovanni  
Bibl.Oliv. 376, vol.I, cc.383-85

Filippo de Neapoli  
1476  
*depositario denariorum* for construction of the  
Rocca Costanza  
ASPN, Sepolcri, vol. 8, c.256

Fra Francesco d'Ancona  
1466  
confessor of Alessandro  
Olivieri, *Sforza*, p.XC

Francesco di Andrea delli Piccini da Todì  
1464, 1465, 1467, 1479, 1480, 1487  
*referendario o revisore* of Alessandro; *vice*  
*podestà* of Pesaro; *giureconsulto* and *podestà*  
of Pesaro; *auditore* of Giovanni  
Bibl.Oliv. 937, vol.IV, Sq.T, cc.21v, 42; ASF,  
Urbino, Cl.I, Div.B, Fa.10, c.1042; Olivieri,  
*Sforza*, p.XCVI; Bibl.Oliv. 376, vol.II, c.461;  
ASPN, Germano Germani, vol.4, c.249v

Francesco di maestro Angelo  
1458

*scalco* of Costanzo  
Felicciangeli, *Battista*, p.13

Francesco Arduini  
1512  
ambassador sent to Rome to plead for Galeazzo  
Felicciangeli, *Lettere*, p.10

Francesco del fu (Orlandino ?) di Borgo S.  
Donnino  
1491

*curiale* of Giovanni  
Bibl.Oliv. 376, vol.VI, c.368v

Francesco di Bartolomeo da Crespolano  
1482  
*servitore* of Costanzo  
Bibl.Oliv. 455, vol.I, cc.138-39

Francesco del q. Stefano Becci (Bezio) da  
Fiorenza  
1473, 1486, 1493; died c.1510  
*a speciale* (spice merchant) who became *mag-*  
*giordomo* of Giovanni

Bibl.Oliv. 937, vol.V, Sq.AB, c.13v; Bibl.Oliv.  
455, vol.I, c.371; Olivieri, *Diplovatazio*, p.XIV;  
Gregorovius, Appendix p.31, doc.9; Bibl.Oliv.  
376, vol.I, c.327

Francesco delli Beni  
1481  
*referendario* and *revisore* of Costanzo  
Vaccai, 1928, p.202

Francesco di Bonadia de' Zanchis  
1464  
*famigliare* of Alessandro  
Bibl.Oliv. 455, vol.II, c.103v

Francesco da Cotignola  
1470, 1473  
*cassiere* of Alessandro and Costanzo  
Bibl.Oliv. 374, vol.I, c.106; Bibl.Oliv. 937,  
vol.V, Sq.AB, c.13v

Francesco di Gerolamo da Monte Milone,  
detto Milone  
1491  
*staffiere* and *famigliare* of Camilla  
Bibl.Oliv. 376, vol.VI, c.362v

Francesco di Guglielmo Verità di Verona  
1460-64  
*famulus familiaris, marescalchus* of Alessan-  
dro  
Soranzo, *Cronaca sconosciuta*, pp.96-97

Francesco del fu Orlandino di Borgo (same as  
Francesco di Borgo S. Donnino ?)  
1492  
*connestabile* for Giovanni  
Bibl.Oliv. 376, vol.VI, c.385

Francesco da Palude (son of Niccolò)  
1479, 1480, 1490-93, 1494/95, 1497; died  
before 1501  
*siniscalco* of Costanzo; *oratore* of Giovanni at  
Milan (1490-93); *maestro di casa* and *maestro*  
*delle entrate* of Giovanni (1494/95, 1497)  
Bibl.Oliv. 376, vol.II, c.462; Felicciangeli, *Lu-*  
*crezia*, p.32 n.1; Bibl.Oliv. 376, vol.VI, cc.423-  
24

Galeotto Agnesi da Napoli  
after 1459; died 1462  
*segretario* and *luogotenente* of Alessandro  
Felicciangeli, *Battista*, p.13

Gaspare  
1456  
*cappellano* of Sveva  
Olivieri, *Sforza*, p.L

Gaspar de Cesena  
1458  
*servant* of Battista  
Felicciangeli, *Battista*, p.12

Gasparino Ardizij (de Mediolana)

1465, 1473

doctor of Alessandro (who marries him to his mistress, Pacifica); then doctor of Costanzo, and also for the town of Pesaro

Olivieri, *Sforza*, pp.XCV-XCVI; Bibl.Oliv. 937, vol.V, Sq.AB, c.13v

Giacometto da Caiazzo

1497

*capitano dei balestrieri e sagittari* of Giovanni

Bibl.Oliv. 376, vol.I, cc.389-90

Iacominus

1469

*cameriere* of Alessandro

Bibl.Oliv. 376, vol.X, c.149

Giacomo (Jacomino) (same as the above ?)

1497; died 1510

*cameriere, cameriere maggiore* of Giovanni

Feliciangeli, *Lucrezia*, p.43; Bibl. Oliv. 455, vol.II, c.161; cinelli, p. 133

Giacomino di Ferrara

died before April 1493

*curiale* of Giovanni

Bibl.Oliv. 376, vol.VI, c.406

Giacomo di Ancona

1491

*curiale and familiare* of Giovanni

Bibl.Oliv. 376, vol.VI, c.374

Ser Jacomo delli Bagarotti da Piacenza (da Parma)

1473, 1475, 1485

*cancelliere and segretario* of Costanzo; *segretario* of Camilla and Giovanni

Bibl.Oliv. 937, vol.V, Sq.AB, c.13v; Ratti, p.155; Vaccai, *Le nozze*, p.35; Bibl.Oliv. 455, vol.II, c.11

Giacomo Biancuccio

1498; died 1510

*depositario del porto and tesoriere* for Giovanni

Bibl.Oliv. 455, vol.I, c.243; Bibl.Oliv. 455, vol.II, c.161; Cinelli, p.133

Mro Jacomo di Ser Guido da Verona

1463

*scrittore, scrivano, segretario* of Alessandro

Bibl.Oliv. 937, vol.IV, Sq.R, c.29v; Soranzo, *Cronaca sconosciuta*, p.97

Mro Jacomo del q. Bartolomeo da Norsia

1463, 1464, 1465, 1468, 1473

*ministro, fattore* of Alessandro

Olivieri, *Sforza*, p.LXXI; Bibl.Oliv. 376, vol.VIII, cc.226-27; Bibl.Oliv. 937, vol.IV, Sq.R, c.43v; Sq.T, c.42; vol.V, Sq.Z, c.8v; Sq.AB, c.13v

Iacomo di Pero Banzo da Fossombrone

1440

*castellano* (with seven pages) of the Rocca of Pesaro

Olivieri, *S. Tommaso*, p.88

Giacomo da Pesaro

1430s-1450s

humanist and notary

Saviotti; Feliciangeli, *Costanza*, p.19 n.3

Jacomo Piccinino

1457

*allevato* of Alessandro

Feliciangeli, *Sveva*, p.17

Giacomo Probo di Atria (de Probis d'Atri, son of Angelo ?)

1481

ambassador for Costanzo in Rome

Bibl.Oliv.376, vol.VI, cc.325, 325v-326

Mro Jacomo delli Scotti da Marignano

1458

*barbiere* of Alessandro

Bibl.Oliv. 937, vol.IV, Sq.Q, c.25v

Giacomo Venuti

1505

*luogotenente* of Giovanni

Bibl.Oliv. 455, vol.II, cc.260-61

Gian Antonio da Cremona

1491

*credenziere* of Giovanni

Bibl.Oliv. 376, vol.VI, c.385

Gian Francesco detto Riccio di maestro Tommaso (Bettini da Urbino) barbiere

1481, 1482

*cameriere* of Costanzo

Bibl.Oliv. 376, vol.II, cc.467, 469



Gian Pietro del fu Mro Tomasso calzolaio  
1471

*trombettiere* of Alessandro  
Bibl.Oliv. 376, vol.I, c.374

Gianozzo  
1478

*castellano*  
Olivieri, *Lettera*, p.V

Ginevra  
1515  
servant of Galeazzo  
ASF, Urbino, C1.III, Fa.38, c.209

Giorgio Attendolo da Cotignola  
1500  
*castellano*  
Felicciangeli, *Lettere*, p.41 n.16; *idem.*, *Sull'acquisto*, pp.39, 45, 46, 47

Giorgio Ayberti  
*scalco* of Giovanni  
Vernarecci, *L'incendio*, p.791

Giovanni Andrea da Gambarano  
1515  
*auditore* of Galeazzo  
ASF, Urbino, C1.III, Fa.38, c.209

Giovanni di Antonio Guglielmini di Bellinzona  
1491, 1493  
*cameriere* of Giovanni  
Bibl.Oliv. 376, vol.VI, cc.384, 413v

Giovanni Antonio de Bresani da Cremona  
1465  
*cancelliere* of Alessandro  
Bibl.Oliv. 376, vol.X, cc.145v, 146; Bibl.Oliv. 937, v.IV, Sq.T, c.40; Olivieri, *Sforza*, p.LXX;  
Bibl.Oliv. 376, vol.VII, cc.81, 346-48

Giovanni Antonio del Tonso  
1468  
*corriere* of Alessandro  
Olivieri, *Sforza*, p.CIII

Giovanni Battista dell'Antella  
1457  
*computista* of Alessandro  
ASP, Sepolcri, vol.1, c.145

Giovanni Battista de Narni  
1467  
*cancelliere* of Alessandro  
Olivieri, *Sforza*, p.XCVII; Soranzo, *Anonimo*, p.242 n.2

Giovanni Benevoli (Bonavoglia) da Mantova  
1489-91  
*segretario* of Giovanni  
Felicciangeli, *Sull'acquisto*, p.56 n.3

Giovanni Germani  
1490s, 1497  
*cancelliere* of Giovanni; *notaio* of Pesaro; *segretario del comune* (1497)  
Olivieri, *Gradara*, p.97; Felicciangeli, *Lucrezia*, p.67

Giovanni di Giontarelllo da Pesaro  
c.1451  
*famigliare*  
Olivieri, *Sforza*, p.XLV

Giovanni da Lacha (dal Lago)  
1478  
one of Costanzo's *squadra*  
Bibl.Oliv. 376, vol.I, c.344

Giovanni Maria Dino da Castelfidardo  
1496-1500  
*luogotenente* of Giovanni  
Felicciangeli, *Sull'acquisto*, p.53 n.2, p.57 n.1

Giovanni Ondedei  
1499  
*capitano* of Monte Baroccio  
Bibl.Oliv. 455, vol.I, c.344

Giovanni di Padovani  
1481  
*fattore* of Costanzo; astrologer  
ASP, Sepolcri, vol.10, c.407v; Vaccai, 1909, pp.84-85

Mro Giovanni di Pietro alias Riccio del fu Scar-  
amuccia di Torricella parmense  
1493  
*cuoco* of Giovanni  
Bibl.Oliv. 376, vol.VI, cc.411v-12

Giovanni de Roxellis da Aretrio  
1469  
*luogotenente* of Pesaro for Alessandro  
Olivieri, *Sforza*, p.CV

Giulio di Piersante Bosi da Sarnano

1457

*ministro* of Alessandro

Madaia, p.109

Giustiniano Castelli da Cremona

c.1463

*luogotenente* of Pesaro for Alessandro

Vaccai, 1909, p.43

Guglielmo da Pesaro

1444, c.1463

*ballerino*, choreographer of dances at Alessandro's wedding; dedicated dance treatise to Galeazzo Maria Sforza of Milan

Rodocanachi, p.198; Pellegrin, pp.40-41

Guido Antonio da Sajano

born c.1479; 1499

*cameriere* of Giovanni

Cinelli, p.93, and p.161 document

Hieronyma da Pesaro

1515

*domicella* of Ginevra Bentivoglio Sforza, wife of Galeazzo

ASF, Urbino, Cl.III, Fa.38, c.209

Hieronymo

1515

*cameriere* of Galeazzo

ASF, Urbino, Cl.III, Fa.38, c.209

Lanfranco de Corvis

1456-62

*cancelliere* of Alessandro

Olivieri, *Sforza*, pp.LXVI-LXVII; Bibl.Oliv. 374, vol.I, cc.56-57

Helio dei Maddaleni Capodiferro

1495

*oratore* of Giovanni at Rome

Feliciangeli, *Lucrezia*, pp.24, 40

Leonardo qm Giovanni Botta da Cremona

1465, 1467, 1471

*cancelliere* and *segretario* of Alessandro

Bibl.Oliv. 937, vol.IV, Sq.T, c.41v; Bibl.Oliv. 376, vol.X, c.146; Olivieri, *Sforza*, pp.XCV, CIX

Leonardo dal Colle

1480

*copista* of Costanzo

Vaccai, *Le nozze*, pp.28-29; *Miniature*, p.43 no.57

Lionino Giovanni di Bergamo

1492

*armigero* of Giovanni

Bibl.Oliv. 376, vol.VI, c.392

Lorenzo de (...)

1515

*cancelliere* of Galeazzo

ASF, Urbino, Cl.III, Fa.38, c.209

Lorenzo Lauti da Siena

1495

*segretario* of Giovanni; *consigliere* and *procuratore* for Lucrezia Borgia

Feliciangeli, *Lucrezia*, pp.30, 31 n.3

Luciano da Laurana

1476, 1478, 1479

*ingegnere* of Costanzo

ASPN, Sepolcri, vol.8, c.242; vol.9, c.190; Matteo Lepri, vol.10, c.138v

Ludovico Bergolini da Bologna

1457

*famigliare* and *commensale* of Alessandro

Feliciangeli, *Sveva*, p.18; Madaia, p.97

Ludovico de Cardanis da Torricella di Parma

1493, 1497-1500, 1510; died 1510

*cancelliere* and *segretario* of Giovanni; drew up Giovanni's will (1510)

Gregorovius, p.31 document 9; Feliciangeli, *Lucrezia*, p.67; *idem.*, *Sull'acquisto*, p.53 n.2; Bibl.Oliv. 455, vol.II, cc.161, 199v; Cinelli, p.133

Ludovico da Pexia

1452

*castellano* of the fortress of Pesaro

Olivieri, *Zecca*, p.212

Luigi di Bonabello da Salò

1500

sent by Giovanni to "ritirare certa quantità di perle lasciate dal padre Costanzo in deposito a Bonifacio Manerba di Brescia"

Feliciangeli, *Sull'acquisto*, p.41

Maddalena del q. Petrozorzo de Almerici da Pesaro

1457-58

servant of Battista

Feliciangeli, *Battista*, p.9

Marco Citara

1494, 1497, 1498, 1503; died 1510

*mercante* who became *referendario*, *maestro delle entrate* and *maestro di casa* for Giovanni Bibl.Oliv. 376, vol.VI, c.411v; Feliciangeli, *Sull'acquisto*, p.53 n.2; ASPN, Giovanni Germani, vol.16, c.224; Bibl.Oliv. 455, vol.II, c.161; Cinelli, p.133

Marco de Monaldi

1458, 1459, 1465

*scalco* of Alessandro; councillor; *sopraistante* for construction on Alessandro's palace

Feliciangeli, *Battista*, p.10; Olivieri, *Sforza*, p.XLVIII; Bibl.Oliv. 937, vol.IV, Sq.S, c.14v; ASPN, Sepolcri, vol.2, c.235v

Marcone del fu Giacomo

1486, 1495

*uomo d'arme* of Giovanni (before 1495)

Bibl.Oliv. 376, vol.VI, c.415v

Margarita de li Ardoino da Pesaro

1457-58

servant of Battista

Feliciangeli, *Battista*, p.9

Margherita da Marzano di Napoli

1479

*damigella* of Camilla (married Francesco, son of Niccolò della Palude)

Feliciangeli, *Lucrezia*, p.32 n.1

Mariano di Tassolo alias il Perusino

1464

lived in the palace with Costanzo; occupation not known

Bibl.Oliv. 937, vol.IV, Sq.T, c.18

Marino Grisanti

1447-48

*rappresentante* and *procuratore* of Alessandro, for the wedding between Alessandro and Sveva

Feliciangeli, *Sveva*, p.9

Martino Filetico

1459

Roman humanist; teacher of Battista and Costanzo

Feliciangeli, *Battista*, p.6

Matteo di Antonio de Callio

1445

*cappellano* of Costanza Varano Sforza Sajanello, p.375

Matteo del fu Giovanni di Salò

1494

*connestabile* of Pesaro

Bibl.Oliv. 376, vol.VI, c.413

Matteo da Sassoferato dei Collenucci

1458; died 1465

grammar instructor to Battista and Costanzo; *notaio* and *cancelliere*

Feliciangeli, *Battista*, pp.6, 14

Ser Michele (is he identical with Ser Michele de Covardi, father of Vittoria, *donzella* of Costanza and Sveva ? See Olivieri, *Appendice*, p.V)

1458

*cancelliere* of Alessandro

Paltroni, p.115; Feliciangeli, *Sveva*, p.76

Michele de Vittorini

1478

worked for Costanzo

Bibl.Oliv.376, vol.VII, cc.98-99

Niccolò di Barignano

1467, 1473, 1474, 1475; died 1484 in Fano

*famigliare* of Alessandro; *segretario* and *squadrero* of Costanzo

Soranzo, *Anonimo*, p.243 n.1; Ratti, p.155; ASPN, Sepolcri, vol.7, c.150; Tabarrini, p.4; Bibl.Oliv. 455, vol.I, c.336

Nicolò Pacediano

*segretario* of Galeazzo

Ratti, p.172 n.10

Niccolò della Palude

1465, 1474

*luogotenente* of Alessandro and Costanzo

Bibl.Oliv. 937, vol.IV, Sq.S, c.15; vol.V, Sq.AB, c.14v



Niccolò Pietro da Perugia (Nicolaus Petri de Perusio; Nicolò Perusino)

1457, 1475, 1476, 1478, 1481

*famigliare* of Alessandro; *revisore* of Costanzo Feliciangeli, *Sveva*, p.80; Madi ai, p.96; ASPN, Sepolcri, vol.8, cc.68, 256; vol.9, c.190; Vacc ai, *Le ville*, p.265; *idem.*, 1928, p.202

Niccolò Porcinari de Aquila

1463/64

*luogotenente* of Pesaro for Alessandro

Olivieri, *Sforza*, pp.LXV, LXXX

Niccolò da Saiano

1481, 1491, 1493, 1500

*famigliare* of Costanzo; *vicario della gabella*; *commissario* and *consulatore* for Giovanni; *orator et procurator ac specialis nuntius* for the marriage between Giovanni and Lucrezia Borgia; *oratore speciale* sent to Venice

Bibl.Oliv. 455, vol.II, c.320v; Bibl.Oliv. 376, vol.VI, cc.372v-73; Gregorovius, Appendix p.31, doc.9; Feliciangeli, *Sull'acquisto*, pp.16, 43

Nicolò delli Savini da Santa Vittoria

1464, 1467, 1468, 1478

*podestà* of Pesaro; *dottore in diritto* and *auditor* of Alessandro; *luogotenente* for Alessandro and Costanzo

Bibl.Oliv. 455, vol.II, c.120; Soranzo, *Anonimo*, p.243 n.1; Vacc ai, 1928, p.202; Bibl.Oliv. 376, vol.II, c.457

Nobilia da Parma

c.1457

*donna di compagnia* of Sveva

Madi ai, p.109

Ser Orlandino di Ser Bartolino dei Superchi da Pesaro (da Tomba)

1447(48), 1458; died c.1471

*cancelliere* of the Malatesta and of Alessandro; drew up the marriage contract of Alessandro and Sveva

Feliciangeli, *Sveva*, p.9 n.1; *idem.*, *Battista*, p.10; Bibl.Oliv. 458

Pandolfo Collenuccio

1483

humanist; ambassador of Giovanni and Camilla in Rome

Bibl.Oliv. 376, vol.VI, cc.328, 329

Pasquale Maripetro (Malipiero)

born c.1447; 1458

companion of Costanzo (cousin of the Doge of Venice)

Feliciangeli, *Battista*, p.13

Petro

1515

*servant* of Galeazzo

ASF, Urbino, Cl.III, Fa.38, c.209

Petro de (...) (not same as above)

1515

*cameriere* of Galeazzo

ASF, Urbino, Cl.III, Fa.38, c.208

Pier Giorgio Almerici

1440s, 1457; died c.1468

*famigliare* of Elisabetta Malatesta Varano in Pesaro; *famigliare* and *commensale* of Alessandro

Feliciangeli, *Elisabetta*, p.201; Bibl.Oliv. 376, vol.IX, cc.177, 182

Piergiorgio Almerici

1512

ambassador in Rome for Galeazzo

Feliciangeli, *Lettere*, p.10

Piergiovanni di Alessandro da Camerino

1491

*armigero* of Giovanni

Bibl.Oliv. 376, vol.VI, c.374v

Piermatteo Giordani

1492, 1508, 1512

*capitano* of Novilara; Count Palatine; ambassador in Rome for Galeazzo

Bibl.Oliv. 376, vol.IX, cc.136, 80; Feliciangeli, *Lettere*, p.10

Piero da Cornazzano

1457

*cameriere* and *scudiero* of Alessandro

Feliciangeli, *Sveva*, p.23; Madi ai, pp.94, 97

Piero Gentile di Varano (is he identical with Pier Gentile da Camerino, born c.1461, who carried the baldachin at the wedding of Costanzo and Camilla? Tabarrini, p.13)

c.1503; died 1508

*oratore* of Giovanni in Venice

Vacc ai, *Ginevra*, p.168; Feliciangeli, *L'itinerario*, p.34 n.2

Piero Lodovico Piemontese

died 1456

*cameriere* of Alessandro (first husband of his mistress, Pacifica)

Feliciangeli, *Sveva*, p.15

Pier Ludovico Saraceni da Pesaro

1499

*dottore* and *cavaliere*; *oratore straordinario* sent to Venice by Giovanni

Feliciangeli, *Sull'acquisto*, pp.22, 23

Pier Sante di Marino Bosi da Sarnano

1455-58

*ministro* of Alessandro

Feliciangeli, *Battista*, p.9

Pietro Barignani da Brescia

1503

*canonico*; *procuratore* for Giovanni to borrow money for the restitution of the Rocca Costanza

Feliciangeli, *Lettere*, p.41 n.20

Prospero Montani da Fermo

1491

*luogotenente* for Giovanni

Bibl.Oliv. 376, vol.VI, cc.360, 371v

Raniero Almerici

born 1430, 1458, 1468, 1475, 1484, 1498, died 1499/1501

nominated *cavaliere aurato* by Francesco Sforza; Count Palatine (1468); served Alessandro; *capo di squadra* for Costanzo; *equitis* serving Giovanni

Bibl.Oliv. 376, vol.IX, cc.177v-78; Feliciangeli, *Costanza*, p.39 n.2; Tabarrini, p.4; Bibl.Oliv. 376, vol.VI, c.426; ASPN, Giovanni Germani, vol.16, c.224

Riccio del fu Ambrogio di Milano

1493

*famigliare* and *curiale* of Giovanni

Bibl.Oliv. 376, vol.VI, c.409

Roberto Ondedei

1464, 1467, 1468

*commisario* for Alessandro; his *luogotenente* and *segretario*, and *ministro* in Venice

Bibl.Oliv. 376, vol.VIII, c.220; ASF, Urbino, CLI, Div. B, Fa.10, c.1042; Soranzo, *Anonimo*, p.242 n.2; Olivieri, *Sforza*, p.CII

Sebastiano Spandolini

1500, 1503

*famigliare* of Giovanni

Feliciangeli, *Sull'acquisto*, p.41 n.3; Olivieri, *Diplovatazio*, p.IX

Mro Silvestro di Marco Sozzi dei Graziani da Cotignola

1476; died c.1491

*castellano* of the fortress of Gradara

Bibl.Oliv. 376, vol.II, c.453; Bibl.Oliv. 376, vol.VI, c.370

Simone da Pesaro

1462

*depositario* for Alessandro and for Pesaro Olivieri, *Sforza*, p.LXVI

Spilimbertus Bartholomei de Crispolano

1476

*famigliare* of Costanzo

ASPN, Sepolcri, vol.8, c.242

Staxio q. Staxii de Cotignola

1473, 1476

*suprstantibus deputatis supra fabrica* of the Rocca Costanza

Bibl.Oliv. 937, vol.V, Sq.AB, c.13v; ASPN, Sepolcri, vol.8, c.242

Sveva

1457

*damigella* of Sveva Montefeltro Sforza

Feliciangeli, *Sveva*, p.35 n.2

Terenzio

died 1510

*dispensiere* for Giovanni

Bibl.Oliv. 455, vol.II, c.161; Cinelli, p.133

Thomasina

1515

servant of Galeazzo

ASF, Urbino, Cl.III, Fa.38, c.209

Thomasa

1499

*cancelliere* of Giovanni

Feliciangeli, *Sull'acquisto*, p.78 doc.III, p.79 doc.IV

Tommaso di Coldazzo

1496

*capitano generale of the contado of Pesaro*

Bibl.Oliv. 376, vol.VI, c.422

Tommaso Diplovatazio

1489, 1492, 1506

called to Pesaro by Camilla in 1489 "per esercitarvi la carica di vicario delle appellazioni e gabelle;" *avvocato fiscale della Camera* for Giovanni; ambassador sent by Galeazzo to the Marquis and Cardinal of Mantua

Olivieri, *Diplovatazio*, pp.V, X, XI; Bibl.Oliv. 455, vol.I, c.372

Vittoria (daughter of Ser Michele de Covardi)

died 1488

*donzella of Costanza and Sveva (married to Count Monaldino di Montevecchio)*

Olivieri, *Sforza*, p.LIII; *idem.*, *Appendice*, p.IV

Zongus q. Jacobi Lodovici de Pisauro

1483

one of the *suprstantibus* of the Rocca Costanza

ASP, Sepolcri, vol.11, c.146



# La Description de la nouveauté dans les récits de voyage de Cartier et de Rabelais

JEAN-PHILIPPE BEAULIEU

On estime généralement que les récits de voyage du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle ont participé de façon importante à la transformation de l'image du monde qui s'est opérée progressivement chez les Européens de la Renaissance.<sup>1</sup> Lieux de rencontre du connu et de l'inconnu, ces récits cherchaient à transmettre à un lecteur souvent limité par ses systèmes de référence, les impressions et les interrogations des voyageurs relativement aux objets et aux êtres nouveaux rencontrés dans le cadre de cet élargissement du champ "expérientiel" que constituait le voyage d'exploration.

La description de la nouveauté, composante verticale de ces relations,<sup>2</sup> semble être l'un des éléments les plus susceptibles d'avoir amené des changements sur les plans langagier et épistémologique, en grande partie parce que la pause descriptive est l'endroit du récit où sont énoncées les données linguistiques et référentielles qui révèlent le rapport établi avec le monde nouveau par le rédacteur – que ce dernier soit le voyageur ou son secrétaire.<sup>3</sup> C'est au niveau de ce rapport "expérientiel" que l'on peut identifier les éléments discursifs qui ont participé à la création d'une nouvelle épistémè au cours des XVI<sup>e</sup> et XVII<sup>e</sup> siècles, épistémè "analytico-référentielle," pour reprendre l'appellation de Timothy Reiss, dont les éléments de base consistent en la valorisation de la connaissance empirique de l'univers, au moyen de modèles conceptuels capables de saisir et de formuler les lois naturelles qui sont censées présider à l'organisation du cosmos.<sup>4</sup>

On peut par conséquent supposer que les récits du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle qui se présentent au lecteur comme des narrations de voyages effectués dans des régions inconnues offriront des différences notables sur le plan de la description de la nouveauté, selon que les voyages relatés sont réels ou imaginaires. Les récits basés sur des périple historiquement vérifiables posséderaient ainsi des caractéristiques stylistiques que l'on peut rapprocher du discours analytico-référentiel établi définitivement au XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle par Francis Bacon.<sup>5</sup> Les relations imaginaires, quant à elles, moins influencées par les expériences nouvelles, se rattacheraient davantage aux traditions épistémologiques médiévales, où la cosmologie et les modes de

connaissance s'inscrivent dans un discours conjonctif (ou théocentrique).<sup>6</sup>

L'influence ainsi supposée de l'expérience nouvelle sur le discours descriptif se vérifie lors de l'examen comparatif de la composante descriptive de deux textes presque contemporains, qui ont souvent été rapprochés, dans le passé, pour des raisons de ressemblances thématiques. Il s'agit du *Brief Récit* de 1545, attribué à Jacques Cartier, et du *Quart Livre*, de François Rabelais, qui a été publié dans sa version intégrale en 1552.<sup>7</sup> L'étude stylistique de ces deux textes révèle que les descriptions du *Brief Récit* sont organisées de façon épistémologique, tandis que celles du *Quart Livre* le sont de manière rhétorique, c'est-à-dire que les descriptions de Cartier se préoccupent surtout de mettre en valeur le signifié, c'est-à-dire l'information, tandis que celles de Rabelais accordent une importance particulière au signifiant, c'est-à-dire aux différents procédés de présentation de l'information. On peut en effet constater que les descriptions du *Brief Récit* s'articulent comme des définitions qui tentent de cerner la nature de l'objet décrit au moyen d'une diversification des éléments informatifs, alors que les descriptions du *Quart Livre* esquissent une image globale de l'objet décrit en utilisant un minimum de renseignements qu'elles mettent cependant en évidence par des procédés rhétoriques. Les pauses descriptives provenant du récit de Rabelais sont par conséquent plus proches de l'illustration que de la définition.

Les différences d'orientation, que nous venons de situer en termes de définition et d'illustration, trouvent leur prolongement dans d'autres aspects des moments descriptifs et concourent ainsi à mettre en évidence ce qu'on peut considérer comme la principale différence stylistique, soit, d'une part, l'organisation unifiée des descriptions de Rabelais et, de l'autre, la diversité dont font preuve les pauses descriptives provenant du *Brief Récit*. Cette polarité unité/diversité caractérise les deux séries de descriptions tant sur le plan de l'énoncé que sur celui de l'énonciation.

Sur le plan de l'énoncé, les descriptions de Rabelais se centrent sur un nombre réduit de renseignements, qu'elles exploitent cependant de façon maximale au cours d'une démarche textuelle qui répète et amplifie les renseignements de départ en leur adjoignant des détails synonymiques et en leur faisant subir des métamorphoses de présentation. On peut ainsi reconnaître, dans les descriptions du *Quart Livre*, une récurrence de "l'identique" toutefois transformée par des procédés rhétoriques qui créent une progression de l'effet. L'énumération est le principal outil stylistique qu'utilise le narrateur afin de présenter les différentes métamorphoses de l'information thématique qu'il a choisie de mettre en relief. Il peut s'agir d'une répétition de sons, de mots ou de phrases syntaxiquement identiques. En conjonction avec d'autres procédés, tels l'intensification des images, l'absence de verbes et l'abondance d'adjectifs souvent hyperboliques, cette succession de propositions synonymiques qu'est l'énumération crée une image thématiquement unifiée, mais peu détaillée, de



l'objet ou de l'être décrit. La dynamique centralisatrice de cette esquisse descriptive, pléonastique sur le plan de l'énoncé, est de plus renforcée par une énonciation unifiée quant à l'effet, bien que variée en ce qui concerne les moyens utilisés pour créer cet effet. Dans l'ensemble des descriptions du *Quart Livre*, le rédacteur fait effectivement appel de façon continue au registre subjectif pour signaler au lecteur l'ampleur et la nature des réactions émotives que lui et les personnages ont éprouvées devant les réalités nouvelles rencontrées au cours du voyage. Qu'il s'agisse de crainte, dans l'épisode du Phytetere, ou d'étonnement, dans la description des habitants de Ruach,<sup>8</sup> l'émotion se manifeste du début à la fin de la pause descriptive, par la présentation et l'accumulation de mots qui possèdent une connotation émotive, ainsi qu'au moyen d'interpellations et de commentaires du narrateur qui indiquent non seulement l'existence d'émotions, mais aussi l'origine et la nature de ces dernières.

Les descriptions de Rabelais sont donc unifiées tant sur le plan de l'énoncé que sur celui de l'énonciation, unité rhétorique qui ne cherche pas à cerner l'essence de la "chose" à décrire, mais illustre certaines caractéristiques de cette dernière, en insistant particulièrement sur leur rapport avec la subjectivité des voyageurs.

Comme nous venons de l'indiquer, il est possible de percevoir distinctement, dans le *Quart Livre*, l'orientation "monothématique" et unidirectionnelle qu'adopte la démarche descriptive du conteur. Il s'agit d'une dynamique paradigmatique, où l'élan descriptif est suscité par une continue permutation du "semblable." Les descriptions de Cartier, par contre, se situent sur le plan syntagmatique du langage où le "différent" succède au "différent," tant sur le plan de l'énoncé que sur celui de l'énonciation, pour offrir une image composite de l'objet décrit. Au lieu de se superposer, comme dans le *Quart Livre*, pour arriver à un patron idéal de la "chose" dont on parle, les informations fournies par le relateur se juxtaposent les unes aux autres de façon linéaire à l'intérieur d'un mouvement du regard descriptif qui renseigne le lecteur sur plusieurs aspects de la nouvelle réalité rencontrée.

On peut ainsi reconnaître, dans le *Brief Récit*, une diversification de l'information qui projette dans l'espace textuel une image détaillée et plutôt complexe de l'objet décrit. Ce dernier n'est pas représenté au moyen d'une esquisse linguistique pléonastique, mais plutôt à l'aide de divers procédés stylistiques qui créent une image nettement différenciée de la nouvelle réalité. Dans le moment descriptif portant sur l'adhothuys,<sup>9</sup> par exemple, on retrouve des renseignements sur les dimensions, la couleur, le lieu d'habitation, la répartition géographique et même le goût de cet animal marin, présentés au moyen de comparaisons, d'évaluations perceptuelles et de compte-rendus. Cet inventaire rapide signale bien la variété du matériel linguistique inscrit dans un espace textuel limité.



Une telle constatation révèle l'effort que fait le "relateur" pour transmettre au lecteur un ensemble varié de signifiés qui correspondrait à l'image cognitive que les voyageurs se sont faits de la réalité nouvelle. Quoique l'on puisse sentir ici une volonté de définir, donc de cerner l'essence de ce qui est décrit, le texte, en multipliant les détails et les procédés stylistiques, donne naissance, non pas à une image précise et intégrée de l'objet, mais à une création linguistique hétérogène, qui présente une "chose" hybride dont l'essence et l'existence prennent appui, du moins dans le texte, sur une juxtaposition de caractéristiques appartenant à d'autres objets de l'univers. Dans la description de l'adhothuys, par exemple, l'animal que le texte évoque semble ainsi être la résultante d'une combinaison de traits physiques appartenant à d'autres éléments de l'univers que connaît le "relateur." Ce dernier nous présente en effet un poisson sans nageoires, qui ressemble à un cétacé et à un chien, blanc comme neige et qui vit entre deux eaux. La juxtaposition de ces attributs nous fait voir l'animal plus par ses contours analogiques, c'est-à-dire par les correspondances avec l'univers que l'humain croit retrouver dans la bête, que par ses caractéristiques propres.

À cette diversité de l'énoncé correspond une diversification des registres de l'énonciation qui rend compte du sentiment d'ambiguïté entourant le statut des objets nouveaux dont parle le "relateur." Ce dernier présente certaines informations avec objectivité, tandis que pour d'autres, le ton qu'il utilise devient lyrique, admiratif ou méprisant. La présence d'un tel mouvement de va-et-vient entre le registre objectif et le registre émotif souligne la nature changeante de l'attitude du "relateur" face aux réalités nouvelles.

La polarité unité/diversité, qui caractérise, d'une part, les descriptions du *Quart Livre* et, de l'autre, celles provenant du *Brief Récit*, peut s'exprimer dans les termes d'une autre opposition qui tient compte de façon plus globale de la dynamique interne des moments descriptifs. Il s'agit de la dualité centrifuge/centripète, modèle conceptuel binaire qui nous semble intéressant parce qu'il indique que l'ensemble des éléments qui forment les descriptions de Cartier possèdent une tendance à l'expansion, tandis que ceux qui composent celles de Rabelais font preuve d'une énergie centralisatrice. Cela signifie que même si certaines caractéristiques des deux séries de descriptions se ressemblent, leur façon de s'organiser les oppose selon une importante différence d'orientation.

Une telle polarité peut s'expliquer par la correspondance du choix organisationnel des éléments stylistiques et d'un mode de connaissance de l'univers. Dans la perspective où le texte représente un microcosme dans lequel les deux écrivains transcrivent les composantes du macrocosme (l'univers) au moyen d'un réseau de correspondances analogiques,<sup>10</sup> on peut considérer la transcription du "grand" au "petit" comme une opéra-

tion de médiatisation qui met en évidence la vision du macrocosme que possède le rédacteur. Il est par conséquent possible de rapprocher les caractéristiques stylistiques d'une description – cette dernière étant la transcription linguistique d'une "chose" appartenant au macrocosme – et la conception que se font les deux écrivains du langage comme outil de transposition. Une telle inscription des données descriptives dans un discours épistémologique global permet d'expliquer les différences qui caractérisent les deux récits, en identifiant l'épistémè à laquelle appartient le langage de chacun des rédacteurs.<sup>11</sup>

Comme nous l'avons déjà noté, les descriptions du *Quart Livre* font preuve d'une grande force de cohésion interne qui se traduit par une présentation pléonastique des éléments linguistiques. L'impression d'ordonnance et de stabilité qui résulte de cette organisation textuelle suggère que Rabelais propose au lecteur une transcription linguistique univoque et fidèle du monde qu'il décrit. Ce procédé de transposition, dans lequel l'ordonnance centripète des éléments stylistiques semble reproduire une ordonnance similaire du macrocosme, nous indique que le rédacteur du *Quart Livre* reconnaît, d'une part, le pouvoir de représentation du langage par rapport à son univers imaginaire et, de l'autre, la possibilité de réduire la correspondance macrocosme/microcosme à un principe premier vers lequel tendent toutes les composantes de ces deux systèmes analogiques.

La place et l'importance de l'attribution de noms dans les pauses descriptives du *Quart Livre* indiquent en effet que, pour le rédacteur, le mot possède le pouvoir d'évoquer directement une réalité précise: à chaque "chose" – même nouvelle sur le plan de l'imaginaire – correspond un mot capable d'englober la nature et la fonction de cette "chose." Rabelais admet donc que le langage est à même de transcrire le macrocosme en lui imposant toutefois, au cours du processus de transcription, l'encadrement d'une logique rhétorique plus conceptuelle "qu'expérientielle," qui est d'ailleurs censée refléter les lois et l'organisation de l'univers, où tout concourt à la reconnaissance de la présence première et ultime de Dieu.

Dans une telle perspective, la description de la nouveauté ne présente aucune difficulté particulière pour le conteur. Même s'ils sont périphériques par rapport à l'univers connu, les mondes nouveaux explorés par les voyageurs du *Quart Livre* sont soumis aux mêmes lois universelles d'ordre divin et, par conséquent, au même système analogique qui permet d'assimiler linguistiquement le "différent" au "semblable" en l'inscrivant dans une organisation hiérarchique pyramidale dont Dieu est le sommet et la condition d'existence. L'économie centripète des descriptions de Rabelais reflète donc une dynamique épistémologique conjonctive dont les éléments – tout comme ceux du texte – tendent vers un point commun en reproduisant l'organisation théocentrique de l'univers.



Comme cette conception du langage et du cosmos relève d'un principe unificateur qui trouve son origine dans le symbolisme universel énoncé par saint Augustin,<sup>12</sup> nous pouvons donc conclure que les descriptions de Rabelais participent de l'épistémè médiévale.

Les descriptions du *Brief Récit*, pour leur part, se caractérisent par la variété des moyens stylistiques mis en oeuvre pour décrire la nouvelle réalité. La transcription de cette dernière dans le microcosme du texte s'avère ainsi une opération linguistique qui se distingue plus par l'expansion de ses éléments constitutifs que par leur concentration. Il s'agit d'une stratégie textuelle qui met en évidence la difficulté qu'éprouve le "relateur" à décrire brièvement la nouveauté au moyen de procédés stylistiques univoques. Cartier reconnaît en effet le caractère approximatif de son langage descriptif, en ne cessant d'ajouter des renseignements à son texte, de façon parfois anarchique, afin d'appréhender une réalité qui semble continuellement se dérober à son effort langagier.

Le Nouveau-Monde ne semble guère vouloir s'assimiler à l'Ancien sur le plan analogique, d'où la nécessité de singulariser les choses à l'aide de procédés épistémologiques qui constituent en fin de compte un aveu partiel de l'impossibilité du langage à saisir directement la réalité. Bien que l'ordre universel de similitude et de hiérarchie des choses semble ainsi rompu de façon irrémédiable, le "relateur" réussit néanmoins à situer le "différent" en l'incorporant à un discours descriptif dont les prémisses, qui s'inscrivent dans la tradition analogique médiévale, mènent à des constructions scripturaires qui tiennent de plus en plus compte de l'individualité des choses, saisie par l'expérience immédiate. De ce fait, Cartier fait preuve d'une orientation intellectuelle "renaissante," car tout en étant conscient de l'arbitraire relatif du langage, le "relateur" tente de cerner la nature des choses avec le principal outil de communication qu'il connaît. Cette attitude vis-à-vis de la réalité du Nouveau-Monde, qui donne naissance à un discours descriptif diversifié, se rapproche ainsi "de l'ouverture à la variété des choses" que Jérôme Cardan identifiait comme caractérisant la révolution intellectuelle que les Européens du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle ont eu conscience de vivre.<sup>13</sup>

À partir des informations présentées précédemment, il apparaît donc fort probable que les contraintes "expérientielles" du voyage ont influencé le rédacteur du *Brief Récit* en lui imposant la problématique de la description de la nouveauté, problématique que Rabelais, en décrivant son univers imaginaire, n'a pas rencontrée, et dont la résolution textuelle se présente chez Cartier comme une des étapes importantes menant à la formation d'une nouvelle épistémè.



## Notes

- 1 Il faut insister ici sur le mot "progressivement," qui souligne l'étendue temporelle d'un processus épistémologique dont les effets culturels ne se sont manifestés que peu à peu. À ce sujet, voir Lucien Febvre, *Le Problème de l'incroyance au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Paris: Albin-Michel, 1942), p. 422-423; John H. Elliott, "Renaissance Europe and America: a Blunted Impact?" in *First Images of America*, éd. Fredi Chiappelli (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), I, p. 17.
- 2 Gérard Genette, "Frontières du récit," in *Figures II* (Paris: Seuil, 1969), p. 56.
- 3 La problématique de l'influence de l'expérience sur la description de la nouveauté est énoncée par Alexandre Cioranescu, "La Découverte de l'Amérique et l'art de la description," *Revue des Sciences Humaines*, 106 (1962), p. 161.
- 4 Timothy Reiss, *The Discourse of Modernism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), p. 31.
- 5 Pour un exposé des éléments qui constituent l'empirisme de Bacon, voir Reiss, chapitre 6, "The Masculine Birth of Time," p. 198-224.
- 6 Reiss, p. 72; Peter Haidu, "Repetition: Modern Reflections on Medieval Aesthetics," *Modern Language Notes*, 92 (1977), p. 878-879.
- 7 *Brief Récit* in *The Voyages of Jacques Cartier*, éd. H. P. Biggar (Ottawa: Publications of the Public Archives of Canada, 1924); François Rabelais, *Le Quart Livre*, éd. R. Marichal (Genève: Droz, 1947). Nous utiliserons le nom de Cartier comme un "vocabulaire" qui désigne l'auteur du *Brief Récit*. Au sujet de la paternité de ce texte, voir André Berthiaume, *La Découverte ambiguë* (Montréal: Pierre Tisseyre, 1976), p. 40.
- 8 Rabelais, p. 152 et 182-183.
- 9 Cartier, p. 117.
- 10 Guy Demerson, "Rabelais et l'analogique," *Études Rabelaisiennes*, 14 (1977), p. 25.
- 11 Reiss, p. 32.
- 12 Johan Chydenius, "La Théorie du symbolisme universel," *Poétique*, 23 (1975), p. 325; Alfonso Maierù, "'Signum' dans la culture médiévale," in *Sprache und Erkenntnis im Mittelalter*, éd. J. Beckman et L. Honnefelder (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1981), I, p. 57.
- 13 Cité par Michel Mercier, *Le Roman féminin* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1976), p. 34.

# Daniel, Rainolde, Demosthenes, and the Degree Speech of Shakespeare's Ulysses

CLIFFORD J. RONAN

Gayley, Muir, and the editors of the Variorum, Cambridge, and Arden Shakespeares carefully consider the numerous influences, direct and indirect, upon Ulysses' magnificent oration On Degree in *Troilus and Cressida* I.iii.<sup>1</sup> Hints of the underlying premise of the speech – a threat to the universal binding power of the Cosmos – have been found in numerous Western writers, commencing with Homer, Plato, Ovid, and the apocalyptic authors of Holy Scripture. Shakespeare undoubtedly encountered the idea frequently in his reading and listening. But beyond his favourite Ovid, there can be scarcely more than two sources to which Shakespeare would be incontrovertibly exposed. One is Chaucer's *Troilus and Criseyde*, which would be Shakespeare's *locus classicus* for the Troilus story. There, in Boethian terminology, man is urged to live in harmony with that universal "bond of thynges" (III.1261), Love.<sup>2</sup> Another indisputable source of On Degree is the official homily "Of Obedience" (1547), which Shakespeare would have heard as often as thirty times before the date of composition of this play (entered in the Stationers' Register early in 1603).<sup>3</sup> "Of Obedience" seems to be imitated and even echoed in several of Ulysses' phrases, particularly his "Take but degree away . . . / And . . . Discord" or "Chaos" "followes" (11. 115-33):

Euery *degree* of people, in their vocacion, callyng, & office, hath appoynted to them, their duetie and ordre . . . and euery one haue nede of other . . . For wher ther is no right ordre, there reigneth all abuse, carnall libertie, enormitie, syn, & *babilonicall confusiō*. Take away kynges, princes, rulers, magistrates, iudges, & suche states of Gods ordre, no mā shall ride or go by the high waie vnrobbed . . . and there must needes *folow* all mischief and *vter destrucciō* . . .

("Of Obedience," *Homilies*, italics supplied)

Other works that On Degree has plausibly been said to echo include Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations* and, from more modern times, Elyot's *Governor* (1531) and Hooker's *Ecclesiastical Polity* (1593). It is here my purpose to suggest at least two additional verbal sources, neither of which seems ever to have been mentioned in connection with this play before. Both

of these likely sources are concerned with rhetoric: Samuel Daniel's "Musophilus" (1599), a dialogue delineating functions of literature; and Richard Rainolde's *Foundacion of Rhetorike* (1563), a collection of original essays designed by the author to illustrate (for teachers, students, and general readers) a wide variety of rhetorical strategies.<sup>4</sup> That Shakespeare should be alert to the ideas and locutions of Daniel would not be a surprising discovery, as he seems to have reacted to or borrowed from Daniel's treatment of Marcus Antonius and the War of the Roses. But if Shakespeare can be found contemplating Rainolde about 1600, there may be something more worth noticing: the interestingly tight cluster of dates (1597-1603) when Shakespeare seems most to echo – and presumably thus to show a renewed interest in – the rhetorical textbooks of his age.<sup>5</sup>

The chief point of significant resemblance that I am proposing between Daniel's "Musophilus" and Ulysses' speech involves a hunting image and the apocalyptic phrase *universal prey*, which both authors use to describe the confusion and Armageddon that will occur if a great bond is missing – Degree, for Shakespeare; Literary Excellence, for Daniel. According to Daniel, "Presumption" and "interiangling Ignorance" produce literature so ephemeral that poets cannot

hold out with the greatest might they may,  
Against confusion, that hath all in chace,  
To make of all, a vniuersall pray.

("Musophilus," 11. 243-45)

Shakespeare seems to have substituted the word "Chaos" for "Confusion," and for the generalized image of a "chace," the particular image of the self-devouring "Wolfe":

Appetite (an vniuersall Wolfe[ ])

...  
Must make perforce an vniversall prey,  
And last, eate vp himselfe.

...  
This Chaos, when Degree is suffocate,  
Followes the choaking.

(Tro. I.iii.127-33)

So fond does Shakespeare here become of the word *universal* that he uses it twice, applying it to the wolf as well as (with Daniel) to its primary prey.

Daniel, too, seems to have contributed to impulses, experienced by Shakespeare in many quarters, to speak of cosmic harmony (or its absence) in musical terminology. Hooker, it is often said, is the chief source for Ulysses' reference to the "Discord" that follows when the "string" of



"Degree" is "taken[n] away" or "vn-tune[d]" (I.iii.115-16). And in a long passage on the threat of disorder in the Cosmos, Hooker does indeed make an explicit musical analogy:

See we not plainly that obedience of creatures unto the lawe of nature is the stay of the whole world? Notwithstanding with nature it commeth somtimes to passe as with arte. Let *Phidias* have rude and obstinate stuffe to carve, though his arte do that it should, his worke will lacke that bewtie which otherwise in fitter matter it might have had. He that striketh an instrument with skill, may cause notwithstanding a verie unpleasant sound, if the string whereon he striketh chaunce to be uncapable of harmonie.

(*Ecclesiastical Polity*, I.iii.2-3)

In Hooker the "string" "uncapable of harmonie" is implicitly ill-tuned, but only implicitly. In two interrelated passages in Daniel's "Musophilus," however, the author comes one step closer to speaking of a string that sounds out of tune. In Daniel we read of jarring poetic "discords" made by the "unhallowed string" – a term that may have helped inspire Shakespeare's reference to the "vn-tune[d] . . . string" of degree-less "Discord":

so many so confusedly sing,  
Whose diuers *discords* haue the Musicke mar'd,  
And in contempt that mysterie doth bring,  
That he must sing alowd that will be heard:  
And the receiu'd opinion of the thing,  
For some *unhallowed string* that vildely iar'd. . . .

("Musophilus," 11.62-67; italics supplied)

The musical image of a Cosmos of poetry is repeated a hundred and fifty lines later in Daniel's reference to the "divers disagreeing cordes/ Of inter-angling Ignorance" (11.234-36). Similarities of Daniel to Shakespeare in no way weaken the case for the dramatist's simultaneous use of Hooker here in *Troilus* (or for a use in such contemporary plays as *Hamlet* and *Measure for Measure*).<sup>6</sup> Instead, Hooker's influence would appear to reinforce, rather than surmount, that of Daniel in at least the musical imagery of these Ulyssean lines.

The opening of Hooker's First Book resembles Ulysses' speech not just in individual phrases but also in its broad, sweeping survey of an ordered, yet endangered, universe. Another evident resemblance between these two is shared also with such forebearers as Elyot's *Governor*, Rabelais' *Gargantua*, and the homily. This is only natural, because all five participate in an international tradition. What seems to have gone unremarked in the criticism of *Troilus and Cressida*, however, is that this tradition is a Renaissance one in the strictest sense: a revivifying of an ancient custom. When Hooker posits so eloquently a dissolution of our orderly universe—

Now if nature should intermit her course, . . . if the frame of that heavenly arch erected over our heads should loosen and dissolve it selfe: if the . . . seasons . . . blend themselves by disordered and confused mixture, . . . what would become of man himselfe . . . ?

(*Ecclesiastical Polity*, I.iii.2)

– Hooker is, in fact, translating word for word (without acknowledgement) from a patristic source, Arnobius' *Against the Pagans* (I.2).<sup>7</sup>

A similar but more ancient and prestigious occurrence of this hallowed trope can be found in a popular speech often ascribed in the Renaissance to the great Demosthenes, the *First Oration against Aristogiton*.<sup>8</sup> There, too, we read of a hypothetical future disorder that will occur when some protective and unifying bond is *loosed*. In pseudo-Demosthenes, the verb is *lu-ô* ("luthentô" and "lethutai"), which means (and shares the same Indo-European root as) *loosen*. The word thus corresponds to "*relaxata aut dissoluta*" in Arnobius, "loosen and dissolve" in Hooker, and the "vn-tuned" or loosened string in Shakespeare (cf. "loose" 1. 124).

[If] the laws and the obedience that all men yield to the laws . . . were done away with [*luthentôn*] and every man were given license to do as he liked, not only does the constitution vanish, but our life would not differ from that of the beasts of the field . . . For vice is . . . daring; . . . probity is . . . liable to come off second-best. Therefore . . .juries ought to protect and strengthen the laws . . . If not, all is dissolved [*lelutai*], broken up, confounded, and the city becomes the prey of the most profligate and shameless.

(*1st Aristogiton* 20, 24-25)

After reading this speech about man's proclivity to political disease and psychological brutalization, we need not agree with the Victorian editor<sup>9</sup> of Demosthenes, who, in silently citing a parallel with *Troilus*, seems to encourage a belief in Shakespeare's direct indebtedness. But this much is clear: pseudo-Demosthenes and Arnobius fall within the same subdivision of a classical tradition as do the Renaissance writers already cited.

Yet another such author, an Englishman who would have had to listen to the homily and could also have read Elyot, is Richard Rainolde, adapter and only Tudor translator of the most popular elementary composition text in Renaissance Europe, Aphthonius' *Progymnasmata*.<sup>10</sup> Rainolde rewords and retitles this originally Hellenistic book, calling it the *Foundation of Rhetorike* (1563). In his "Oration" "against thieues," Rainolde, unlike other adapters of the *Progymnasmata*, makes a point of mentioning and speaking highly of the pseudo-Demosthenean *Aristogiton*, which we have just examined. Moreover, Rainolde quotes from it and writes variations of its section on a hypothetical chaotic future. Rainolde's anticipations of Shakespeare's phraseology are in many regards as striking as Elyot's and the homilist's.



Elyot, the anonymous author(s) of the homily, and Rainolde share with Shakespeare three speech patterns seen in no other purported source of the motif of universal dissolution. All four writings employ the phrase *take away*, place some universal bonding agent as direct object of *take away*, and speak in very similar language of the dire eventuality forthcoming. Specifically, each writer says that what "follow[s]" (homilist, Rainolde, Shakespeare) or "ensue[s]" (Elyot) is a "Chaos" (Elyot, Rainolde, Shakespeare) or "confusion" (homilist, Rainolde). Of all these three possible sources of the Ulysses' speech, Rainolde alone anticipates Shakespeare in dividing the phrase *take away* into its two halves, and in his precisely similar choice of both the words *Chaos* and *follow(s)*:

*Take but Degree away, vn-tune that string,  
And hearke what Discord follows:*

...

*This Chaos, when Degree is suffocate,  
Follows the choaking.*

(*Tro.* I.iii.115-16, 132-33, italics supplied)

*Take lawes awaie, all order of states faileth . . . [B]othe lawes and the Prince,  
hane that honour and strength, that without them, a Chaos a confusion would  
followe . . .*

(*Foundacion*, sig. I3r; italics supplied)

Other of Rainolde's phrases, pallid though they are in comparison with those in some alternate sources and in Shakespeare, seem also to anticipate Shakespeare and probably provide reinforcement for tendencies and devices he was already adopting under pressure of Platonic and other influences. (Book VIII of *The Republic*, for instance, describes psychology, sociology, and political science in terms drawn from medicine, music, and animal-lore, including wolf-lore.<sup>11</sup>) Specifically, Rainolde shares with Shakespeare the use of medical analogies in describing the Mesocosm, a conventional device present also in Elyot and the pseudo-Demosthenes.<sup>12</sup> Also, Rainolde, like Daniel, uses some musical imagery (e.g. "harmonie," "concorde," sig. I2r) and the word *prey*. Rainolde, however, is especially emphatic about the idea of beastly predation when the universal force is loosened. In a few consecutive pages of his long oration, Rainolde touches upon the bestiality motif a dozen times, of which the following is a fair sample:

*Lawes . . . kepe backe, the wilfull, rashe, and beastlie life of man, . . . for  
. . . of ill maners came good lawes, that is to saie, the wicked and beastlie life of  
man, their iniurius behaiour, sekyng to frame themselves from men to beastes  
. . . If the labour and industrie of the godlie, should be alwaie a praie to  
wicked, and eche mannes violence and iniurious dealyng, his owne lawe, the  
beaste in his state, would bee lesse brutishe . . .*

(*Foundacion*, sigs. I1v-2v; italics supplied)



In addition, Rainolde, unlike all the other purported sources, uses much imagery of the cutting down or uprooting of growing things. Disorders like earthquakes or tempests in the Mesocosm threaten, in Shakespeare, to "crack," "rend," and "deracinate" from its "fixure" the peaceful tree of state (11. 103-107). Such images are analogous to Rainolde's many remarks about criminal elements as "weedes" in need of being "plucked vp" (sig. I2r) or "cut of" where they "roo[t] out" virtue (sig. K2r). And lastly, in his use of contending abstractions, Rainolde is closer to Shakespeare than are Daniel, Hooker and other followers of Prudentius. Shakespeare's excitingly phrased psychomachia of "Force," "Iustice," "Power," "Strength," "Will," and "Appetite" (I.iii.120-28) seems to be anticipated in Rainolde's pseudo-Demosthenean passages, where this device is handled with a concentration and vibrancy approaching the dramatist's:

For, as Demosthenes the famous Orator of Athenes doeth saie. If that wicked men cease not their violēce . . . If dailie the heddes of wicked men, cease not to subuerte lawes, . . . *oppression and violence should bee lawe, and reason, and wilfull luste would bee in place of reason, might, force, and power, should ende the case.* Wherefore, soche as no lawe, no order, nor reason, will driue to liue as members in a common wealthe, to serue in their functiō. Thei are as Homere calleth them, burdeins to the yearth . . .

(*Foundacion*, sign. I4r; italics supplied)

In both Rainolde and Shakespeare, it seems likely, the *tune* of these remarks is meant to seem Grecian or antique.

Shakespeare's resort to Rainolde may seem less credible than other of his borrowings. But Rainolde does write on rhetoric, a subject in which Shakespeare seems to have taken a remarkably clear professional interest in the years immediate before *Troilus and Cressida* (c. 1602). Puttenham is echoed, for instance, in *Love's Labor's Lost* (c. 1597); and Peacham, in *Much Ado About Nothing*, (c. 1598). Another rhetorical anthology like Rainolde's, Sylvain's *Orator*, is used in *Merchant of Venice* (c.1598).

Still, Rainolde is the most graceless and redundant of the four rhetoricians mentioned above, a writer whose prose is in the limping styles of a half century before the date of *Troilus*. Yet if young Shakespeare really had been, as rumored, "a Schoolmaster in the Countrey,"<sup>13</sup> with a less thorough command of Latin and Greek than would be deemed appropriate, might he not have once been interested in this little teaching guide? After all, Rainolde comments also upon several subjects to which Shakespeare's writing interests brought him: Venus and Adonis, Helen, Hecuba, Menenius, Junius Brutus, Cassibelan, Caesar, Cato, Nero, Richard III, Henry VIII. Also Rainolde's pages resound with a salvo of Greek words and names: "Thesis," "Rhetorique," "Eidolopoeia," "Prosolopoeia," "Progimnasmata," "Democratia," and "tokos" (Greek for *usury*); and Thebes,

Athens, Lacedaemon, Boeotia, Aphthonius, Aesop, Cadmus, Aristotle, Plato, Isocrates, Solon, Thucydides, Diogenes, Alexander, Lysimachus, Epaminondas. It is not inconceivable that Shakespeare would have turned, or returned, to this school text when he was contemplating formal rhetorics in the late 1590s. Then, remembering that Rainolde claimed to imitate Demosthenes at some length, Shakespeare might have come back to make specific borrowings when he needed to devise an antique speech for the greatest of Homeric orators. Perhaps Rainolde's version of the famous Demosthenes looked "Greek" enough to the dramatist. And if he checked the Greek original or one of the Latin translations,<sup>14</sup> Shakespeare would have found that Rainolde is faithful to the ancient rhetorical topos of the threatened return of chaos – a tradition whose classical associations and connotations were probably as well known to Shakespeare and his audience as they were to Elyot, Cranmer and associates, Hooker, and Daniel.

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#### Notes

- 1 Shakespeare citations are to the New Variorum *Troilus and Cressida*, Harold N. Hillebrand and T. W. Baldwin, edd. (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1953). Besides the above (pp. 51-59, 389-410), the chief extended discussions of the sources of On Degree include Charles Mills Gayley, *Shakespeare and the Founders of Liberty in America* (New York: Macmillan, 1917) pp. 162-90, 234-59; Alice Walker, ed., *Troilus and Cressida* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 153; Kenneth Palmer, ed., *Troilus and Cressida* (London: Methuen, 1982), pp. 320-22; and Kenneth Muir, *The Sources of Shakespeare's Plays* (New York: Yale University Press, 1978), pp. 151-57. It should be noted that this last work, a standard authority, erroneously states that Hooker formulates Shakespeare's phrase "Degrees in Schooles" (I.iii.110). Hillebrand, p. 391, on the contrary, follows Gayley and quite rightly stresses that Hooker could have provided the "figure" of academic ranks; nowhere does the phrase *degrees in schools* occur in Hooker, even though a discussion of such degrees is to be found in Hooker's Preface. The Hooker passage in question is some 8,000 words, or 18 folio pages, prior to the passages on the Cosmos in Book I, the portion of Hooker with the best claim to underlie Ulysses' speech. Below, unless otherwise specified, Richard Hooker is cited in *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, Vol. I*, ed. Georges Edelen, Folger Library Edition (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1977).
- 2 Chaucer is cited in F. N. Robinson's ed. of *The Works*, 2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton, 1957); see also the binding "cheyne of love" in *Knight's Tale* (a source of *MND*), 11. 2988ff.
- 3 In 1602, Shakespeare (b. 1564) would have been a churchgoer for some 30 years. Alfred Hart, *Shakespeare and the Homilies* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1934), p. 73, reminds us that attendance was compulsory in Tudor parishes and that "Of Obedience" would be read annually. A recent writer on this subject, Professor Ronald B. Bond of the University of Calgary, has communicated to me privately his opinion that this crucial homily would have been read more than once a year. Bond, too, believes that the "controlling hand" in "Of Obedience" is Cranmer's; see Bond's "Cranmer and the Controversy Surrounding Publication of *Certain Sermons or Homilies* (1547)," *Renaissance and Reformation*, 12 (1976), 28-35, especially 30. My citation of the Tudor "Of Obedience" is from the readily available excerpts in the Variorum *Troilus*, though I have also consulted a full text in *Certain Sermons or homilies* . . . , intro., Mary Ellen Riekey and Thomas B. Stroup (1623; Gainesville: Scholars' Facsim., 1968).
- 4 The Daniel and Rainolde citations are from Samuel Daniel, *Musophilus*, ed. Raymond Himelick (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Studies, 1965) and Richard Rainolde, *The Foundation of Rhetorike*, *The English Experience*, no. 91 (1563; facsim. rpt. Amsterdam: Da Capo, 1969).



- 5 For Shakespeare's use of formal rhetorics, see below; Sister Miriam Joseph, *Shakespeare's Use of the Arts of Language* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1947) pp. 44, 113; and Kenneth Muir, "Shakespeare and Rhetoric," *Shakespeare-Jahrbuch* (Heidelberg) 90 (1954), 49-68. *Troilus* is usually assigned to 1601-02. Commenting on the likely use of rhetorical works in, respectively, *Merchant of Venice* (1596-97), *Much Ado* (1598-99), and *Love's Labor's Lost* (1594-97), Muir believes that Shakespeare "seems to have read Pyott's translation of *The Orator*, Peacham's *Garden of Eloquence*, and Puttenham's *Arte of English Poesie*" (Muir, "Rhetoric," 53).
- 6 Gayley (pp. 187-89) argues for an especially strong influence of Hooker on *Hamlet*. To me, it seems that the lines in *Measure for Measure* on glass, apes, heaven, and angels (II.ii) could involve Shakespeare's reading Hooker's passage on the order and degree of angels. Hooker's angels are internally ranked and given to searching for divine reflections in themselves and man; they are filled with a God-like love "unto the children of men; in the countenance of whose nature looking downward they behold themselves beneath themselves, even as upward in God, beneath whom themselves are, they see that creature which is no where but in themselves and us resembled" (I.iv.1).
- 7 For a convenient look at the Arnobius text, see Christopher Morris' notes to his Everyman ed., Richard Hooker, *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*, 2 vols. (London: Dent, 1907), I, 157.
- 8 English and Greek citations of the *1st Aristogiton* are from the J. Vince ed., *Demosthenes: Against Meidias*, . . . *Aristogiton*, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1935). I have, in addition, consulted various sixteenth-century Greek editions and one of the Latin translations at which Shakespeare could have glanced (Philip Melancthon, tr., *Contra Aristogiton* . . . , Hague, 1527).
- 9 Charles Rann Kennedy, ed., *The Orations of Demosthenes, Vol. IV*, Bohn's Classical Library (1888; London: George Bell, 1901), p. 61, n. 1, quotes *Tro.* I.iii. 109-30 with only the simple and enigmatic introductory comment "compare . . ."
- 10 F. R. Johnson provides a useful summary of the reputation of Rainolde and the popularity of Aphthonius and his Latin imitators; see Johnson's introduction to his facsimile of *Foundacion of Rhetorike* (New York: Scholars' Facsim., 1945). For the schoolroom use of Aphthonius, see T. W. Baldwin, *William Shakespeare's "Small Latine & Lesse Greeke,"* 2 vols. (Urbana: Illinois University Press, 1944), II, 288 *et passim*. Marion Trousedale, *Shakespeare and the Rhetoricians* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981), pp. 3-38, makes an interesting case for Rainolde as an important specimen of a class of rhetoricians whom Shakespeare may almost everywhere be imitating.
- 11 Cf. James Holly Hanford, "A Platonic Passage in Shakespeare's *Troilus and Cressida*," *Studies in Philology*, 13 (1916), 100-09.
- 12 Rainolde wants magistrates to rid their country of "yll humors" and "ill bloode" (sig. 12v) when the land is "plagued" with "pestiferous doinges" (sig. 13r). For this imagery of the diseased *corpus politicum* there are Greek antecedents: in Plato (*Relubric* 564B), who speaks of a country's disease (*nosêma*); and in pseudo-Demosthenes, who terms criminals incurable (*aniatos*) and cancerous. (See the P. Shorey ed., *The Republic*, 2 vols. Loeb Library [London: Heinemann, 1930-35].) But since Elyot anticipates Shakespeare's use of the word "med'cinable," perhaps the early Tudor Englishman is as responsible as any of the other authors for Shakespeare's talk of the Greek enterprise as "pale" and "sicke" of "Feauer" and "Plagues." See Sir Thomas Elyot, *The Boke Named the Gouernour*, 2 vols., ed. Henry Herbert Stephen Croft (London: Kegan, 1883), I, 5.
- 13 The written source is John Aubrey, quoting Christopher Beeston, son of one of Shakespeare's colleagues in the King's Men. Reasons for accepting Aubrey's account are well argued by, among others, Baldwin in his *Small Latine* II, 36 *et passim*.
- 14 Baldwin, *Small Latine* II, 650 and 661 states that proof is lacking for Shakespeare's use of any work ascribed to Demosthenes. At least until such proof may be forthcoming, Shakespeare's dependence on the second-hand Athenian classicism of Rainolde will continue to be most probable.



## Book Reviews/Comptes Rendus

Elizabeth A. Chesney. *The Countervoyage of Rabelais and Ariosto. A Comparative Reading of Two Renaissance Mock Epics*. Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1982. Pp vii, 232. \$20.00

This comparative study does for Ariosto and Rabelais what Giuseppe Mazzotta's acclaimed *Dante, Poet of the Desert* has recently done for the Florentine poet: it offers many close readings, probes linguistic ambiguities, makes use of a rich and varied critical vocabulary, displays impressive erudition, and raises issues that every student of the texts in question must ultimately treat. Elizabeth Chesney's work, like that of Mazzotta, may also prove controversial because of some of its revisionist conclusions. Nevertheless, as a whole it builds beautifully on the Renaissance studies of such distinguished scholars as Thomas Green, A. Bartlett Giamatti, Robert Durling, and the author's own mentor Marcel Tetel, who directed her work in its original form as a Duke University dissertation. The book consists of an introduction, five chapters ("The Voyage," "Myth and Fantasy," "The Narrator," "Time and Art," "Folly"), and a conclusion, nine-page bibliography, and ten-page index.

The Introduction contains an explanation of the purpose of the study and a rationale for the work's organization. Chesney does not desire to focus on Ariosto's possible influence on Rabelais, but rather wishes to examine the shared "difference" in the two authors. That which sets them apart from their medieval predecessors and links them to a new age and to each other is "their propensity for exploring the opposite of every truth and the other side of every argument," or what Chesney calls "a countervoyage, a critical reflection upon each conceptual pole by its other" (p. 5). She sees this dialectic as a pervasive structure in Ariosto and Rabelais, which accounts for textual ambiguities, sets them in the context of contemporary voyages of discovery, and relates them to the epoch's "antirationalistic movement" (p. 6). In Hegelian terms this self-criticism is the price a civilization must pay to evolve from one stage to the next. Ariosto at the end of the Italian Renaissance and Rabelais at the beginning of the French are transitional and pivotal figures, and as a result they engage in much consciousness-raising. Structures and themes highlighted during the era and developed in the two Renaissance mock epics become, therefore, the areas of Chesney's interest and form the basis of her five chapters. She justifies her multi-thematic approach as an attempt "to unite thematic and stylistic contradictions under the rubric of the countervoyage" (p. 15). The subsequent reading

of the *Orlando furioso* and the Rabelaisian *opus magnum* repeatedly shows synthesis-in-antithesis, convincingly argues for structural unity where little had previously been seen, and eloquently testifies to the value of Chesney's approach.

The first chapter warns against seeing the voyages depicted in Ariosto and Rabelais as a means for praising contemporary progress. Although topographical and nautical detail abounds in their descriptions of imaginary voyages, it serves primarily "to involve the reader in a spiritual odyssey" that will soon be spatially and temporally fragmented (p. 22). The voyage soon becomes "a vehicle for self-analysis and the formation of judgment" (p. 40), rather than an encomium of a Renaissance explorer. In the second chapter the uses of myth and fantasy are similarly revealed. While Chesney agrees that the widespread inclusion of pagan divinities in Renaissance literature "contributes to . . . man's own mythification" (p. 63), she argues that in the Ferrarese poet and the Gallic monk much of the myth is a parody and an indictment of the "indiscriminate valuing of antiquity over modernity" by their contemporaries (p. 66). The juxtaposition of fact and fantasy "demystifies by means of remythification" (p. 96). In other words, the authors use fantasy to remind the reader that illusion is part of being and the stuff of (re)mythification.

The next chapter, on the narrator, depends on Gérard Genette for much of its analytical terminology. It attempts to demonstrate that in Ariosto and Rabelais "narrative ambiguity . . . is . . . a mainspring of the countervoyage and, as such, contributes to the two works' conceptual unity" (p. 98). The narrator who is neither reliable nor consistently unreliable is designed to make the reader pause and consider the facets of knowledge; the consciousness of such a narrator "reflects the problems and contradictions of a transitional age" (p. 115). Chapter 4 treats the problem of time and art. Chesney identifies temporal vacillations in the two texts as evidence of "a temporal tension" in their descriptions of history and futurity (p. 136). The purpose of the tension is to demonstrate that the only constant is change; even art, which may transcend time, is subject to changing interpretations. The final chapter discusses the concept of folly as seen in such figures as Panurge in the Pantagrueline tales and Astolfo in the *Furioso*. Orlando's madness is analyzed as a "coupling of monomania with schizophrenia," a fact which supposedly makes him more polemical and didactic since he breaks with the typical literary type of fool (p. 188). The Conclusion acknowledges the geographical and temporal differences between Ariosto and Rabelais but concludes that these differences only serve "to render their profound similarities all the more intriguing" (p. 213). The bibliography, like the index, is exemplary, although Eric Auerbach's *Mimesis* essay on Rabelais should probably be included.

Chesney buttresses most of the above assertions with careful readings of multiple passages from both texts. Although she could be more careful when speaking of allegory in Ariosto (it is of a limited scope) and more attentive to the medieval currents in Rabelais (there are more than she credits), the book's overall approach—with its emphasis on the "divided consciousness" of the two authors—makes it a must for scholars of Renaissance comparative literature.

Mistakes and errata include "nouvi" for "nuovi" (pp. 4 and 22), "*Canzonere*"



for "*Canzoniere*" (p. 6), "provde" for "provide" (p. 39), "condemmed" for "condemned" (p. 45), "Ruggerio" for "Ruggiero" (p. 48), "noms" for "mons" (p. 68, l. 5), "lascai" for "lasciai" (p. 128, n. 39), "Aristo" for "Ariosto" (p. 165), "moveover" for "moreover" (p. 178), "scritte" for "scritto" (p. 186), "né" for "ne" (p. 191, l. 1) and an italicization problem on p. 34, n. 22. Notwithstanding these minor problems, the author's prose style is lucid, and the volume's printing is noteworthy for its clarity.

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Jonathan Goldberg. *Endlesse Worke: Spenser and the Structures of Discourse*. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981. P.p. Xv, 177. \$17.50 US.

The title of this book is taken from Spenser's apology following the great 'river-canto' in the fourth book of *The Faerie Queene*. When the magnificent procession of water-gods and nymphs attending the marriage of the Thames and the Medway has been described, the poet exclaims, "O What an endlesse worke have I in hand, / To count the seas abundant progeny . . . Then blame me not, if I have err'd in count / Of Gods, of Nymphs, or rivers yet unred: / For though their numbers do much more surmount, / Yet all those same were there, which erst I did recount." Those gods he has named in his catalogue were in fact there, he reports, but there were many more he could not describe, crowding the hall even up to the door, "Yet were they all in order, as befell, / According their degrees disposed well" (IV. xii. 1-3). To give an exact account of "the seas abundant progeny" (IV. xii. 1) lies beyond his powers, even though he has been assisted by the muse. The very possibility of attempting to do so in writing invokes a dream of a complete and accurate representation, after the pattern of those "records of antiquitie" that are "layd up in heaven above" and to which "no wit of man may comen neare" (IV. x. 10). But the actual experience of writing calls forth a 'topos of modesty' (*excusatio propter infirmitatem*) in which the poet seems uncomfortably aware of the limitations of his medium. Not so, paradoxically, for the less reliable medium of Homer whose invocation before the catalogue of ships (*Iliad* II. 485 ff.) lays down the claim that he has a tremendous array of detail exactly correct because of the divine help given him by the muses. For Spenser, however, the event he has attempted to describe constitutes in itself a full presence that cannot be adequately represented within the confines of his art: "How can they all in this so narrow verse / Contayned be, and in small compasses held?" (IV. xi. 17).

To contemplate a writing that would seek to fulfill the dream of total statement, in which no portion or feature of its object would escape representation, is to contemplate the prospect of an 'endless work' advancing forever toward the end it projects for itself while remaining unfinished forever: there would always be one last thing to be extricated from the folds, one last detail to work in, and the more words we spend attempting to exhaust what is there, the further we seem to be from a representation that can be said to be complete. When the artist himself recognizes this situation he must respond by striking some attitude toward it, let us say of



melancholy or exuberance. Either he can regard the "endlesse worke" of writing toward an unattainable goal as being exuberantly productive, like a Rabelaisian cornucopie, or he can regard it as being profoundly depressing, a hopeless rage for order that is always being unravelled and frustrated by the maddening slippages, complicated folds and shifting configurations of writing itself. The first, exuberant response we find, as Terence Cave has shown (*The Cornucopian Text*; 1979), in Rabelais, the second, melancholy response, in Robert Burton with his panicky Ramist designs and that 'extemporall style' which he compares to a running sore and a purging of infection, a writing that is always exiled from, or at best supplemental to, some fantasized 'normal state' of good health where words can be made to stand clearly and completely for things.

Which of these alternatives do we attribute to Spenser? For A. Bartlett Giamatti (*Play of Double Senses*; 1975)—at least with respect to the passage at hand—the inability of the narrow frame of Spenser's verse to contain the immense variety of "the seas abundant progeny" (IV. xii. 1) is greeted by the poet with joy as an act of participation in the larger work of great creating nature. Mr. Goldberg, on the other hand, takes the position that Spenser's mood, with respect to the incompleteness that is written into the centre of his dream of artistic fulfillment, is one of profound melancholy. In the final sentences of his book, Goldberg cites the passage from the correspondence with Harvey in which, by 1580, Spenser is confidently referring to a large corpus of works which are now lost, or were never written, or (perhaps) partially incorporated into *The Faerie Queene* which the poet requests Harvey to return to him so that he can get back to work: "I will in hand forthwith with my *Faery Queene*, whyche I praye you hartily send me with al expedition . . ." "This," Goldberg concludes, "is the poet's fantasy; he has these lost texts to himself. Giving them will empty him into the reality of loss" (p. 174).

There is ample room in Spenser, one feels certain, for both moods, and we are most likely to find them together in that final installment which William Blissett ("Spenser's Mutabilitie"; 1964) has aptly referred to as a "retrospective commentary" on the poem as a whole, one in which a melancholy awareness of the ruins of time is counterpoised by the goddess of Nature's "chearefull view" (VII. vii. 57), and by the spirit of one of Queen Elizabeth's preferred epigrams: "*per molto variare la natura bella*." The melancholy experience of loss that Goldberg sees as dominating the poem proceeds, he believes, from the expectation that a story can be made to complete itself in a definitive ending that has been foreseen by the poet at the outset and then accomplished by writing toward it along an orderly sequence of events. Thus the book is concerned with studying how *The Faerie Queene* seems to undo its fundamental assumptions, not with respect to its claims to allegorical meaning, but with respect to its presuppositions about the nature of stories.

It seems to me that there are two errors here: first, it assumes that a poet immersed in the tradition of romance would start out with such a naive assumption about the nature of stories and the process of narration, and that definitive endings, as opposed to elaborately devious variations, would be of primary importance to him; secondly, it chooses to examine what might be called the 'logocentrism' of

*The Faerie Queene* in terms of its narrative rather than its claims to allegorical meaning. To insist upon speaking of its narrative alone, independent of the claims made for that narrative as a system for representing ideas, is to over-simplify the issue by extricating the text from the circuit within which the reader transforms information into a structure of meaning, feeds that structure back into his perception of the text as he continues to read, and then re-configures it in response to new stimulus. It is a continuous process driven by the assumption that the frenetic circulation of commentary can be stabilized finally in the achievement of full understanding. Here, if anywhere, is where a 'deconstructive' reading of *The Faerie Queene* should begin.

Despite these reservations about its premises, the book presents a clear account of what it sets out to do that promises to hold our interest even if it does not win our consent: a "reading of Spenser" is offered in which the somewhat neglected fourth book of *The Faerie Queene* is focussed upon as typifying more fully than any other the peculiarities of Spenserian narrative which is characterized, we are told, by frustrating disruptions, retrogressions, incoherencies, subversions of narrative logic, and so on. It is a narrative, moreover, that is shot through with a profound sense of loss because of the incompleteness of all stories and perhaps, if I understand the final sentence correctly, the futility of an art in which, as Beckett puts it, there is nothing to say combined with the obligation to say it. "The only way to tell a story," Goldberg says, "is never to have it end" (p. 72).

The book is intended to contribute to knowledge in two ways: first, it reverses a tendency in criticism of *The Faerie Queene* to gloss over Book IV (which does not separate itself into a complete unit so conveniently as the others) by bringing it into the centre of attention and grounding an interpretation of the poem as a whole upon problems raised by it; and, secondly, it reverses the natural tendency of readers to unify the narrative, while suppressing or explaining away any inconsistencies, by setting forth these normally 'marginalized' snags in the fabric as being essential to the aesthetic experience of the poem: "Most often, when criticism takes stock of such traits of narrative, it considers them as problems that could only be elucidated by pointing to some principle other than narration . . . the frustrations of reading are thereby neglected, and so is something vital to the nature of Spenserian narration" (xi). Goldberg claims that this regressive and inherently frustrating movement he finds in Spenserian narrative is what energizes the creative process itself: "The generation of the text and its production is my subject" (xii).

Allowing for a degree of exaggeration which is perhaps necessary if any unusual approach is to catch our attention, this might suggest that an interesting book is to follow, especially when we encounter the promising remark that Spenser's poem "generates itself precisely out of its own instability" (xiv), for it seems right that there should be some vital relationship between the general 'looseness' of the narrative of *The Faerie Queene* and the mysterious creative forces that shaped and directed Spenser's creative project. Unfortunately, the book does not live up to this promise.

The problem lies partly in its theoretical pretensions which are shored up by an impressive list of authorities—Barthes, Derrida, Eagleton, Lucacs, Jameson, Foucault, Kermode, Lacan, Levi-Strauss, Said and Hayden White—all laid out



for us in mini-essays that appear in the notes: "Another crucial term that Barthes and I use is *supplement* . . ." (p. 10n.). Although Barthes is announced to be the most important of these because of his distinction between the 'readerly' and the 'writerly' text (the latter characterizing *The Faerie Queene* because the poem sets forth the problems of writing by frustrating the reader), the above list should indicate that Goldberg's theoretical approach is broadly eclectic, its purpose being simply to read *The Faerie Queene* in a new way and to express, incidentally, a general enthusiasm for the language of theory. The difficulty seems to arise with his management of theoretical ideas: "the meanings of words are determined *inside a text* as a matter of differences" (p. 24; emphasis mine). Such problems are magnified by the author's enthusiasm for lush overstatement, as in the following commentary on the epithet of Elizabeth as "dearest dred" (I. poem. iv): "this is the power that generates his desire, the desire to write, to be written, and to be destroyed in the process. Is this a consummation devoutly to be wished? The space of narration is, in a word, where loss and excess meet, where orgasm would be no different from castration . . ." (p. 24).

In addition to this, the book is not particularly strong as scholarship on Spenser. The author indulges, for instance, in the kind of naive 'readerly' construction he condemns when referring to Una's "symbolic lamb" (p. 7). The lamb is mentioned only once in our first view of Una (I. i. 4. 9), because of its presence in almost all versions of the legend of St. George; and it soon dropped out of sight because it served no symbolic function (*Variorum* I, 389-90). Elsewhere he states confidently—too confidently for anyone alive to the 'intertextuality' which makes the hunting of absolute origins problematic—that Chaucer's tale of Sir Thopas is an "undeniable source for *The Faerie Queene*" (p. 18), citing as his authority for this Hugh MacLean's abridged, undergraduate edition where the tale of Sir Thopas is much more cautiously noted as taking up the same theme as we find in Arthur's nocturnal vision (I. ix. 13). Apparently, Goldberg is unaware that MacLean follows Greenlaw's discussion of the problem (excerpted in *Variorum* I, 267-68), where it is pointed out that the elements we find in the Tale of Sir Thopas are common to "a rich body of traditional material" in Celtic folklore, and that Spenser must have seen it within a matrix of similar tales, none of which could be privileged absolutely over the others as a definitive "source" even for Arthur's dream, let alone the poem as a whole. It was Josephine Waters Bennet, in 1942, who presented the most vigorous argument for the centrality of Chaucer's tale in the scheme of *The Faerie Queene* as a whole, a readerly construction which Goldberg accepts without question (or acknowledgement) but which is by no means a settled issue.

Between an introduction and a conclusion, entitled "Pretexts" and "After-words" respectively, there are three main chapters: "Other Voices, Other Texts," in which the relation of Book IV to Chaucer's Squire's Tale is discussed, "Others, Desire, and the Self in the Structure of the Text," in which it is argued that it is really the text, not the lovers portrayed in it, that experiences desire, and a third chapter, better than these, entitled "The Authority of the Other," in which, in the manner of critics such as Orgel and Greenblatt, Goldberg discusses images surrounding Queen Elizabeth to situate Spenser's poem within a framework of



socially produced fictions that are instantialized in the text as figures of the 'Other' (capitalized to invoke current re-readings of Freud). This chapter has pictures.

In the introductory section, Goldberg takes up "the revisionary juncture between Books III and IV," arguing that "failed endings are part of the design of the poem" (p. 2) even though the first books give us, as he over-hastily asserts, the "pleasures of resolution" (p. 3). This concession is forgotten several pages later when he claims that the "radical disturbances of narration" in Book IV "lay bare the nature of narration throughout *The Faerie Queene* (p. 6). Pointing out that Book IV has its space in the poem opened for it by "the displacement of an ending" (the reunion of Scudamour and Amoret in the cancelled stanzas concluding the 1590 version of Book III), an ending which never finds its way back into the poem, Goldberg argues as follows: "the fundamental quality of narration . . . is . . . not a progression toward a conclusion, but a deferral, leaving an ending 'to be perfected' in 'another place'; the fundamental quality, as the narrator calls it, is 'endlesse worke' (IV. xii. 1. 9). Such work involves seemingly endless acts of undoing, denial and frustration. Because of it, narration is best measured in losses . . ." (p. 8). As a consequence, *The Faerie Queene* "is a 'writerly text' whose production entails an " 'endlesse worke' of substitution" (p. 11) in which "the problematization of writing" itself becomes central to the poet's concerns (p. 13 n. 6).

The difficulty with much of this is not primarily its suspect familiarity to what is central to *our* concerns: Spenser's poem does indeed raise questions about the creative process which might well be examined in the light of current thought about writing, difference, deferral, supplementarity, the distinction between inside and outside, and so on. But such an analysis should take into account, at some level, the question of intentions if only to show that, even in the case a poet who seems preoccupied with complete patterns and polished surfaces, the forces at work in the process of writing tend to distort, bend and re-configure those intentions in illuminating ways. It is reasonable to assume, for instance, that Robert Burton, as he worked on his extended treatise on melancholy, became increasingly fascinated by the counterforce of prolix disorder that he discovered to be inherent in the process of writing, and that he intentionally exploited its subversion of organized structure. His style therefore seems to proceed out of a carefully managed dialectic between a 'readerly' dream of perfect control over rational exposition and a 'writerly' fascination with the spirited proclivity of writing to take hold of the bit and run where it will. If we think of Burton doing this deliberately we are likely to have a rather different conception of the significance of disorder in *The Anatomy of Melancholy* than if we assume that he attempted throughout to impose order on his material, and failed.

It is simply not possible to avoid this question of intention when thinking about *The Faerie Queene*. In the 'Letter to Raleigh,' for instance, we have an almost obsessively explicit (and notoriously problematic) description of what Spenser, shortly after registering the first installment, seems to have thought he was doing. Did Spenser write the Letter in the same spirit that Burton may have produced his elaborate charts—to deliberately set up a dialectic between the chaotic disorder of writing and an impossible fantasy of meta-discursive control? Or did Spenser

candidly intend it to be a reliable aid, allowing the reader "as in a handfull [to] gripe al the discourse"? The reader of this book soon gives up hope that such questions will have a fair hearing, for Goldberg never tires of rhapsodic incantation on the 'writerly text': "It plays upon the void," he exclaims, "it occupies the place of loss—where Britomart's wound is extended to Amoret, where Amoret is 'perfect hole.' This is the space of text" (p. 11).

To substantiate the claim that *The Faerie Queene* is a 'writerly text,' much of this introductory section is devoted to a reading of the proem to Book I in which a reversal of priority occurs whereby writing takes authority over voice. These introductory stanzas are seen as disseminating into chains of substitution all positive terms that might have been used by a reader to stabilize the meaning of the text and to draw boundaries between inside and outside: the authorial 'I' and the 'Muse' are initially thought to be outside the poem, constituting its creative 'source,' while the corresponding pair of the 'Briton Prince' and 'Tanaquill' are inside the poem and give to the narrative its beginning; but because "the pattern of repetition and substitution has priority and undermines all beginning stories, all stable selves" (p. 17), "both Muse and poet are inside the text and nowhere else" (p. 16). This familiar move (which goes back to the 'new critical' refusal to acknowledge anything but words on the page), is contradicted a moment later when Goldberg claims that the "boundary" between inside and outside "has been explicitly violated," a state of affairs in which it would obviously be meaningless to speak of poet and muse being either inside or outside.

This is of more than incidental significance, for it is symptomatic of Goldberg's procedure throughout of mystifying—one might now say 'theologizing'—the word "text" as his critical mantra. One can only wonder, for instance, at the status of his metaphor of the text as a sphere (which is nothing if not a figure of closure) and his fondness for the locution "space of the text": "By the end of the first stanza of the poem, we may already suspect that to enter the space of the Spenserian text is to cross these boundaries to the loss of our security. The questions, and the reversals, drive us deeper into this textual sphere in which the inside is the outside" (p. 16). I am not sure that anyone's security is any longer at stake when confronted by intertextual conceptions of the literary work as a knotted vortex of codes, unless of course they cling to such metaphors as 'textual space' and 'textual sphere.'

The first chapter takes up the matter of the relation of Chaucer's Squire's Tale to Spenser's continuation of it in Book IV, arguing that Spenser's narrative "works by entering more and more deeply into loss" and that this negative principle for generating the text out of its own failures is observed most clearly in Book IV which "imitates the lacuna that the Chaucerian tale defines as the space of narration" (p. 44). Note the words 'imitate,' 'lacuna,' 'space,' and the active verb, 'to define.' This sentence can mean anything at all. Then we are told that "obliteration is the ending provided" (p. 44), that "loss is the principle of narration" (p. 47), that "community is reduced" (p. 47), that in the relationship of Artegal and Britomart "consummation is postponed because so much has been lost" (p. 47), and that Britomart's returning to where she lost Amoret (IV. vi. 47) is meant to figure *explicitly* the movement of the poem as a whole:



The poem's forward motion is explicitly announced as retrogression, retirement, withdrawal; and the earlier, flashback 'interruption; in which *The Squire's Tale* was first ended now has become a basic structure of narration. . . . Moving back, the text moves into itself, or refers to its own movement, for this return reveals explicitly that the text has been finding its voice only in reworking and unworking that ending with which it began . . . For the narrative to look ahead it looks back. Going forward, the narrative confronts the loss behind the text that generates it. (p. 48)

While this passage will give some idea of the appalling repetitiveness of the book—going nowhere, it goes nowhere—we can get an idea of the general level of critical discussion from the following analysis of the episode at the cave of Lust: "As Amoret and AEmylia 'did discourse' (20. 1), Lust appears in 'the mouth' (20.5) of the cave. He means to rape them and then to eat them. The place of desire is characterized by the equation of discourse and sexuality. Lust's cannibalism and rape are an extreme version of a pattern of substitution" (p. 57).

The chapter entitled "Others, Desire and the Self in the Structure of the Text" is ostensibly concerned with the pairs of lovers who move from Books III to V. Goldberg asserts that they are all "driven to their undoing" by "incestuous desire" (p. 117), but it soon becomes apparent that the sex-life of the text itself is much more exciting than theirs: "In the text, what the desire of the text does is enacted by what desire makes the characters enact" (p. 99). This seems to put the text into a state of anthropomorphic hyperactivity: it "quietly announces" (p. 79), it "comes to Belpheobe by way of Lust" (p. 157), it "satisfies itself in itself" (p. 117), it "engulfs itself" (p. 117), and it "arrives" at Marinell and Florimell where we observe the "submergence of the self in the desire of the text" (p. 119) etc., etc. What the text does with this desire is then explained in a note for those who have not quite got the point: "What I am urging is a freeplay within the text's own narcissism, which also leaves the text playing with itself and the reader defeated" (p. 116. n. 14).

The closest we come to a treatment of allegory is the following offhand remark: although Britomart might be read as an embodiment of married love "in some readers interpretation," to do so would replace "the actuality of the textual space in which characters move in *The Faerie Queene*" with "something supposedly outside it" (p. 75; cf. p. 76 n.). While Goldberg forthrightly declares himself opposed to replacing images in the text with meanings we might wish to find in it, it is clear that he will make some exceptions: Lust, for instance, "figures the economics of exchange that affects women, objects, and words" (p. 157), and, worse still, "male generativity" (p. 158). Would the author of the "Epithalamion" endorse this simplistic and entirely unwarranted equation? It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the text is allowed to refer to some things "supposedly outside it," and not to others.

I move forward now to Goldberg's discussion of the central moment of Book VI, the vision of Mt. Acidale in the tenth canto, for it provides the best example of the general competence and tone of this book. Let me begin with a brief account of the episode itself. The mount is described, with lavish Spenserian detail, as a *locus amoenus* instinct with fairies and nymphs, a sacred resort of Venus who prefers it



even to Paphos. Calidore, hearing the sound of piping and the tread of dancing feet, advances through the surrounding woods toward the "open greene" at the summit where he sees, from "the covert of the wood" (VI. x. 11), a vision of harmony and order that is at once thematically central to the book of courtesy and profoundly suggestive of the poet's conception of his art. One hundred naked maidens devoted to Venus, all "differing in honor and degree" (VI. x. 21), dance in a circle around the three graces who, in the configuration of their dance, are emblematic of "all the complements of courtesy" (VI. x. 23). A the centre of this circular pattern, "as a precious gem / Amidst a ring" (VI. x. 12), is a shepherd girl who is "there advanced to be another Grace" (VI. x. 22). The entire vision has been called forth, and is sustained from within, by the piping of the shepherd-poet Colin Clout who is the lover of the shepherd girl. The relation of the vision to the theme of courtesy is anticipated by the mention of differences of honour and degree among the hundred maidens, openly stated in the description of the graces, and placed within the larger context of culture by the remarkable simile of Ariadne's crown (VI. x. 13)—and image of social order emerging from the primal, 'uncultivated' energy of violence. It is more difficult to determine what kind of 'poetic signature' we are reading, whether it is introduced for largely biographical reasons, whether Spenser really did consider himself to be at the end of his creative project, with what degree of seriousness and finality we should read it and, most difficult of all, how much weight we are to give to the almost unavoidable impulse to see the vision itself as symbolizing the great creative work of *The Faerie Queene*. In short, the passage is nuanced and layered like few others in the poem and raises questions that are complicated even to phrase, let alone to answer definitely.

Goldberg does not find it complicated at all. He says that "Calidore stumbles into this scene of poetic reverie and loss," demanding an "explication of the text," and that the answer he receives from Colin, with its explanation of the iconography of the graces, is "learned baggage" (p. 170). For all his mystical communion with the word "text," he is remarkably careless about what the thing says. Calidore does not "stumble" into the open green but deliberately steps forward—a significant difference: "Therefore resolving what it was to know, / Out of the wood he rose, and toward them did go" (VI. x. 17). It may be a "scene of poetic reverie" toward which Calidore advances, but there is nothing in it of that "loss" which Goldberg is so eager to find because it is Calidore himself who causes the vision to disappear as soon as he comes into view. He has not seen loss but brought it with him—another significant difference. Finally, to dismiss the iconography of the graces as "baggage" may genuinely express how Goldberg feels about it personally, but it is an attitude that is quite out of tune with the aesthetic ambience of *The Faerie Queene* as a whole.

Then we have the interpretation of the critical moment in the episode when Calidore steps forward and the vision instantly disappears: "When Calidore separates Colin from his vision he is doing what he did when he stumbled upon Serena and Calepine in the bushes, interrupting coitus, making bliss bale, a 'lucklesse breach'" (p. 170). The crudeness of this, as criticism, hardly needs to be pointed out by citing the passage (VI. iii. 20) from which Goldberg fantasizes this lively picture of Calepine and Serena, or the later episode in which Serena is

deeply embarrassed by her nakedness because Calepine, who has rescued her from the cannibals, is not yet her husband (VI. viii. 50-51).

But there is still the simile of Ariadne's crown to be discussed and on this we are enlightened as follows: "Ariadne: won at a bloody feast, the emblem of cannibalistic civilization in Ate's house. Ariadne: won and lost, dismade [sic.], and had again as the pattern in the heavens. Ariadne: eternally lost and eternally there, the jewel in nature, text and nature at once. Ariadne: the heavenly scales, weighing words and gifts" (p. 171).

What are we to make of the existence of this tedious book? Is it an attack on the discursive principle of reason itself or a brilliant subversion of reactionary scholarly standards, not to mention competent prose? One feels on every page that the author is defining this position as one extreme in a simplified relationship of symmetrical opposition, flattening out complexity onto a single plane so that he requires an imaginary antagonist to get himself thinking—not unlike the synergistic hostility of Sans Loy and Huddibras, as Sean Kane has shown in the most important recent contribution to our understanding of Spenser's moral allegory ("The Paradoxes of Idealism: Book II of *The Faerie Queene*," *John Donne Journal*, vol. 2, no. 1). It is the old story of the sour traditionalist and the hyperactive radical, each needing the other as an image for what he denies in himself.

In short, this is a book that is too preoccupied with striking a pose to accomplish much else, fantasizing for itself a critical position which will exist only in so far as it is opposed by an imaginary other that is, as Goldberg puts it, "conservative in nature" (xi).

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Jacques Krynen. *Idéal du prince et pouvoir royal en France à la fin du moyen âge (1380-1440)*. Étude de la littérature politique du temps. Paris: Éditions A. et J. Picard, 1981, 341 p.

Ce livre de Jacques Krynen se situe dans la foulée des ouvrages édités depuis quelques années sur la fin du moyen âge français; on a vu, par exemple, B. Guenée s'intéresser à l'idée de nation, F. Autrand aux gens du Parlement de Paris, R. Cazelles, aux règnes de Jean II et Charles V pour ne nommer que ceux-là. Les historiens constatent en effet de plus en plus que cette période est la source de changements politiques profonds qui marqueront de façon très nette les siècles suivants.

À partir de plusieurs auteurs tels Jean Gerson, Philippe de Mézières, Jean de Terrevermeille, Jean de Montreuil, Christine de Pizan et des différents "Miroirs du Prince" dont le *De regimine principum* de Gilles de Rome traduit en français par Henri de Gauchi à la fin du XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle, Jacques Krynen examine d'une part les conceptions médiévales de l'éducation du futur roi et les qualités morales qu'elle vise à lui communiquer, d'autre part, comment le moyen âge concevait les devoirs et les obligations du roi lorsque celui-ci accédait au trône. De tous les textes utilisés par Krynen, peu nous sont inconnus et tous ou presque ont déjà fait



l'objet d'études (philosophiques, littéraires, ou autres); la contribution de Krynen est de les mettre en rapport et d'examiner les idées qui s'en dégagent. Il nous permet de jeter un regard neuf sur des textes qui, de prime abord, peuvent nous sembler disparates et contribue à enrichir notre connaissance de la littérature politique médiévale.

L'ouvrage se divise en deux grandes parties: la première traite du "prince idéal" et la seconde du "pouvoir royal." Ces deux parties correspondent, l'une à l'éducation du roi et l'autre à son mode de gouvernement. La première partie nous apprend que les éducateurs médiévaux tenaient à ce que le prince possède des vertus morales hors du commun: humilité, piété, chasteté, droiture, éloquence et, surtout, qu'il doit adopter en toute chose une juste mesure. Comment apprend-on au jeune prince à acquérir toutes ces vertus? Tout d'abord, par l'exemple que l'on se doit de lui donner. En effet, si l'entourage du prince lui donne en tout l'exemple, celui-ci ne sera pas tenté de tomber dans l'excès et donnera ainsi libre cours à ses bons penchants. Les précepteurs nous apprennent ensuite que l'éducation elle-même du prince doit faire l'objet d'une attention particulière. Il doit être entouré de quelques conseillers, choisis avec grand soin, qui s'emploieront à son éducation morale et religieuse ainsi qu'à sa formation intellectuelle. La lecture de la *Bible*, des *Vies de Saints*, de la vie des grands rois qui l'ont précédé et d'oeuvres morales, historiques et politiques seront pour lui des sources d'exemple et de réflexion. Il est frappant de constater l'extrême austérité qui se dégage du système d'éducation proposé.

On doit aussi instruire le prince sur la meilleure façon de gouverner et sur les buts qu'il doit atteindre. Il lui faudra tout d'abord ne pas tenir compte de sa famille qui, la plupart du temps, est source de discorde et de mésentente. Il lui faudra aussi s'entourer des meilleurs conseillers possibles, ceux-ci devant faire preuve de grandes qualités morales et surtout d'intégrité. La finalité du gouvernement est la justice et la paix. Le roi se doit d'exercer sa justice avec autorité et respect, d'être clément et libéral envers ses sujets, qu'ils soient pauvres ou riches, ce qui sera pour lui le meilleur moyen d'être craint par tous. La paix, tant à l'intérieur de son royaume qu'à l'extérieur, est le but ultime vers lequel tout souverain doit tendre. On exige donc du roi qu'il possède des qualités exceptionnelles, qu'il ait une bonne éducation et surtout, qu'il aime son métier: "Le bon prince, en effet, n'a qu'une seule passion, son métier de roi" (p. 136).

La seconde partie de l'ouvrage traite plus spécifiquement de l'enseignement des auteurs médiévaux quant aux qualités du pouvoir royal qui se manifestent d'une part au niveau de la foi, le roi de France est le roi "très chrétien" et d'autre part au niveau du sentiment national, le roi doit assurer la cohésion de son royaume. Cette idée de roi "très chrétien," répandue en grande partie par les conseillers du roi en faisant revivre, dans leurs écrits, les légendes et leurs symboles, la Sainte Ampoule, les fleurs de lis, l'oriflamme, permettra au roi d'utiliser ce titre à un niveau politique tant vis-à-vis des puissances extérieures qu'à l'intérieur même de son royaume. Ce titre, il l'emploiera auprès du Pape, pour lui rappeler qu'il ne lui est pas soumis au niveau des choses temporelles; auprès de l'empereur, pour lui faire savoir qu'il ne permet pas d'ingérence dans les affaires de France; et auprès de l'Église de France, afin de favoriser la formation d'une église nationale dont il prendra la tête.



Le sentiment national quant à lui se manifeste à la fin du moyen âge parce que le roi se doit d'assurer l'unité et la cohésion de son royaume. Il sera fondé d'une part sur la renommée des origines troyennes de la France et d'autre part sur la continuité dynastique de ses rois. En définitive, le conflit avec l'Angleterre servira bien cette cause car il permettra de passer beaucoup plus rapidement du niveau féodal au niveau national. La Guerre de Cent Ans qui avait débuté à partir d'un conflit que l'on peut qualifier de féodal se règlera sur une base nationale.

Les théoriciens politiques français du moyen âge visent à assurer la continuité de l'État. Ils le font en décrivant les rapports du roi avec la couronne et avec la communauté. Ils établissent de façon plus sûre les notions de succession sur le trône (les thèses de Jean de Terrevermeille et de Jean de Montreuil sont ici discutées en détail par Jacques Krynen) et prônent l'inaliénabilité du domaine de la couronne: le royaume doit donc être conservé intact. Vis-à-vis de la communauté, le roi "tête du corps politique," se doit de gouverner dans l'intérêt et pour le bien de la communauté. Jacques Krynen nous rappelle alors la description du prince idéal qui nous a été proposée dans la première partie.

*Idéal du prince et pouvoir royal en France à la fin du moyen âge* nous présente une excellente analyse de la littérature politique du moyen âge. En plus des auteurs mentionnés plus haut, Jacques Krynen fait appel à de nombreuses autres sources (plus de 80 sources médiévales) et chaque point de détail est analysé avec minutie et complété de nombreuses notes (plus de 1200). La bibliographie qui nous est présentée ici est très riche. En bref, c'est un livre à lire.

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*Peter Martyr Vermigli and Italian Reform*, Joseph C. McLelland editor. Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1980. viii, 155pp. ISBN 0-88920-092-0 \$8.00 (hardbound)

"Renaissance and Reformation—partners or enemies?" the editor of this collection of papers asks. The answer he gives, and to which the papers point, is that a "unitive view [is] enjoying primacy today." For this reason Peter Martyr Vermigli is an exemplary case study, for he combines "Thomism and Calvinism, humanism and scholasticism, Italy and the North."

The ten essays in this book have been collected from papers given at the conference on "The Cultural Impact of Italian Reformers" held at McGill University in Montreal (September 1977). They have been published elegantly and inexpensively, in a hardcover book that, in these days of exorbitant book prices, does the conference and the publishers great credit. The first five deal with wider topics (the book trade, the rhetorical-dialectical tradition, religious dissimulation, the trial of Pier Paolo Vergerio, and the concept of Italy and of Italians abroad), thus setting the scene for the last five papers, which deal directly with Peter Martyr Vermigli.

Paul F. Grendler's opening article on "The Circulation of Protestant Books in Italy" traces the influx and dissemination of forbidden books in Venice, the largest Italian publishing centre. Professor Grendler presents us with a well-annotated

and well-documented examination of a number of questions: who were the dealers ready and willing to engage in this illicit trade, how and why were smugglers able to supply the lagoon city with books placed on both the Pauline and Tridentine Index, who purchased these books, and how did all these groups respond to the reality of the Inquisition? Original documentation from the Venetian archives enriches this study and provides reliable support for the proposed models.

Cesare Vasoli's article on "*Loci Communes* and the Rhetorical and Dialectical Traditions" examines the use of *loci* in relation to the rhetorical-dialectical tradition of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The short, incisive *loci* are seen as an alternative, much favoured by Protestant teachers and polemicists, to the ponderous and inadequate techniques of the later Schoolmen. After recalling Lorenzo Valla and examining Rudolf Agricola's *De inventione dialectica* (which had great influence on sixteenth-century reformers), Vasoli touches upon Juan Luis Vives' call for "a different kind of logic" and recalls that the Spanish humanist "imputes to the lack of systematic, logical discipline the unintelligibility which is the dominant feature of the various branches of knowledge, among which theology holds pride of place" (p. 23). Philipp Melanchthon's *Loci communes* offer an answer by providing a text of indisputable teaching value, "capable of reaching those men and social strata who, far removed from the philosophical refinements of the Schoolmen, are unfamiliar with the sophisticated techniques of theological disputation" (p. 25). The work of Melanchthon, in whose tradition Vermigli's own *Loci communes* finds its place, provided the Reformers with a doctrinal structure based on radical simplification and a return to Scriptural sources. It also allowed for quick and "catchy" pronouncements which had an immediate, and lasting, impact on the audience. Professor Vasoli's far-ranging and illuminative article is marred only by one oversight: when having it translated from the original Italian, the editor should have asked for the lengthy passages in Latin (such as the 7 lines on p. 24, the 5 lines on p. 25, the 16 lines in n. 25 of p. 26, the 8 lines of p. 27) to be translated as well—most North-American readers do not enjoy the thorough, European classical education that takes fluency in Latin for granted.

Rita Belladonna's concise article "Aristotle, Machiavelli, and Religious Dissimulation: Bartolomeo Carli Piccolomini's *Trattati Nove Della Prudenza*" examines the spirit of religious reform in Siena. This amply footnoted study provides English translations for all material from the original *Trattati*, thus offering us a rich sub-text to the article itself. Professor Belladonna's thesis points out the secular aspect of Carli's Nicodemism, drawing attention to the strong links to be found between Carli's advice to the prudent man and Machiavelli's norms of ethical relativism for a prince. In fact, Carli proposes a double standard for dealing with religion and official religious ceremonies, particularly those of Rome. Even though the *Trattati* are also deeply steeped in autobiographical mysticism, and though they can be seen to contain elements complementary to Valdes' *Alfabeto Cristiano*, the Nicodemism they espouse is highly secular. Unlike Brunfel, Carli is not interested in Scriptural reasons for his silence. Instead, like Machiavelli, he is more interested in the practical reality of the present political situation. This, Professor Belladonna suggests, should make us wary of dealing with Nicodemism as a unified European phenomenon.



Antonio Santosuosso picks up this theme of political pragmatism and looks at "Religion *More Veneto* and the Trial of Pier Paolo Vergerio," in order to show that changing political and religious factors played an important part at the trials and in the treatment of the Bishop of Capodistria by the Venetians. Concentrating on the years 1544-49, this study is a lucid, linear exposition of the Venetian government's expertise in blending strong religious beliefs and adherence to political necessity into a policy of practical politics for the good of the state. Although Vergerio is as much to blame for his demise as is the changed attitude of the Venetian government towards him (his own venomous tongue, his personal spiritual mid-life crisis, his bitter anticurialist stance, his irrepressible urge to reprimand and correct others, for example, were important factors that lead to his fall from grace), Professor Santosuosso clearly shows him to be a victim of political circumstance as well.

Antonio D'Andrea, in his work on "Geneva 1576-78: The Italian Community and the Myth of Italy," looks once more at the rise of the anti-Italian sentiment that associated all inhabitants of the peninsula with the worst excesses of "Machiavellism." Using the incidents surrounding the publication in Geneva by two expatriate Italian Protestants of a Latin translation of the *Principe* (1560), and also those surrounding the publication of the *Discours sur les moyens de bien gouverner... Contre Nicolas Machiavel Florentin* by the expatriate French Huguenot Innocent Gentillet (1577), D'Andrea examines the sources of this irradicable, virulent opinion of all Italians. Great emphasis is placed on the anti-Italian sentiment already found in France as a result of both Italian influence at court and sectarian politics at the national level; however, more discussion than just the two passing comments ought to have been presented about "Calvin's misgivings about the Italians" (p. 60). Nonetheless, the article does show that the time was favourable for an unfavourable view of Italians.

With Marvin Anderson's "Peter Martyr Vermigli: Protestant Humanist" the book moves into its second section and begins to examine more closely the main subject of its title. Professor Anderson takes to task John Patrick Donnelly, and others with him, who see Vermigli as a Scholastic Reformer. To balance this view, he points out that Vermigli only appears to be a Scholastic, while he is in fact much more of a Humanist. Although he retained the Scholastic training received at Padua, Vermigli turned directly to classical and patristic sources to gather from them new insights, firmly believing that the Holy Spirit "may haue us to be scholars euen unto the ende of the worlde" (p. 84).

Rather than examining the entire period in question, Philip M. J. McNair's article on "Peter Martyr in England" chooses instead to concentrate on the circumstances that led to the Disputation of 1549. Particular emphasis is placed on the religious climate in late Henrician and Edwardian England, on Christ Church College, on Oxford's reaction to Peter Martyr and vice versa, and on the fanatical opposition Martyr had to endure from his predecessor in the chair of Regius Professor of Divinity, Richard Smith. The article is lively, precise and well documented; it points the way to an examination of the other six major moments of Peter Martyr's influence in England which, for the sake of brevity, McNair mentions but does not examine.



John Patrick Donnelly, remarking that Vermigli's *Loci communes* devotes a great amount of space to practical social questions and that to Peter Martyr there was no distinction, as there is for the modern reader, between social and ethical thought, offers an "exploratory essay" into "The Social and Ethical Thought of Peter Martyr Vermigli." In clear, incisive paragraphs, the essay touches upon "Social Status, Inequality and Minorities" (women, nobility, slavery, religious dissenters, Jews, Moslems), "The Christian and the Economic Order" (wealth, poverty), "Marriage" (also polygamy, mixed marriages, divorce, virginity), to terminate with some "General Principles and Presuppositions" that point out Vermigli's strong links with Aristotle (especially with the *Nichomachean Ethics*), his mixture of theological and secular proofs for an argument, and his use of Roman law.

Robert M. Kingdon examines "The Political Thought of Peter Martyr Vermigli" to show that, although the structure and some of the contents are Aristotelian (from Vermigli's days at the University of Padua), most of Vermigli's thoughts derive from Scriptural and Patristic sources, while some come from Roman law, and a few from contemporary political practice. Professor Kingdon then examines in detail Vermigli's definition of government (or of "the magistrate") and the question of political resistance by "inferior magistrates" or by citizens, basing his observation on the *loci* dealing with the ten scholia that he feels are most instructive in this question.

Joseph C. McLelland brings the book to an end with his essay "Peter Martyr Vermigli: Scholastic or Humanist?" in which he shows that "Martyr is more subtle than allowed by the thesis that he is a chief contributor to the fall of Calvinism into 'scholasticism'" (p. 150). The point, present in several of the articles preceding this one (especially Vasoli's and Anderson's), is supported by an examination of contemporary scholarship and the place of both Aristotelianism and Scholasticism in Vermigli's education. As such, it is an appropriate conclusion to this fine collection of essays.

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Charles E. Hambrick-Stowe. *The Practice of Piety. Puritan Devotional Disciplines in Seventeenth-Century New England*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982. Pp. xvi, 298. \$28.00.

Though a number of writers have reestablished the signal importance of spirituality to Puritanism, little attention has been paid to the themes of piety or how it was practiced on a daily and weekly basis, a subject for inquiry long overdue given recent interest in social history and popular culture. In this Jamestown Award-winning study Charles Hambrick-Stowe explores the "inner" history of ordinary people through an examination of public worship, family and small group discussions, and private or "closet" meditations. Hambrick-Stowe succeeds admirably in providing readers with a useful description of the form, content, and impact of spiritual activities in seventeenth-century New England.

At its heart, Hambrick-Stowe argues, Puritanism was neither a social nor an

intellectual movement, but part of a larger devotional revival that swept European communities in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Through a careful examination of devotional manuals and sermons, he shows how significant continuities linked Puritan, Anglican, and even Roman Catholic devotional themes and rituals. The theme of intensive self-examination and meditation upon one's sins, for example, was previously assumed to be a unique activity of lay Puritans. Yet, by exhibiting parallel texts, Hambrick-Stowe demonstrates how introspection also characterized Catholic devotionals. Likewise, many other spiritual exercises, such as meditation upon the joys of heaven and emphasis upon human experience and divine initiative in salvation were shared by Puritans and Catholics.

Having reestablished Puritanism's ties to mainstream Western Christianity, Hambrick-Stowe builds a strong case for the popular nature of Puritan culture. The central themes of Puritan spirituality, he argues, had long been at the heart of popular piety and were shared by clerics and laymen alike. The point is crucial because the description of devotional themes and practices—which comprises most of the book—is drawn almost exclusively from manuals, sermons, almanacs, and other documents composed by ministers. The principle metaphor running through all these sources is that of the pilgrimage. Ministers described the individual's spiritual life as a journey from sin to salvation and glory. Building on the work of others like Michael McGiffert and his mentor David Hall, Hambrick-Stowe asserts that the conversion experience, generally a gradual rather than violent, life-altering development, marked the beginning of the soul's pilgrimage, not the culmination. The Puritan achieved salvation only after death, upon redemption and union with God. Preparation for salvation, then, did not end with the conversion experience but continued throughout life and public and private worship, the means by which the individual proceeded along the path toward redemption.

Several chapters are included that contain illuminating and insightful descriptions of public and private devotional activities. Means of public worship included participation in the sacraments, attending sermons, church discipline, and prayer. Private devotions involved family prayer, private prayer meetings and conferences, and individual "secret" devotions. While all prayer centered around some variation of the redemptive cycle of confession, petition for forgiveness, thanksgiving, and union with God, the daily private devotions were of particular importance to the individual Puritan. Secret exercise, Bible study, meditation and prayer were the most powerful channels through which grace might flow, the crucial point of contact between the believer and God. Hambrick-Stowe distinguishes between the specific functions of prayer and meditation. While the believer actively sought God through prayer, he attempted to find ongoing evidence of salvation and to chart his progress on his pilgrimage through meditation.

Although this devotional synthesis survived in New England until the early eighteenth century, the second generation faced a devotional crisis. The old spiritual images and religious terminology no longer seemed to apply to a generation that did not share the founding experience of the fathers. Ministers con-



fronted unprecedented difficulties in attempting to motivate their flocks to seek salvation. Clerics responded to the challenge by adapting several major themes of Puritan devotionism to the new circumstances. They venerated and celebrated the fathers, and placed a greater emphasis upon the spiritual implications of their pilgrimage to America. In addition, ministers created new forms of worship, such as the covenant renewal. Renewed interest and larger printings of devotional manuals in the late seventeenth century suggest that ministers succeeded in rekindling the devotional zeal that characterized the first years of settlement.

*The Practice of Piety* is a useful volume though, as with any book, the reader is left with a few questions that may be mentioned in passing. For example, in his discussion of popular culture Hambrick-Stowe argues that Puritanism represented an effort to reform English culture from within. The reform impulse was neither propagated nor directed by ministers, who, partly because of their emphasis upon literacy, could not monopolize the Bible and thus "wielded little authority of their own" (48). Their style of plain preaching and prayer was a response to the demands of the movement, just as the contents of their writings reflected popular needs. Hambrick-Stowe does well to remind readers that the ministers and the laity interacted within a shared world of meaning. Many will resist, however, his undocumented assertion that Puritanism's individualism coupled with its rejection of outward forms resulted in a popular culture characterized by inherent anticlericalism. Hambrick-Stowe also makes a significant contribution in stressing the paramount importance of private devotions in the conversion process. But again, his subordination of the ministry in the early chapters seems anomalous and unnecessary, especially in light of his later description of the ministerial role in rejuvenating zeal and redefining critical devotional themes. Though the ministry is by no means ignored, emphasis upon the individual relationship with God is so strong in parts that the reader is surprised to see the 1650 Connecticut law stating: "The preaching of the Word . . . is the chiefe ordinary means ordained by God for the converting, edifying, and saving of the soules of the elect" (116).

In addition, the influence of social and cultural change upon the practice of piety on the individual level remains cloudy, a problem undoubtedly rooted in a lack of available sources. Hambrick-Stowe asserts that the Puritans "practiced preparation for salvation through the means of grace," yet devotes little attention to the spiritual experience of the sizeable proportion of second generation believers who never experienced conversion (219). In general, Hambrick-Stowe's treatment of the conversion experience should not be considered the final word on the subject. His description of the gradual conversion experience, a notion central to his lifelong pilgrimage theme, is based heavily upon evidence drawn from Thomas Shepard's Cambridge church. Shepard emphasized the gradual nature of conversion as much or more than any of his contemporaries. The sudden, life-changing conversions experienced by many followers of John Cotton, Solomon Stoddard, and others receive little attention here; they suggest that the variety of spiritual experience may have been more significant than Hambrick-Stowe implies.

The above points pertain largely to matters of detail. In general, Charles Hambrick-Stowe's rich description and penetrating analysis casts much needed



light into an area of Puritanism fraught with obstacles to research and long overdue for study. *The Practice of Piety* enriches our understanding of Puritan "inner" history and the spiritual experience of the individual and the movement as a whole.

JAMES F. COOPER, JR., *University of Connecticut*

Joyce Main Hanks. *Ronsard and Biblical Tradition*. Tübingen and Paris: Gunter Narr Verlag and Editions Jean-Michel Place, 1982. Pp. 199. DM 38.

One is perhaps too often tempted to regard the poets of the Pléiade as wholly pagan in their *vision du monde*, despite Lucien Febvre's having shown in the case of Rabelais that no-one in sixteenth-century France can justifiably be called non-Christian. This book is an important contribution to a developing interest in the influence of the Bible and of the biblical tradition on both the content and style of sixteenth-century French poetry, since, as Dr. Hanks says in her introduction, "no attempt has been made to show [Ronsard's] overall dependence on the Bible, conceived primarily as a literary source." When, some six years ago, she completed her doctoral thesis on which this book is based, the author was able to draw on a recent major work in this field. Jacques Pineaux's *La Poésie des protestants de langue française* (Paris, 1971). One can only regret that she was not able to use Marguerite Soulié's *L'Inspiration biblique dans la poésie religieuse d'Agrippa d'Aubigné* (Paris, 1977) and Malcolm Smith's invaluable edition of Ronsard's *Discours des misères de ce temps* (Geneva, 1979), which prints earlier texts than hitherto of the *Epistre au lecteur par laquelle succinctement l'auteur respond à ses calomniateurs* (Paris, 1564) and the *Prière à Dieu pour la victoire* (Paris, 1569), provides more biblical references and cross-references to Ronsard's other works than Paul Laumonier's edition of 1946 and, as Jean Baillou did in 1949, brings together all the prose and poetry which was to form the *Discours* in the collective editions from 1567 to 1587.

The close investigation by Hanks of her subject can be seen from the titles of the five main chapters: "Biblical Imagery and Language," "Biblical Characters and Events," "Biblical History and Classical Mythology," "Biblical Commentary and Polemic," and "Biblical Vision: God and Man." She is always careful to avoid implying that Ronsard repeatedly read biblical texts as subjects of imitation or of free adaptation. She prefers the term "biblical tradition" to describe what the poet draws on: his how reading of the Bible, readings at mass and in the breviary, sermons, readings of other poets and recollections of all of these, all elements of that cultural memory described by Du Bellay in the second preface to *L'Olive*. The many biblical quotations rightly adduced in the text properly come from the translation of the Bible by Lefèvre d'Étaples or from the Vulgate, when the latter is closer to Ronsard's language or thought than Lefèvre's version.

Since most of Ronsard's themes are decidedly secular and his sources tend to be more mythological than Judeo-Christian, it is inevitable, given the Renaissance cast of mind, that one should find a syncretist mixture of the two traditions in some poems, a mixture that has often disconcerted readers and critics. Ancient myth is

regarded as a prefiguration of Christian truth and the earliest poems were, in Ronsard's own words of 1565 which are in the tradition of the Florentine Neoplatonists, a *theologie allegorique*, whose mode of expression is the only form in which ineffable truths (*secrets*) may be conveyed to mankind. Mythology's insights, reflecting as they do important aspects of reality, are seen to be complementary rather than opposed to biblical tradition, a position that is attacked by Ronsard's Huguenot critics. This syncretism is adumbrated in the early chapters of the book and is fully and clearly discussed in the second longest chapter. Mythological deities are identified in theory and in practice with attributes of the Judeo-Christian God: the many gods deepen one's understanding of the one God. Moses is identified with Minos, Adam with Prometheus and Christ with Hercules. The image of Hesiod's path that leads to Virtue is conflated with the description of the narrow way found in Matthew 7:13-14. Ronsard occasionally emphasizes not only the similarities but also the differences between Greek religion and Judeo-Christian tradition, to the clear advantage of the latter. Hanks' concludes on this subject that there is almost always a mythological admixture in predominantly biblical poems, even where a quite appropriate biblical image exists. She sums up by saying: "He consistently honors his Judeo-Christian heritage as superior to paganism in matters of *doctrine*. When it comes to *imagery*, however, he usually prefers mythology" (p. 83).

The chapter on biblical imagery and language usefully analyses the way in which Ronsard adapts his material for his own independent purposes. A closer investigation of his language might reveal a use of hebraisms, a feature that critics are not aware of in D'Aubigné's religious poetry, thanks to the researches of Soulié.

Dr. Hanks discusses at length and with many interesting insights the key texts for her subject: the unprecedentedly successful series of *plaquettes* that make up the *Discours des misères*. These works, which were in the vanguard of the Catholic literary counter-attack and which earned for Ronsard a reputation as a hero of the Catholic reformation, she considers to be important not least because no French poet had previously presented theological concepts in a lengthy polemic. She agrees with the abbé Charbonnier's verdict that "les idées théologiques sont devenues accessibles au monde des lettrés; c'est déjà un progrès appréciable, et par là cette poésie fait pendant à l'*Institution chrétienne* de Calvin." Many of Ronsard's attacks on the Huguenots are theological and biblical, and Dr. Hanks pays particular attention to the sources of Ronsard's often satirical arguments. Her analysis does, however, tend to remain at the level of subject-matter, not delving deeper, as Henri Weber does in *La Création poétique au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle en France*, to discuss the *Discours* as poetry, as a form of discourse which generates its own peculiar energy (and expectations) and can have decided advantages over prose polemic.

Two useful indexes are included: one of references in the text to Ronsard's works, and one of biblical references. The latter graphically illustrates Dr. Hanks' conclusion that the frequency curve of references begins at a low level in 1550, rises rapidly to a plateau in the *Hymnes* of 1555, reaches a peak in the *Discours* of 1562 and 1563 and falls back to the level of 1555, rising again towards the end of



Ronsard's life, especially in the posthumously published *Derniers Vers*.

In conclusion, Dr. Hanks' book demonstrates the value of this approach to an important sixteenth-century French poet. Can one hope that Du Ballay will also be studied in this way?

THOMAS THOMSON, *University of Dundee*

*The Entry of Henri II into Paris 16 June 1549*, with an Introduction and Notes by I.D. McFarlane. Vol. 7 of second volume of "Renaissance Triumphs and Magnificences." New Series. Margaret M. McGowan, General Editor. Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, Center for Medieval and Early Renaissance Studies, Binghamton, New York, 1982. Pp. xciv, 48. \$15.00

This volume includes both the facsimile of the *livret* of Henri II's Royal Entry and of the Queen's *sacre*, which was published as a companion to the main entry. In a Foreword, I.D. McFarlane, Professor of French at Oxford University, points out that the *livret* was accepted for publication some years ago and then lay in the original publisher's drawer for a considerable time. In McFarlane's own words it is an ill wind that blows nobody any good, and delay meant that the results of recent research could be incorporated into his substantial Introduction; the appearance of work on the social and political background of royal entries has allowed him to take a broader view of Henri II's Entry.

McFarlane's primary concern in the Introduction is to show that the Entry came at a key point in the emergence of France's neo-classical aesthetic. We are first shown how the Entry into Rheims in 1547, two years before the Paris Entry, had triumphal arches and classical motifs in the architectural design but that more traditional aspects were still prominent: the *tableaux vivants*, the *jardin de Plaisance* and the allegorical figures, such as the Virtues, which were more medieval than classical in inspiration. McFarlane emphasizes that the planners of the Paris Entry were to make a conscious effort to dispense with these old world features. We also learn about the Entry into Lyon of 1548; while this Entry had elaborate classical elements—a double triumphant arch, a *naumachia*, as well as the major presence of classical allegorical figures and neo-classical traits such as columns and perspective—the classical gods were numerous rather than tidily grouped round a few dominant motifs, and the classical orders were not exploited methodically, as was to be the case with the 1549 Paris Entry. McFarlane suggests that the Paris Entry reflected not only the Parisians' desire to outshine the Entry into Lyon, but also perhaps Henri's desire to produce an Entry more impressive than those recently effected by Philip II.

After briefly considering some of the difficulties and delays surrounding the Paris Entry, McFarlane draws upon municipal records for details of the preparations by the city. Then he goes on to give an overview of events on the sixteenth of June, drawing upon a variety of sources, which include Jean Du Tillet in his *Recueil* and historians of the University, before he turns to a detained analysis of the information contained in the *livret*.

McFarlane devotes a lengthy section of the Introduction to a consideration of



the Entry's themes as revealed by the *livret*. We are shown how the sense of national distinction finds expression in the new neo-classical aesthetic, which underlies the architectural and artistic features of the Entry and which was starting to appear in artistic circles of the court at this time. While we cannot see this Entry as representing a total break with the past, it is unusual compared with other pageants because greater care was taken "to plan and coordinate the various aspects of the ceremonies and the artistic features: this shows itself in the systematic development of major themes (themselves not necessarily new) in the Entry and particularly in the progression of architectural structures along the Royal route." (28-29) The devisers of this more unified Entry included Jean Martin, the chief planner, who was also translating Vitruvius, Serlio and Alberti at this time, and Jean Goujon, one of the architects for the Entry, who also collaborated in the publication of Vitruvius. Through their influence "the Entry assumes some of the features associated with Roman triumphs" (39).

McFarlane points out that "the Entry shows more interest in the visual arts" (60), while the poetic aspects are slight; consequently, we have to study the illustrations of the *livret* closely in order to acquire a clear understanding of the importance of this Entry. In a number of instances the text of the *livret* has little to say about certain features of the Entry structures and the reader is obliged to discover architectural innovations for himself through a perusal of the illustrations; for example, the First Arch of the Pont Notre-Dame has an Ionic and Corinthian order, which Serlio considered to be exceedingly rare, but the *livret* does not remark on this, showing, instead, more concern for the massive figure of Typhis. To take another example, the *livret* refers to the unusual feature of "une salle à la mode Française" on the top of the Rue Saint-Antoine triple arches, while leaving it to the reader to decipher the paintings on the sides of the arches as they appear faintly in the illustration, which is in the form of a *dépliant*. McFarlane provides a brief evaluation of each illustration and in some cases supplements the information supplied by the *livret* with details from other sources; in the case of the Rue Saint-Antoine arch, he draws upon Philippe Macé's accounts of the festivities, while on other occasions he uses P. Guerin's *Registre*, which was published in 1886 and which provides more technical detail than the *livret*, notably in the matter of capitals. However, even with McFarlane's own analyses and with the supplementary texts he cites, the details concerning the Entry structures are still incomplete and one should reiterate that the illustrations themselves, despite the fact that they do not show the varied colors of the original pageant structures, add significantly to our appreciation of the Entry. The actual illustration of the "portique à la mode Ionique" at the Châtelet, for instance, makes clearer to us the way in which the innovative *trompe-l'oeil* effect of the "perspective" was brought about not only by the disposition and proportions of the columns, but also by the gallery "percée à jour" which was intended to give an impression of solidity to the whole fabric.

Having studied each of the Entry structures, McFarlane gives consideration to the political implications of the overall neo-classical design of the Entry, to the way in which a structure will be coherently organized around a central symbol of royal virtue or authority: the striking figure of Hercules atop the Porte Saint-Denis

triumphal arch, for example, or the figure of Lutetia, who serves as the point of focus for the "perspective" scene in the Châtelet "portique." As Roy Strong has demonstrated in *The Illusion of Power* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), single-point perspective in court entries and entertainments serves as a visual embodiment of the monarch's centralised authority. Unfortunately, within the limited confines of an Introduction, McFarlane can only pay cursory attention to the way in which the Entry reflects architecturally the increasing authority of the monarch and represents an important stage in the development of the iconography of the *Roi Soleil*—and there is also no opportunity here to explore the influence of an innovation like perspective on the production of other forms of court pageantry and *vice versa*.

The Entry's neo-classical architectural advances are coupled with a more sophisticated use of classical mythology and with a more elaborate handling of emblems, *imprese*, mottoes and inscriptions. With regard to the latter, the Entry reveals the emerging taste for veiled truths, for the mixing of literary text and visual arts and for a growing erudition, which, while "giving an exalted view of national culture, helps to insert a wedge between the King and the plebs, unable to grasp all the symbolism of such a grandiose pageant" (75). McFarlane does not allude to royal entries in other European countries, but it is interesting to note in this context that James I's coronation Entry into London over fifty years later was to display a similar erudition that was beyond the ken of the plebs.

With respect to the literary aspects of the Entry, McFarlane finds no evidence of any contribution by the Pléiade. However, there is a certain parallelism between the neo-classicism of the Entry and Joachim du Bellay's *Déffense et illustration*, which was published in the same year. In addition, some of the themes of the Entry—Hercules and *la France fertile*, for example—are found in Ronsard's work, while the idea of perspective may have been translated into his poetry. The way in which pageantry influenced poetry demands more attention; McFarlane does not explore the matter here, but with his knowledge of sixteenth-century French literature he is well qualified to do so and one can only hope that perhaps he will in the future.

After a Postlude describing the journey and the naval battle, which succeeded the Entry, the Introduction concludes with a detailed bibliography of both primary as well as useful secondary sources. McFarlane himself acknowledges that this Paris Entry brings up more lines of scholarly inquiry than can be pursued within the narrow scope of an introduction; however, given the limitations of space, he has provided us with a fine overview of recent scholarly findings relating to the 1549 Paris Entry. In addition, the facsimile of the *livret* and *sacre* will prove to be a useful source of material to scholars interested in the development of French—and European—pageantry in the Renaissance.

NIGEL G. BROOKS, *University of Pennsylvania*



R. V. Young, *Richard Crashaw and the Spanish Golden Age*, Yale University Press, 1982.

This book on Crashaw fits into the category of studies in comparative literature that explain the phenomenon of a literary figure in one country by the phenomenon of a literary movement in another. Here, an English Metaphysical poet is discussed according to the literary ideals of the Spanish Golden Age. R. V. Young originally drafted this book as a doctoral thesis under Louis Martz' supervision at Yale, and he contends that the Golden's Age's mystics, Teresa of Avila and John of the Cross, explain Crashaw's mysticism. He affirms, moreover, that the Age's great lyricist, Lope de Vega, is the source for the "gay tone" of Crashaw's sacred parodies, and that the Age's other critic and lyricist, Luis de Gongora, was the inspiration for the refined and artificial beauty of Crashaw's verse. Effectively, in spirit if not in body, Crashaw was a Spanish Golden Age poet.

Young's critical point of view is grounded on a number of avowed assumptions. These include that a clearly identifiable, presumably homogeneous "English devotional tradition" existed, from which Crashaw along among contemporary English poets deviated. Another assumption is the "modern Anglo-American culture is more disposed to accept the expression of emotion in private circumstances", and that Crashaw, having in the Renaissance written emotional public verse, is therefore an English Metaphysical poet *manqué* (p.8). A further assumption is that Renaissance poets who wrote in Latin may be grouped into a coherent body of a "neo-latin" writers no matter what their national origins and convictions were; because of their "neo-latin" homogeneity, the real influence of these poets on Crashaw may be dismissed, as nothing fundamental in him resembles them.

Another guiding principle in Young's book is that Spain was the country to hold the "preeminent role" in the Counter-Reformation. Being a Counter-Reformation poet, Crashaw must therefore conform to "Spanish" ideals as did the Dutchman Reubens who, Young contends, living in Holland under Spanish rule, was perforce one of the three Spanish painters with El Greco and Murillo to whom Mario Praz compares Crashaw (p.13). Yet another guiding principle behind Young's argument is that sacred parody is more "insistent" and "pervasive" in Crashaw's verse than in the work of any other English poet, including Alabaster's and Donne's sonnet sequences, and Southwell's, Beaumont's, Constable's, Lok's, Brerely's, and Barnes' religious lyrics. Crashaw was not a prophet but a stranger in his own country in virtue of his identity with the Spanish Golden Age and his resulting differences with English writers. Finally, the book defines mysticism as "the intensification of Christian love for God" not differing in essence from ordinary Christian experience (p.27), and it suggests that "the selection and disposition of poetic elements" are the hallmarks of the baroque as a poetic style (p. 157).

As Young's identification of Crashaw with the Spanish Golden Age progresses, a number of modern critics and scholars, who have explained Crashaw's work in other ways, take a beating. Joan Bennett, H. J. C. Grierson, and Douglas Bush are noted "for similar instances of blank incomprehension erected into dogma" of Crashaw's little degree of intelligence and display of emotion (pp. 175, 18). Furthermore, in one place Bennett's criticism of Crashaw is described as the



factor responsible for her "distaste" of his personality, and in her hands, consequently, Crashaw's poems deteriorate into "pseudo-clinical evidence" in a case study of "masochism" (p.24). Young's language is strong, but so far many people would be sympathetic to his claims. They might even feel such claims overdue.

Unfortunately, however, Young continues to attack strongly, beyond pseudo-psychological criticism onto the trickier ground of historical appreciation. His frontal method tends to spoil. Another modern critic, Robert Adams, in supporting Bennett's claims, for example, is made to conclude implicitly that Crashaw's poetry is "a seething kettle of latent sexual perversion" (p.25). This may be going too far. Later, Ivor Winter's rejection of the pertinence of "sexual imagery to religious imagery" appears "untenable" to Young because he, Winters, "casually dismisses" the old "Christian tradition" of relating them (p. 28). That such a tradition existed has yet to be proven. For her part, Rosemund Tuve seems "mesmerized" by the suggestions of the word "parody", and unable to cope with Crashaw. Young dismisses her because of her inability to recognize the existence of "sacred parody" as opposed to general parody, and her criticism degenerates into a "crudely biographical interpretation of the concept of poetic tension" (pp 29-30). Elsewhere in Young's pages, Robert Petersson is declared "not altogether correct" in his assertions about Crashaw's imaginative creativity at the end of the first poem to Teresa; then, the "speculations" of so valid a critic as Ruth Wallerstein on the musical qualities of Crashaw's poetry appear merely to "restate the problem rather than . . . answer it;" and, what the venerable Austin Warren has to say about Crashaw's changes in style "drives a destructive wedge between literature and religion (or style and content)" (pp. 115, 162). Finally, Young claims the existence of a "general misapprehension" of Crashaw's "Epiphany" poem by modern critics because of their over-emphasis on neo-Platonism.

The reader of Young's book is disconcerted by the isolation into which, critically speaking, he corners not himself but Crashaw. Crashaw, who never left England and who therefore never saw the Continent until the vast majority of his poetry was written and practically all of his life was over, is stripped of his English origins. A Spanish Golden Age influence, identified according to principles of international cultural literary penetration, is made to explain a whole man. And yet, the prosodic parallels between Gongora and Crashaw (p. 168), stick in the reader's memory. To read that "the similar use of long and short lines to pursue a single idea or to unfold a single scene through a series of images—unrestricted by a strict prosodic form—which seem to tumble forth one on top of another", is a pleasant change from reading that Crashaw gives off too much heat. Nevertheless, *Richard Crashaw and the Spanish Golden Age* tempts the reader to think that Young has followed Warren, Bush, Wallerstein, Petersson and Tuve into what he describes as their errors.

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Jules Brody. *Lectures de Montaigne*. Lexington, Kentucky: French Forum, 1982. Pp. 181. \$13.50

Dans ce livre qui veut corriger les torts faits au texte de Montaigne par l'ensemble de la critique ancienne et actuelle, Jules Brody replace les *Essais* à l'intérieur d'une expérience fondamentale du désordre de la lecture. Ce désordre, auquel se conforme Montaigne, si l'on peut dire, exige que nous abandonnions pour un moment notre esprit de système et que nous fissions preuve d'une grande ouverture sur le plan méthodologique. Il faut donc attendre du lecteur une part étonnante de tolérance et de patience, car, au lieu de recourir au contenu systématique pour expliquer la démarche des *Essais*, le critique restore toute la difficulté du texte, l'énorme problème de sa lecture. "Montaigne n'est pas de ces penseurs qui proposent des vérités; c'est plutôt un artiste qui expose, qui découvre et révèle au niveau du langage des nuances et des secrets le plus souvent offusqués et obscurcis par la pensée systématique" (p. 35).

L'étude que nous propose Jules Brody s'inscrit donc, d'une façon méticuleuse et acharnée, contre les forces qui tendent à assimiler l'oeuvre de Montaigne à son contenu idéologique. Elle suggère plutôt, sous divers modes, une analyse plus respectueuse du travail de Montaigne sur le langage et surtout du déni farouche de l'ordre dans cette oeuvre. Ce postulat ne veut nullement dire que le critique doit s'abstenir d'intervenir dans le texte à l'étude. Bien au contraire, les "lectures" de Montaigne par Brody sont toutes faites d'interventions qui dérangent légèrement le texte en y faisant surgir, ne serait-ce que par le trait de l'italique, une continuité secrète, une sorte de persistance à relais du désordre. Il faut expulser l'apparente satisfaction du système, car elle nous empêche, en nous aveuglant, de véritablement lire et interpréter les mouvements invisibles de l'oeuvre.

Dans *Lectures de Montaigne*, Jules Brody a rassemblé plusieurs articles et communications, certains ayant fait l'objet de publications antérieures limitées. C'est d'abord dans le contexte de la réception des *Essais* au XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle que l'on doit situer l'ensemble du livre. L'accueil plutôt réservé et correctif fait à l'autoportrait de Montaigne, dès les premières années du XVII<sup>e</sup>, semble avoir donné le ton définitif à toute la critique subséquente, si bien que, de Jean-Pierre Camus à Pierre Villey, le pas méthodologique est resté fort mince. Ce premier chapitre des *Lectures de Montaigne* est extrêmement intéressant par le détail et la précision des rapports établis. Brody est absolument exhaustif. Il en ressort ce que nous savions déjà, à savoir que les *Essais* ont subi une censure considérable et ont fait l'objet d'un travail de réorganisation assez unique, somme toute, dans l'histoire littéraire française. De Charron à Camus, Brody note la même volonté de reclasser, d'organiser, d'ordonner une oeuvre dont l'atèlie est jugée insupportable. C'est qu'aux yeux du XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle, le désordre des *Essais* ne permet nullement de véhiculer un contenu idéologique clair; le texte de Montaigne "débordait les confins d'une éloquence scholastique prépondérante et (...) les ressources expressives d'un vocabulaire critique affecté surtout à la description des formes fixes" (p. 18). Le panorama qu'effectue Brody en une vingtaine de pages sera sans doute définitif et devrait convaincre les plus récalcitrants d'entre nous.

Après cette étude contextuelle, *Lectures de Montaigne* comporte une analyse



détaillée de trois chapitres des *Essais* qui paraissent particulièrement déformés ou "réformés" par la critique montaignienne; il s'agit donc de "De mesnager sa volonté," "De l'expérience" et "Que philosopher, c'est apprendre à mourir." Dans les trois cas, Brody tente d'extraire les *Essais* de "l'obsession de la composition, de l'ordre et l'unité des chapitres" (p. 50). C'est ainsi qu'il formule, à plusieurs moments dans les *Lectures*, une méthode d'analyse dite "philologique" (une sorte de repérage des thèmes sous-jacents à partir de l'étymologie), qui permet de révéler la forme essentiellement redondante ou circulaire des *Essais*.

Le chapitre sur "De mesnager sa volonté," magistral et mené d'une façon brillante et singulièrement éclairante, est de loin la meilleure étude du livre. Ce chapitre vaut à lui seul l'ensemble des "Lectures." Brody y démontre fort habilement qu'il y a, dans l'essai sur la volonté, des "circuits philologiques" qu'un repérage attentif des mots clés permettra de parcourir assez clairement. Il s'agit d'une couche de mots à la fois souterraine car elle n'apparaît guère à la simple lecture, et superficielle, car elle refuse l'émergence de tout contenu idéologique substantiel. Ce parcours philologique, résultat d'une découverte éphémère, ne vaut que par son statut de relais de la signification, une *autre* signification que celle que nous sommes habitués à conférer d'emblée au texte de Montaigne.

L'analyse de Brody est particulièrement convaincante dans le cas de l'essai sur la volonté, dans la mesure où elle s'adjoint une métaphore absolument insistante, celle du désir (souterrain et superficiel, lui aussi) qui est sa source même. Le désir est une force disjonctive: voilà pourquoi l'essai apparaît morcelé et disloqué. Mais la dislocation que provoque la volonté, devenue désir, appelle justement la lecture philologique proposée par Brody, celle qui nous fera voir (ou prévoir) les concentrations où Montaigne a "mesné" son texte. Le processus d'écriture des *Essais* est donc fait d'une sorte de pointillisme lexical, un mot à mot qu'il faut faire surgir: "ces atomes de signification," conclut Brody, "sont progressivement synthétisés en des constructions métaphoriques quantitativement plus grandes et qualitativement plus riches que la somme de leurs parties" (p. 53).

Dans un second temps, *Lectures de Montaigne* comprend l'étude de deux autres essais fortement censurés par les siècles. Citant le célèbre extrait de l'Essai III, 2 où Montaigne parle de ses mets favoris, Brody se demande s'il n'y a pas une valeur textuelle à ces "fadaïses" (comme on le disait au XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle). Encore ici, il s'agit d'établir une série de liens philologiques, dont on peut citer celui de la "saveur" et de la "sagesse," par exemple, qui permettraient de suivre le discours des *Essais* au-delà du niveau anecdotique, en passant encore une fois par une approche de la surface du texte.

Ce chapitre des *Lectures*, tout comme celui qui suit sur Montaigne et la mort, paraît un peu moins convaincant, on ne sait trop pourquoi. Brody est un brillant analyste et la minute du travail de repérage lexical est certes la même ici que dans l'étude de l'essai sur la volonté. Mais il y a une sorte de revers à l'éclat de cette analyse. Ce qui semble faire défaut, en fin de compte, c'est peut-être la conviction qu'un rapport métaphorique existe bel et bien entre le tracé philologique (la saveur) et l'appareil métaphorique (la sagesse). Et quelle est justement la nature de ce rapport? Brody appelle à son aide le "langage effectivement symbolique" de Ricoeur, mais l'on reste tout de même un peu perplexe. Car ces rapports philo-



logiques-métaphoriques ont-ils vraiment une valeur herméneutique, comme le croit apparemment le critique? Il aurait peut-être été utile d'étendre le rôle conjoncteur et disjoncteur du désir à l'ensemble des *Essais* de Montaigne. Dans la lecture superficielle que nous soumet Brody, c'est effectivement le désir qui manque.

En dépit de ces lacunes sur le plan du langage symbolique, le troisième volet des *Lectures* sur "Que philosopher, c'est apprendre à mourir" offre un très grand nombre de remarques vraiment éclairantes. Brody s'attache à rétablir la lecture du texte dans son contexte historique et remet ainsi en question l'abécédaire des éditions successives des *Essais*. Pourquoi, en effet, se demande Brody, s'obstine-t-on à toujours indiquer dans les éditions modernes du texte de Montaigne les ajouts successifs par les lettres A. B. C? Pourquoi faut-il absolument que le livre soit clairement démarqué dans sa diachronie? Pour Brody, cet abécédaire n'est qu'une autre forme de l'idéologie de censure et de réorganisation qui a accueilli le livre de Montaigne depuis sa publication.

Dans ce dernier chapitre sur le motif de la mort, le critique a le mérite de situer le texte des *Essais* parmi les milliers d'*ars moriendi*, si populaires à la Renaissance. Ce qui distingue Montaigne de la littérature de son époque, c'est le glissement vers une analyse de la mort à partir de "la fonction de Nature" (p. 128). Ce rituel de la nature, d'où la préparation religieuse est pratiquement exclue, transparait dans l'analyse encore ici philologique et étymologique que fait Brody du détail des premières pages du texte I, 20. A ce niveau, on conviendra que les *Lectures de Montaigne* ne sont pas totalement nouvelles, mais elles ont le grand mérite de disséquer le texte dans ses plus infimes particularités.

Malgré les quelques lacunes que nous avons soulevées et malgré aussi quelques problèmes de composition (les introductions à chacun des chapitres sont beaucoup trop redondantes: il aurait amplement suffi de présenter la méthode une seule fois), il n'en reste pas moins que *Lectures de Montaigne* est une des études les plus percutantes qu'il nous a été donné de lire depuis une dizaine d'années. La méthode conçue par Brody devrait encourager d'autres "lecteurs" et "lectrices" à relire l'oeuvre de Montaigne avec un goût renouvelé pour le texte lui-même. Il serait bon de vérifier si la "composition intensive," la "démarche additive et cumulative," les "reprises redondantes," les "prélèvements sémantiques" (p. 135), tout ce code ponctuel dont Brody fait la base de son analyse pourra maintenant s'intégrer au projet d'autoprotrait, défini par Montaigne. Car les *Essais* sont avant tout une entreprise autobiographique, comme l'a justement dénoncé Pascal. Il faudrait voir aussi si le rapport étonnant ébauché dans les *Lectures*, entre Erasme et Montaigne, pourra faire l'objet d'une étude plus approfondie. Il convient d'y consacrer au moins tout un chapitre, beaucoup plus qu'une note infrapaginale.

En fin de compte, Brody a raison de nous rappeler que la parution des *Essais* avait constitué "un événement spectaculaire" (p. 9) en cette fin du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle. A d'autres "lectures" maintenant de relever le défi du désordre et de la quantité que le texte de Montaigne pose sans contredit.

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Brian Tierney. *Religion, Law, and the Growth of Constitutional Thought, 1150-1650*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982. Pp. xi, 114.

The reader familiar with Brian Tierney's many years of fruitful scholarship on the relation between Church law and constitutional thought will probably find this little book (as its author calls it) to be something of a disappointment. Admittedly, one can hardly object to the impulse that led Tierney to write the volume. As both a corrective to and expansion of Figgis' classic studies collected in *From Gerson to Grotius*, Tierney proposes to disclose the significance of his discovery that certain constitutionalist "themes are common to medieval law, to fifteenth century conciliarism and to seventeenth century constitutional theory. The resemblances are too striking to be mere coincidences; but merely to call attention to resemblances is not to explain the whole phenomenon. The recurrence of similar patterns of thought in different historical environments is itself the problem that needs elucidation" (p. 103). Unfortunately, while *Religion, Law, and the Growth of Constitutional Thought* clearly identifies the various aspects of "resemblance," it never proceeds to explain such "recurrence" in historically intelligible terms.

Those who turn to Tierney's book for insights into the constitutional doctrines of early modern Europe will be particularly frustrated. In the first paragraph of the first page, Tierney announces that "it is impossible really to understand the growth of Western constitutional thought...unless we consider the whole period from 1150 to 1650 as a single era of essentially continuous development." Yet Tierney cites (according to a count of footnotes—there is no index) a mere ten texts dating from the last two hundred years of his time-frame. This might be excused on the grounds Tierney himself offers: namely, that the "material presented...displays the characteristic limitation of the lecture form"—the contents were originally delivered as the Wiles Lectures at Queen's University, Belfast—"extreme selectivity in the topics and authors considered" (p. xi). But such a rationale is not wholly valid; for in surveying the period from 1150 to 1450, Tierney manages to cite upwards of fifty treatises. And more substantively, the only authors dating to the era following the Council of Basle (1432) who merit extended attention are Althusius and George Lawson—hardly representative figures in the history of early modern constitutionalism. As a consequence, Tierney's attribution of medieval origins to early modern constitutionalism in general seems to be largely a case of imputed influence.

A more unsettling charge to be levelled against *Religion, Law, and the Growth of Constitutional Thought* is that Tierney has consciously left the most important and challenging portion of his book unwritten. After devoting in excess of one hundred pages to "the description of the evolution of constitutionalist themes, he admits that the more serious questions remain. Why did the medieval ideas persist? Why did they continue to prove meaningful and useful? Even when we can explain the process of transmission in the simplest fashion—even when we can construct a neat little chain of tests leading all the way from the twelfth century to the seventeenth (and this is indeed often possible)—we shall not have answered, we have not even addressed, the more difficult questions" (p. 105). Tierney then dedicates the final three pages of his conclusion to these "more serious questions."



Not surprisingly, his responses are so unsatisfactory that he is finally led to observe: "It may seem that the whole tradition of Western constitutional thought—both its origin and its persistence—can only be explained as the result of a random play of contingent circumstances" (p. 108). This admission has severe consequences. For the inability to explain in coherent historical terms the recurrence of constitutionalist ideas leaves him without the consolidated intellectual tradition he seeks. In Tierney's account, the various medieval and early modern constitutionalist doctrines are connected by a vague 'family resemblance' rather than by some more essential historical principle.

Does this mean that there is *no* historical foundation at all for a constitutionalist tradition extending from the Middle Ages into modern Europe? Assuredly not. But the identification of the basis for this tradition requires us to re-examine for a moment our historical and historiographical premises. Tierney staunchly dissociates the origins of constitutional theory from the practice of feudal politics. In defense of this view, he cites the fact that the most precious intellectual preconditions for constitutionalism—concepts of "sovereignty," "community," and "state" (pp. 9-10, 30)—were antithetical to feudal institutions, and moreover their introduction occurred only through "external" sources like Roman Law and Aristotle. In turn, Tierney's explanation (derived from Walter Ullmann) for the reception of these "foreign" ideas into the medieval tradition is their immediate applicability to such non-feudal political arrangements as "monasteries, cathedral chapters, collegiate churches, confraternities, universities, guilds, communes" (p. 11; cf. p. 36). It was the novel problems posed by the "new corporate groups" of this order that Tierney believes to have been the "soil" in which the essential constituents of constitutionalism first took root. But Tierney's opposition of feudal institutions to "corporative structures" is historically artificial. For the actual emergence of these corporate communities, so far from conflicting with and/or undermining the arrangement of feudal society, saw their rapid integration into the general pattern of medieval life. As much as Tierney wishes to see "communal experience" and feudalism as in principle antithetical, they were in matter of fact practically compatible. And the reason is that feudalism, understood as the narrow and personalized relationship of lordship and vassalage (*fodalit*), was but a single and limited aspect of a more general social system (*fodalisme*) characterized by the decentralized and fragmented distribution of political authority in essentially private hands. Hence, while various communal organizations, when viewed in isolation, seem incompatible with the personal bonds of the feudal contract, both political forms constitute prime instances of the widespread and uncoordinated dispersion of sovereign power upon which feudal society was constructed. Concomitantly, it was the process, internal to feudalism itself, by which this power was progressively reconcentrated—first in principalities, later in kingdoms—that provided the most crucial recurring political issues in medieval and early modern Europe.

When conceived in these terms, it then becomes possible to treat the constitutionalist tradition as a response to the increasingly pressing problem endemic to feudalism of the accommodation of public power (generally represented by monarchy) to the privatized distribution of jurisdictions and liberties. Of course,



constitutionalism was not the *only* sort of response to this historical reality, for as Tierney rightly remarks, "one could just as easily write a history of absolutism as a history of constitutionalism" covering the same era (p. xi). Where absolutist authors sought to integrate the power of private franchises into the state office structure by appeals to royal supremacy/sovereignty, however, constitutionalist theorists beginning in the Middle Ages proposed that at least some right and powers were so thoroughly imbedded in private hands that they could never be claimed (or reclaimed) by any superior authority. The constitutionalist view might take the form of an unabashed defense of local individualized and/or corporate rights; or it might adopt the more sophisticated strategy of the "mixed constitution" theory. But always it involved a denial of *plenitudo potestatis* on the part of an ultimate or "sovereign" ruler (regardless of composition). A recurrent aspect of the constitutionalist tradition throughout its medieval and early modern history was the principle that no ruler could be afforded a regularized set of arbitrary or discretionary powers which might be used to interrupt the particularized jurisdictions of the *dominus* and the *universitas*.

Tierney's insensitivity to the crucial historical dimension of medieval and early modern political thought does not, however, invalidate his claim that the constitutive features of constitutionalism first arose within the context of Christian ecclesiology. Conciliar theories of the church constitution—such as those advocated by Gerson and d'Ailley, whose influence was later felt in secular circles—were in fact founded on canonistic doctrines dating to the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. But this ecclesio-canonical impact upon secular constitutionalism can itself be explained historically. After all, the Western Church, as the most "advanced" system of feudal politics during the High Middle Ages, suffered at an early date from serious conflicts between local jurisdiction (bishops, communities, "national" churches) and the centralized administration of the papacy. It was these sorts of conflicts that were eventually to be transferred to the realm of secular politics. Despite the special circumstances implied by ecclesiastical government, the temporal organization and consequent jurisdictional disputes of the Church typify the feudal polity as accurately as do the conditions of the French or English kingdoms. The problems implied by feudal political organization were felt by clerical and lay lords, communities and rulers without substantial differentiation, and were addressed by authors concerned with the governance of ecclesiastical and secular affairs alike. Such facts are hardly incompatible with the basic insights of *Religion, Law, and the Growth of Constitutional Thought*. But Tierney's failure to inspect adequately the historical foundations of the constitutionalist tradition means that the more compelling issue of accounting for recurrent intellectual "resemblances" is, at least by inference, pushed entirely aside.

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Pierre-Victor Palma-Cayet. *L'Histoire Prodigieuse du Docteur Fauste*, publié avec introduction et notes par Yves Cazaux. Genève: Librairie Droz, 1982. Pp. 220. Fr.S. 40.

From the original edition of the *Faustbuch* [published (anonymously) by John Spies in Frankfurt, 1587] to modern times, the story of Dr. Faustus has played an important role in Western literature. This little book is rooted in historical reality, for there is some biographical basis for the story of Dr. Faustus' life, and it shows a specific ideological orientation, for it is generally considered to be a Lutheran pamphlet. It gave rise to one of the most influential of all literary myths. The story has fascinated writers because of its concern with such religious and philosophical problems as the desire for unlimited knowledge, the human relationship with the forces of good and evil, the human revolt against the limitations of life, the relationship between ethical principles and the pleasure principle.

The *Faustbuch* is the first known literary version of the legend, and the theme is itself most interesting. It is the Reformation's attempt to use the Faust story as an example of the horrible death that awaits skeptics and sinners. It is a didactic work directed against those who are tempted to *hubris*, who try to go beyond their human condition. Although it presents a few facts about Faust's life, it is largely fantastic. Faust is a scholar gone wrong, a proud intellectual who makes a pact with the devil and must pay for his earthly pleasures with his eternal damnation. He conjures up the devil Mephistophiles, who purchases his soul in return for twenty-four years of forbidden knowledge, devilish powers, and material rewards. Faust engages in discussion with the devil who reveals the truth about heaven and hell and gives a geocentric description of the cosmos. Various fantastic adventures of Faust are presented, including tricks reminiscent of Till Eulenspiegel, together with his remorseful lamentations, and his final horrifying death at the hands of the devil.

Spies' book was quickly translated into a number of languages including French. Yves Cazaux has given us a scholarly edition of the first French translation of the *Faustbuch* (1598). It was done by Pierre-Victor Cayet, "sieur de la Palme," often called Palma-Cayet, an interesting figure in his own right. Best known as historiographer of Henri IV, Palma-Cayet was converted to Protestantism in his youth and studied in Geneva and Germany. He entered the service of Jeanne d'Albret as tutor to her son, Henri de Havarre and served as a Protestant preacher in several French towns, but his return to the court in 1593-94 under the auspices of Catherine de Bourbon, sister to Henri, led to his reconversion to the Catholic faith in 1595. However, these dates are controversial. He was named historiographer to the king, appointed professor of oriental languages, and given a pension by the clergy. He was the object of violent attack by his former co-religionists and accused of debauchery and black magic. He was certainly interested in alchemy and fantastic stories, and this led him to translate the *Faustbuch*, which brought accusations of occultism.

M. Cazaux mentions a possible earlier edition of Palma-Cayet's translation which a German scholar, Carl Kiesewetter (*Faust in der Geschichte und Tradition*, 1893. Reprinted: Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung,



1963, p. 71) had posited, but Cazaux claims that this edition remains lost. This first edition would have been prepared while Cazaux was still a Protestant so that its Lutheran message could easily have been seconded by Cayet at that time. In 1598 the situation is more confused. The text follows the original *Faustbuch* fairly closely and so the Lutheran message remains. However, the Preface, addressed to the Count of Schomberg, must have been new, for it shows Palma-Cayet attacking the Protestant spirit or "libra-examen," exemplified by Faust, and ends with his pious hope that the German nation will return to the bosom of "nostre mere sainte Eglise Romaine, pour delaisser tant d'opinions monstreuses, qui y ont pullulé depuis cete miserable defection . . ." (p. 53). Thus Cayet attempts to turn the *Faustbuch* with its Lutheran message into an anti-Protestant work in which Faust himself represents the Protestant ideology, and in which it, like he, is condemned to eternal damnation. Small wonder that Cayet was so vehemently attacked!

This edition contains an introduction that includes remarks on the historical Faust and the creation of his legend, the original *Faustbuch* and its sources, the translator, Palma-Cayet and the edition he used, the facts of publication of his translation, the characteristics of the translation and its afterlife. Three Annexes follow, presenting documentary material concerning Faust (an anecdote by Jean Wier), Palma-Cayet (extracts of the *Journal* of Pierre de L'Estoile), and a listing of the editions of the Palma-Cayet's translation taken from the *Faust-Bibliographie*. The text itself contains a dedication by Palma-Cayet to the Count of Schomberg and the history of Jean Fauste divided into three parts, which are themselves divided into chapters, although the chapters are not numbered. Regrettably, there is no bibliography, glossary or listing of the chapter headings.

M. Cazaux fails to tell us what modifications he has made to the text so that we are at a loss as to whether to attribute the considerable number of typographical errors to the original French text or to the editor of this modern version. A comparison between the modern French translation by Joël Lefebvre (Lyon: Les Belles Lettres, 1970) and Palma-Cayet's version shows that Palma-Cayet did not know German very well and did not consider it necessary to be faithful to the text. Thus, there are many errors of sense, and Palma-Cayet's text is sometimes incomprehensible. M. Cazaux often uses Lefebvre's modern version to explain garbled or unintelligible passages in Cayet's text, but he should have done more of this, since incomprehensible passages remain. He also should have gone back to the original German text to verify the translation.

Despite the many errors, this version was for a long time the only French translation, and nineteen editions of it were published between 1598 and 1798 according to the *Faust-Bibliographie*. It is curious, then, that Cazaux does not find any influence of this translation on French literature, and, indeed, dismisses any possible influence of Palma-Cayet's translation. The question of such influence demands deeper study.

Such as it is, this text is an interesting stage in the development and propagation of the Faust legend throughout Europe. Because of its value as a Reformation and Renaissance document, and because of its rarity (the text has not been reprinted in its entirety since 1712), we must thank M. Cazaux for his contribution to Faust studies. Even the lacunae in M. Cazaux's book rouse the curiosity of the reader and lead one to search for further enlightenment.

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Nancy Lindheim, *The Structures of Sidney's Arcadia*, Toronto: Univ. of Toronto; 1982. Pp. 224. \$30.00.

Although not lengthy, *The Structures of Sidney's Arcadia* deals with many of the salient concerns of recent scholarship on the *Arcadia*, as, for example, the rhetorical underpinnings of Sidney's prose style and method of composition, the didactic motives of the romance, its generic affinities, and the nature of the relationship between the episodic material and the pastoral 'core' the *New Arcadia* retains from the *Old Arcadia*. No all-embracing theories or schemes of interpretation are to be found here, but instead a series of enlightening and often provocative deliberations concentrating on the text of 1590. Regarding the multiple texts, Professor Lindheim counsels the student to attempt to keep all three versions in mind, especially when working with the problematic conclusion of 1593, and to do so without thoughtlessly conflating them. The over-all impression of the *Arcadia* conveyed here is of a deeply serious "re-vision," or refashioning of what had been (indeed, what is) a comedy in tone and structure into something more akin to epic or heroic poem, owing its general conception of the hero and heroic purpose to the *Aeneid* and its more specific didactic aims to the ideals of Tudor humanism.

The structures under investigation are three: rhetorical, tonal, and narrative, each of which is shown to contribute to the *Arcadia's* sense of 'multiple unity' and to the expression of a coherent thematic pattern. With respect to Sidney's 'rhetoricism,' or the *Arcadia's* "essentially rhetorical perception of experience," preliminary references are made to some recent work on Renaissance histories in relation to what is termed the Sophistic strain in the rhetorical tradition, that is, an inherent bias in classical rhetoric to deal with the things of this world and to leave the transcendent to philosophy. Sophistic epistemology affects rhetorical strategies inasmuch as it calls for antilogy, the presentation of opposing arguments, "to give pluralistic illuminations to 'truths' and motivation; in style it makes use of antithesis to highlight contradiction and of irony to achieve detachment and awareness of discrepancies between the intention and effect of action." Such an approach to reality, it is claimed, well suits the *Arcadia's* overwhelming concern with ethical behaviour and its depiction of a world in which moral choice becomes increasingly difficult and the confusion of good and evil ever more subtle.

From this theoretical overview the book proceeds to examine Sidney's rhetorical habits of composition, in particular his use of antithetical *topoi*, the importance of which to the organization of his ideas has been long recognized. Perhaps most original in this section is the analysis of the recurring figures *antimetabole* and *correctio*. By means of such figures Sidney is able to set up oppositions or distinctions and then to overturn or blur them; two things initially antithetical end by sharing the same identity. The ubiquity of these figures of reciprocity and reversible balance, together with his reliance on the antithetical *topoi*, seems to be "related to a tension between Sidney's analytical habit of mind and his temperamental need for synthesis." Of the two antithetical *topoi* under consideration, 'Reason and Love,' the first, is studied in the light of the Hercules/Omphale motif, which attaches chiefly to Pyrocles disguised as Zelmane, the Amazon. Unlike Ariosto or Spenser, Sidney draws on the positive implications of a tradition

originating with Prodicus, that is, on the 'Not only/But also' development whereby Hercules becomes a symbol of reconciliation. It is argued quite reasonably that Sidney's choice here would seem to indicate that he intended a final reconciliation of the seemingly opposed chivalric and pastoral values of the romance.

The discussion of the second *topos*, 'Knowledge and Virtue,' focusses on Sidney's treatment of character. By contrast with the other major characters in the work, Gynecia, Philoclea, and Cecropia do not demonstrate that direct, positive relationship between virtue and knowledge that is a central principle of humanist *paedeias* and so of the *Arcadia*. It is typical of Professor Lindheim's approach throughout that where, as in this case, she cannot find a reasonable, ready solution to a problem, she does not try to enforce one; her exploration of the problem, however, is always full of insight. Looking at characterization in general, she observes that whereas the conception of virtue is dynamic in the *Arcadia*, the conception of character is static. It is suggested that Sidney's use of the conventional topics of praise and blame for the delineation of character gives rise to problems in differentiation, especially between similar types such as Pyrocles and Musidorus. Again, the two heroes seem almost too perfect in their chivalric roles and too lucky in their pastoral roles; according to Professor Lindheim, the result is that the unfortunate and even tragic Amphialus becomes a more complex and interesting character. Some readers, however, will contest this opinion by regarding the witty and inventive Pyrocles as the most attractive and well-rounded personage even in the uncompleted romance.

Tonal structure is apparent where the very sequence of narrative events seems to direct the reader's attitude to the material. The three personal combats that take place during the siege in Book III seem best to illustrate a three-part tonal scheme of positive, negative, and humorous representations of a theme; the three-part sequences pointed out in Book I would not appear to fit quite so neatly into this pattern. Another agent of tone, the impersonal narrative voice, is viewed as a technical advance of the intrusive and sometimes limiting narrator of the *Old Arcadia*. On the other hand, it could be objected that a character such as Gynecia is diminished in the course of this improvement.

Narrative structure is examined first through an analysis of the 'retrospective' narrative material. The princes' adventures in Asia Minor are said to illustrate the testing of virtues acquired in an idealistic setting against the morally confused situations of the real world. While Musidorus' more straightforward account suits the application of theory to situations of clear-cut injustice, Pyrocles' 'interwoven' narrative treats events of a more complicated and morally ambiguous sort. Sidney would appear to follow Aristotle in maintaining that the essence of moral virtue resides in choice. Professor Lindheim is not accepting of the thesis that the princes' pastoral experience represents a further stage in their education. Investigating the *Arcadia*'s affinities with chivalric, pastoral, and epic materials—including all the familiar sources—she points out that the chivalric ethic fails in its pre-occupation with self, while pastoral deals with social issues in too small and particular a fashion. Maintaining the priority that society and public virtues, especially justice, assume in the revised *Arcadia*, she concludes that its most powerful model is the *Aeneid*, not only for its peculiar mixture of heroic and pastoral, but more espe-



cially for the *Aeneid*'s stress on public virtues and its depiction of love and the softer life rejected in favour of the heroic quest. It is suggested, too, that because the Renaissance defined epic in terms of genre, Sidney quite conceivably thought that when he wrote the *New Arcadia* he was recasting the *Old Arcadia* as an epic.

*The Structures of Sidney's Arcadia* is a book that presents the major critical issues in a thoughtful and learned way. It has the great virtue of persuading the reader to think of the various issues as having a degree of complexity not often amenable to single approaches. Occasionally its views seem corrective. Not everyone will agree that there is virtually no Neoplatonism in the *Arcadia*. Again, the reader may feel that love and the sentimental aspects of the romance have been treated rather harshly, and that the pastoral experience in general has been skimmed. Secular love in this romance featuring young protagonists must surely bear some resemblance, however faint, to that Divine Love which, as Pamela explains, brings into harmony all the warring elements of the cosmos. One of Professor Lindheim's valuable contributions is to be found in her analysis of the chief rhetorical figures and of the purpose of the "vanishing distinction." Similarly helpful will be her clear, incisive evaluation of the influences of the various modes and sources, whether or not one agrees that the *Aeneid* provides the determinative influence, or that Sidney thought of his romance as an epic. One may regret the complete omission of the poetry on the grounds that it does not simply re-state the themes of the prose in simpler, more schematic form, as Professor Lindheim implies, but that it is an integral part of a design that, encompassing tournaments and descriptions of beautiful ladies and chivalric furniture, is meant to be handsome and gay as well as sober and wholesome. *The Structures of Sidney's Arcadia* ends with the intriguing idea that the trial scene of the *Old Arcadia* gave rise to a conceptual framework too weighty and fertile for the action it purports to sum up, and that therein were sown the seeds of the revision that was to become the broader, more serious, and more intricate *New Arcadia*.

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*The Renaissance and Reformation in Scotland: Essays in Honour of Gordon Donaldson*, edited by Ian B. Cowan and Duncan Shaw. Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1983. Pp. x, 261. \$20.00

This Festschrift for the dean of Scottish historians has the signal merit of exploring many overlooked areas of sixteenth-century Scotland. It has the perhaps unavoidable signal demerit of disunity and very uneven quality of pieces. All are aimed at a scholarly audience, but only some make convincing cases. The editors apparently tried to guide their contributors and nearly all the pieces follow lines of investigation opened by Professor Donaldson. The contributions cover administrative and political, social and intellectual history, with a dash of diplomacy thrown in.

Under the first rubric, two essays on ecclesiastical patronage by Ian Cowan and James Kirk are extremely valuable, documenting the shift of patronage from pre-Reformation churchmen to the crown by the later sixteenth-century. The three-



corner game between pope, king and patron underwent a "silent revolution" that almost accidentally led the way to increased lay patronage in the next century. Athol Murray's "Financing the Royal Household" focuses on the career of James Colville as comptroller presiding over the disaster of James V's financial policy, which led to the assault on church revenues and helped to weaken it just as the Reformation hit. In a more political vein is Thorkild Christensen's "The Earl of Rothes in Denmark," but his essay does little to demonstrate why this episode should be rescued from the "near oblivion" in which it has reposed for four centuries.

John Durkan's "The Early Scottish Notary" bridges the gap between administrative and social history, though it focuses mainly on medieval notaries. John Bannerman's valuable "Literacy in the Highlands" does a persuasive job of reconstructing a tri-lingual culture and explaining the social dynamics of literacy. His piece also contains a short but illuminating discussion of the bard's role. Margaret Sanderson's is one of the most useful articles. She details "The Edinburgh Merchants in Society, 1570-1603" chiefly on the evidence of their wills. A very intriguing picture emerges of the mercantile enterprise that made Scots such formidable competitors in later centuries. T.M.Y. Manson's sketch of Norse "Shetland in the Sixteenth Century" fills out the social history category.

Another hybrid contribution leads to two other primarily intellectual pieces. Edward Cowan's "The Darker Vision of the Scottish Renaissance" is a rather confused effort to portray Francis Stewart, earl of Bothwell as a minor *magus*. This he may well have been, but Cowan's attempt to hang that thesis on the North Berwick witchcraft episode fails to lend coherence to his case. Denys Hay, undoubtedly the most distinguished historian represented in this volume, wrote a short piece on "Scotland and the Italian Renaissance," a somewhat tenuous connection, as it turns out. Much of the piece concentrates on Hay's latter-day interest in historiography.

Two remaining pieces grapple with Scottish religion, one in a primarily intellectual way, the other in a predominantly political fashion. The second editor, Duncan Shaw, produced the longest essay on Adam Bothwell's library. It is, as the author admits, only the "scaffolding" for his subject, and is marred by too many assumptions about what sort of beliefs Bothwell should have held. Maurice Lee's treatment of Alexander Seton, "King James's Popish Chancellor," by contrast, is a subtly eirenic appreciation of the possibilities for a permanent religious peace inherent in Seton's career and James's policy. In so far as such categories still have value, the Renaissance is better served than the Reformation. Only Lee's and Cowan's pieces, together with Kirk's deal directly with the Reformation, though many others touch on it.

All in all a suitably eclectic tribute to a many-sided historian. Two introductory essays recount Donaldson's life-long love of history and documents. A five-page bibliography of his publications testifies to the strength of his twin passions.

THOMAS F. MAYER, *Southwest Missouri State University*

# News / Nouvelles

## **RSA Annual Meeting**

The Renaissance Society of America annual meeting will be hosted by the Mid-Atlantic Renaissance Seminar, March 20-22, 1986, at the University of Pennsylvania. Enquiries should be directed to Georgianna Ziegler, Special Collections, Van Pelt Library/CH, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia PA 19104.

## **RSA South-Central Conference**

The South-Central Renaissance Conference has announced April 3-5 as the dates of its 1986 meeting, to be held at Southwest Texas State University in San Marcos, Texas. Stephen Orgel of The Johns Hopkins University will be the featured speaker. Inquiries from those wishing to read papers should be sent to the program chair, Gary A. Stringer, Department of English, University of Southern Mississippi, Box 5037 Southern Station, Hattiesburg, MS 39406. The deadline for submission is December 31, 1985.

## **Query re Shakespearean Statuary**

Would anyone knowing the whereabouts of plaster statuettes on Shakespearean themes (i.e. The Closet Scene from Hamlet, The Cave Scene from Macbeth) by the Anglo-Canadian sculptor Hamilton Plantagenet MacCarthy (1846-1939) please contact Dr. Robert J. Lamb, Dept. of Art & Design, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, T6G 2C9?

## **Un colloque sur Du Bartas**

Le Groupe de Recherches sur l'Ancienne langue française et sur la Renaissance de la Faculté des Lettres de Pau organisera un Colloque International les 7, 8 et 9 Mars 1986 qui se tiendra à la Faculté des Lettres, et a retenu le sujet suivant: Du Bartas: Poesie et encyclopedisme.


Il serait souhaitable que pour la rentrée (au plus tard le 15 novembre) les propositions de communications soient accompagnées d'un bref résumé. Les collègues désireux de présenter une communication et ou d'assister à ce colloque sont invités à prendre contact avec: James Dauphiné—223 avenue de Fabron Les Oliviers 06200 NICE; ou Faculté des Lettres de Pau Avenue du Doyen Poplawski 64000 PAU.



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# *Renaissance and Reformation*

# *Renaissance et Réforme*



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**NEWS / NOUVELLES**



# Renaissance Exempla of Schizophrenia: The Cure by Charity in Luther and Cervantes\*

WINFRIED SCHLEINER

It is a commonplace that literature and life intersect in many places. Even without adopting philosophic concepts (the Kantian categories, say, or Cassirer's symbolic forms) as tools for probing facts in various realms of experience, a literary scholar may point to the derivation of many narrative or dramatic episodes and plots from actual cases: moral, judicial, and medical. But derivation certainly does not imply primacy of importance of the source, i.e., if we study the interplay of disciplines in actual *casus*, reciprocal fertilization between disciplines is more apparent than mere debt. Indeed, if we pursue the Renaissance thinking about one kind of medical case, namely what we would now call schizophrenia, and particularly the delusions associated with it, Francis Bacon seems to have been right for that period when he said pointedly that "Medicine is a Science, which hath been . . . more professed, than laboured, and yet more laboured, than advanced."<sup>1</sup> While some cases of psychoses and some minimal classification of them have their firm place in disquisitions on "melancholy" from the earliest medical authors onwards, it seems that such cases needed sympathetic penetration by thinkers outside the medical academy for the full extent of suffering in them to be realized – perhaps an analogue to recent impulses the treatment of psychotics has received from a movement sometimes called "anti-psychiatry."<sup>2</sup>

In our period the troubled mind will derive not only insight but sustenance from the sympathetic account of schizophrenia in a book like R. D. Laing's *The Divided Self*. Describing the exaggerated desire for privacy and the acute sense of vulnerability in these patients, Laing points out that their sense of being exposed and vulnerable is carried to such an extreme that one of them "may say that he is made of glass, of such transparency and fragility that a look directed at him splinters him to bits and penetrates straight through him,"<sup>3</sup> or that a man who says he is dead "means that he is

\* The research for this article was supported by a grant from the Herzog August Bibliothek, Wolfenbüttel, Germany. Ruth El Saffar, Alan S. Trueblood, and Michael A. Hirsch, M.D. read earlier versions of it and made valuable suggestions.

'really' and quite 'literally' dead, not merely symbolically or 'in a sense' or 'as it were'."<sup>4</sup> According to one of Laing's patients, the fear of being hurt can be pitched to such a degree that the person "really wants to be dead and hidden in a place where nothing can touch him and drag him back" (p. 180).

While there is a strong ancient and Renaissance tradition linking madness and genius in the notion of genial or heroic melancholy (powerfully presented by Ficino, Agrippa of Nettesheym, and Melanchthon), medical writers of the period rarely show any sympathy for such delusive conditions as those described by R. D. Laing. Although cases like that of someone believing himself dead or thinking himself a clay vase or a glass jug or a helpless bird are often mentioned as special cases of melancholy (some go back to Hippocrates and Galen), one must look to theologians and writers of fiction to find sympathetic treatments of the condition. It is not in Marcello Donati, Hercules of Sassonia, André du Laurens, Juan Huarte, and perhaps not even in the highly courageous and innovative Johann Wierus (Weyer) or the perceptive Thomas Fienus (Feyens), whose *De viribus imaginationis* elicited Robert Burton's highest praise, but in the ostensible anti-melancholics Luther and Cervantes that the condition of such psychotics and the ambiguity of their cure are most clearly presented.

### The Laughable Psychotic

As I noted above, cases of persons thinking themselves other than they were (a clay jar, a cock with flapping wings) are included in ancient discussions of melancholy such as Galen's *De affectis* (Bk. 3),<sup>5</sup> but there is no question that Renaissance doctors delighted in them, expanded them by introducing local detail, and added new ones for their comic interest, often dated and localized, to the popular case books. Thus Renaissance handbooks of medical and related knowledge are filled with cases of deluded people who frequently try to impose their vision upon their neighbors. Often the authors or compilers do not even try to conceal their amusement: "Quite ridiculous is also the case of the person who went to Murano to throw himself into a furnace wanting to have himself turned into a salad bowl."<sup>6</sup>

Without belabouring this point with a variety of cases from the curiosity shop of Renaissance medicine, let me add only one of a voluntary retentive that almost invariably elicited amusement. The French physician André du Laurens writes

The pleasantest dotage that ever I read, was of one Sienois a Gentleman, who had resolved with himselfe not to pisse, but to dye rather, and that because he imagined, that when he first pissed, all his towne would be drowned. The



Phisitions shewing him, that all his bodie, and ten thousand more such as his, were not able to containe so much as might drowne the least house in the towne, could not change his minde from this foolish imagination. In the end they seeing his obstinacie, and in what danger he put his life, found out a pleasant invention. They caused the next house to be set on fire, & all the bells in the town to ring, they perswaded diverse servants to crie, to the fire, to the fire, and therewithall send of those of the best account in the town, to crave helpe, and shew the Gentleman that there is but one way to save the towne, and that it was, that he should pisse quickelie and quench the fire. Then this sillie melancholike man which abstained from pissing for feare of loosing his towne, taking it for graunted, that it was now in great hazard, pissed and emptied his bladder of all that was in it, and was himselfe by that means preserved.<sup>7</sup>

The earliest instance I have seen of this story is in Marcello Donati, but it may well have already been part of the bedrock of medical commonplace before him. While Burton tells only half of the case, the Englishman Thomas Walkington presents this melancholic as "of all conceited famous fooles . . . most worthy to be canoniz'd in the chronicles of our memory," and almost a century later the compiler Laurentius Beyerlinck identifies this case as the "most ridiculous" of all stories of melancholics.<sup>8</sup> It is quite possible that Swift was thinking of the man of Siena when he had Gulliver so effectively extinguish the fire in the Queen's apartments.

The "humour" in the last case does not derive merely from its violating some sexual or scatological taboo (though certainly breach of decorum is a vehicle of Swift's satire); this element is not present in the other cases that are called by Renaissance authors "ridiculous". Not breach of decorum but psychotic delusion is common to them all. Speaking of "melancholike persons, and mad men [who] imagine many things which in verie deed are not," Ludwig Lavater says "Those which dwell with suche kinde of men, when they here them tell such absurd tales, such strange things, and such marvellous visions, albeit they pittie their unfortunate estate, yet can they not many times containe themselves from laughing."<sup>9</sup> Although Lavater refers to the pity of the patients' keepers, this reference actually amplifies the ridicule evoked by the psychotic delusions: the sense of the ridiculous overcomes pity. Of course the pain and inhumanity resulting from unsympathetic attitudes towards psychotics have mostly gone unrecorded. A striking exception is the case of a person whose death is reported as an instance of medical misjudgment (or we might say 'malpractice') or in answer to the question whether the imagination is so strong that it can kill. A man believes his body is no huge that he cannot pass through a door and therefore refuses to leave his room. When at the request of the physician several helpers carry the screaming patient through the doorway by force, he feels his body to have been shattered inside and falls so ill that he dies shortly afterwards.<sup>10</sup>

### The Erasmian Praise of Mental Distraction and the (Pseudo-) Aristotelian Praise of Melancholy

A related but significantly different Renaissance attitude towards psychotic delusion is what for want of a better term I will call the "Erasmian," an attitude perhaps more humanistic than humane, drawing some support from the ancients. In *Praise of Folly*, Erasmus' ambiguous speaker (Folly) describes a "pleasant mental distraction [that] relieves the heart from its anxieties"<sup>11</sup> and distinguishes it from destructive madness. While destructive madness is sent up from the underworld by the avenging Furies, this madness takes its origin from Folly, the imagined speaker, and according to her is "most desirable": "It occurs whenever a certain pleasant mental distraction relieves the heart from its anxieties and cares and at the same time soothes it with the balm of manifold pleasures."<sup>12</sup> Folly refers to one of Cicero's letters to Atticus (3.13) claiming that "Cicero wishes for this mental distraction as a great gift from the gods, because it would have deprived him of all awareness of the great evils around him," but two recent editors of *Praise of Folly* have correctly pointed out that Cicero does not say what Folly here attributes to him.<sup>13</sup> Although Cicero may be the wrong informant, Folly effectively illustrates her view of this mental condition by reference to a case reported by Horace (Epist. 2.2.128-40):

Nor was there anything wrong with the judgment of the Greek who was so mad that he sat alone in the theatre for whole days on end, laughing, applauding, enjoying himself, because he thought that wonderful tragedies were being acted there, whereas nothing at all was being performed. But in the other duties of life he conducted himself very well: he was cheerful with his friends, agreeable with his wife; he could overlook the faults of his servants and not fly into a mad rage when he found a winejar had been secretly tapped. Through the efforts of his friends he took some medicine which cured him of his disease, but when he was completely himself again, he took issue with his friends in this fashion: "Damn it all!" he said, "you have killed me, my friends, not cured me, by thus wresting my enjoyment from me and forcibly depriving me of a most pleasant delusion."<sup>14</sup>

Erasmus is clearly not interested in the kind of medicine (which Horace reports to be hellebore). In the first version of the case I have seen, the medication is not even mentioned; Aristotle's exemplum makes the same general point (that the melancholic was happier in his delusion), but without the elaborate details Folly borrowed from Horace: "It is said that at Abydos a man who was mad went into the theatre and watched for many days, as if there were people acting, and showed his approval; and when he recovered from his madness, he said that he had enjoyed the best time of his life."<sup>15</sup> In the Renaissance the case of this "melancholic" was well known. Ludwig Lavater recounts it in his work just mentioned together with an equally famous case of a melancholic called Thrasyllos; from Athenaeus



to Burton, Thrasyllus is cited to show that a person can be happier in his melancholic delusion than after his cure:

*Atheneus* [sic] *lib.* 12 writeth of one *Tresilaus* [in *Athenaeus*: Thrasyllus], whose braines were so distempered, that he verily supposed all the ships whiche aryved at *Porte Piraeus*, to be his owne: he would numbre them, he commaunded the Mariners to launch from shore, and when they returned after their voyage home againe, he as much rejoyced as if he had ben owner of all wherewith they were laden. The same man affirmed, that in al the time of his madness he lived a verie pleasant life, untill the Phisitian hadde cured him of his disease.<sup>16</sup>

As in *Athenaeus*, the cure is just a given, necessary to make the point of the story, but we do not learn how it was effected.<sup>17</sup> In fact Lavater tells us even less about the patient's background, about whom *Athenaeus* relates that he was afflicted by madness "resulting from luxurious living."

Lavater's point in stringing these cases together is to illustrate a sense of amusement (resulting from the disturbed perception of reality) and to show the patient's preference for the deluded state. In Erasmus' *Praise of Folly*, the speaker takes the argument one step further, claiming that such states are generally desirable. To realize that Erasmus' speaker is Folly does not entirely discredit the view propounded; since the reader finds many of Folly's arguments (particularly in satiric passages) eminently reasonable, this realization merely helps to suspend the praise of deluded folly in a tantalizing and very Erasmian ambiguity.

Occasionally the view that a mentally deluded state is preferable to normalcy is supported by the (pseudo-) Aristotelian notion already mentioned, that melancholy is the precondition of all genius: "Why is it," Problem XXX, section 1 opens, "that all men who have become outstanding in philosophy, statesmanship, poetry or the arts are melancholic, and some to such an extent that they are infected by the diseases arising from black bile, as the story of Heracles among the heroes tells?"<sup>18</sup> Melancholics may philosophize in their illness – and only in their illness – or, although unlettered, may speak in perfect verses for days on end: the characteristic response elicited by such cases is not sympathy but wonder. Shakespeare accurately catches this mood when he has the Duke in *As You Like It* ask his men to lead him to the scene of melancholy Jaques's ravings: "Show me the place," the Duke says. "I love to cope [i.e., converse with] him in these sullen fits, / For then he's full of matter" (*AYLI* II, i, 66-68 [Riverside ed.]). The Duke's motive is not charity, but enjoyment of spectacle, i.e. an excitement he gets from Jaques' unusual association of ideas, perhaps satisfying his urge to catch a glimpse of the transcendent world.

We may study the blend of Erasmian and Aristotelian ideas in a case reported by the sixteenth-century doctor Juan Huarte de San Juan, a case



that will later serve us as a basis for describing important transformations wrought by one of the greatest literary artists of the Renaissance. Huarte tells of the "notable speeches, uttered by a Page of one of the great ones of this realme, whilst he was made, who in his health was reported a youth of slender capacity."<sup>19</sup> Thus the pattern is similar to the Athenaeon or Erasmian one, except that intellectual capacity attends illness and is considered more important than the patient's health. Huarte continues:

Falling into this infirmitie, he delivered such rare conceits, resemblances, and answers, to such as asked him, and devised so excellent manners of governing a kindome (of which he imagined himself to be the soveraigne) that for great wonder people flocked to see him and heare him, and his very maister scarcely ever departed from his beds head, praying God that he might never be cured. Which afterwards plainly appeared, for being recovered, his Phisitian (who had healed him) came to take leave of his lord, with a mind to receive some good reward, if of nothing else, yet at least in good words; but he encountered this greeting: "I promise you maister doctor, that I was never more aggrieved at any ill successe, than to see this my page recovered, for it was not behooffull that he should change so [sic] wise folly, for an understanding so simple as is this, which in his health he enioieth. Me-thinks that of one, who to fore was wise and well advised, you have made him a foole againe, which is the greatest miserie that may light upon any man." (Huarte, *Examination of Mens Wits*, p. 43)

Of course this is the sense of wonder a "melancholic's" stunning abilities usually evoke in Renaissance beholders, abilities that Huarte on the next page explains in terms of Problem XXX, as resulting from an unusual humoral mixture. First, however, he reports in Athenaeon/Erasmian fashion the patient's own reaction to his cure. After politely thanking his doctor, the page says to him

I assure you on my faith, that in some sort, it displeaseth me to have bene cured. For whilst I rested in my folly, I led my life in the deepest discourses of the world, and imagined my selfe so great a lord, as there raigned no king on the earth, who was not my vassal, and were it a jeast or a lie, what imported that, whilst I conceived thereof so great a contentment, as if it had bene true? I rest now in far woorse case, finding my selfe in troth to be but a poore page, and to morrow I must begin againe to serve one, who whilst I was in mine infirmitie, I would have disdayned for my footman. (pp. 43-44)

Rather curiously this passage has the marginal comment "This page was not yet perfectly cured" representing accurately the annotation of the first edition (1575): "Este page aun no habia sanado del todo."<sup>20</sup> The comment seems to indicate that its author, Huarte or his editor, was not entirely aware that the case of the page harking back to his pleasant delusions stood in the Athaenean/Erasmian tradition. As so often in cases deriving from this tradition, the medication or therapy that cured the page remains unmentioned.

### Luther: Cure by Charity and Company (*societas*)

If, then, a certain kind of psychotic case tended to attract medical ridicule and if the Erasmian notion of pleasurable delusion likewise did not lead to serious consideration of therapy, we may have to look elsewhere in the Renaissance for a glimpse of what has become so strikingly obvious in our times: that a knowledge of the patients' histories, empathy with their condition, and endeavors to understand their particular thought processes are important in the treatment of psychotics, whose suffering and pain are beginning to be fully recognized. A measure of the importance of such thought now is the participation of psychiatrists and psychologists of the most diverse persuasions in community programs bringing together "primary consumers" and their friends and families.

Perhaps it is significant that I have found the most striking Renaissance intimation of such matters in a theologian and in a poet, who transmuted the medical commonplaces through their specific fears and predilections, and above all through an encompassing sympathy for the psychotic. While medical authors often had been content to map out diverse psychotic cases comparing the patient's psychotic to his sane state without suggesting any therapy or cure, the cases recounted in Luther's *Tischreden* (or *Colloquia*) are informed by a sense of caring for the patient and include the nature of the patient's cure. Indeed, it can be said that this sense of caring becomes a vehicle of therapy.

The first case is of a melancholic who refuses to eat and drink and hides in a cellar. He rebuffs any charitable helpers with the words "Don't you see that I am a corpse and have died? How can I eat?" Michel Foucault points out that a seventeenth-century medical author refers to a similar exemplum to show that the insane are capable of logical rigor, to such an extent in fact that they will starve to death for a syllogism.<sup>21</sup> Although in Luther's story the patient is not brought to revise his minor premise, which would mean sanity, at least he is induced to life-preserving illogic: after several days, when his life is in danger, his friends decide to set a table in the cellar; they bring in the most delicious dishes, select a monk for his *embonpoint*, and have him eat and drink loudly and demonstratively. By the feasting monk's example and company the melancholic is impelled to eat and drink: "I must drink with you and cannot help it, though I be dead a hundred times."<sup>22</sup>

The second case (in some versions of the *Colloquia* not attributed to Luther but to his physician Lindemann) is of a melancholic who thought that he was a cock, with a red comb on his head, a long beak, and a crowing voice – surely since Galen one of the most hallowed medical *topoi*. But while Galen does not suggest a cure, this *melancholicus* is joined by an inventive person who simulates the gait and voice of a cock. After living with the patient in this manner for several days, he says "I am not a cock



any more, but a human being; and you have returned to being human, too.” And the speaker concludes with something like a moral, which would have been a fitting close for the previous case as well: “And by that company he cured him” (*Et illa societate illum persuasit*).<sup>23</sup>

The third case told by Luther is perhaps even more interesting because it resonates with echoes of the major theological divisions of the Reformation. It concerns a *iustitiarius*, or as the German text says more expressively, a *Werkheiliger*. Since the case of this voluntary retentive is at the same time a minor anecdotal or even novelistic masterpiece – incidentally illustrating the overlap of a medical case with short fiction – I have translated it *in toto*.

Then Dr. Martin Luther said “that there was a devout man, a *Werkheiliger*, who heard a monk preach about a saint who had stood for three years in one place on a step [of a ladder or stair]. Then he had stood another three years on another and higher step, without in that period eating or drinking anything. As a result maggots had come out of his feet. But as soon as these worms had fallen to the ground, they had turned to pearls and precious stones. And the monk concluded his sermon saying: ‘You also must let everything become bloody sour for you if you want to win heaven!’ [‘Also musst ihrs euch auch lassen blutsaur werden, so ihr wollet selig werden!’]”

“When the melancholic heard this, he resolved (to put it decorously) not to let water. No one could persuade him to urinate; and he continued like that for several days. Then someone came to him saying that he was doing right in castigating his body and that he should certainly stay with his resolve (to serve God and to make himself suffer), for one entered into heaven through many crosses and tribulations. The same person also pretended that he too had taken a vow not to urinate, but that since he had prided himself on this pledge and had thought to gain heaven by it, he had sinned more than if he had urinated; indeed, he had almost become a murderer of his own body. ‘Thus all the world will say similarly of you, that you do so out of pride. Therefore give up your resolve and let nature have its course.’ In this way he persuaded the melancholic to urinate.”<sup>24</sup>

This case, or we may more appropriately call it an *exemplum*, illustrates some concerns central to Luther’s thought about justification, spiritual temptation (*Anfechtung*), and melancholy (which he usually calls, using a medieval adage, “the Devil’s bath,” *balneum diaboli*), a nexus deserving more thorough exploration than it can receive in the present context.

Luther’s presentation of the story is different in two ways from the version that entered the collections of medical commonplaces. Perhaps because of the authority of Galen, who merely listed instances of melancholic behavior, such as claiming to have a body of fragile material, playing the cock, or claiming to support the world on one’s shoulders, medieval and Renaissance compendia usually give no history of such patients. Huarte’s case of a noble lord’s page who fell into the delusion that he was a sovereign



lord himself is rather unusual, for presumably his kind of madness is related to his station in life.<sup>25</sup> The connection between the delusion and the patient's kind of life and habits (*genus vitae et consuetudo*) is not expressed systematically until the early seventeenth century in a Wittenberg dissertation on melancholy, and then the idea is somewhat simplistic: "The theologian claims to speak with angels and to be Christ; . . . the chemist disclaims on the making of gold; the miser, however rich, weeps about lacking everything; the astronomer says he is a prophet, the courtier a king."<sup>26</sup> While in the usual version of the voluntary retentive's case his previous history is not explained, Luther gives an etiology: he describes the man as a "iustitarius" before the onset of his disease, i.e. someone attempting to justify himself by works rather than by faith. For Luther it is appropriate that such a *iustitarius* should fall into melancholy (a version of the medieval monks' disease *acedia*) upon hearing a monk praising a man for castigating himself. The terms in which Luther has the monk urge the congregation to works of penitence are loaded: "Also musst ihrs euch auch lassen blutsaur werden . . ." (Thus you must let everything become bloody sour for you too). "Sour" is often Luther's derogatory epithet for the looks or life style of the *iustitarii*, whether of Romish or Enthusiast (i.e. Anabaptist) persuasion.

The second way in which Luther's exemplum differs from the versions typically found in medical handbooks of the period is in the kind of cure proposed. We saw that the abnormal behavior in the second case, of the man imitating a cock, was remedied by ingenious persuasion through human contact or company, and that the final sentence *Et illa societate illum persuasit* could just as well have applied to the first patient (who thought himself dead). In Renaissance terms, this man was not suffering simply from *acedia*, since his refusal to eat was not a means of mortifying himself:<sup>27</sup> he thought he was already dead. Thus Luther's version belongs to the cases usually taken to exemplify *laesa imaginatio*, an injured or harmed imagination, although some medical writers record "cures" significantly more ingenious than Luther's: in Sennert's chapter "De viribus imaginationis," the starving melancholic is joined by someone pretending to be dead yet hungry and by that example is persuaded that corpses also should eat.<sup>28</sup> As we have seen, in Luther the appeal is more physical and social, to the infectious pleasure commonly experienced by human beings in eating: someone simply wines and dines in the patient's view thus stimulating his fellow creature's appetite. While in these brief stories the evidence for such judgements is scanty, it may be said that in modern terms Luther's "melancholic" comes closer to being cured.

Clearly human company is the essential element in the cure of the melancholic *iustitarius* also. Indeed, although the German version translated above omits any "moral," the Latin text draws it in such a way that it

functions like a refrain: "Et ita illum persuasit societate" (And thus he persuaded him by company). Just as in the cure of the birdman "company" meant that friend imitated the patient's behavior, so in the case of the retentive *iustitiarius* it means claiming to have had an experience similar to his. Thus at the outset of therapy, there is an attempt to overcome the psychotic's isolation by demonstratively negating the border between "normalcy" and "insanity".

### Cervantes: In the Interaction of Three Traditions

The most powerful fictional elaboration of the tensions between ridicule, compassionate reintegration (which I see best exemplified in Luther), and the Erasmian stance towards psychotic delusion is Cervantes' *Don Quixote*, a novel that broadens the issue from a question of the patient's characteristically Erasmian ways of evaluating abnormal states of mind and even suggesting their benefit for society. Uncertainty about the value of the ingenious psychotic's state of mind – is his perception comparable, even preferable to that of the many? – casts a shadow of ambiguity over the intended cure of the *ingenioso hidalgo* Don Quixote. It is impossible to review here the specific arguments about Don Quixote's humoral condition and cure that have been brought forth since Iriarte's concerted attempt to bring medical history to bear on the novel.<sup>29</sup> In any case, the disagreements about Don Quixote's condition in terms of humoral physiology (whether he is best explained as an ingenious melancholic [H. Weinrich] or as a *colérico* with enthusiasm turning melancholic [O. H. Green]) are relatively unimportant in the present context, for ultimately, according to general Renaissance physiological theory, even *cholera adusta* produces what is also considered a version of melancholy.

Much of the plot is motivated by notions of curing, and the motives of the curers (priest and barber in part I and Sansón Carrasco in part II) are pure at least at the beginning: selected representatives of La Mancha society set out in order to find their fellow villager and to bring him home. Although Cervantes' irony, as complex and subtle as Erasmus's, invariably tempers the moral significance of action, the fundamental strain of compassion and human sympathy evident in these motives of cure comes to the surface in other places in the novel: in Maritornes's offering Sancho a glass of wine after he has been tossed in a blanket (I,17); in Don Quixote's counsel to Sancho, about to set out to govern his island, to err in favor of mercy, not rigor (II,42); in scattered remarks in various places criticizing those laughing at Don Quixote (without necessarily defending Don Quixote – as e.g. Cide Hamete's comments on the Duke and the Duchess in II,70). To be sure, some of the action (like the comportment of the Duke and Duchess) only shows people's interest in and enjoyment of the madman's genius – and thus is equivalent to the noble lord's dubious enjoyment of his schizo-



phrenic page's wisdom in Huarte's exemplum or the Duke's interest in conversing with Jaques in his fits (in *As You Like It*). But most of the time it is the ostensible motive of curing Don Quixote that turns much of the novel into a series of masquerades in which the would-be curers enter into the fiction of the patient. Before Sansón Carrasco as the Knight of the White Moon takes on Don Quixote in the final and humiliating bout, he has him agree to return to La Mancha for a year if he should lose. When Don Antonio Moreno after the fight accuses him of having foolishly robbed the world of the benefit of Don Quixote's eccentricities, Sansón Carrasco defends himself, saying "I myself felt particular sympathy for his sad case, and as I believed his recovery to depend upon his remaining quietly at home, I earnestly endeavored to accomplish that end."<sup>30</sup>

As we have seen with several cases already, a certain kind of therapy was indicated for patients with fixed delusions, and this therapy was based on a few theoretical assumptions shared by most medical writers. In his section "Of the Force of the Imagination" (pt. 1, sec. 2, memb. 3, subs. 2) and throughout his *Anatomy of Melancholy*, Robert Burton accurately records a Renaissance trend to assign the causes of melancholy to the imagination. He agrees with Nicholas Piso and other medical authorities in saying that the fountain of distempers is *laesa imaginatio*<sup>31</sup> (wounded or injured imagination) and draws upon Thomas Feyens (Fienus), who in an eminently interesting book called *De viribus imaginationis* held that melancholic humors result from *prava imaginatio* (distorted imagination). Hence, said Feyens, they cannot be expelled from the body except by inducing other and contrary images in the imagination. In the resulting therapy, the healers become stage managers and actors who act within the fiction of the patient, even expanding it. Thus one finds scores of reports like those of people who believed they contained frogs or snakes and were cured by a physician who pretended to extract the animals from their innards, or of patients who thought that antlers were growing on their heads and were healed by a clever physician's simulated operation.<sup>32</sup>

Surely no one familiar with Renaissance medical notions about curing *laesa imaginatio* will miss the attempts at manipulating Don Quixote in the interest of a presumed cure, but the fictions resorted to are so elaborate that Cervantes may have been satirizing exactly this medical theory. The would-be therapists devote themselves to their masquerade with so much enthusiasm that in their fascination for the means they lose sight of the end; as a result they seem at times as deluded as Don Quixote himself. Thus Sansón Carrasco engages Don Quixote in the final bout ostensibly in order to get him home for a year, but Oscar Mandel, who has sifted through the novel's characters to determine which come closest to being reliable and reasonable agents and spokesmen for the author, is undoubtedly correct when he calls Sansón a "doubtful referent."<sup>33</sup> Not only is he too bungling in



his attempts to get Don Quixote home, but even Sansón's motives are questionable: while after the final joust Sansón claims that he has had Don Quixote's interests and specifically his cure in mind (II ch. 65), the reader remembers that Sansón Carrasco had at one point affirmed the opposite. After being defeated by Don Quixote, he had said to his own "squire" "It is not my wish to make him recover his wits that will drive me to hunt him now, but my lust for revenge" (II, ch. 15). That many a reader has agreed with Don Antonio's reprimand of Sansón Carrasco is an index of how deeply the Erasmian spirit pervades the novel:

May God forgive you for the wrong you have done in robbing the world of the most diverting madman who was ever seen. Is it not plain, sir, that his cure can never benefit mankind half as much as the pleasure he affords by his eccentricities? But I feel sure, sir, that all your art will not cure such deep-rooted madness; were it not uncharitable, I would express the hope that he may never recover, for by his cure we would lose not only the knight's company, but also the drollery of his squire, Sancho Panza, which is enough to transform melancholy itself into mirth. (II, ch. 65; Starkie trans., p. 995)

Though we know that Sansón Carrasco succeeds in getting Don Quixote back to his village, at the entrance to which Don Quixote experiences what psychiatrists now call "ideas of reference" (he interprets a hare fleeing toward him as a *malum signum*), and that Don Quixote finally regains sanity on his deathbed, Cervantes does not give anyone unambiguous credit for the "cure" – neither Sansón Carrasco nor any other would-be therapist from La Mancha, including the doctor. It may well be that he wishes to reserve for God the distinction of being the ultimate physician.

While Don Antonio's view is not the last word on the ingenious psychotic, in its moral ambiguity (the opposition of charity versus delight as incapsulated in the expression "diverting madness") it highlights Erasmian tenets and enriches them with the aesthetic pleasures of watching a character so obsessed with books that he takes his imagined world for real. While this genetic view of Cervantes' thought may perhaps simplify his tantalizing creation inordinately (obscuring for instance the point that Don Quixote never hallucinates), it should be noted that some of the seeds of his accomplishment are contained in the kind of topical medical cases we have been considering. The Greek madman who sat in a theater alone for days on end "saw" an imaginative creation, evaluating it emotionally or aesthetically. And just as this Athenian psychotic singled out by Erasmus represents a hyper-cultural phenomenon, so unquestionably "bookish" patients suffering mental illness are quite common in medical discussions in the Renaissance. Renaissance doctors are not averse to drawing upon literary characters and episodes, doing so eclectically of course, without the Freudian and Jungian underpinnings that motivate most modern

attempts at bridging the gap between life and literature. Thus Lavater reports that the slighted Ajax became so "madde through grieve" that he drew his sword and "set upon herds of swine supposing that he fought with the whole army of the Grecians . . ." <sup>34</sup> – an episode that will strike one as potentially Quixotic.

There is no question that Don Antonio's reaction is plotted in the tension field between delight and charity, for he says so ("were it not uncharitable," etc.). The same tension animates what may be the most moving episode of this kind in the novel – Sancho's pleading words to Don Quixote, who is on his deathbed and resigned to die: "Up with you this instant, out of your bed, and let us put on shepherd's clothing and off with us to the fields as we were resolved a while back. Who knows but we may find Lady Dulcinea behind a hedge, disenchanted and as fresh as a daisy" (II, 74; Starkie trans. p. 1047). If we assume that Sancho at this point in the novel cannot hope any more to find the world of romance (pastoral or other) in his own world, his suggestion is comparable to the Lutheran healer's compassionate act: he will keep Don Quixote company to prolong his life. But the categories I have been distinguishing are only the roughest guides in a complex situation like this one, veiled in subtle irony: for Sancho's proposal, though charitable, also affirms his pleasure in their unusual companionship. Therefore it is more to the point to say that Cervantes here manages to transform the (Erasmian) pleasure taken in Don Quixote's madness into sympathy and brotherhood. In Sancho's spontaneous and feeling reaction, Cervantes transcends the categories' separateness.

The two elements which I find *in nuce* in Luther's thinking about cases of "melancholics," namely the consideration of the psychotic's past and the role of *societas* in re-integrating such a person into the community, are highlighted with an almost uncanny perspicuity (and without the irony veiling the compassion in *Don Quixote*) in a novella by Cervantes that has long been considered the most puzzling but also fascinating of his short works.<sup>35</sup> Working from the kind of topical medical exempla we have reviewed in this paper and of course thinking in the context of the humoral physiology reigning in his period, Cervantes' imaginative genius highlights problems of communal integration not only in therapy but also after some "cure" has been accomplished, thus going far beyond the theoretical interests of medical academicians of his time.

"El Licenciado Vidriera," one of Cervantes' *Novelas ejemplares*, tells the story of a young man with a good memory (good memory in humoral physiology distinguishes the melancholic) who sees the world, returns to Salamanca to take his law degree, but because of a supposed love potion secretly administered to him falls grievously ill. He recovers physically but becomes "mad" or "melancholic," or as we would say, psychotic:



The poor wretch imagined that he was all made of glass, and under this delusion, when someone came up to him, he would scream out in the most frightening manner, and using the most convincing arguments would beg them not to come near him, or they would break him.<sup>36</sup>

Along with his delusion the *licenciado* acquires stunning wisdom: he baffles the professors of medicine and philosophy by answering the most difficult questions put to him, and Cervantes spends the larger part of the novella giving examples of his ingenious perceptions and sayings. The story thus presents a version of the melancholic of genius in the tradition of pseudo-Aristotle's problem XXX,1, a tradition that has been described by Saxl, Panofsky, and others.<sup>37</sup>

Modern scholars are undoubtedly correct if they see the story as a conflation of a psychiatric case in the tradition of Galen (of a man believing he is made of some brittle substance) with Huarte's case (mentioned above) of the page with the delusion of being sovereign of a realm.<sup>38</sup> But Huarte's story here reveals an affiliation that Cervantes' "Licenciado Vidriera" does not have: the page enjoys being treated like a lord (he is somewhat like Shakespeare's Sly in the induction scene to *The Taming of the Shrew*). As we have seen, the cure, which is not explained, returns the page to a disappointing reality: "For while I rested in my folly, I led my life in the deepest discourses of the world, and imagined my self so great a lord as there reigned no king on the earth, who was not my vassal, and were this iest or lie, what imported that, whilst I conceived thereof so great a contentment, as if it had bene true?" (p. 44). Thus Huarte's case is ultimately a version of Athenaeus' case of Thrasyllos, the imagined owner of all the ships in the harbor of Piraeus, who later lamented his cure. The case of Cervantes' *licenciado* is not of the Athaenean/Erasmian type. Although this wise madman's pronouncements may be said to appeal to an interest similar to that of a string of Erasmian apothegmata,<sup>40</sup> the *licenciado* does not enjoy his ability to coin pithy sayings, many of which are righteous, caustic, some even uncharitable. Nor does he derive any pleasure from his conviction that his body is made of glass.

As Harald Weinrich says, the motif of the man of glass presupposes the traditional conception of the body as vessel of the soul.<sup>41</sup> Indeed, some of the gifts traditionally attributed to melancholics in the pseudo-Aristotelian and Ficinean tradition, for instance the gift of divination, were commonly explained as the result of the higher penetrability of their bodies to the subtlest spiritus and astral influences. But this learned reading by no means precludes the psychiatric (or perhaps in this case we should say Laingian) interpretation, in which the schizophrenic's particular delusion is seen as the result of a trauma and of fear of more wounds. Not only has Cervantes' *licenciado* been hurt by a person who wanted to be very close to him (i.e.

wanted him), but the novelist makes it clear that the man of glass is especially vulnerable to human contact. He tells us of attempts to cure him that are as well-intentioned as the ones recorded in Luther's *exempla* but lack the fuller understanding of the psychotic person that characterized those:

In order to relieve him of his strange delusion, many people, taking no notice of his shouts and pleas, went up to him and embraced him, telling him to look and he would see that in fact he was not getting broken. But all that happened as a result of this was that the poor wretch would throw himself on the ground shouting for all he was worth, and would then fall into a faint, from which he did not recover for several hours; and when he did come to he would start begging people not to come near him again.<sup>42</sup>

Thus unlike Athenaeus' Thrasyllus and Huarte's page, this "paranoid schizophrenic" as he has been called,<sup>43</sup> suffers pain in his psychotic condition in spite of his stupendous gifts, in fact so much pain that most readers, past and present, expect a cure to turn the novella into a "success story." The cure, in contrast to that of Huarte's *exemplum*, is brought about not by a physician "with a mind to receive some good reward" (p. 43), i.e., for financial gain, but by a monk of the Hieronymite order "out of charity" (p. 145).

Since Cervantes gets the *licenciado's* cure over with in a couple of sentences, it might be thought that he was not interested in the subject, but nothing could be more incorrect. His introduction of the healer's charity is in some way equivalent to Luther's emphasis on notions of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* (*societas*), which are animated by it, and may (as Gwynne Edwards suggested) have had special significance for Cervantes, who was delivered from North African Moslem slavery by the patient and charitable efforts of certain mendicant monks; even more so it may reverberate with Cervantes' own charity, the impulsiveness of which defied worldly prudence so much that he was once clapped into jail for aiding a mortally wounded victim of a street fight.<sup>44</sup>

Of course Cervantes' story of the man of glass does not end happily with this cure. After the patient has returned to sanity, Cervantes adds another reversal to the plot: in spite of the *licenciado's* pleas, the townspeople of Salamanca do not allow him to return to normalcy and practice law. They are unwilling or unable to accept his cure. The stigma of his past condition is so strong that he has to leave town, profession, and country.

In source studies one should not emphasize similarity but grant it, and then interpret the differences. From my perspective it is not so important to agree or disagree with Saturnino Rivera Manescáu's contention that at Valladolid Cervantes heard from the physician Antonio Ponce Santacruz the case of a Parisian "man of glass" not reported in print until 1622; to



accept the possibility or even likelihood that Cervantes knew the case would not, as Walter Starkie supposes, "diminish his genius,"<sup>45</sup> for the therapy Santacruz reports is too different: the doctor has the patient lie on a bed of straw (Cervantes' *licenciado* also likes to protect his seemingly fragile body with straw) and, setting a fire, leaves:

This done, he decamped rapidly, shutting the door and leaving the madman to his own devices. The latter, finding himself encircled by flames, jumped up in terror and beat upon the door with all his strength, but without breaking or injuring himself, crying out that he no longer believed he was made of glass. Thus the terror of being consumed by fire was so great that it caused his mania to disappear.<sup>46</sup>

This therapy is harsh, and we may wonder how the *licenciado* might have reacted to it: he might have fallen into a faint (as Cervantes reports him to have reacted to the equally harsh though perhaps less ingenious treatment of the Salamancans) and might have incurred the same fate as the patient who against his will was carried through a door he thought was too narrow for his body.

## Conclusion

As we saw, Luther shows none of the dehumanizing amusement that often animates even learned physicians when they report certain kinds of cases. In his exempla the imagination is used, at most, to gain a patient's confidence, but the 'cure' is brought about not by trickery but by friendly persuasion, by appeal to common humanity, by company. There is taunting amusement in Cervantes' "El Licenciado Vidriera," but he puts this amusement in perspective by demonstrating that it is destructive. Certainly the ruffraff among the Salamancans prefers an insane to a sane licensee – perhaps this is Cervantes' later comment on Erasmian views of madness. The entire story is informed by a strong sense of sympathy for a patient who becomes stigmatized by society.

While we know that the glass graduate's cure was motivated by charity, we cannot be sure about motivation in *Don Quixote*. The simplicity and efficiency of the Hieronymite monk contrasts with the elaborate and bungling attempts of some like Sansón Carrasco. The charity of the former (affirmed by the author) contrasts with the motives of the latter, which are often tainted or at least questionable. If there is no unambiguous sign of a therapy in La Mancha, this may be because there is no Hieronymite monk *movido de caridad* and no friend unambiguously curing in the spirit of Luther's *Gemeinschaft*. Sancho's desperate attempt to prolong Don Quixote's life is spontaneous and moving, but it is part of Cervantes' irony to present Sancho as ill-equipped for the therapeutic task. Another element of irony is that at the time of Sancho's compassionate proposal Don Quixote

has just come to his senses through the help of no physician except perhaps, as the narrator veiledly hints, the Divine.

It would seem that Luther and Cervantes represent the best of a long psychiatric tradition. So does Samuel Johnson in a later century when he has Rasselas and his sister meet an astronomer who believes that he regulates the seasons, another case that goes back to Donati, and through him to Avicenna.<sup>47</sup> The recluse gets relief from his terrifying spectres and is gradually weaned away from his imagined absorbing task through freely proffered male and female friendship.

Is William Wharton's best-selling *Birdy* (to mention only one modern example of a psychiatric novel) evidence that in our times the give and take between imaginative fiction and psychiatry has been reversed? This engaging work shows how the inmate of a psychiatric ward, whom we meet at the outset perched in bird fashion on his toilet seat, is very slowly wakened from his catatonic state by his former playmate's gently recalling childhood feats in which they shared: Lutheran *societas* and Cervantesque consideration of the patient's past, both of course now informed by a post-Freudian understanding of childhood experience. But to name Freud, a man steeped in the imaginative literature of the past (and from his youth a reader of Cervantes<sup>48</sup>), suffices to prevent an easy answer to my question. Further, while much of the focus in *Birdy* is indeed psychiatric, the professional army psychiatrist in the novel is perceived as the patient's antagonist and thus remains unable to help him. An element of the novel's imaginative core aligns it with the movement somewhat unfortunately called "anti-psychiatry," a movement broader than a fad, with eminently respectable antecedents as we have seen. One may hope that the antagonistic stance is only a passing phase – certainly antagonism to medicine (or psychiatry) has not motivated the best writers old or new. The kind of cases we have considered, so instructive because they are in a sense extreme and represent the *cas limite* of human consciousness, call upon an interpretive ability that is decidedly similar in psychiatrist and imaginative artist, for R. D. Laing is no doubt correct in saying that the kernel of the schizophrenic's experience of himself remains incomprehensible (p. 39).

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#### Notes

1 *Advancement of Human Learning*, Bk. 2, in Bacon, *Works*, ed. James Spedding *et al.* (London: Longmans, 1859), III, 373. In a strict sense "schizophrenia" was of course not defined until early in this century (by Eugen Bleuler), see Silvano Arieti, *Interpretation of Schizophrenia*, 2nd. ed. (New York: Basic Books, 1974), ch. 2. In the Renaissance all such psychoses as intended in my title were included under *melancholia*, an extensive term which has only recently been narrowed to a particular psychotic condition.

2 See *Critical Psychiatry: The Politics of Mental Health*, ed. David Ingleby (New York: Random House, 1980), p. 8 and *passim*.



- 3 *The Divided Self* (London: Travistock, 1960), p. 38.
- 4 *The Divided Self*, p. 39.
- 5 *De locis affectis*, bk. 3, ch. 10 in Galen, *Opera* ed. C. G. Kühn (Leipzig, 1821-33), VIII, 190: "... siquidem alius testaceum se factum putavit, atque idcirco occurrentibus cedebat, ne confringeretur; alter gallos cantare conspiciens, ut hi alarum ante cantum, sic ille brachiorum plausu latera quatiens, animantium sonum imitatus est."
- 6 Tommaso Garzoni, *L'hospitale de' pazzi incurabili* (Venice, 1601), p. 101: "E' assai ridicoloso ancora quello de collui, che, parendoli esser devenuto un vetro, andò a Murano, per gettarsi dentro un fornace e farsi fare in foggia d'un inghistara."
- 7 André du Laurens, *A Discourse of the Preservation of Sight: Of Melancholike Diseases*, trans. R. Surphlet (London, 1599), p. 103. The French ed. is of Paris, 1597.
- 8 Donati, *De medica historia mirabili* (Mantua, 1586), fol. 34f; Burton, *Anatomy*, pt. 1, sec. 3, mem. 1, subs. 3 (Shilleto ed., vol. I, 460), Walkington, *The Opticke Glasse of Humours* (London, 1607), fol. 72; Beyerlinck, *Magnum theatrum vitae humanae* (Lyons, 1678), V. 398C.
- 9 Ludwig Lavater, *Of Ghostes and Spirites Walking by Night*, trans. R. H. (London 1572), p. 10.
- 10 Marcello Donati, *De medica historia mirabili*, fol. 34; Ercole Sassonia, *De melancholia* (Venice, 1620), p. 31; Thomas Feyens [Fienus], *De viribus imaginationis*, 3rd ed. (London, 1657), p. 160 and pp. 167-68.
- 11 Erasmus, *Praise of Folly*, trans. Clarence H. Miller (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1979), p. 58.
- 12 *Praise of Folly*, trans. C. H. Miller, p. 58.
- 13 *Praise of Folly*, trans. Hoyt H. Hudson (Princeton: 1941), p. 149 and *Praise of Folly*, trans. C. H. Miller, p. 58, note 5. Miller suggests that Erasmus may have intended to show Folly deliberately twisting Cicero's words.
- 14 *Praise of Folly*, trans. C. H. Miller, pp. 58-59.
- 15 Aristoteles, *De mirabilibus auscultationibus* 832 b 17, in Arist., *Minor Works*, trans. W. S. Hett (Loeb Classical Library, 1936), p. 251.
- 16 Lavater, *op. cit.*, p. 11.
- 17 Athenaeus, *Dipnosophistae*, trans. Charles B. Gulick (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Loeb Classical Library, 1933), V, 521.
- 18 Aristotle, *Problems*, trans. W. S. Hett (Loeb Classical Library, 1937), p. 155.
- 19 *The Examination of Mens Wits [Examen de ingenios]*, trans. R. C. (London, 1594), p. 43.
- 20 Juan Huarte de San Juan, *Examen de ingenios*, ed. Rodrigo Sanz (Madrid: La Rafa, 1930), p. 129.
- 21 *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason*, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Random House, 1965), p. 95. The reference is to Paul Zachias, *Quaestiones medico-legales* (Avignon, 1660-61).
- 22 Luther, *Tischreden* (Weimar: Böhlau, 1912-19), III, 52: "Ich mus mit dir trincken und kans nicht lassen, wan ich hundert mal todt were."
- 23 Luther, *Tischreden*, vol. III, 52.
- 24 Luther, *Tischreden*, vol. III, pp. 52-53:  
Darnach sagete D. Martin Luther, "dass ein gut fromm Mensch wäre gewesen, ein Werkheiliger; der hatte von einem Mönch hören predigen, dass ein Heiliger gewesen wäre, der hätte auf einer Stufen an einer Stätte drei Jahr über gestanden. Darnach auf einer andern und höhern Stufen wäre er noch einmal drei Jahre gestanden, und hätte diese Zeit über gar nichts gessen noch getrunken. Drüm waren aus seinen Füßen Maden gewachsen. Aber alsbald solche Maden auf die Erde gefallen, so wären daraus lauter Perlen und köstliche edele Gesteine worden. Und hatte der Mönch die Predigt mit diesem Exempel beschlossen und gesagt: 'Also musst ihrs euch auch lassen blutsaur werden, so ihr wollet selig werden!'

Da dieses ein Melancholicus gehört, hatte er ihm fürgesetzt, er wollte sein Wasser (mit Züchten zu reden) nicht von sich lassen. Es hatte ihn auch kein Mensch darzu bereden können, dass er hätte wollen pinkeln. Und solches hatte er etzliche Tage gethan. Darnach kömmt einer zu ihm und uberredet ihn, 'dass er daran recht thäte, dass er seinen Leib casteite, und sollte ja bei diesem Fürsatz und Gelüben (Gott zu dienen, und ihm selber wehe zu thun, und den alten Adam zu tödten und zu creuzigen), verharren und bleiben, denn man müsste durch viel Creuz und Trübsal eingehen ins Himmelreich. Item derselbige hatte sich gestellet, dass er auch ein solch Gelübde hätte gethan und ihm fürgenommen, nicht zu pinkeln, aber da er auf diesem Gelübde stolziret hätte und vermeinet, dardurch den Himmel zu verdienen, hätte er mehr gesündigt, denn wenn er hätte gepinkelt. Auch wäre er schier ein Mörder an seinem eigenen Leibe worden. Darum so wird alle Welt dergleichen von dir sagen, dass du es aus Hoffart thust; so stehe nun von deinem Fürsatz ab und lass der Natur ihren Gang.' Also hatte er den Melancholicum uberredet, dass er wieder gepinkelt hatte."

- 25 Juan Huarte de San Juan, *Examen de ingenious*, ed. R. Sanz (Madrid: La Rafa, 1930), pp. 119-20.
- 26 Tobias Tandler (Praeses), *De melancholia eiusque speciebus* (Wittenberg, [1608], no. LXI: "Sic et vitae genus et consuetudo phantasmata variat. Theologus enim se cum angelis loqui, se Christum proficitur: Juris studiosus acta fori declamat; Chymicus auri confectionem; avarus etsi opulentissimus, omnium rerum inopiam deflet: Astronomus, se prophetam; aulicus se regem vendicat."
- 27 On acedia, see Mark D. Altschule, "Acedia: Its Evolution from Deadly Sin to Psychiatric Syndrome," *British Journal of Psychiatry*, 111 (1965), 117-19; Noel L. Brann, "Is Acedia Melancholy? A Re-examination of this Question in the Light of Fra Battista da Crema's *Della cognitione et vittoria di se stesso* (1531)," *Journal for the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences*, 34 (1979), 80-99; and Siegfried Wenzel, *The Sin of Sloth: Acedia in Medieval Thought and Literature* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1967). Cf. also Susan Snyder, "The Left Hand of God: Despair in Medieval and Renaissance Tradition," *Studies in the Renaissance*, 12 (1965), 18-59.
- 28 Daniel Sennert, *De chymicorum cum Galenicis consensu ac dissensu liber I*, ch. 14 (Wittenberg, 1619), p. 403: "Alius quoque qui se mortuum esse imaginabatur, et cibum propterea aspernabatur, socii comitate, qui cum eo se in sepulchro mortuum esse asserebat, et quod ipse mortuus cibum caperet, ad cibum capiendum persuasus fuit; ut refert Holer. lib. 1. de morb. inter. cap. 15." The reference is to the French doctor Jacobus Hollerius, *De morbis internis*, bk. I, ch. 16 (Lyons, 1588), p. 63, where the story is told as Sennert reports it.
- 29 M. de Iriarte, S. J., *El doctor Huarte de San Juan y su Examen de ingenios* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1948 [first ed. Münster, 1938]; Harald Weinrich, *Das Ingenium Don Quijotes* (Münster: Aschendorf, 1956); Otis H. Green, "El Ingenioso Hidalgo," *Hispanic Review*, 25 (1957), 175-193.
- 30 *Don Quijote*, trans. Walter Starkie (New York: Signet), p. 994. This is pt. 2, ch. 65, ed. Martin de Riquer (Barcelona: Editorial Juventud, 1958), p. 1014: "... y entre los que más se la han tenido he sido yo; y creyendo que está su salud en su reposo, y en que esté en su tierra y en su casa, di traza para hacerle estar en ella."
- 31 *Anatomy of Melancholy*, pt. 1, sec. 2, memb. 3, subs. 1 (Shilleto ed., vol. 1, 290).
- 32 For these and other topical cures, see Marcello Donati, *De medica historia mirabili* (Mantua, 1586), fol. 34 and Ercole Sassonia, *De melancholia* (Venice, 1620), p. 31, who spells out the principle of deception.
- 33 Oscar Mandel, "The Function of the Norm in *Don Quijote*, MP, 55 (1957-58), 160.
- 34 Lavater, *Of Ghostes and Spirits*, p. 13.
- 35 See Gwynne Edwards, "Cervantes's 'El Licenciado Vidriera': Meaning and Structure," *MLR*, 68 (1973), 589. Also Dana B. Drake, *Cervantes' Novelas Ejemplares: A Selective, Annotated Bibliography* (2nd ed.; New York & London: Garland, 1981), pp. 135-54. The most penetrating analysis of the Licenciado as a paradoxical cynic philosopher censured by Erasmian *humanitas* is by Alban K. Forcione, *Cervantes and the Humanist Vision: A Study of Four Exemplary Novels* (Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 260-316.



- 36 *Exemplary Novels*, trans. C. A. Jones (Baltimore: Penguin, 1972), p. 128.
- 37 The pioneering studies of Saxl and Panofsky are summarized and expanded in Raymond Klibansky, Erwin Panofsky, and Fritz Saxl, *Saturn and Melancholy* (London: Nelson, 1964). See also Rudolf Wittkower, *Born under Saturn* (London: Weidenfels and Nicolson, 1963), ch. 5: "Genius, Madness, and Melancholy"; Lawrence Babb, *The Elizabethan Malady* (East Lansing: Michigan State College Press, 1951); and Bridget Gellert Lyons, *Voices of Melancholy* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971).
- 38 In the Renaissance this case is a *locus communis*, and (as Weinrich points out) Cervantes could have found it in Jason Pratensis, *De cerebri morbis* (Basel, 1549), ch. 18, p. 270 or in Ludovicus Caelius Rhodiginus (=Ludovico Ricchieri), *Lect. ant.* 17,2; p. 625. See Harald Weinrich, *Das Ingenium Don Quijotes* (Forschungen zur Romanischen Philologie, Heft 1), Münster:Aschendorff, 1956, pp. 51-52; also Otis H. Green, "El Licenciado vidriera: Its Relation to the *Viaje del Parnaso* and the *Examen de ingenios* of Huarte" in *The Literary Mind of Medieval and Renaissance Spain*, ed. John E. Keller (The University Press of Kentucky, 1970), pp. 190-92. In addition to the works cited by Weinrich, the following ones also contain the case of a person imagining to have a brittle body: Bernard Gordonius, *Opus lilium medicinae: De morborum curatione*, bk. 2, ch. 19 (Lyons, 1574), p. 211 says: "Alii videntur, quod sint vasa vitrea vel argillosa, et timent quod si tangerentur, frangerentur"; Marcello Donati, *De medica historia mirabili* (Mantua, 1586), fol. 35 and 36f, mentions people with bodies of clay and legs of glass.
- 39 Huarte, *The Examination of Mens Wits*, trans. R. C. (London, 1594), p. 43.
- 40 The authoritative study of Erasmian influence on Spain in general and Cervantes in particular is Marcel Bataillon, *Erasmus y España: estudios sobre la historia espiritual del siglo xvi* (2nd ed., Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1966). But "influence" rarely means wholesale acceptance of a paradigm. In spite of the narrowness of my focus, my spotlight may still help clarify the larger issue of Cervantes' relationship to Erasmian thought.
- 41 Weinrich, *Das Ingenium Don Quijotes*, p. 51.
- 42 *Exemplary Novels*, trans. C. A. Jones (Penguin ed.), pp. 128-29.
- 43 A. Vallejo Nájera, *Literatura y psiquiatria* (Barcelona: Edit. Barcelona, 1950), pp. 43-44, 49.
- 44 Most biographies of Cervantes mention the role of the Order of the Most Holy Trinity for the Redemption of Captives (OSST) in freeing Cervantes from bondage, see e.g. William Byron, *Cervantes: A Biography* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1978), pp. 242-46. James Fitzmaurice-Kelly mentions both biographical events (*Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra: Reseña documentada de su vida* [Buenos Aires: Editorial Bajel, 1944], chs. iv and ix); Edwards relates them to Vidriera, *MLR*, 68 (1973), 566.
- 45 See Starkie's otherwise informative Foreword (p. xx) to his transl. Cervantes, *The Deceitful Marriage and Other Exemplary Novels* (New York: Signet, 1963). G. Hainsworth also is concerned only with similarity; see "La source du 'Licenciado Vidriera'," *Bulletin Hispanique*, 32 (1930), 70-72. For S. Rivera Manescau's argument, see his "El Modelo del Licenciado Vidriera" in *Fiesta del Libro: IV Centenario de Miguel de Cervantes* (Universidad de Valladolid, 1947), 1-11.
- 46 Walter Starkie's paraphrase in his Foreword to Cervantes, *The Deceitful Marriage and Other Exemplary Novels*, p. xx.
- 47 Donati, *De medicina historia mirabili*, fol. 36f: "Avic. itaque 4. Naturalium 6. tantum imaginationi tribuit, et pluvias, et tonitrua, terremotusque ad libitum excitare, et aegritudines inducere, ac sanare poterit, ait Montanus in com. in 2 fen. 1 Avic. se hominem quendam vidisse, qui ex sola forti imaginatione quoties volebat, in facto circulo plusquam centum serpentes convocabat."
- 48 See S. B. Vranich, "Sigmund Freud and 'The Case History of Berganza': Freud's Psychoanalytic Beginnings," *Psychoanalytic Review*, 63 (1976), 73-82.

# Henry Peacham, Ripa's *Iconologia*, and Vasari's Lives

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The first illustrated edition of Cesare Ripa's *Iconologia* (Rome, 1603) had an early influence in England upon triumphal pageants and masques. Ripa's extremely popular alphabetized handbook was designed to assist poets, painters, sculptors and others who wished to portray personifications of virtues and vices, and human sentiments and passions, and, as has been recognized for some time, Ben Jonson made early use of it in *The King's Entertainment in Passing to His Coronation* (15 March 1603-04), and, in collaboration with Inigo Jones, he used it in *Hymenaei* (1606), in *The Masque of Beauty* (1608), in *The Masque of Queens* (1609) and in subsequent works of the kind.<sup>1</sup> Also well-known is the fact that another English poet and artist, Henry Peacham, consulted the *Iconologia* while compiling his emblem collection *Minerva Britannia* (1612),<sup>2</sup> and, as Rosemary Freeman pointed out in her *English Emblem Books*, as many as fifteen emblems in *Minerva Britannia* are adaptations of sections of Ripa's book. In his emblem book Peacham only acknowledges his debt to Ripa in three of the fifteen instances,<sup>3</sup> but in his treatise *The Gentleman's Exercise*, which was published later in the same year,<sup>4</sup> Peacham seems to have gone out of his way to remain silent concerning his far more considerable debt to the Italian iconologist. It is the nature and importance of this debt that I should now like to consider.

Peacham's *The Gentleman's Exercise* was a much-expanded and revised version of his earlier handbook for would-be gentleman artists, *The Art of Drawing* (1606). Virtually the entire 1606 version is contained in Book One of the new publication, and to this Peacham adds two further parts: "The Second Booke of Drawing and Limning," and a "Discourse tending to the Blazon of Armes." It is Book Two of *The Gentleman's Exercise* that is of concern here, since, as I shall show, it consists of a thirty-two page iconology largely compiled from selected passages, translated and re-arranged, from Ripa's *Iconologia*,<sup>5</sup> and is hence the first English version of that popular and influential Italian work.<sup>6</sup> *The Gentleman's Exercise* was one of Peacham's most widely-read works. Further editions of it appeared



in 1634, when it was published both separately and as an appendage to a new and expanded edition of *The Compleat Gentleman*, and in 1661 when it was again published as an appendage to a new edition of *The Compleat Gentleman*. William London included *The Gentleman's Exercise* in his *Catalogue of the Most Vendible Books in England* (1657), and during the seventeenth century sections of it were considered sufficiently important to be copied out by hand.<sup>7</sup> Peacham's role in acquainting English readers with Ripa's *Iconologia* may thus have been considerable, and future scholarship will have to consider the degree to which Ripa became known in England to artists and writers from Peacham's selected and abridged edition rather than from the *Iconologia* itself.

Peacham appears to have become acquainted with Ripa's work shortly after he completed a manuscript emblem book that he presented to Prince Henry in 1610.<sup>8</sup> The manuscript contains no evidence that Peacham was familiar with Ripa, whereas, as already pointed out, by 1612 he clearly knew the *Iconologia* well. From his use of Ripa's illustrations in *Minerva Britanna* it is clear that Peacham's copy was an illustrated edition, either that of 1603 (Rome) or that of 1611 (Padua), the only illustrated editions of Ripa at that time, and a close comparison of Peacham's illustrations with both of these editions reveals that he probably used a 1603 edition, since on four occasions details of his woodcuts match those of the 1603 rather than the 1611 edition.<sup>9</sup> Peacham's iconology abandons Ripa's alphabetical system and replaces it with a series of seven chapters dealing successively with various personifications "as they haue beene by Antiquitie described either in Comes, Statues, or other the like Publike Monuments" (Chapter One), floods and rivers (Chapter Two), Nymphs (Chapter Three), the Ocean, Thetis, Galatea, Iris and Aurora (Chapter Four), the Nine Muses (Chapter Five), Pan and the Satyres, and the Four Winds (Chapter Six), and the Twelve Months (Chapter Seven). Peacham's version therefore only represents a small portion of Ripa's compendium, and furthermore Peacham does not attempt to translate entirely those entries from Ripa that he does pick out, nor does he stick to their original sequence. As can be seen from the comparative listing given in Appendix A at the end of this paper, Peacham's arrangement is encyclopedic in character. In the main the rationale behind his new groupings of personifications is clear. Only in his first chapter does he appear to have selected almost at random to produce a somewhat arbitrary grouping in which individual entries have little connection with each other.

Peacham's method of creating an entry is worth examining. His entry under Providence may be taken as typical since it is drawn from three separate entries under that heading in Ripa which are now rendered in a new sequence. Only parts of Ripa's sentences are translated, but enough for us to recognize that Peacham in his own way can be very close to his source:

## 1. Peacham:

## Providence

A Lady lifting vp both her hands to Heauen with this worde *Prouidentia Deorum*. In the Meddals of *Probus* a Lady in a Robe in her right hand a Scepter, in her left a *Cornucopia*, a Globe at her feete.

Of *Maximinus* carrying a bundle of Corne, with a speare in one hand.  
(sig. Q1r)

## 2. Ripa (In original sequence):

## PROVIDENZA

*Nella Medaglia di Probo.*

Si vede per la prouidenza nella Medaglia di Probo, vna Donna stolata, che nella destra mano tiene vn Scettro, & nella sinistra vn Cornucopia, con vn globo a'piedi, & si mostra la prouidenza particolarmente appartenere à Magistrati.

## PROVIDENZA

*Nella Medaglia di Massimino.*

Donna, che nella destra tiene vn mazzo di spighe di grano, & nella sinistra vn'hasta, che con diuerse cose mostra il medesimo, che si è detto dell'altra.

\* \* \* \* \*

*Prouidenza.*

Vna Donna, che alza ambe le braccia verso il cielo, & si riuolge qua si con le mani giunte verso vna stella, con lettere, *Prouidentia Deorum*; la quale è di Elio Pertinace, come racconta l'Erizzo.

(p. 415)

Many of Peacham's entries are highly selective paraphrases of this kind. The main details are retained but much complementary detail is dropped.

On occasion details are also compressed. In Peacham's version of Ripa's Time, Time's four children (fanciulli), two of whom look in a mirror while two others write in a book, are reduced by Peacham to two, and the reference to the mirror is dropped (sig. Q1<sup>v</sup>).<sup>10</sup> In his next entry, Concord, Peacham selects from four of Ripa's entries under that heading and rearranges their sequence, and for his fifth and final sections he compresses the detail "Donna, che tiene in mano vn fascio di verghe strettamente legato" from one entry and "vno scettro che in cima habbia fiori" from another into "In another place she is shewed with a Scepter, hauing flowers bound to the toppe of the same, and in her arme a bundle of greene rods" (sig. Q1<sup>v</sup>). Similarly Peacham's Aurora combines two entries from Ripa, Aurora (p. 34) and Crepusculo della Mattina (p. 95). Ripa's "Una fanciulla alato di color incarnato con vn manto giallo in dosso" and the description of her riding on Pegasus are both retained from the Aurora entry, but Peacham adds to this from Ripa's Crepusculo della Mattina the



attributes "in cima del capo vna grande, & rilucente stella, & che con la sinistra mano tenghi vn'vrna riuolta all'ingiu versando con essa minutissime goccioline d'acqua" (this last to represent the morning dew). Where Ripa in his entry for Aurora had described her as bearing her lantern in her hand, Peacham says "some give her a light in her hand, but in stead of that I rather allow her a Viol of deaw, which with sundry flowers she scattereth about the earth" (sig. R3<sup>v</sup>). This last detail of the flowers, purportedly an especially personal choice, is, however, taken directly from Ripa's second Aurora entry ("& con la destra [mano] sparge fiori" p. 34).<sup>11</sup>

As already noted, even while omitting and compressing the materials of his source, Peacham on occasion makes additions. For the most part, as in the example just referred to in Note 11, these are of a minor nature. In his discussion of the Ocean, for example, Peacham adds the attribute of seal skin drapery for Ocean's loins, together with an explanation of the Greek origin of Ocean's name: "*ωκυς*," which is swift, and suddenly violent" (sig. R2<sup>v</sup>). A number of Peacham's additions are similarly etymological in nature. Presumably Peacham the schoolmaster felt quite confident in contributing learned etymologies for Hercules' name (sig. P4<sup>v</sup>), and for the Greek words for Nymph (sig. R1<sup>v</sup>), Dryad (sig. R2<sup>r</sup>) and Diana (sig. R2<sup>r</sup>). In much the same vein Peacham on occasion adds further information from various learned sources. In his entry for Piety, for example, he adds information about the elephant from Plutarch, Aelian, Pliny and Oppian not in Ripa (sig. P4<sup>r</sup>), and in his discussion of the Nile he adds that the crocodile is so named "from the feare he hath of Saffron, which hee cannot endure, wherefore those in Aegypt that keepe Bees set great store of Saffron about the hiues, which when hee seeth, hee presently departeth without doing any harme" (sig. Q4<sup>r</sup>). In his entry for the River Indus, Peacham similarly expands Ripa's reference to the camel at Indus' side and the Italian's explanation for its presence ("Gli si mette à canto il camelo, come animale molto proprio del paese, oue è questo fiume" p. 162) and states "the beast hath his name from *Χαμαι*, that is, on the ground he is represented pleasantly graue, because the East Indians are held to bee the most politique people of the world, as our countrymen haue had good experience among those of *China*, *Iaua*, *Bantam*, and in other places in those Eastern parts" (sig. R1<sup>r</sup>).

This last example with its reference to "our countrymen" is indicative of another form of change that Peacham makes in his translation. On a number of occasions he anglicizes his original in some way. In his entry for Disimulation (Simvlatione in Ripa) Peacham adds that "the Poet *Spencer* described her looking through a lattice" (sig. Q2<sup>v</sup>). In his entry for the Napeae or Nymphs of the Mountains Peacham alters Ripa's "varie sorti di fiori con loro mischiati, & varij colori" (p. 353), which adorn the

heads of the Nymphs, in order to name specific and familiar English plants "vpon their heads garlands of hunnisuckles, woodbine, wild roses, sweet Marioram and the like" (sigs. R1<sup>v</sup>–R2<sup>r</sup>). Similarly in the entry for the Naidēs or Nymphs of Floods, Peacham anglicizes Ripa's reference to a garland of the leaves of reeds ("vna ghirlanda di foglie di canna" p. 354) to "garlands of water-cresses, and their red leaues" (sig. R2<sup>r</sup>).

This technique of deliberate anglicization, no doubt quite justifiable in an iconography designed with English artists in mind,<sup>12</sup> is chiefly in evidence in the concluding section of Peacham's book where he deals with the twelves months. Peacham specifies, for example, hawthorn buds and primroses for April (sig. S3<sup>r</sup>) and "bents, king-cups, and maidenshaire" for June (sig. S3<sup>v</sup>), and he gives August pears, plums, apples, gooseberries and "at his belt (as our *Spencer* describeth him) a sickle" (sig. S4<sup>r</sup>).<sup>13</sup> Peacham's December entry is particularly striking and quite different from that of Ripa:

December must bee expressed with a horrid and fearefull aspect, as also *Ianuary* following, cladde in Irish rugge, or course freeze, gyrt vnto him, vpon his head no Garland but three or foure nightcaps, and ouer them a Turkish Turbant, his nose redde, his mouth and beard clogd with Iseckles, at his backe a bundle of holly Iuy or Mistletoe, holding in furd mittens the signe *Capricornus*.

(sig. S4<sup>v</sup>)

Peacham's entries for the Months then conclude with two admonitions. First he urges his reader to "giue every moneth his instruments of husbandrie, which because they do differ, according to the custome (with the time also) in sundrie countires, I haue willingly omitted, what ours are heere in England *Tusser* will tell you" (sig. T1<sup>r</sup>). Ripa does give such a list when he discusses the sequence of months in terms of agriculture, but Peacham evidently felt that what was proper to the Italian clime was not always appropriate to England's. Peacham then warns his reader "to giue euery month his proper and naturall Landtskip, not making (as a Painter of my acquaintance did in seuerall tables of the monthes for a Noble man of this land) blossomes vpon the trees in December, and Schooleboyes, playing at nine pinnes vpon the yce in Iuly" (sig. T1<sup>r</sup>). This would appear to be a genuinely personal comment. Certainly there is no equivalent for it in Ripa.

Apart from such anglicizations, Peacham adds references to his own work that seem designed to disguise the fact that what he is offering is a translation of foreign material. At the conclusion of his first chapter, for example, he inserts a reference to his *Minerva Britanna*: "for further variety of these and the like deuises, I referre you to my Emblemes Dedicated to *Prince Henry*" (sig. Q2<sup>v</sup>), and in his entry of Zephyrus he



refers to a Petrarch sonnet "which with *Gironimo Conuersi* and many more excellent Musicians I haue lastly chosen for a ditty in my songs of 4. and 5. parts" (sig. S2<sup>r</sup>). Even more deceptive are statements that appear to be direct personal observations which nonetheless are taken from Ripa. Thus, when describing Time, Peacham says "I haue seene time drawne by a painter standing vpon an old ruine, winged, and with Iron teeth" (sig. Q1<sup>r</sup>). Yet this is clearly a condensation of Ripa's "Hvomo vecchio alato, il quale tiene vn cerchio in mano, & stà in mezzo d'vna ruina, hà la bocca aperta, mostrando i denti, li quali sieno del colore del ferro" (p. 483). Similarly in his entry for the River Danube, Peacham remarks "whereupon as I remember *Ausonius* saith, *Danubius perijt caput occultatus in ore*" (sig. Q4<sup>v</sup>), but the original of this is in Ripa (p. 160). Less clear, however, is what Peacham does with his entry for the River Ganges. Ripa's entry states "*Fiume comme dipinto nell'esequie di Michel'Angelo Buonaroti in Firenze. Vn vecchio inghirlandato di gemme, comme l'altri fiumi, con l'vrna, & à canto l'vcel grifone*" (p. 162). Peacham expands and alters this to give a seemingly more accurate first-hand detailed description: "I have seene this riuier with wonderfull art cut out in white Marble, bearing the shape of a rude and barbarous sauage, with bended browes of a fierce and cruel countenance, crowned with Palme, hauing (as other flouds) his pitcher, and by his sides a *Rhinoceros*" (sig. Q4<sup>v</sup>). Ripa's description is taken from Vasari's *Le vite de' piu eccellenti pittori, scultori, e Architettori* (1568 edition) and refers to a painting by Bernardo Timante Buontalenti displayed during the funeral ceremonies for Michelangelo in Florence.<sup>14</sup> One wonders what marble sculpture had so impressed Peacham that he should decide to diverge from his source.

These then are the principal kinds of changes that Peacham makes when translating Ripa's *Iconologia*. Listed in this way, they may seem numerous enough for one to conclude that Peacham's work is sufficiently different to be considered independent of its source. However, such an inference would be false. For the most part Peacham follows Ripa very closely (albeit selectively) and the second book of *The Gentleman's Exercise* should therefore be considered as the first translation into English of selections from one of the most influential and popular of Italian Renaissance works.

With this notable "first" to his credit, Peacham ten years later, in his chapter "On Drawing, Limning, and Painting" with the liues of the famous Italian Painters" in *The Compleat Gentlemen* (1622), provided English readers with another translation of selected passages from an important Italian author – Giorgia Vasari. This time he acknowledged his sources,<sup>15</sup> but in general modern scholars have not noticed Peacham's debt,<sup>16</sup> and it is still generally believed that William Aglionby in 1685 was the first English translator of Vasari. As he himself acknowledged (see

above, Note 15), Peacham was unable to obtain a copy in Italian of Vasari and was instead forced to work from the Dutch translation by Carel van Mander (1548-1606). Van Mander had used a 1568 edition of Vasari and editions of his translation into Dutch had appeared in 1603-04 and 1618, but it is not clear which of the Dutch editions Peacham used.

Van Mander's translation of Vasari forms only part of his massive *Het Schilderboeck*, the section dealing with Italian artists being entitled *Het Leven der Moderne/oft dees-týtsche doorluchtighe Italiaensche Schilders*.<sup>17</sup> Van Mander selects under half of Vasari's 161 lives, and in those lives he does select he tends to cut much of Vasari's original text. In his turn Peacham selects only eighteen of the lives in van Mander, twelve of these deriving from Part One of Vasari (dealing with the Trecento), five from Part Two (Quattrocento), and one only from Part Three (Cinquecento). Furthermore, he tends to cut from each passage he does take from van Mander, keeping, on occasion, only the barest biographical facts. Not surprisingly the end product is sometimes barely recognizable as an abridged translation of Vasari, since, due either to van Mander's or to Peacham's cuts, detailed descriptions of individual works of art, quoted poems and epitaphs, philosophical comments, digressions, and a great many incidental biographical details tend to be lost. Van Mander's translation of the life of Simon of Siena, for example, retains the opening paragraph from Vasari. This comments on the good fortune of artists whose names are immortalized by poets, as happened in the case of Simon, who painted a portrait of Petrarch's Laura and was rewarded by being celebrated in some verses by the grateful poet. There follows a brief comment on Simon's inventive powers, and van Mander's version ends with the date of Simon's death, his age at death, and the epitaph carved on his tomb. Omitted are the relevant quotations from Petrarch and detailed descriptions, several pages in length, of Simon's works at Rome, Siena and Florence. Peacham's version of van Mander is, however, even less detailed, for it omits the philosophical opening, the epitaph, and even the date of death.

*Simon of Siena* was a rare Artist, and liued in the time of the famous and Laureate Poet *Francis Petrarch*, in whose verses he liueth eternally, for his rare art & judgement showne, in drawing his *Laura* to the life. For invention and variety he was accounted the best of his time.

(p. 130)

This is an extreme example of compression on Peacham's part, but elsewhere there are many passages that survive intact (via van Mander) from Vasari. One example will suffice. In his life of Andrea di Cione Orcagna, Vasari describes in some detail a painting of the Last Judgement that Orcagna did in the Campo Santo in Pisa. The complete description and



van Mander's and Peacham's respective versions of it are too long to quote in full, but the following extract demonstrates how whole sections of the Italian original are preserved in Peacham:

Vasari:

Dall'altra parte nella medesima storia, figurò sopra vn'alto Monte la vita di coloro, che tirati dal pentimento, de' peccati, e dal disiderio d'esser salui, sono fuggiti dal mondo à quel Monte, tutto pieno di Santi Romiti, che seruono al Signore, diuerse cose operando con viuacissimi affetti. Alcuni leggendo, & orando si mostrano tutti intenti alla contemplatiua, e altri lauorando per guadagnare il viuere, nell'actiua variamente si essercitano.

(sig. Z4r)

Van Mander:

Op d'ander syde der Historien / maechte hy op harde rootse al Volck / dat de Weerelt ontvloten / daer in penitentie / Eremyten wesende / Godt dient / verscheyden actien doende / met leuendige affecten: d'een leest met grooten vlydt / oft bidt met grooter innicheyt en aendacht / oft arbeyt om den cost te winnen.

(fol. 35r)<sup>18</sup>

Peacham:

On the other side of the table, he made an hard Rocke, full of people, that had left the world, as being Eremites, seruing of God, and doing diuers actions of pietie, with exceeding life; as here one prayeth, there another readeth, some other are at worke to get their liuing. . . .

(p. 131)

As can be seen in Appendix B at the end of this paper, Peacham provided his readers with biographical material on eighteen artists. Where in his use of Ripa he had radically altered the sequence of his source, in this instance his selection retains the original sequence he found in van Mander. Though only offering a selected sampling of Vasari, Peacham's translation had an even wider circulation than his version of Ripa, since editions of *The Compleat Gentleman* appeared in 1622, 1627, 1634, and 1661. Like *The Gentleman's Exercise*, it was included in William London's *Catalogue of the Most Vendible Books in England* (1657), and in 1663 in a court case involving the notorious Sir Charles Sedley, it was cited by the judge in such a way as to imply that educated men would be familiar with it.<sup>19</sup> Peacham's translations of Ripa and Vasari precede the hitherto assumed first English translations of these writers by ninety-seven and sixty-three years respectively. Though in the case of his version of Ripa Peacham evidently wanted to pass off selections from the *Iconologia* as his own, and though his purpose in *The Compleat Gentleman* is quite different since he concludes his translation of Vasari by recommending his reader to go back to the original, in each instance Peacham deserves to be given credit for being the first to acquaint English readers both with the most influential of all

iconologies and with what art historians continue to acknowledge as perhaps the most important art history ever published.

*Acadia University*

#### Notes

- 1 See Paul Reyher, *Les Masques Anglais* (Paris: Hachette, 1909), pp. 394, 399; Ben Jonson, ed. C.H. Herford, Percy and Evelyn Simpson (Oxford: Clarendon, 1950), X, 388-91; Allan H. Gilbert, *Symbolic Persons in the Masques of Ben Jonson* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1948), pp. 4-5, 23; D.J. Gordon, *The Renaissance Imagination*, ed. Stephen Orgel (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1975), pp. 146-53, 161, 174, 285.
- 2 Reyher, *Masques Anglais*, p. 401; Allardyce Nicoll, *Stuart Masques and the Renaissance Stage* (London: Harrap, 1937), p. 190; Gilbert, *Symbolic Persons*, p. 271; Rosemary Freeman, *English Emblem Books* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1948), pp. 79-81.
- 3 *Minerva Britannia*, pp. 23, 149, 206. For further discussion of Peacham's debt to Ripa in *Minerva Britannia*, see Alan R. Young, *Henry Peacham* (Boston: Twayne, 1979), pp. 52-54, 147n42.
- 4 Another issue appeared in the same year with the title *Graphice*. That *The Gentleman's Exercise* appeared after *Minerva Britannia* is evident from the manner in which Peacham refers to his emblem book in *The Gentleman's Exercise* (sigs. E3r, Q2v). For a brief discussion of Peacham's debt to Ripa in *The Gentleman's Exercise* and for an analysis of his use of Ripa's eternity, see Young, *Henry Peacham*, pp. 65-68.
- 5 Freeman noted that some parts of *The Gentleman's Exercise* derived from Ripa (*English Emblem Books*, p. 80), but she appears not to have been aware of the full extent of Peacham's borrowings. I am indebted to Professor Allan H. Gilbert for the suggestion he once made to me privately that Peacham did more than borrow the occasional detail from Ripa.
- 6 The first English translations of the *Iconologia* have hitherto been assumed to be those of 1709, 1771-79 and 1785.
- 7 Bodleian Library: MS Rawlinson B32, fols. 2-5, 17-38; British Library: Add. MS 34120, fols. 34-41, and MS Harleian 1279, fol. 12<sup>b</sup>. F.J. Levy's "Henry Peacham and the Art of Drawing" discussed the importance of the work but missed the debt to Ripa (*JWCI*, Vol. 37 [1974], 174-90).
- 8 ΒΑΣΙΛΙΚΟΝ ΔΩΠΟΝ (British Library: MS Royal 12A LXVI). The manuscript is undated but in addressing Prince Henry in *Minerva Britannia* (1612) Peacham refers to his previous gift of the manuscript "two yeares since."
- 9 Compare *Minerva Britannia*, pp. 26, 47, 128, 132 with the 1603 edition of Ripa, pp. 117, 229, 75, 306 respectively. The relevant illustrations in the 1611 edition are pp. 128, 248, 84, 327.
- 10 It should be noted, however, that Peacham adds (probably from his own direct observation) the following description: "Hee is commonly drawne vpon tombes in Gardens, and other places an olde man bald, winged with a Sith and an hower glasse" (sig. Q1<sup>v</sup>). Here only the attribute of Time's wings is in Ripa.
- 11 In his entry Peacham adds the Homeric epithet *ροδοδακτυλος* (rosy-fingered) as explanation for the pink-coloured wings with which both he and Ripa provide their respective personifications.
- 12 Peacham's consciousness of his English readership is nowhere more evident than at the end of his chapter on rivers where he remarks, "Thus haue I broken the Ice to inuention, for the apt description and liuely representation of flouds and riuers necessary for our Painters and Poets in their pictures, poems, comedies, maskes, and the like publike shewes, which many times are expressed for want of iudgement very grosly and rudely" (sig. R1<sup>r-v</sup>).
- 13 Spenser is not the only English author Peacham refers to in this section. A further "English" flavour is added by his allusion to Sidney in his entry for September (sig. S4<sup>r</sup>).
- 14 Vasari, *Le vite*, sig. 5D4<sup>r</sup>.
- 15 At the conclusion of his chapter in *The Compleat Gentleman* Peacham says, "If you would reade the liues at large of the most excellent Painters, as well Ancient as Modern, I refer you vnto the two



volumes of *Vasari*, well written in Italian (which I haue not seene, as being hard to come by; yet in the Libraries of two my especiall and worthy friends, M. Doctor *Mountford*, late Prebend of Pauls, and M. *Ingo Iones*, Surueyer of his Maiesties workes for building) and *Caluin Mander* in high *Dutch*; vnto whom I am beholden, for the greater part of what I haue heere written, of some of their liues" (p. 137).

- 16 But see F.J. Levy, "Henry Peacham and the Art of Drawing," *JWCI*, 37 (1974), 188; Luigi Salerno, "Seventeenth Century English Literature on Painting," *JWCI*, 14 (1951), 237; and Young, *Henry Peacham*, pp. 81, 151n41 and 42.
- 17 References here will be to the 1618 edition of Van Mander.
- 18 "On the other side of the picture he devised a hard rock full of people, who, having escaped the world and being hermits doing penance, serve God in diverse ways with lively feelings. One reads with great diligence, another prays with great devotion and concentration, and another labours to earn his living."
- 19 Andrew Clark, *The Life and Times of Anthony Wood* (Oxford, 1891), I, 477; II, 335.

## Appendix A

Peacham, *The Second Booke of Drawing and Limning from The Gentleman's Exercise* (1612)

Ripa, *Iconologia* (Rome, 1603)

Chapt. I	Eternitie (sig. P2 <sup>r-v</sup> )	Eternità (pp. 140-41)
	Hope (sig. P2 <sup>v</sup> -P3 <sup>r</sup> )	Speranza (pp. 469-72)
	Victory (sig. P3 <sup>r-v</sup> )	Vittoria (pp. 515-18)
	Piety (sig. P3 <sup>v</sup> -P4 <sup>r</sup> )	Pietà (pp. 401-03)
	Peace (sig. P4 <sup>r-v</sup> )	Pace (pp. 375-78)
	Vertue (sig. P4 <sup>v</sup> -Q1 <sup>r</sup> )	Virtù (pp. 506-12)
	Prouidence (sig. Q1 <sup>r</sup> )	Providenza (pp. 414-16)
	Time (sig. Q1 <sup>r-v</sup> )	Tempo (pp. 482-83)
	Concord (sig. Q1 <sup>v</sup> )	Concordia (pp. 80-82)
	Fame (sig. Q2 <sup>r</sup> )	Fama (pp. 142-45)
	Captiue Fame (sig. Q2 <sup>r</sup> )	Cattiva Fama (p. 143)
	Salus publica, or common safety (sig. Q2 <sup>r</sup> )	Salute (pp. 438-40)
	Clemencie (sig. Q2 <sup>r</sup> )	Clemenza (pp. 68-70)
	Fate (sig. Q2 <sup>r</sup> )	Fato (p. 146)
	Felicity (sig. Q2 <sup>v</sup> )	Felicità (pp. 154-56)
	Fecundity (sig. Q2 <sup>v</sup> )	Fecondità (p. 148)
	Security (sig. Q2 <sup>v</sup> )	Sicurezza, et Tranquillità (pp. 452-53)
	Money (sig. Q2 <sup>v</sup> )	Pecunia (p. 384)
	Dissimulation (sig. Q2 <sup>v</sup> )	Simulatione (p. 455)
	Equality (sig. Q2 <sup>v</sup> )	Equalità (p. 130)
	Matrimony (sig. Q2 <sup>v</sup> )	Matrimonio (pp. 305-07)
Chap. II	Of Flouds and Fiuers (sig. Q3 <sup>r</sup> )	Fivmi (p. 156)
	The Riuer Tiber (sig. Q3 <sup>r-v</sup> )	Tevere (pp. 156-58)
	The Riuer Arnus (sig. Q3 <sup>v</sup> )	Arno (p. 158)
	The Riuer Po, or Padus (sig. Q3 <sup>v</sup> )	Po (pp. 158-59)
	The Riuer Nilus (sig. Q3 <sup>v</sup> -Q4 <sup>r</sup> )	Nilo (p. 160)
	The Riuer Tigris (sig. Q4 <sup>r-v</sup> )	Tigre (p. 160)
	The Riuer Danubius, or the Donow (Sig. Q4 <sup>v</sup> )	Danubio (p. 160)
	The Riuer Achelous (sig. Q4 <sup>v</sup> )	Acheolo (p. 161)
	The Riuer Ganges (sig. Q4 <sup>v</sup> -R1 <sup>r</sup> )	Gange (p. 162)
	The Riuer Indus (sig. R1 <sup>r</sup> )	Indo (p. 162)
	The Riuer Niger (sig. R1 <sup>r</sup> )	Niger (p. 162)

Chap. III	The Nymphes in generall (sig. R1 <sup>v</sup> ) Napaeae or Nymphes of the mountains (sigs. R1 <sup>v</sup> -R2 <sup>r</sup> ) Dryads and Hamadryades, Nymphes of the woods (sig. R2 <sup>r</sup> ) Naiades or the Nymphes of flouds (sig. R2 <sup>r-v</sup> )	Ninfe in commvne (p. 352)  Ninnedi, & Napee (p. 353)  Driadi, & Hamadriadi (p. 353)  Naiadi. Ninfe de fiumi (p. 354)
Chap. IV	The Ocean (sig. R2 <sup>v</sup> ) Thetis (sig. R2 <sup>v</sup> ) Galatea (sig. R3 <sup>r</sup> ) Iris or the Rainebow (sig. R3 <sup>r</sup> ) Aurora or the Morning (sig. R3 <sup>r-v</sup> )	Mare (p. 354) Thethi (pp. 354-55) Galatea (p. 355) Iride (Ninfe de l'aria) (pp. 355-56) Aurora (p. 34) and Crepvscvlo della Mattina (pp. 95-96)
Chap. V	The Nine Muses (sig. R3 <sup>v</sup> ) Clio (sig. R3 <sup>v</sup> ) Euterpe (sig. R4 <sup>r</sup> ) Thalia (sig. R4 <sup>r</sup> ) Melpomene (sig. R4 <sup>r</sup> ) Polymnia (sig. R4 <sup>v</sup> ) Erato (sig. R4 <sup>v</sup> ) Terpsichore (sig. R4 <sup>v</sup> ) Vrania (sig. S1 <sup>r</sup> ) Calliope (sig. S1 <sup>r</sup> )	Mvse (p. 346) Clio (p. 346) Everte (pp. 346-47) Talia (p. 347) Melpomene (p. 347) Polinnia (pp. 347-48) Erato (p. 348) Terpsicore (pp. 348-49) Vrania (p. 349) Calliope (p. 349)
Chap. VI	Pan and the Satires (sigs. S1 <sup>v</sup> -S2 <sup>r</sup> ) Thr 4. Winds Eurus or the East wind (sig. S2 <sup>r</sup> ) Zephorus or the West wind (sig. S2 <sup>r-v</sup> ) Boreas, or the North winde (sig. S2 <sup>v</sup> ) Auster or the South wind (sig. S2 <sup>v</sup> )	Mondo (pp. 330-32)  Evro (pp. 496- 97) Favonio, o Zephro (p. 497) Borea, overo Aquilone (pp. 497-98) Avstro (p. 498)
Chap. VII	The twelue moneths of the yeare (sig. S3 <sup>r</sup> ) March (sig. S3 <sup>r</sup> ) Aprill (sig. S3 <sup>r</sup> ) May (sig. S3 <sup>r-v</sup> ) Iune (sig. S3 <sup>v</sup> ) Iuly (sig. S3 <sup>v</sup> ) August (sigs. S3 <sup>v</sup> -S4 <sup>r</sup> ) September (sig. S4 <sup>r</sup> ) October (sig. S4 <sup>r-v</sup> ) Nouember (sig. S4 <sup>v</sup> ) December (sig. S4 <sup>v</sup> ) Ianuary (sigs. S4 <sup>v</sup> -T1 <sup>r</sup> ) Februarie (sig. T1 <sup>r</sup> )	Mesi (p. 315) Marzo (pp. 315-16) Aprile (p. 316) Maggio (p. 316-17) Givgno (p. 317) Ivglio (pp. 317-18) Agosto (p. 318) Settembre (pp. 318-19) Ottobre (p. 319) Novembre (p. 319) Decembre (p. 320) Gennaro (p. 320) Febraro (p. 320)



## Appendix B

Peacham, "On Drawing, Limning, and Painting: with the liues of the famous Italian Painters" in *The Compleat Gentleman* (1622)

Vasari, *Le Vite de' piu eccellenti pittori, scultori, e Architettori* (1568)

van Mander, *Het Schilderboeck* (1618)

	Vol. I	
Cimabue (p. 117-18)	L1 <sup>v</sup> -L4 <sup>r</sup>	fol. 29 <sup>r-v</sup>
Tasi (p. 118-19)	O2 <sup>r</sup> -O4 <sup>v</sup>	fols. 29 <sup>v</sup> -30 <sup>r</sup>
Gaddi (p. 119)	O4 <sup>r</sup> -P1 <sup>v</sup>	fol. 30 <sup>r</sup>
Margaritone (p. 119)	P2 <sup>r</sup> -P3 <sup>v</sup>	fol. 30 <sup>r</sup>
Giotto (pp. 119-23)	P4 <sup>r</sup> -Q3 <sup>r</sup>	fols. 30 <sup>v</sup> -31 <sup>v</sup>
Stefano (p. 123-24)	S2 <sup>v</sup> -S4 <sup>r</sup>	fol. 32 <sup>r</sup>
Pietro Lauratio (p. 124)	S4 <sup>v</sup> -T2 <sup>r</sup>	fol. 32 <sup>v</sup>
Buffalmacco (pp. 124-30)*	V1 <sup>r</sup> -X2 <sup>r</sup>	fols. 32 <sup>v</sup> -33 <sup>v</sup>
Ambrogio Lorenzetti (p. 130)	X2 <sup>v</sup> -X3 <sup>v</sup>	fols. 33 <sup>v</sup> -34 <sup>r</sup>
Pietro Cavallini (p. 130)	X4 <sup>r</sup> -Y1 <sup>r</sup>	fol. 34 <sup>r</sup>
Simon of Siena (p. 130)	Y1 <sup>v</sup> -Y3 <sup>v</sup>	fol. 34 <sup>r</sup>
Andrea Orcagna (pp. 131-32)	Z3 <sup>r</sup> -2A2 <sup>v</sup>	fol. 35 <sup>r</sup>
Masaccio (p. 132)	2O2 <sup>r</sup> -2O4 <sup>v</sup>	fol. 36 <sup>r-v</sup>
Alberti (pp. 132-33)	2Z1 <sup>v</sup> -2Z3 <sup>v</sup>	fols. 35 <sup>v</sup> -37 <sup>r</sup>
Filippo Lippi (pp. 133-35)	3B2 <sup>r</sup> -3C2 <sup>r</sup>	fols. 37 <sup>r</sup> -38 <sup>r</sup>
Antonello of Messina (p. 135)	3A2 <sup>r</sup> -3A3 <sup>v</sup>	fol. 38 <sup>r-v</sup>
Ghirlandaio (pp. 135-36)	3L1 <sup>r</sup> -3M1 <sup>v</sup>	fol. 39 <sup>r-v</sup>
Raphael (pp. 136-37)	Vol. II, h4 <sup>v</sup> -m1 <sup>r</sup>	fols. 49 <sup>v</sup> -53 <sup>v</sup>

\* There is a hiatus in the pagination of *The Compleat Gentleman* between pages 124 and 129.

# François de la Noue (1531-1591) au service du libéralisme du XIXe siècle

WILLIAM H. HUSEMAN

Il ne semble guère nécessaire de présenter le maréchal François de La Noue aux lecteurs de cette revue. Si La Noue est demeuré un personnage moins célèbre que Coligny, Monluc, Condé, et d'Aubigné, l'on aurait tort de sous-estimer le rôle qu'a joué le "Bras de Fer" dans les guerres de religion et dans l'"institution" de la Réforme en France.<sup>1</sup> La parution en 1967 d'une édition moderne de ses *Discours politiques et militaires*<sup>2</sup> a contribué à l'accroissement de sa réputation en rendant accessible à la communauté des seiziémistes une oeuvre riche mais relativement peu connue. Depuis cette date, de nombreux chercheurs ont recouru à son témoignage à cause de la lucidité de ses analyses et de la qualité indéniable de sa prose.<sup>3</sup> Le lecteur des *Discours* découvre avec plaisir non pas les réminiscences décousues d'un vieux guerrier hargneux mais un témoignage équitable qui impressionne par sa franchise et sa bonne foi, qualités rarissimes à l'époque des guerres de religion. L'on comprend facilement pourquoi Montaigne a pu s'émerveiller de "la constante bonté, douceur de meurs et facilité consciencieuse de monsieur de la Nouë, en une telle injustice de parts armées, vraie eschole de trahison, d'inhumanité et de brigandage, où toujours il s'est nourry, grand homme de guerre et très-experimenté."<sup>4</sup> Serait-il superflu de rappeler ici que la plupart des historiens se sont rangés du côté de ce Gascon qui n'avait pas l'habitude de couvrir d'éloges des guerriers huguenots?

## La biographie de la Noue

Etant conscient des limites d'une étude consacrée à un seul homme, nous proposons un réexamen de la carrière et du caractère de François de La Noue, un homme qui, selon le père Lelong, "a joué un si grand rôle dans les premiers troubles de la Religion que sa Vie en est comme l'Histoire."<sup>5</sup>

Son nom apparaît dans presque tous les récits des historiens, des chroniqueurs et des mémorialistes du 16e et du début du 17e siècle. Si l'on repérait et rassemblait toutes les sources qui contiennent des références à la Noue, il serait possible de le suivre de jour en jour – et parfois même



d'heure en heure – pendant quarante ans. Mais il est évident qu'une telle étude dépasserait de loin le cadre de cette revue, et l'on est en droit de se demander si cette énorme entreprise aiderait à mieux saisir l'intérêt essentiel de la vie de cet homme et de son oeuvre. Ainsi plutôt que d'analyser en détail chaque escarmouche, chaque bataille, chaque entretien avec un adversaire, etc., nous porterons un jugement global sur la totalité de sa vie.

Ecrivant en 1892, Henri Hauser a reconnu que, "nous sommes loin . . . d'avoir pu explorer tous les dépôts qui peuvent ou même qui doivent contenir des pièces relatives à La Noue; et si cette vie présente peut-être quelques énigmes insolubles, il est aussi des lacunes que d'autres, plus heureux que nous, pourront sans doute combler."<sup>6</sup> Hauser a suggéré, par exemple, qu'il était "peu croyable que les archives des petites villes flamandes ne conservent pas encore des lettres de La Noue."<sup>7</sup> Etant ainsi conscient des lacunes qui restaient à combler, il a pourtant conclu qu'"en présence des documents que nous avons consultés, nous ne pensons pas que des trouvailles nouvelles puissent sensiblement modifier notre récit ou altérer nos conclusions."<sup>8</sup> Voilà donc les deux défis que Hauser a implicitement lancés à la postérité: parviendra-t-on à mettre en doute soit son récit de la vie de La Noue soit ses conclusions sur le comportement de cet homme et sur la valeur de sa vie?

De telles questions se sont posées lors de la conception de la présente étude: les années qui se sont écoulées ont-elles confirmé le bien-fondé de la position de Hauser? Pour rendre justice à La Noue, fallait-il se lancer à la recherche d'éventuelles sources inédites cachées dans des bibliothèques isolées? Après avoir examiné et les sources du seizième siècle et les ouvrages qui ont été publiés depuis la parution de la thèse de Hauser, il nous a semblé qu'il n'y avait pas lieu de "sensiblement modifier" son récit. Si Hauser n'a pas fourni de réponses à toutes les énigmes posées par la vie de ce capitaine, il a eu le mérite d'avoir posé les bonnes questions et d'avoir établi les points de repère principaux. Quant à son analyse du personnage, on peut légitimement poser d'autres questions et proposer d'autres interprétations.

Il s'agira donc de rouvrir le dossier en utilisant le fil qu'a tissé Hauser et en tenant compte des contributions de l'historiographie du vingtième siècle. Nous nous sommes efforcé de ne pas commettre "l'erreur d'enfermer les événements dans un cercle trop mesquin, de tout ramener à la portée d'un individu, de grossir par artifice les 'questions de personnes' et de mettre les catégories générales dans la dépendance de simples incidents."<sup>9</sup>

### Le portrait de Hauser: "confiante et indulgente bonhomie"

Chaque époque est marquée par ses préoccupations idéologiques, voire par de véritables idées fixes. Celle de Hauser avait les siennes, nous avons certainement les nôtres. Le portrait de La Noue que l'on trouve chez Hauser reflète deux obsessions du dix-neuvième siècle: le nationalisme et le laïcisme. Hauser, d'origine israélite, aurait voulu que La Noue fût un bon citoyen patriote d'une république laïque, et il semblait éprouver un besoin intense de montrer que les protestants (et, avec eux, d'autres minorités) étaient des Français à part entière. En essayant de montrer que le plus grand héros de la Réforme naissante était "un bon Français," ne cherchait-il pas aussi à prouver que tous les protestants (et peut-être aussi les Juifs) étaient à leur tour "de bons Français"?

Non que ses concitoyens du dernier quart du dix-neuvième siècle aient eu besoin de recevoir des leçons de patriotisme; au contraire, la communauté protestante cherchait à se protéger du chauvinisme exclusiviste qui s'est manifesté lors de l'Affaire Dreyfus. Comme les Juifs, les témoins protestants de la fin du siècle font état d'une "campagne d'accusations, de calomnies de toutes sortes, qui se poursuit depuis quelque temps contre nous et que cherchent à perpétuer certains journaux, certains livres. . . . On fait beaucoup de bruit aujourd'hui autour de cette grande formule: *La France aux Français*, et l'on s'en sert contre nous."<sup>10</sup> Il s'agit évidemment des répercussions de la montée de l'Allemagne et de l'humiliation de 1870: "Les débuts de la guerre franco-prussienne de 1870 donnèrent lieu à une recherche de coupables dont les protestants français eurent à souffrir. Une campagne de presse les accusa de souhaiter la victoire de l'ennemi, voire parfois de l'aider activement."<sup>11</sup>

Hauser et les protestants cherchaient à repousser deux accusations. Il y avait, d'une part, celle qui dépeignait le protestantisme, enfant bâtard du "renégat saxon" Luther, comme un phénomène essentiellement étranger: "Du fait que Calvin s'était réfugié à Genève, . . . que les grandes puissances, Angleterre, Allemagne, souvent ennemies de la France, étaient à majorité protestante, une suspicion s'attachait à la minorité réformée française."<sup>12</sup> D'autre part, ils luttèrent contre l'idée qu'ils devaient forcément être soupçonnés de "collaborationisme" avec les ennemis. Bien qu'ils aient fait semblant de ne pas prendre au sérieux de telles accusations – "A qui fera-t-on croire qu'il y a un *péril protestant*, un *complot protestant*, que nous voulons livrer la France à l'Angleterre ou à l'Allemagne?"<sup>13</sup> – ils se sont crus obligés d'y répondre. L'on peut être tenté d'en sourire, mais le parallèle ne paraissait que trop évident à ceux qui rêvaient d'une France "toute catholique" et qui s'en prenaient aux "ennemis de l'âme française":<sup>14</sup> de même que les huguenots avaient cherché l'appui d'Elisabeth et des princes allemands contre les rois Très-Christiens, leurs descendants étaient capables de "vendre la patrie" aux ennemis contemporains.



Si les Rochelois avaient invité les Anglais à s'établir chez eux, si Condé avait fait venir des reîtres, si l'Etat protestant avait ébranlé le trône des Valois, que pouvait-on espérer de leurs petits-fils? Tel était le climat à l'époque où Hauser rédigeait sa thèse.

Les protestants se sentaient particulièrement exaspérés par ceux qui prétendaient qu'il y avait "une sorte d'incompatibilité entre l'esprit protestant et l'esprit français . . . que le protestantisme est contraire à notre caractère national."<sup>15</sup> Ils insistaient donc sur les origines purement françaises de la Réforme, sur "le caractère profondément national du protestantisme français,"<sup>16</sup> mais ce faisant ils reconnaissaient la priorité accordée aux intérêts de l'Etat-nation: "Notre Eglise est une Eglise essentiellement nationale. Et savez-vous pourquoi? parce qu'elle est protestante."<sup>17</sup> Le "bon" protestantisme égalait donc le nationalisme. Ils étaient fiers d'avoir contribué à la formation des institutions démocratiques grâce à "la participation des laïcs à l'administration ecclésiastique."<sup>18</sup> Le protestantisme qu'ils envisageaient était ainsi un protestantisme respectueux de la règle du jeu de la Troisième République: un régime laïc, démocratique, bourgeois, tolérant, exigeant toutefois la subordination de l'Eglise à l'Etat.

Hauser aurait voulu que La Noue fût conforme à cet idéal laïc et nationaliste. N'a-t-il pas fini par écrire "une étude historique où le passé pouvait soutenir l'opinion libérale dans le présent"?<sup>19</sup> Mais force lui était de constater que son héros s'est écarté de cet idéal à de nombreuses reprises: il a participé activement à des soulèvements armés contre l'autorité légitime de son pays; il avait des contacts avec des agents de puissances étrangères; il a fait introduire sur le territoire français des soldats étrangers; il a cherché à embrouiller des sujets français dans les affaires des Pays-Bas, sachant bien que cette intervention aurait pu mener à une guerre avec l'Espagne; il a collaboré avec la machine administrative de l'Etat protestant, etc. Comment la communauté protestante aurait-elle osé proposer comme héros un homme qui, au dix-neuvième siècle, aurait pu être considéré comme un traître?: "L'on ne voulait à aucun prix, dans certains milieux protestants français – surtout à Paris, centre du nationalisme, et chez les Réformés – prêter *le moindre* le flanc aux accusations selon lesquelles le protestantisme était en France un élément *étranger*."<sup>20</sup> (Evidemment, il est inutile d'insister sur le fait que le comportement des rois de France et des extrémistes catholiques mérite l'étiquette de "traître," mais il s'agit ici de François de La Noue.)

Hauser se voyait donc obligé d'expliquer certains aspects "gênants" du comportement de son héros. Il s'efforce de démontrer que la politique de La Noue était dominée par un sentiment national, d'où une litanie d'affirmations de son patriotisme. Comparé à certains huguenots, La Noue était "trop bon Français et trop peu fanatique à leur gré" (xiv), et "trop bon Français pour servir d'instrument docile" (xvii) aux desseins des Anglais.

Il était "toujours prêt à aider la grande reine protestante, s'il pouvait le faire sans manquer à ses devoirs de Français" (p. 129; cf. pp. 282, 234, 76, 90). Comparé à Du Guesclin, La Noue "se décida, non comme un chef de bande du XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle, mais comme un bon Français du XVI<sup>e</sup>"—ne faut-il pas lire, "du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle" (p. 268)? Hauser s'efforce de concilier religion et nationalisme: "En même temps que chrétien, il est resté Français" (p. 260) et "faisait passer l'intérêt national avant celui de sa secte" (p. 76), sauf après 1573, lorsque "le politique parut l'emporter sur le chrétien, le sectaire sur le Français" (xviii). Hauser essaie d'attribuer à La Noue une espèce de "nationalisme" qui, en réalité, n'était concevable qu'après la Révolution de 1789: à La Rochelle, La Noue refuse de commettre "un crime de lèse-nation. . . . Il possède, à un très haut degré pour un homme de son temps, et presque en dehors du sentiment loyaliste, un véritable sentiment national. . . . La Noue y répond comme un moderne, qui a le sentiment très vif de la nationalité française" (pp. 288, 164, 223). Hauser insiste sur son sentiment de "fraternité nationale" (p. 245), de "solidarité nationale" (p. 286), de "devoir national" (p. 267). La Noue aurait professé les doctrines d'"une école nationale" (p. 288). Bref, à en croire Hauser, "il croit même, et c'est chose nouvelle, qu'en dehors et au-dessus de ces devoirs envers son roi, il en a, et de plus sacrés encore, envers cet être moral qui s'appelle la patrie" (p. 288). S'il est indéniable que La Noue faisait preuve d'un sentiment "nationaliste" qui mérite, à certains égards, l'étiquette de "moderne," ce genre d'explication va amener Hauser à une impasse.

S'il est embarrassé par la question de la "trahison," on sent qu'il est également gêné par la foi de La Noue. De même qu'il cherchait un patriote modèle, il aurait voulu trouver chez La Noue un protestantisme de bon ton qui ne risquât pas de choquer la sensibilité bourgeoise, un protestantisme mesuré, "raisonnable", "philosophique" qui incarnât les plus nobles aspirations de la Révolution. Et lorsque La Noue ne s'y conforme pas il faut, encore une fois, trouver une explication pour le protéger contre les accusations de fanatisme.

Si le guerrier intrépide ne s'est pas adonné au culte des Anciens, "il s'est moins bien défendu contre une autre cause d'erreur, il a cru aveuglément à la lettre de la Bible. On le voudrait un peu moins servilement attaché au texte de saint Paul, on lui souhaiterait un peu plus de cette noble indépendance d'esprit, de cette largeur de pensée qu'on rencontre chez les grands païens de l'époque, chez ces épicuriens qu'il a condamnés au nom de la foi, les Rabelais et les Montaigne" (pp. 280-81). (Notons en passant que la critique bourgeoise a essayé ainsi de récupérer Rabelais et Montaigne.) Mais si on élimine cet attachement à la lettre de la Bible, qui découle évidemment du principe de *Sola Scriptura*, et la doctrine fondamentale de saint Paul, la justification par la foi et par la grâce, on peut se demander ce



qui reste non seulement de la foi de La Noue mais aussi de la Réforme. On sent que Hauser est également gêné par la foi et par le comportement des premiers huguenots: "Ce rude soldat avait en lui je ne sais quoi de bon-homme et de bon enfant; cela lui donne un visage à part, et plein d'attrait, au milieu de l'austère et un peu ennuyeuse compagnie des calvinistes" (p. 197). Il trouve que son style, "si vif et si lesté à l'ordinaire, devient parfois grave et terne au point de faire déjà pressentir ce qu'on appellera plus tard le 'style réfugié'" (p. 281). Les pasteurs sont présentés comme des fanatiques aveugles (Chapitre II). Mais il faut demander si Hauser cherche des gens qu'il aurait aimé rencontrer dans un salon parisien ou des gens prêts à tout sacrifier pour pouvoir vivre selon la pureté de l'Évangile. Est-ce qu'il ne finit pas par renforcer le stéréotype du protestant froid, renfrogné, sévère, etc.? L'on comprend que, vivant dans un milieu intellectuel dominé par les idées d'un Renan ou d'un Comte, Hauser ait pu se sentir gêné par cette foi trop primitive, trop naïve, trop "crue," mais cette attitude influe sur son analyse du caractère et du comportement de La Noue.

De même qu'il a insisté sur la "modernité" du seizième siècle, Hauser aurait voulu voir en La Noue un homme moderne: "Il possède, à un très haut degré pour un homme de son temps . . . un véritable sentiment national. . . . La Noue y répond comme un moderne. . . . Il se décida, non comme un chef de bande du XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle, mais comme un bon Français du XVI<sup>e</sup>. . . . On se prend, malgré soi, à songer à ces philosophes du XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle qui devaient travailler au triomphe de la tolérance et de l'humanité" (pp. 164, 223, 268, 280). Mais le fait est que La Noue n'aurait pas pu se conformer à un tel idéal philosophique, laïc et nationaliste, même s'il avait pu le concevoir. Et lorsque Hauser le constate, il en est déçu. Il est indéniable que La Noue aimait profondément une entité appelée "France", que ses *Discours* constituent un programme pour la restaurer, et qu'il termine sa *Déclaration* en affirmant "Je suis un bon François" (p. 20). Il est "moderne" à certains égards, témoin ses tendances absolutistes, centralisatrices et "tolérantistes."

Mais Hauser ne tient pas assez compte des différences sémantiques survenues au cours de trois siècles d'histoire, attribuables notamment à une Révolution qui a bouleversé les structures de l'Ancien Régime. Les mots "patrie," "nation" et "France" n'évoquaient plus pour un citoyen de la République au dix-neuvième siècle ce qu'ils évoquaient pour un sujet du Royaume au seizième siècle. La Noue utilise aussi l'expression "bon citoyen" (*Observations*, p. 786), mais qui oserait prétendre qu'elle avait en 1585 les mêmes résonances qu'elle aura dans la bouche d'un Robespierre, d'un Danton, d'un Saint Just? C'est toute la différence entre un "ancien" et un "nouveau" régime. Il faut surtout faire attention à des mots comme "nation" et "national" qui, après 1789, avaient pris des connotations que La Noue n'aurait même pas pu concevoir. Hauser voudrait

que le "patriotisme" de La Noue soit le "nationalisme" post-révolutionnaire et post-napoléonien, que son protestantisme soit un protestantisme post-renanien. Mais ne finit-il pas par tomber dans le piège des anti-protestants dont l'"interprétation de l'actualité fut souvent une projection de leur vision du passé sur le présent, comme si les rapports entre religion et politique ou la conception du patriotisme, par exemple, avaient été les mêmes au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle et au tournant du XIX<sup>e</sup> et du XX<sup>e</sup> siècles"?<sup>21</sup> Il n'accepte pas qu'un homme du seizième siècle ait pu légitimement être tiraillé entre plusieurs devoirs contradictoires, ceux de la religion, de la féodalité, du "patriotisme" régional ou national, de l'amitié, etc. Un homme du dix-neuvième siècle ne pouvait plus l'être parce que l'évolution historique avait fait de la loyauté à l'Etat-nation la valeur suprême, et tout devait être subordonné aux intérêts de la nation (même si on prétendait ne voir aucun conflit entre les intérêts de la religion et ceux de l'Etat). Dans l'Europe d'états-nations du siècle dernier, le comportement des huguenots et de La Noue aurait pu être considéré comme un comportement de "traîtres." Mais c'est précisément parce qu'ils ne vivaient pas au dix-neuvième siècle qu'on ne peut pas les juger d'après les critères de ce siècle; il ne faut pas non plus essayer de justifier le comportement de La Noue en utilisant des critères d'un siècle qui n'était pas le sien. Cet homme qui a vécu au seizième siècle se considérait comme un "bon citoyen," mais il a commis des actes qui auraient scandalisé un "bon citoyen" du dix-neuvième siècle. Si ce genre de comportement n'était guère apprécié par les monarques du seizième siècle, La Noue n'a pas été traité avec la même rigueur que l'auraient été des ennemis de l'Etat moderne: ce rebelle a été reçu à la cour et nommé ambassadeur à La Rochelle! (Et rappelons encore une fois que le comportement des rois et des extrémistes catholiques n'était guère un modèle de probité, de bonne foi, de patriotisme.)

L'on voit le dilemme auquel a dû faire face Hauser, embarrassé par ce qu'il appelle "de véritables défaillances morales" (pp. 62, 286) de cet homme qui semble bel et bien avoir mis les intérêts de sa foi avant ceux de sa patrie, mais qui semble avoir, à d'autres moments, mal servi ses coreligionnaires et ses "bienfaiteurs," prêtant ainsi le flanc aux accusations d'un Denis d'Aussy.<sup>22</sup> La seule explication que propose Hauser, c'est la naïveté, aussi invraisemblable que cela puisse paraître: "Il eut ses faiblesses. Son esprit, ferme et sage en beaucoup de choses, n'était pourtant pas sans travers; le moindre était la naïveté" (p. 280). Ces termes reviennent à travers toute l'étude de Hauser: "Dans sa naïve confiance, il ne voulait croire au péril. . . sa sensibilité un peu naïve. . . on le savait naïf, scrupuleux à l'excès. . . Il n'échappe pas à une certaine naïveté," etc. (pp. 85, 35, 225, 177). Il va encore plus loin: "Ce rude soldat avait en lui je ne sais quoi de bonhomme et de bon enfant" (p. 197) et "une candeur qui . . . est bien près de toucher au ridicule" (p. 285). A en croire Hauser, La



Noüe aurait même oublié un des fondements de la doctrine calviniste (pour ne pas dire, chrétienne): "Sa confiante et indulgente bonhomie ne pouvait croire longtemps à la méchanceté, surtout à la méchanceté persévérante. . . . Il est trop désintéressé. . . . Il ne croit vraiment pas assez à la méchanceté des hommes. . . . Il ne sait pas haïr" (pp. 35, 177). Hauser affirme que "La Noue, c'est son honneur et son ridicule, ne croit pas à la méchanceté humaine. Au fond, cette impossibilité de croire au mal, cette confiance exagérée dans les retours de bonté dont les pires sont parfois capables, c'est la grande, l'irréremédiable infirmité de La Noue, le seul défaut de cette intelligence si nette et si pratique, de ce ferme caractère" (pp. 283-84). C'est à cause de ces traits que La Noue ne pouvait pas se débarrasser de "la manie de la conciliation universelle" (p. 284), de "cette chimère d'universelle réconciliation" (p. 285).

### **Le témoignage des contemporains: d'un "iugement solide & posé" aux "surprises & meschancetez"**

L'on voit que Hauser se permet d'utiliser des termes comme "ridicule", "exagéré", "infirmité", "manie", etc. pour justifier le comportement de La Noue lorsque celui-ci ne se conforme pas à l'idéal républicain et patriotique. Mais Hauser n'est pas hostile à son héros; au contraire, il admire La Noue et maintient qu'il mérite le surnom de "Bayard Huguenot." Il tente le "coup d'escrime désespéré" parce qu'il est sûr que les énormes qualités du Bras de Fer l'emporteront facilement sur ses défauts. Mais, confronté à ces "défaillances", il a recours à une explication qui, à notre avis, déforme les véritables traits de La Noue. Il n'était pas nécessaire de forcer le lecteur à prononcer La Noue coupable soit de "trahison" soit de "naïveté": il n'était pas naïf lorsqu'il négociait avec les rois, de même qu'il n'était pas traître lorsqu'il s'opposait à la politique de ceux-ci. Sans vouloir paraître désinvolte, l'on peut se demander si Hauser ne finit pas par évoquer plutôt l'image d'un pépère quelque peu gâteux en train de somnoler devant la cheminée—et qu'on réveille de temps en temps pour lui demander si on peut se fier à la parole du roi de France, s'il faut livrer La Rochelle aux Anglais ou pousser le royaume à la guerre en envahissant les Pays-Bas, si Henri de Navarre devrait se convertir au catholicisme, etc.! Le contraste entre le portrait qu'en fait Hauser et le rôle que La Noue a joué en réalité semble démesuré. N'a-t-il pas décrit un Candide huguenot? Et pourtant, ce "bonhomme enfantin" a survécu à tous ses maîtres à travers quarante années de luttes sanglantes, acquérant une réputation qui "est sortie bien loin hors de la France, & s'est estenduë iusques en Espagne, Italie, Allemagne & Angleterre"<sup>123</sup>

Où est l'homme qui, selon ses ennemis acharnés, avait "servy de vraye phare & guide en l'armée des heretiques, en laquelle il a tant apprins & pratiqué de surprises & meschancetez, qu'il se peut aysément vanter estre

le plus redouté de ceux qui tiennent pour le iourd'huy leur party"?<sup>24</sup> Auraient-ils craint à ce point un "bonhomme crédule"? Les Ligueurs qui le détestaient n'hésitaient pas pourtant à lui attribuer "une des meilleures têtes qu'il y ait" en l'armée de Henri IV.<sup>25</sup> Son ennemi Brisson insiste sur sa maîtrise de la ruse: "La Noue pratiquoit soubz main & s'asseuroit de ceux desquelz il se vouloit servir pour executer l'entreprise."<sup>26</sup> Brisson en fait le portrait suivant: "Il est doué d'un esprit assez vif, d'une grace douce, qui à sa contenance monstre qu'il pense plus qu'il ne dit. . . . Toutesfois ceux qui le frequentent l'ont en reputation d'estre homme d'entreprise & d'execution, de sçavoir conduire & mener les hommes à la guerre, d'estre brave & adroit gentil-homme, versé és affaires d'estat. Ceux encore qui le suivent, louent en luy un iugement solide & posé."<sup>27</sup> L'on recherche en vain le grand benêt décrit par Hauser.

Aurait-on confié la lieutenance de la Guyenne à Candide? Aurait-on envoyé un tel député à la cour "pour recevoir les plaintes & remontrances de leurs confederez; afin de les faire conoistre au Roy qui leur promettoit y pourvoir selon le besoing"?<sup>28</sup> Bentivoglio l'appelle un "personnage de grande valeur & des plus estimez aux affaires de guerre qu'il y eust alors en France parmy la faction des Huguenots."<sup>29</sup> Son ami La Popelinière le considérait comme "un des plus accomplis Gentils-hommes de toute la France" et "l'un des plus avisez & resolutus guerriers de France. . . . Il n'y avoit en France Gentilhomme de la Religion plus signalé que lui pour le maniment des armes & affaires de consequence."<sup>30</sup> Est-ce que les Flamands auraient confié le commandement de leur armée, et donc leur propre destin, à un naïf? J.B. de Blaes écrit que les Etats l'ont invité parce qu' "on l'estimoit le plus habile & plus experimenté Capitaine en l'art militaire, qui fut en son temps."<sup>31</sup> Les ambassadeurs anglais rapportent que les ennemis refusaient parfois de se battre, fuyaient en terreur et abandonnaient des places à l'annonce de l'approche de La Noue.<sup>32</sup> L'on peut se demander comment la capture d'un bonhomme enfantin aurait pu inspirer le désespoir chez les uns, le déchainement de joie chez les autres, y compris le roi d'Espagne. Après la prise de Bruges, le prince de Parme s'est vu obliger de reconnaître que "La Noue. . . a enfin si bien joué son personnage, qu'il l'a surprins par intelligence de quelques sectaires."<sup>33</sup> (Une tentative de s'emparer de Bruxelles et du prince de Parme a échoué.) Rappelons que sa première action d'éclat avait été la prise d'Orléans "moins par la force . . . que par la ruse & l'artifice; ce qu'il executa avec autant d'habileté que de bonheur."<sup>34</sup> En 1574 il est entré à La Rochelle grâce à un coup d'état, et vers la fin de sa vie il utilisait les mêmes méthodes: "Toutes les troupes de ces hérétiques, Givry et la Nouë, furent pour surprendre la ville de Meaux, avec l'intelligence de certains politiques de dedans, lesquels par force ouvrirent une des portes de la ville."<sup>35</sup> De Thou fournit le témoignage suivant: les ennemis ayant fait circuler de faux bruits afin d'attirer les



huguenots dans une embuscade, "La Noue, qui étoit l'homme du monde le moins crédule, n'ajouta ps beaucoup de foi à ce bruit. Les bonnes nouvelles, dit-il, qui nous viennent par la voye des ennemis, doivent toujours nous être suspectes, & il est bon d'être en garde contre les pièges qu'ils pourroient nous tendre."<sup>36</sup> C'est sa prudence qui l'amenait souvent à prendre des risques "imprudents": il "retourna à la porte Saint-Michel, & s'étant approché seul pour examiner avec plus d'attention l'endroit qu'il vouloit attaquer, il reçut au bras gauche un coup qui lui cassa l'os"<sup>37</sup> (cf. p. 706). Il a été tué par une balle tirée dans des circonstances pareilles. Henri de Navarre s'est moqué de lui à cause de sa prudence "excessive," mais L'Estoile raconte que La Noue, "un des plus vieux & expérimentés Capitaines de la France . . . lui prédisoit ce qui en advint."<sup>38</sup> Même les réformés extrémistes retenaient leur jugement: "Quant à moy en telle division & partialité d'opinions . . . ie suspendi, comme ie tiens encore suspendu, mon jugement de son affaire: ne voulant rien temerairement prononcer d'un gentilhomme si bien qualifié que cestuy-là."<sup>39</sup>

Les affirmations de Hauser et des contemporains de La Noue divergent à tel point que l'on peut être tenté de demander s'il s'agit du même personnage! Seuls les réformés les plus extrémistes s'en prenaient à sa crédulité, et bon nombre d'entre eux le regrettaient après son départ de La Rochelle. A notre avis, ce sont les contemporains qui avaient raison, et nous essaierons de montrer que la naïveté est un mobile insuffisant pour expliquer le caractère et le comportement de La Noue. Bien au contraire, il y a d'excellentes raisons de conclure que sa politique n'était ni celle d'un naïf ni celle d'un traître, mais plutôt celle d'un homme d'état réaliste et accompli à qui on pourrait approprier l'éloge qu'il a lui-même fait de Coligny: "C'estoit un personnage digne de restituer un Estat affoibli & corrompu" (p. 780). Selon nous, on diminue la grandeur et l'humanité d'un tel homme en faisant de lui un type de naïf simplet. S'il s'est trompé à certains moments, ce n'est pas par naïveté ou par faute de lucidité; c'est plutôt parce qu'aucun homme dans une situation pareille n'aurait pu rassembler suffisamment de renseignements pour y voir clair. Il fallait donc peser les risques et en accepter les conséquences, et La Noue était le premier à reconnaître que "les plus fins, & qui ouvrent bien les yeux, ne laissent quelquefois d'y estre attrapez" (p. 707).

Contrairement à ce qu'en dit Hauser, La Noue comprenait bien le monde de la guerre et de la Realpolitik; il connaissait bien les mobiles du caractère humain, notamment ceux des "Grands"; il était conscient du caractère instable et "ondoyant" des affaires humaines; et il reconnaissait la possibilité de l'échec. Mais à notre avis le secret de sa grandeur gît dans le fait qu'il n'en désespérait pas, s'étant efforcé d'accepter avec équanimité les vicissitudes de l'existence. (La sienne en a certainement eu!) Face à des obstacles qui paraissaient insurmontables, il croyait à la dignité de la lutte,

à la possibilité de surmonter “ce qui espouvante tant de gens, & principalement les délicats” (p. 779). Tenant compte de la “branloire perenne,” il croyait à la nécessité de confronter des choix pénibles, de juger, de choisir et, une fois le choix fait, de s’y lancer corps et âme, sachant bien qu’il pourrait rencontrer l’échec, mais n’oubliant jamais qu’il pourrait se relever le lendemain pour reprendre la lutte. C’est cette “résilience” exceptionnelle, cette réaffirmation continue de l’esprit humain qui caractérise son attitude et explique son comportement – et qui risque de dérouter l’historien! C’est ce que Hauser prend pour de la naïveté. Mais faut-il toujours assimiler espoir, optimisme, équanimité et confiance à naïveté, crédulité et niaiserie? Le fait que La Noue s’efforçait de ne pas être méchant ne veut pas dire, comme Hauser l’affirme, qu’il était incapable de soupçonner les autres d’être méchants. Le fait que La Noue n’était pas un traître ne le rendait pas incapable de se méfier des intentions d’un Charles IX ou d’une Catherine de Médicis. L’on peut croire à la méchanceté sans être soi-même méchant; l’on peut reconnaître l’existence du mal sans pour autant s’y abandonner. La Noue a passé toute sa vie dans ce que Montaigne appelle une “vraie eschole de trahison, d’inhumanité et de brigandage” sans pour autant devenir traître, inhumain et brigand. Il y a survécu sans perdre sa “constante bonté, douceur de meurs et facilité consciencieuse.” Ces qualités ne l’ont pas pourtant empêché d’être un “grand homme de guerre et très-experimenté.”<sup>40</sup> C’était un homme exceptionnel parce qu’il réfléchissait à ce qu’il faisait et fondait son comportement là-dessus – mais de tels hommes existent. Ne réduisons pas sa grandeur en expliquant son comportement par des “manies” ou des “chimères.”

### **La vision idéologique de La Noue: “naïveté” ou “modernité”?**

Nous espérons que cette analyse des *Discours* de La Noue contribuera à mettre en relief un aspect peu connu de son caractère. La Noue était dans un sens un “loyal serviteur,” un “Bayard huguenot,” mais il servait loyalement des principes auxquels il avait bien réfléchi, sans se laisser aveugler, sans abandonner la raison. Il réfléchissait avant d’agir en s’efforçant de conformer sa vie à des modèles idéologiques cohérents. La comparaison avec Bayard risque de le réduire à un type quelque peu béat et dépourvu de subtilité. Nous espérons avoir montré que c’était un homme intelligent, sensé, prudent et même malin. Sans ces qualités, il n’aurait pas pu survivre dans l’univers guerrier, cette “eschole de trahison, d’inhumanité et de brigandage.”

Serions-nous “naïf” à notre tour de voir dans cet homme un mélange unique, l’incarnation de l’idéal noble et de l’idéal calviniste? De sa formation nobiliaire, il tire le modèle idéologique d’une vie fondée sur la poursuite de la vertu, de la justice, de l’honneur, aussi bien que le sens de mission: la défense des opprimés et du royaume de France.<sup>41</sup> Il reconnaît



pourtant des limites et s'efforce de maîtriser les penchants à la violence gratuite. Du calvinisme il tire sa confiance, surtout la conviction qu'il existe un plan divin et que l'homme a un rôle actif à jouer. S'il reconnaît la possibilité de l'échec, il se lance dans la bataille comme si la victoire était inévitable. S'il ne cherche pas activement la défaite, les douleurs ou la mort, il ne les craint plus: "Quand elles lui adviendront, il ne fera pas l'accident plus grand qu'il est, ains taschera, avec la vigueur de l'esprit, de le rendre encores plus petit. . . Ils ne se contristent point outre mesure de quitter une vie caduque & transitoire pour une parfaitement accomplie de tous bien eternels," etc. (pp. 571, 580). La Noue s'efforce donc de vivre à la fois l'idéal évangélique et l'idéal guerrier.

Nous n'hésiterons pas à affirmer que c'était un homme exceptionnel qui a assuré la survie de la Réforme et qui en honore l'histoire. N'exagérons pas en faisant de lui un saint, car son idéologie comporte des éléments qui choqueront (espérons-le) le lecteur "éclairé" du vingtième siècle. Mais s'il est indéniable qu'il accepte le principe d'une société fondée sur le privilège, il insiste quand même sur la nécessité de mériter ces privilèges et se montre tout à fait insensible à l'égard de ceux qui trahissent leur vocation "naturelle" de cadres dirigeants. S'il consent à peine à reconnaître l'humanité du "peuple champestre" qui semble incapable des "exercices superieures de l'ame" ("Mais la charité nous doit faire juger que Dieu ne fait rien en vain," p. 606), il n'hésite jamais à risquer sa vie pour le défendre contre les atrocités perpétrées par ses pairs de la noblesse, ces "harpyes militaires." S'il est également indéniable qu'il recourt à la force et à la violence pour défendre une foi fondée sur "misericorde," "charité" et "douceur" (p. 398), il fait tout pour en éviter l'emploi et s'efforce toujours d'en minimiser les dégâts, car "l'homme doit principalement tendre à paix & tranquillité, à fin de mener une vie plus juste" (p. 210. Ajoutons en passant que les idéologies "progressistes" et "scientifiques" qui ont succédé aux doctrines "réactionnaires" de l'Ancien Régime se sont avérées beaucoup plus sanguinaires et répressives.) A notre avis, le mot "grandeur" n'est pas déplacé, une grandeur qui provient moins de ses exploits militaires que de son caractère et de sa capacité de réflexion. Il se montre toujours plus exigeant à l'égard de sa propre conduite qu'à celle de ses contemporains et se croit d'autant plus autorisé à fustiger ceux-ci qu'il s'efforce consciemment de réaliser une synthèse entre l'idéal nobiliaire et l'idéal évangélique. Il s'en est approché.

Quelle est alors la valeur du témoignage vécu et écrit que nous a laissé La Noue? Comme il serait téméraire et déplacé de vouloir empiéter sur le domaine de la foi personnelle des Réformés du vingtième siècle en leur proposant une réponse à cette question, nos conclusions s'organiseront plutôt autour de deux concepts qui risquent de prêter à des malentendus: la "modernité" et la "naïveté." Non que ces concepts entrent forcément en

contradiction l'un avec l'autre; mais comme Henri Hauser s'en sert, non seulement dans son étude sur La Noue, mais aussi dans *La modernité du seizième siècle*, nous les reprenons ici pour tenter de répondre aux questions suivantes: les analyses de La Noue ont-elles anticipé sur l'avenir? Si oui, nous pourrions employer l'étiquette "moderne." D'un autre côté, La Noue ne conçoit-il pas les rapports entre les êtres humains et la nature de l'Etat sous un angle "naïf," c'est-à-dire sans tenir compte de ce que Machiavel appelle *la realtà effettuale delle cose*? Si nous hésitons à utiliser le terme "précurseur" de peur de tomber dans les pièges de l'anachronisme ou d'une vision linéaire de l'histoire, il faut tout de même reconnaître que La Noue devance à certains égards la majorité de ses contemporains. Sa conception de l'Etat et sa vision de l'avenir de la noblesse illustreront cette thèse.

Prenons d'abord sa conception de l'Etat en analysant trois aspects complémentaires: le nationalisme, le monarchisme et la tolérance. Comme il vit à une époque de crise, La Noue propose souvent des solutions provisoires dictées par l'actualité et destinées à rétablir l'ordre le plus vite possible; mais ces remèdes "ponctuels" découlent en réalité de principes abstraits que La Noue s'est formés, soit à partir de ses lectures soit pendant sa carrière militaire. Loin de voir des contradictions entre le théorique et l'universel, d'une part, le pratique et le vécu, de l'autre, La Noue insiste sur leur complémentarité. Son sentiment national en fournit un exemple. Une des sources de son patriotisme est le danger immédiat représenté par l'Espagne. Il est d'autant plus "nationaliste" qu'il craint la domination étrangère, et la peur de voir triompher les forces du roi très-catholique joue un rôle décisif dans ses appels à l'unité nationale. (Il n'hésite pas toutefois à exprimer son admiration pour certaines qualités espagnoles: discours XIV-XVII). Mais à ce sentiment négatif fondé sur la crainte s'ajoute un réel sentiment de fierté à l'égard de la France. Il s'agit d'une attitude "moderne" en ce sens que La Noue dépasse le sentiment tribal primitif, la crainte primordiale de l'Autre en se déclarant prêt à reconnaître comme compatriotes tous ceux qui se réclament de la France: "Aux termes où est maintenant nostre Estat, un Italien francizé est bien autant à priser qu'un François espagnolizé" (p. 107). Peu de ses coreligionnaires se montrent aussi accueillants envers les compatriotes de la Reine-mère. (L'on verra qu'il s'agit naturellement d'un Etat multi-confessionnel.) Si Hauser a tort de chercher chez La Noue une espèce de nationalisme post-révolutionnaire, il a raison d'insister sur sa conscience nationale "moderne."

Ce sentiment est inséparable chez lui d'un sentiment monarchiste que l'on pourrait qualifier de "pré-" ou de "proto-" absolutiste, car La Noue tient à ce que ses compatriotes restent "affectionnez à se maintenir unis souz l'autorité de ceste couronne" (p. 415). De nouveau, théorie et pratique se rejoignent. Un roi fort lui paraît être le remède immédiat aux



désordres causés par les guerres de religion, et ce roi aurait pu en même temps protéger les Réformés. A ces soucis immédiats s'ajoutent les exhortations bibliques qui exigent la soumission aux "magistrats" (discours X), et La Noue est conscient des dangers que comporte tout "changement de police." Qu'il ait cherché des solutions dans la science politique gréco-romaine, dans l'enseignement paulinien ou dans la réalité concrète qui l'entoure, il a trouvé la même réponse: la fidélité à un roi fort qui, seul, exerce la souveraineté à la tête d'un Etat-nation unifié. Lorsqu'il se voyait obligé de s'opposer à la politique des fils de Henri II, son but n'était ni la destruction de la monarchie ni la mort des monarques: il cherchait plutôt à les ramener à la raison, à les obliger à négocier, à accorder la liberté de conscience – d'où sa modération, sa mansuétude, ses efforts d'empêcher des atrocités qui n'auraient fait que provoquer des représailles de la part des catholiques plus nombreux. Il ne voulait pas ravager le pays qui devait un jour servir à tous, réformés et catholiques. Il se comportait donc comme un homme d'état qui voyait loin, qui savait pourquoi il se battait et qui n'oubliait jamais que la fin ne justifie pas les moyens.

La politique de tolérance préconisée par La Noue relève, elle aussi, de facteurs concrets et de principes abstraits. Il est évident qu'une telle politique aurait assuré la sécurité des Réformés, permis le retour des exilés et autorisé le prosélytisme, grossissant ainsi les rangs du parti. Il n'y a donc pas lieu de s'étonner de l'attitude de La Noue. Mais il ne s'agit pas simplement de la politique intéressée d'un sectaire, car La Noue respecte la dignité inhérente de l'individu et reconnaît la suprématie de la conscience en matière de foi (bien qu'il méprise l'Islam et qu'il maintienne que "le feu est pour les Sodomites," p. 124), pourvu que le "faux zelle" ne pousse pas le croyant à répandre le sang d'autrui. L'Etat monarchiste devrait s'en porter garant, "& si la paix regne quelque temps on verra qu'en la Chrestienté ne se trouvera de meilleurs catholiques et évangéliques qu'en France" (p. 409). La coexistence de deux ou de plusieurs confessions se présente ainsi comme un moyen de contribuer à la gloire du royaume de France, d'ajouter une pierre précieuse à la couronne du roi. Hauser a donc des raisons solides de défendre l'authenticité de la "Lettre sur la conversion du Roy."<sup>42</sup>

Bien que les acquis de l'Edit de Nantes aient été progressivement rognés par les successeurs de Henri IV, les trois principes qui viennent d'être analysés constitueront la base de l'Etat français du XVII<sup>e</sup> et du XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècles. Dans la perspective de La Noue, l'unité nationale paraît inconcevable sans la présence d'un roi fort qui, appuyé par une noblesse régénérée, fût capable de veiller sur les droits de tous ses sujets, quelle que soit leur confession. Un tel pays pourrait alors tenir tête à d'éventuelles menaces venues de l'étranger: "Mal-aisément nous pourroient-ils ruiner en quelque estat que nous soyons, moyennant que nous demourrons en

l'obéissance de la couronne" (p. 435). L'analyste moderne y verra sans doute la soumission de la religion aux intérêts de l'Etat, mais La Noue n'y voit aucun conflit, ayant toujours trouvé une parfaite correspondance entre sa foi et son patriotisme. La conception de l'Etat qui se dégage des *Discours* préfigure ainsi certains principes fondamentaux de l'Etat absolutiste du XVII<sup>e</sup> et du XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècles, et de l'Etat "libéral" fondé sur la coexistence de plusieurs confessions et de plusieurs courants d'opinion. Est-ce que La Noue a aussi bien prévu le rôle que jouerait dans cet Etat le Second Ordre?

La Noue comprend bien que la France est en danger parce que ses défenseurs sont incompetents, irresponsables et "indignes de porter ces deux beaux titres de chrestien & de gentil-homme" (p. 697). En tant que noble, il cherche à agir dans un domaine qui relève de sa compétence, ayant conclu que le salut du royaume passerait par le salut de la noblesse. Si de nombreux contemporains éprouvent un besoin urgent de réformes profondes au sein du Second Ordre, c'est La Noue qui, dans ses *Discours*, fournit des analyses parmi les plus perspicaces, proposant des solutions concrètes et réalisables: "Ce ne sont point icy des Idees de Platon (c'est à dire des choses imaginees)" (p. 313).

Comme ses idées sur la nature de l'Etat, ses idées sur l'éducation relèvent et du théorique et du pratique. Le spectacle effroyable des guerres de religion l'a convaincu des résultats catastrophiques de l'ignorance: ceux qui troublent "l'ordre public" et qui "s'emancipent à telles choses, le font par defect de bonne nourriture" (p. 157). L'éducation dans des académies "écuméniques" aurait donc servi à mettre fin aux désordres et à arrêter la destruction de la noblesse.<sup>43</sup>

Mais en même temps "l'institution à pieté & vertu" (p. 142) lui paraît nécessaire si le noble doit réaliser pleinement toutes ses virtualités. Cette insistance sur l'épanouissement moral, spirituel et intellectuel de l'homme laïc – impliquant même la contemplation et la méditation – est à mettre en rapport avec le principe réformé du sacerdoce universel: le père, "prêtre" chez lui, doit être capable de lire l'Ecriture, de l'enseigner à ses enfants, d'en tirer des leçons et d'agir en conséquence. L'union avec la Divinité est non pas un droit, mais un devoir fondamental de tout être humain, notamment du noble, né avec "des inclinations plus vives & ployables que les autres. . . à quoy leur condition noble les doit aussi exhorter" (pp. 595-96). L'on voit donc comment religion et conscience de classe se renforcent. La Noue préconise ainsi la formation de cadres laïcs dignes de diriger le royaume.

L'on comprend facilement la nécessité de bien former la faculté du jugement. La vie de La Noue confirme que le noble est confronté à des choix épineux: la nature de l'engagement du sujet dans la vie de la république; la définition d'une guerre "juste"; les limites acceptables de la force et de la



violence; le devoir de refuser d'obéir à des ordres injustes; les alliances politiques "impures," etc. La religion de La Noue n'exige pas la démission intellectuelle ou la croyance aveugle des pasteurs de La Rochelle. Ses *Discours* et ses *Observations* veulent aider le noble à aiguïser ses facultés de discernement: "Cela est apprendre à estre capitaine. . . à fin que ceux qui veulent s'instruire aux armes en tirent ce fruit. . . Quand quelque fait est décrit à la verité, & avec ses circonstances, encore qu'il ne soit parvenu qu'à my chemin, si peut-on tousjours en tirer du fruit" (pp. 661, 724, 736), etc. Son oeuvre et sa vie constituent un modèle vivant de cette pédagogie nouvelle visant à assurer la survie et l'épanouissement de la noblesse d'épée: "La jeunesse ayant esté ainsi instituee, il ne faudroit point craindre de l'envoyer apres par tout où l'on voudroit, par ce qu'elle seroit à l'espreuve, & au lieu de se gaster, elle iroit choisissant ce qui est de meilleur ailleurs, pour y profiter" (p. 158). Que peut-on dire de ses projets, de sa vision de l'avenir de la noblesse?

Si La Noue a bien compris la nécessité de réformes profondes au sein du Second Ordre, il ne pouvait pas concevoir la domestication de l'aristocratie accomplie au cours du XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle. Tandis que son désir de fournir à la noblesse d'épée un nouveau type de formation intellectuelle représente une percée vers la modernité, son espoir de voir se renforcer l'harmonie entre une noblesse plus "reconnaissante" et la monarchie paraît naïf. Mais qui aurait pu prévoir que les processus de "raffinement" impliqueraient aussi l'approvisionnement intellectuel, moral et même financier du Second Ordre?

Sa conception paternaliste de la monarchie ("Le prince . . . est pere commun de ses sujets," p. 152) l'empêche de concevoir qu'un père puisse chercher à restreindre l'épanouissement de ses "fils." Il faut dire en même temps que La Noue a sous-estimé la rôle qu'allait jouer le Tiers Etat dans cette nouvelle société. Son programme préconise la reprise en main des fonctions clés de l'Etat par ceux dont les ancêtres, "estans parvenus à grandeur & honneur, par les voyes de vertu tant intellectuelle que morale, . . . leur ont laissé des petites semences d'icelles . . . aptes à les renouveler en eux" (p. 595), etc. Mais l'évolution historique n'a pas exaucé ses vœux: il se serait certainement réjoui de voir l'aristocratie raffinée du XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle; il se serait sans doute étonné de constater jusqu'à quel point elle s'était soumise à la monarchie et s'était adonnée au "libertinisme" dénoncé dans le discours XXIV.

Terminons donc en soulignant encore la richesse et la diversité de l'oeuvre de La Noue. On a vu que l'histoire littéraire a relégué notre auteur au rang des "chroniqueurs" ou des "mémorialistes," destin qui n'est pas dépourvu d'honneur mais qui ne rend pas justice au Bras de Fer. S'il est indéniable que le contenu des "Observations" explique ce jugement de la critique, La Noue dépasse de loin les Montluc, les Castelnau, les Barnaud, etc. Ce sont tous des témoins qui, en tant que tels, ont joué un rôle indis-

pensable dans la compréhension de l'histoire du seizième siècle. Mais ces témoins s'avèrent souvent bornés et intéressés, cherchant à se vanter ou à justifier leurs méfaits. Sans vouloir nier que La Noue cherche à se justifier – "Il estoit tres-necessaire alors . . . de lever les mauvaises impressions qui se pouvoient prendre par ceux qui ignoroyent les intentions des entrepreneurs. . . . Qui ne rembarre les calomnies . . . sans doute il se verroit souvent supprimé," p. 622 – nous soutenons que ce n'est pas là l'essentiel.

Tout en étant un témoin objectif et digne de foi, La Noue est avant tout un penseur, un moraliste qui cherche à renvoyer ses lecteurs à des valeurs atemporelles: le vécu et l'immédiat doivent toujours être transcendés et déboucher sur l'abstrait, l'universel et l'éternel. Que ce soit dans ses "mémoires" ou dans ses "opuscules," l'auteur s'efforce de dépasser l'éphémère en avertissant le lecteur de l'existence d'autre chose, d'une leçon générale à en tirer. Tout fait concret débouchant ainsi sur l'universel, le lecteur se voit doublement récompensé de ses efforts. C'est cet aspect de son oeuvre qui l'élève au-dessus aussi bien des mémorialistes que des polémistes déchaînés dont l'oeuvre était destinée à la "consommation" immédiate. Ainsi les véritables confrères de La Noue se nomment-ils Machiavel, Plutarque, Guichardin, Montaigne, Charron, Pascal.

Cette constatation nous mène à poser une question paradoxale: faut-il regretter que La Noue n'ait pas eu le temps de se consacrer à la réflexion et à l'écriture? D'une part, il peut paraître regrettable que ses campagnes militaires incessantes ne lui aient pas laissé le loisir de s'adonner aux activités intellectuelles. La suite des "Observations," par exemple, serait sans aucun doute un document des plus précieux. Ses années de captivité ont été "utiles" dans la mesure où elles lui ont offert une période de temps "libre" pendant laquelle son âme était "desliee des ceps & liens mondains" (p. 598). C'est précisément ce mélange d'action et de réflexion chez La Noue qui fait le caractère unique du personnage et de l'oeuvre, c'est son engagement personnel qui justifie son oeuvre. Ses idées ne sont pas seulement abstraites mais sont en prise sur le réel et l'action. Il se compare lui-même à Saint Augustin, qui "a approuvé du tout ceste bien ordonnee composition" de vie active et de vie contemplative, aussi bien qu'à saint Paul, qui "avec ses hautes & profondes speculations n'a point laissé d'estre en action perpetuelle pour l'edification de l'Eglise" (ibid.). C'est dans ce désir maintes fois exprimé de réaliser une synthèse entre le spirituel et le matériel, le divin et l'humain que réside la "noblesse" de La Noue. Il a cru pouvoir aider la classe dirigeante du royaume de France à atteindre cet idéal à travers son exemple personnel, par son engagement actif et par ses écrits. Il a contribué de la sorte au progrès intellectuel de la noblesse française, ainsi qu'à la "défense et illustration" de l'Eglise Réformée, et ce avec la plume d'un authentique écrivain dont la prose a enrichi la langue française du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle.



## Notes

- 1 Le lecteur trouvera des renseignements sur la vie de La Noue dans Brantôme, *Cœuvres*, éd. Ludovic Lalanne (Paris: J. Renouard, 1873), VII: 203-65; dans Moïse Amyraut, *La vie de François, seigneur de la Nouë, dit Bras-de-Fer* (Leyde: Jean Elsevier, 1661); et dans Henri Hauser, *François de La Noue* (Paris: Hachette, 1892). Ce sont des témoignages de valeur inégale: si Brantôme laisse échapper son sentiment de jalousie à l'égard de La Noue, Amyraut ne résiste pas à la tentation hagiographique. C'est donc l'étude de Hauser qui s'avérera la plus utile.
- 2 François de La Noue, *Discours politiques et militaires*, éd. Frank E. Sutcliffe (Genève: Droz, 1967). Toutes les citations seront tirées de cette édition et apparaîtront dans notre texte. Comme le professeur Sutcliffe n'a pas précisé les principes dont il s'est servi pour établir son texte, nous avons comparé l'édition de 1967 à celle de 1587 ([Bâle ou Genève]: François Forest, 1587; Bibliothèque Nationale R. 6332). Lorsqu'il ne s'agit que de variantes d'orthographe qui ne mettent pas en cause le sens du texte, nous ne nous sommes pas cru obligé de les signaler au lecteur, afin de ne pas encombrer inutilement notre étude.
- 3 Parmi les travaux récents consacrés à La Noue, on peut citer: William H. Huseman, "François de La Noue, la dignité de l'homme et l'institution des enfant nobles: contribution à l'étude de l'humanisme protestant", *Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance* 42 (1980), 7-25; Ian Morrison, "The Dignity of Man and the Followers of Epicurus: The View of the Huguenot François de La Noue," *BHR* 37 (1975), 421-29; Paul Rousset, "Un huguenot propose une croisade: le projet de François de La Noue, 1580-1585," *Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique Suisse* 72 (1978), 333-44; "L'idéologie de croisade dans les guerres de religion au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle," *Revue Suisse d'Histoire* 31 (1981), 174-84; James Supple, "François de La Noue's Plan for a Campaign Against the Turks," *BHR* 41 (1979), 273-91; "The Role of François de La Noue in the Siege of La Rochelle and the Protestant Alliance with the *Mécontents*," *BHR* 43 (1981), 107-22; et "François de La Noue and the Education of the French Noblesse d'épée," *French Studies* 36 (1982), 270-81.
- Parmi les chercheurs qui citent longuement La Noue, on peut mentionner André Devyver, *Le sang épuré. Les préjugés de race chez les gentilshommes français de l'Ancien Régime* (Bruxelles: Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 1973); Arlette Jouanna, *L'idée de race en France au XVI<sup>e</sup> et au début du XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle (1498-1614)*, (Paris: Champion, 1976); Miriam Yardeni, *La conscience nationale en France pendant les guerres de religion* (Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1971); Roger Chartier, Marie-Madeleine Compère, et Dominique Julia, *L'éducation en France du XVI<sup>e</sup> au XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Paris: SEDES, 1976); et René Bady, *L'homme et son "institution" de Montaigne à Bérulle, 1580-1625* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1964).
- 4 Montaigne, *Essais*, éd. Pierre Villey (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1922), II: 448 ("De la présomption," II, 17).
- 5 Jacques Lelong, *Bibliothèque historique de la France* (Paris: Jean-Thomas Hérissant), II: 339. Lelong cite le père Gabriel Daniel, *Histoire de France depuis l'établissement de la monarchie française dans les Gaules* (Paris: J.-B. Delespine, 1713), III: 1531.
- 6 Hauser, p. 274.
- 7 Ibid., xvii.
- 8 Ibid., xvii-xviii.
- 9 Lucien Romier, *Le royaume de Catherine de Médicis. La France à la veille des guerres de religion* (Paris: Perrin, 1925), I: x.
- 10 H.-J. Messines, *Protestants et Français* (Paris: s. éd., [1899]), pp. 3, 8. Cet ouvrage sans valeur "scientifique" s'avère néanmoins extrêmement utile dans la mesure où il exprime l'inquiétude profonde de la communauté protestante.
- 11 Jean Bauberot, "La vision de la Réforme chez les publicistes antiprotestants (fin XIX<sup>e</sup>-début XX<sup>e</sup>)," in *Historiographie de la Réforme*, éd. Ph. Joutard, Actes du colloque du 22-24 septembre 1972 (Neuchâtel-Paris: Delachaux & Niestlé, 1977), p. 216. La revue *Histoire* a consacré un numéro aux protestants français: janvier-mars 1981, n° 7.
- 12 Ibid., "Avant-propos" de P. Guiral, p. 5; cf. Messines, p. 5.
- 13 Messines, p. 3.

- 14 F. Brunetière, *Les ennemis de l'âme française* (Paris: J. Hetzel, s.d.), pp. 55-74; Ch. Buet, *Les mensonges de l'histoire* (Lille: J. Lefort, 1885-1889), I, 53-195; II, 143-86; 209-75; Edouard Drumont, *La France juive* (Paris: Marpon & Flammarion, 1886); Ch. Merki, *L'Amiral de Coligny, la maison de Châtillon et la révolte protestante, 1519-1572* (Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1909); E. Renauld, *Le péril protestant* (Paris: Tolra, 1899); et Georges Thiébaud, *Le parti protestant* (Paris: A. Savine, 1895).
- 15 Messines, p. 4.
- 16 Ibid., p. 13.
- 17 Ibid., p. 23.
- 18 Ibid., pp. 25-32.
- 19 Daniel Robert, "Patriotisme et image de la Réforme chez les historiens protestants français après 1870," in Joutard, p. 207. Voir aussi un article typique de N. Weiss, "La prétendue trahison de Coligny," *BSHPF* 49 (1900), 37-47, ou les Actes du colloque *Les protestants dans les débuts de la Troisième République* (1871-1855), éd. André Encrevé et Michel Richard (Paris: Société de l'Histoire du Protestantisme Français, 1979).
- 20 Robert, p. 215.
- 21 Bauberot, p. 222.
- 22 Denis D'Aussy, "Un Bayard calviniste: François de La Noue et ses dernières campagnes," *Revue des Questions Historiques* 42 (octobre 1887), 397-440. L'on peut consulter aussi ses articles dans la *Revue de la Saintonge et de l'Aunis*, 8 (juillet 1888), 280-83 et 8 (septembre 1888), 331-33; et 13 (janvier 1893), 22-34. N. Weiss lui a répondu dans le *BSHPF* 36 (1887), 667-78 et 37 (1888), 335-36, 388-89. Hauser a défendu l'authenticité des *Discours* dans la *Revue Historique* 53 (septembre-octobre 1893), 301-11.
- 23 Pierre de Dampmartin, *La Fortune de la Cour* (Paris: Nicolas de Sercy, 1644), p. 173.
- 24 *La coppie d'une lettre envoyee par un gentilhomme, de l'armee de Monseigneur le Duc de Mayenne, aux Bourgeois & habitants de la Ville & Faubourgs de Paris* (Paris: Pour Anthoine du Brueil, 1589), pp. 4-5.
- 25 "Discours bref et véritable des choses plus notables arrivées au siège mémorable de la renommée ville de Paris & défense d'icelle," in *Mémoires de la Ligue* (Amsterdam: Arkstée & Merkus, 1758), IV: 282.
- 26 Pierre Brisson, *Histoire et vray discours des guerres civiles es pays de Poictou, Aulnis, autrement dit Rochelois, Xaintonge, & Angoumois depuis l'annee mil cinq cens soixante & quatorze* (Paris: Jacques du Puy, 1578), f. Av. verso.
- 27 Ibid., f. Cvii recto.
- 28 La Popelinière, Henri Voisin, sieur de, *Histoire de France* (La Rochelle: Abraham H., 1581), tome second, livre 24, f. 5 recto.
- 29 Bentivoglio, Guido, Cardinal. *Histoire générale des guerres de Flandres*, trad. Antoine Oudin (Paris: François Promé, 1699), tome I, livre vi, p. 323.
- 30 La Popelinière, tome second, livre 32, f. 118 verso.
- 31 Emanuel van Meteren, *L'histoire des Pays-Bas*, trad. Jean de La Haye (La Haye: Hillebrant Jacobs, 1618), f. 156d (14 juillet 1578).
- 32 *Calendars*, avril 1579, n° 668, p. 501; 10 mai 1579, n° 675, p. 507; 5 octobre 1579, n° 59, p. 68; 22 novembre 1579, n° 96, p. 98.
- 33 Alexandre Farnèse, prince de Parme, *Correspondance . . . dans les années 1578, 1579, 1580 et 1581*, éd. M. Gachard (Bruxelles: C. Muquardt, 1853), p. 112.
- 34 De Thou, *Histoire universelle* (La Haye: Scheurleer, 1740), tome quatre, livre 42, p. 18.
- 35 *La résistance des habitants de la ville de Meaux, contre les troupes de Givry, & la Nouë, & leurs associez politiques* (Paris: Hubert Velu, 1589), p. 7. Palma-Cayet rapporte le conseil suivant qu'a donné La Nouë à Henri IV: "Nous y perdriens temps et moyens, mais peu à peu, usant des ouvertures que je feray, vous verrez que ce grand party se dissipera en soy-mesmes, et nous donnera beau jeu sans beaucoup travailler; mais il faut de la patience et de la finesse" (*Chronologie novenaire*, éd. Petitot (Paris: Foucault, 1824), XXXIX: 329. C'est nous qui soulignons.)



36 De Thou, tome quatre, livre 47, p. 316.

37 Ibid., p. 321.

38 Pierre de L'Estoile, *Journal pour le règne de Henri IV, 1589-1600*, éd. Louis-Raymond Lefèvre (Paris: Gallimard, 1948), p. 72 (août 1590).

39 Nicolas Barnaud, *Le réveille-matin des François, et de leurs voisins. Composé par Eusèbe Philadelphie Cosmopolite, en forme de dialogues*. (Edimbourg: Jaques Iames, 1574), II: 132.

40 Montaigne, II: 448.

41 Cf. La Noue, *Déclaration*, p. 3: "Le devoir d'un gentilhomme faisant profession de vertu, gist en premier lieu, à si bien preparer & digerer ses actions, qu'il en reçoive contentement en soy mesme. Il doit apres les faire reluire & les iustifier en sorte, que les bons soient satisfaits, & les mauvais n'ayent suiet de les condamner."

Palma-Cayet (XL: 292) raconte que, vers la fin de sa vie, La Noue a coupé "deux petites branches de laurier," et "ayant amenuisé l'une de ces branches, il la mit à son armet au lieu de panache." En voyant entrer le sieur de Montmartin, "il luy monstra son armet entouré de lauriers, et luy dit: "Tenez, mon cousin, voylà toute la recompense que vous et moy esperons, suivans le mestier que nous faisons."

42 Voir son article "François de La Noue et la conversion du roy," *Revue Historique* 36 (mars-avril 1888), 311-23.

43 Voir les études de Huseman, de Morrison, de Supple, de Jouanna, et de Bady citées dans la note 3 ci-dessus.

# The Essay as a Moral Exercise: Montaigne\*

JOHN O'NEILL

In the *Essays*<sup>1</sup> Montaigne achieved a unique conformity between the literary exercises of reading and writing and an order of interiority that enabled him to lend himself to the world and to others without loss, but also without either moral idealism or scepticism.<sup>2</sup> The literary unity of the *Essays*, although not as apparent as the integrity of the moral maxims that first figure them, emerges gradually in the self-portrait of the reader/writer doubly reflected in Montaigne's own practices and their embodied demands upon the reader's response to the *Essays*:

La gentille inscription dequoy les Atheniens honorerent la venue de Pompeius en leur ville, se conforme à mon sens:

D'autant es tu Dieu comme

Tu te recognois homme.

C'est une absolue perfection, et comme divine, de sçavoyr jouyr loialement de son estre. Nous cherchons d'autres conditions, pour n'entendre l'usage des nostres, et sortons hors de nous, pour sçavoir quel il y fait. Si, avons nous beau monter sur des eschasses, car sur des eschasses encores faut-il marcher de nos jambes. Et au plus eslevé throne du monde, si ne sommes assis que sus nostre cul.

(III:xiii, 1096)

If we propose to speak of the *Essays* as a moral exercise, we do so only in order to follow Montaigne's deconstruction of the ethical portrait, the moral or maxim forced to stand frozen in time like Cato, attracting an admiration deprived of self-inquiry.

What Montaigne exercises in the *Essays* is himself as a writer, that is to say, he explores his strengths and weaknesses as an essayist rather than as an abstractly moral figure. This exploration begins in the very early and – as he himself remarks – rather dependent essays that trade upon the moral maxims and *exempla* of antiquity. The *exemplum* condenses a moral deed, posture or maxim into a moment that lays a claim upon universal attention. The *exemplum* furnishes the mind with places where it may

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contemplate man's capacity for moral strength or weakness, probity or turpitude. Thus the *exemplum* punctuates its surrounding text, creating a monumental place that gathers to itself moral reflection with the aim of sending away a more resolute moral agent. As a rhetorical device its danger is that it may lure us into a merely echoing morality that will not stand up in the time and altered circumstances of our own trial.

Montaigne seems to have sensed from the very beginning that the *Essays* could not be built upon the footings of the *exemplum*. Indeed, to the extent that they appear only to be a collection of such maxims, the *Essays* have been pillaged, like the Parthenon, to service those anthologies, garlands and museums of the mind, that display an easy spirituality. If the *Essays* lacked any stronger principle of composition, then, of course, they would not have withstood the ravages of time, and they would even have been lucky to survive as fragments in our cultural museum. But then we should also have lost the author of the *Essays*. Or rather, Montaigne would have lost himself through his inability to improvise that form of ethical inquiry that underwrites the *Essays* as a text that cannot be gathered into a garland of moral maxims, nor into an anthology without an author who will claim it as his own body.

The things that stand the test of time, morally speaking, do so by yielding to time rather than by declaring themselves as eternal archetypes. Such archetypes are indeed nothing but the dead stones of history, always ruined by time, surviving fortuitously or by a bricolage indifferent to their original status. The solidity of the *exemplum* collapses in virtue of its pretended *extra-textuality*, its inability to withstand the essayist's amplification of history elsewhere and otherwise brought to similar ends. Montaigne's proliferation of *exempla* destabilizes them, turning certainty into uncertainty, decisiveness into undecidability. The result is that the textual closure aimed at by the moral maxim or paradigm is subverted in the continuous disclosure of the essayist's triumph over the book of received opinion. A weak intertextuality, trading upon the voices of the past, is replaced by the strong intertextuality of the essay form as an exercise in moral inquiry, judgment and self-appreciation.

Montaigne's method of counterposing to an exemplary moral claim everything that can be said to challenge it rescues ethical argument from both idealism and empiricism. In the course of Montaigne's reading and writing, the space of ethical inquiry is displaced into the essay's exploration of ethical ideals and customary moral behaviour. Between them the writer and the reader articulate the essay in a mode of self-inquiry that progresses through the essayist's ability to so suspend the moral alternatives upon which a given essay turns that none rules the text as a foregone conclusion.

In "Of Cannibals," for example, Montaigne proceeds very gradually to

subvert the cultural boundary between civilization and barbarism. The revolving distinctions of the essay drive the reader to redistribute his own critical sense of boundaries as a rude practice that only writing/reading the essay can redeem. By combining civilized reportage with the testimony of his own experience, including that of certain plain savages without any motive to embellish their stories, Montaigne reappropriates the boundary between civilization and barbarism as a textual locus.<sup>3</sup> Thus the essay itself becomes the proper moral space within which the reader can confront the other as himself and himself as other, relativising the very grounds of morality (reason, information, fidelity) to the essayist's ethic. Through the detour of the naked and the familiar, the essayist like a noble savage delivers the unadorned truth of the *spoken body*, undivided and faithful.

The open form of Montaigne's *Essays* is the result not of his irresolute nature nor of his failure to embrace logic and closure. It is a shaping instrument of the writer's determination to dwell within the rhythms of his embodied experience. Thus particular essays drift and vary like Montaigne's own moods, occupying him for a longer or shorter period, and often returning upon him, as we see from the triple levels of the text and its innumerable internal revisions. Montaigne's usage of temporal markers and disjunctive adverbs is an especially significant artifact in the essayist's successful subversion of the exemplary text into a *self-text*. And the places where he succeeds in intertwining his own lived experience with an institutionalized history of morals are similarly marked by subtle shifts from first to third person usage. Thus, having recalled the advice of Epicurus, "Conceal your life," Montaigne himself remarks:

Ces discours là sont infiniment vrais, à mon avis, et raisonnables. Mais nous sommes, je ne sçay comment, doubles en nous mesmes, qui faict que ce que nous croyons, nous ne le croyons pas, et ne nous pouvons deffaire de ce que nous condamnons.

(II:xvi, 603)

The cumulative effect of these distinctive devices is to breed a conversation between Montaigne and his reader in which the text is indifferent to any tendency to mastery or slavery. Rather, the essay solicits a friend, one equal in judgment and ability, less likely to be dominated by words, myths and received opinion for having embraced the essayist.

In the essay form Montaigne discovered a field in which the *embodied self* could test itself against its *written self*, as in conversation or in love.<sup>4</sup> The particular mode in which he devised this contrastive play of selves is to be seen in his typically disjunctive departures from the mould of received sayings, opinions and customs – forcing the text to speak in Montaigne's voice:



Je propose les fantaisies humaines et miennes, simplement comme humaines fantaisies, et separement considerées, non comme arrestées et réglées par l'ordonnance celeste, incapables de doubte et d'altercation; matiere d'opinion, non matiere de foy; ce que je discours selon moy, non ce que je croy selon Dieu, comme les enfans proposent leurs essais; instruisables, non instruisants; d'une maniere laïque, non clericale, mais très- religieuse tousjours.

(I:1vi, 308-309)

Such a passage can be repeated time and again. What happens in them is that, in weighing himself against himself, the essayist pits the reader against himself in a game of doubles, as it were. Like a tennis player, the capable reader whom Montaigne required of himself in order to become a writer is simultaneously doubled in any *lecteur suffisant* of the *Essays*. Any particular essay, therefore, can be shown to put the reader/writer relation into play over its sense, its language, or its very title. But these are not exercises in any general scepticism. They are rather valorisations of reading and writing, weighed in the scale of a nonchalant and learned ignorance that subverts the anxieties of intertextuality with the consubstantiality of the self-text.

The composition of the self-text involves the steady re-assimilation of the self-absorbing or impersonal voice of the essayist who starts by subordinating himself to a narrative seemingly ruled by received opinion. But each exemplary text soon becomes a pretext whose received authority, once placed in the balance of the essay and weighed in the essayist's own judgment of it, is re-assessed in the opinion of the universal subject – Michel de Montaigne:

Les auteurs se communiquent au peuple par quelque marque particuliere et estrangere; moy, le premier, par estre universel, comme Michel de Montaigne, non comme grammairien, ou poëte, ou jurisconsulte. Si le monde se plaint de quoy je parle trop de moy, je me plains de quoy il ne pense seulement pas à soy.

(III:ii, 782-783)

Internal to the composition of the essay, we frequently find that Montaigne succeeds in subverting received opinion by shifting the epistemological question of truth or falsity into the moral question of freedom versus slavery.<sup>5</sup> Thus the question, "is death something or no-thing (to be feared)?," is transposed into the question, "How are we to free ourselves from the fear of death, how are we to make of it an understanding that is our own?":

Omnem crede diem tibi diluxisse supremum Grata superveniet, quae non sperabitur hora.

Il est incertain où la mort nous attende, attendons la partout. La premeditation de la mort est premeditation de la liberté. Qui a appris à mourir, il a desappris à servir. La sçavoir mourir nous afranchit de toute subjection et contrainte.

(I:xx, 85)

The effect of this substitution is to reject the tyranny of death and to make of it a friend encountered daily in a premeditated liberty, yet not morbidly.

It is especially in "Du Repentir" that the essay reveals its peculiar fullness as a moral exercise. We ordinarily consider it the task of ethics to define the ideal criteria of a good man whose premeditated form is and ought to be imposed upon the tendency of his senses to scatter and seduce him. Yet Montaigne forswears any such practice of forming man. He argues that, on the contrary, it is in this way that we are mal- and misinformed. Those who submit to such formation, so far from being self-directed, though less likely to be moved from the outside, remain without internal control, as they know if they at all dare to inspect themselves. By contrast, those like Montaigne, who are apt to lend themselves to the outside, do so without betraying their interior freedom. This reversal of the forms of passage and movement, of stability and being, achieved in so many of the essays, realizes Montaigne's unrepentant claim upon the universal condition of man through his own individual and incorrigible experience of himself:

Je propose une vie basse et sans lustre, c'est tout un. On attache aussi bien toute la philosophie moral à une vie populaire et privée que à une vie de plus riche estoffe; chaque homme porte la forme entiere de l'humaine condition.

(III:ii, 782)

Throughout the *Essays* Montaigne is engaged against the scholastic presumption of linguistic mastery of truth and being given in a fixed code of rubrics and set definitions. He opposes vehemently the humanist conceit of a transcendental language imposing its rationalist classifications upon a degraded order of experience, despite the fact that this is the level upon which most of us live out the history and geography of our lives:

Nous sommes nés pour agir:

Cum moriar, medium solvar et inter opus.

Je veux qu'on agisse, et qu'on allonge les offices de la vie tant qu'on peut, et que la mort me treuve plantant mes chous, mais nonchalant d'elle, et encore plus de mon jardin imparfait.

(I:xx, 87)

As he says, Montaigne needed a language in which lived experience could find expression without being subordinated or reduced to levels of abstraction and/or formalized usage that bleed the life from it, separating



the writer's body from his soul in the name of a fancied transcendence of philosophy and literature. For this reason, Montaigne side-steps the rhetorical arts of memory in favour of the paper paths of the *Essays*, forever side-tracked into those places where the writer finds himself, provided he leaves the royal road of scholastic and set rhetorical reasoning.

Once off the high road of the *exemplum* and free from the weight of the literary tradition, the poor essayist becomes his own rich resource. Simultaneously, however, he restores his wandering, weak-memory self with the abundant improvisation of the *Essays*, thereby revealing the poverty of the literary tradition that might have prevented them. The essayist is then free to shape his formless self, which would otherwise forever escape him in philosophical and literary generalities more deceptive than the phantasies with which he was besieged before he resolved to become a writer. In other words, so far from losing himself to the world as an essayist, Montaigne discovers in the field of writing the one place where his self can come into the world. But the *Essays* do not give us Montaigne simply because he wrote about himself in them in all honesty and sincerity and as modestly as he conducted his life outside of them. This would ignore the surplus effect of writing, the pleasure of the text, towards which the writer must also assume a posture whether of modesty or presumption. Thus we find Montaigne re-embedding his literary self in the *spoken body*, in that bottom nature each of us discovers who listens to his body, especially where the body opens onto language – as in love and poetry. The wild ways of the *Essays* are not merely diversions and digressions from the *via regia* of the book or scholastic treatise. We know that Montaigne prided himself upon a certain poetic dispossession, a fortunate find opened up in the wake of writing to which the essayist trusted himself and his thoughts – not without vanity. It is in this sense that we must regard Montaigne's practice of decentering his text, marginalizing its monumental beginnings, floating everything in search of that supervenient grace achieved through abandoning the fixed architecture of the book for the free form of the essay. Thus the *Essays* are consciously an element of universal folly, inseparable from the political madness of their day and at once an element of moral stability, enduring the ravages of time like Rome, like the Chateau de Montaigne, and like themselves – through a nonchalant neglect that adds more to their survival than any plan.

If Montaigne concentrates upon himself, it is with a steady attachment to his friend La Boétie, to his family and to his city, and to the voices from the past with whom he conversed in his library. He considered himself a small note in the collective and largely anonymous history of mankind, of which literature and art yield us only a fractured sounding. What is ethical in Montaigne is not his scepticism or his relativism. It is rather his ability to hold life's attachments at a distance in order to consider how it is we are

nevertheless beholden to everything and everyone around us. Montaigne is not an idle subjectivist, sunk in fantasy or carried away by endless imaginary projects. He knew himself to be among the most variable of spirits, most changeable in his moods, irresolute and without method in the discharge of his affairs. For all this, the *Essays* are not a series of vile confessions, even though they insist upon self-observation and inquiry. Rather, they 'rebound' from everything that oppresses the mind and the body, whether through the negation of positivity or an affirmation in place of negativity, always ruled, of course, by Montaigne's experience with things and himself. The *Essays*, then, are Montaigne's happy credo – into which he could pour himself, while simultaneously standing at a Sunday distance from them. They accumulate from a working pleasure in reading and writing and from the prospective joy of finding a reader capable of exercising his own literary competence with the *Essays* as a continuous *bodily inscription*. Such pleasure lies outside any literary organization. Hence Montaigne's topics and titles in the *Essays* serve only as *strategies of pleasure*, in taking a page from a book or a poem in order to go on writing yet another book or a poem and to continue reading still more books and poems.<sup>6</sup> And so the *Essays* find readers who find other readers like friends seeking one another. By word of mouth.

Montaigne employed paradox and a visceral style that awakens the reader's instincts, or his bodily ties to language and community. The effect is that the author and reader enjoy a mutual incarnation pleased by the text. The *Essays* shift from the impersonal to the personal voice, from the past to the present, from *obiter dicta* to the testimony of Montaigne's own eyes, ears and body, and by means of these shifts he heightens the literary company between himself and his reader. By requiring of him his own literary competence, the *Essays* exercise the reader, and do not simply subordinate him before an exaltation of literary language. Montaigne's style is therefore essential to the liberty of discourse and friendship that excludes tyranny. It requires, too, the solitude represented by his library tower. There he fostered the silence that permits men to choose their words. By contrast, the tyrant – at times played by the literary critic – monopolizes talk, fearing the liberty of discussion, or else he subordinates the arts to his pleasure, denying them any more serious revelation. Hence Montaigne's conceits, paradoxes, humour and self-parody. Hence, also, his insistence upon the publication of his private thoughts, since thoughts without hope of a public cannot be free. For the same reasons, the *Essays* take their time, walk when they want to, and run when they like, always free to turn to any side that attracts their author, yet never losing themselves for want of their own direction.

Together, Montaigne's love of textuality, i.e., the institution of reading and writing, and his concept of the classical institution of the friendship in



which the *Essays* were composed, require that we reject any argument that they are the work of a dependent imagination without any other life, depth or movement than the reflecting mirror or La Boétie and the literary past that surrounded Montaigne.<sup>7</sup>

I am, of course, invoking the moral sense of friendship that is the result of Montaigne's very essay of that notion, as well as how he lived his love for La Boétie. Montaigne's concept of friendship places it above all other moral relationships. It is not an addition to Montaigne's life, nor does it subtract from what he might have owed himself. In friendship, as in essay writing, Montaigne doubled himself. Friendship opened him to himself as the *Essays* opened him to Michel de Montaigne. In both he gathered himself as the bee gathers its life from the flowers that otherwise give no honey. In reading and writing on his beloved historians and poets he enlarged and gave back to the world the book of himself. For he knew full well that the mirror of Narcissus can only be avoided through the mediation of other minds, in the amplification of discourse and intertextuality. Like Petrarch, Montaigne was faithful to his ancient authors in order rightfully to add himself to them, in a graft of humanity more enduring than the water image of Narcissus.

Thus friendship is a figure of the reader's freedom which the writer knows cannot be constrained by logic, any more than a lover's discourse can constrain the meaning of the love declared through him.<sup>8</sup> Rather, reader and writer are floated upon one another, like friends and lovers whose talk amplifies their sensory lives, intertwining them with threads they weave about themselves. In such reverberation there can be no false note, though there may be suffering. A false note is struck once only in the music of friendship and love: when mastery or servitude is heard. Then the doubled unity of love and friendship separates or succumbs to tyranny.<sup>9</sup>

The *Essays* pursue to the very end their own disequilibrium, upsetting the maxims and monuments of morality upon which we are tempted to fixate our lives. Thus by subverting the great lists of history, Montaigne could introduce the history of ordinary everyday living in the great innovation of the *Essays* as an *Ethics*. To make this ethical departure, Montaigne had simultaneously to subvert the plenitudes of classical morality in the play of writing and, specifically, in the essayist's quest for freedom from form. Yet the *Essays* do not simply catch the wind of writing's vanity. On the contrary, there supervenes upon the essayist's practice a discovering awareness of the moral composition of textuality and selfhood in the acquisition of that spoken body which is Montaigne's self-portrait.

The *Essays* never betray the carnal ambiguity of man's relation to himself, to his reason, his senses, his body and his language. In each case, man must avoid the wilful pursuit of absolute distinctions, of complete certainty and clarity, since these belie his own mixed composition. In exchange for

foregoing such transcendental excesses, there opened up to the essayist that mundane presence of the literary body to the embodied self which is the one place where the otherwise wholly metaphorical exercise of self-study can be practised.

Thus we must locate Montaigne's bodily troubles in writing and reading, upon which he so often remarks, as natural effects of the romance of books. Whereas other critics have seen faults in Montaigne's methods of reading and composition, with the purpose of displaying their own higher morality in these matters, I am arguing that it is precisely in the way that the essayist works that Montaigne gradually established himself as the most serious of all writers, the one most concerned with the bodily regimen of literature and its lively practice. Montaigne never tires of revealing his own incapacities, quirks, and mannerisms of thought and speech. Yet writing was as essential to him as it was to Petrarch or to Rabelais; it was a daily undertaking that he could no more go without than any other bodily function. Montaigne lived the *Essays*, and waited upon them like the very days of his life for the trail of meaning that life acquires only over its course, and in no other way than at its own expense: in this respect Montaigne may finally be compared with that incomparable artist of the self-portrait, Rembrandt. Convinced of the impossibility of any definitive revelation, the artist and essayist have nevertheless to avoid the traps of narcissism and relativism, of wilful contradiction and ultimate self-defeat. Thus we see in the self-portraits of Rembrandt and in the *Essays* of Montaigne the gradual dominance of the author's look, mocking, suspicious, candid, proud, humble and caught in the farce. But, with all the strength of natural inquisitiveness and self-scrutiny, these portraits throw back the pain of living, of aging and dying. In both cases, there is a gradual deepening of the expressive potentials of the baroque, away from theatrical dispersion, towards the inner concentration of the soul's body. In a portrait of 1648, Rembrandt Drawing Himself by the Window,<sup>10</sup> we have, as in Montaigne's comments upon his own activity as a writer, a subversion of the myth of representation by means of a reflection endlessly reflected upon, unless gathered religiously in each of us. In these two men we are face to face with the mystery of creative work, and with its virtuosity of moving us long after its author has left his hand upon it:

je peins principalement mes cogitations, subject informe, qui ne peut tomber en production ouvrager. A tout peine le puis je coucher en ce corps aérée de la voix.

(II:vi, 359)



## Notes

- 1 *Oeuvres Complètes de Montaigne*. Textes établis par Albert Thibaudet et Maurice Rat (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1962). See Appendix for translation of passages cited.
- 2 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Reading Montaigne," pp. 198-210 in his *Signs*, trans. Richard C. McCleary (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964).
- 3 Michel de Certeau, "Le lieu de l'autre Montaigne: 'Des Cannabals,'" pp. 187-200 in *Le racisme: mythes et sciences*, sous la direction de Maurice Olender (Paris: Editions Complexe, 1981).
- 4 John O'Neill, *Essaying Montaigne: A Study of the Renaissance Institution of Writing and Reading* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982).
- 5 Lawrence D. Kritzman, *Destruction/Découverte: Le fonctionnement de la rhétorique dans les Essais de Montaigne* (Lexington: French Forum, Publishers, 1980).
- 6 Roland Barthes, *The Pleasure of the Text*, trans. Richard Miller (New York: Hill and Wang, 1975).
- 7 John O'Neill, "L'essayiste n'est pas un 'malade imaginaire,'" pp. 237-246 in *Montaigne et les Essais 1580-1980*, actes de Congrès de Bordeaux (Juin 1980), Présentés par Pierre Michel (Paris-Genève: Champion-Slatkine, 1983).
- 8 Roland Barthes, *A Lover's Discourse*, Fragments. Translated by Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 1978).
- 9 John O'Neill, "Power and the Splitting (*Spaltung*) of Language," *New Literary History*, 14 (1983), 695-710.
- 10 Jean Paris, *Tel qu'en lui-même il se voit, 'Rembrandt'* (Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1965), p. 122.

## Book Reviews/Comptes Rendus

F. Edward Cranz. *A Bibliography of Aristotle Editions 1501-1600*. Second Edition with addenda and revisions by Charles B. Schmitt. Bibliotheca Bibliographica Aureliana, XXXVIII\*. Baden-Baden: Verlag Valentin Koerner, 1984. Pp. xxiv, 247.

Compiling bibliographies of printed books in the post-incunabular era (i.e., after 1500) is a formidable task whose difficulties can be fully appreciated only by those who do it. While the cataloguing of incunables is well in hand, less has been done for sixteenth-century printing because so many more books were printed in so many different places. Moreover, sixteenth-century books are usually considered less beautiful and less interesting historically. But one can argue that the bibliography of sixteenth-century printing deserves more scholarly attention than that of incunables because books then truly spread to all who could read. Sixteenth-century bibliography is especially important for documenting the Renaissance in northern Europe.

Possibly Aristotle was the most influential and often-printed ancient author in the Renaissance; only the Roman Cicero might rival him. Aristotle continued to be studied and interpreted, albeit sometimes in different ways than during the Middle Ages. In 1971, F. Edward Cranz published a comprehensive listing of all the Aristotle editions appearing between 1501 and 1600, based on the findings of the *Index Aureliensis*, about a thousand in all. It was a significant and useful book. But the coverage of the *Index Aureliensis* was far from complete, because it tended to limit itself to major northern European libraries; Italian libraries were particularly under-represented.

Now Charles B. Schmitt, a noted scholar of Renaissance Aristotelianism, has published a revised edition of Cranz's bibliography. This second edition reprints Cranz's listings in the same format, but makes a number of corrections, and adds significantly to the total. Based on visits to about 100 libraries in western, eastern, and southern Europe plus the United States, Schmitt has added 430 more printings of Aristotle. It is an important achievement. Although Schmitt warns in the introduction that other editions will turn up, he speculates that 90 to 95% of the total have now been located. This revised edition includes, as did the original, useful indexes, bibliography, and adds a table of places of publication for the sixteenth century. Paris, Lyon, and Venice printed over 60% of the total.

In his brief introduction, Schmitt makes some points worth repeating. Probably no individual library contains more than a third of the total. The British Library of



London and the Bibliothèque Nationale of Paris combined shelve about one-half of the total. This underlines the importance of bibliographic research in numerous libraries. One sometimes finds notable printings in obscure libraries very far from the places of publication. Another conclusion, with which this reviewer fully concurs, is that, while the cataloguing of medieval and Renaissance manuscripts is important and difficult work – and is appreciated as such – producing a comprehensive bibliography of sixteenth-century printings on an author or subject can be equally important and difficult – but is less recognized and appreciated. The Cranz-Schmitt volume is a very useful one that should facilitate and encourage further study of Renaissance Aristotelianism.

PAUL F. GRENDLER, *University of Toronto*

Jerry H. Bentley. *Humanists and Holy Writ: New Testament Scholarship in the Renaissance*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983 Pp. xiii, 245.

Ever since the time of Burckhardt, it has been an historiographical commonplace that Renaissance humanists displayed a radically new attitude towards the ancient world. They venerated that world, and passionately sought to recover it as fully as possible: they collected classical cameos and statues, studied architectural remains, copied inscriptions, and reclaimed and circulated previously neglected texts. At the same time, they were acutely aware of the gulf that separated them from that world. In order to bridge that gulf and recover their beloved antiquity, both pagan and Christian, they developed tools of philological analysis and historical criticism – and so created modern scholarship.

Jerry Bentley illustrates this commonplace with a detailed appreciation of New Testament scholarship in the Renaissance. Renaissance humanism, according to Bentley, broke with the medieval tradition of biblical studies, a tradition dominated by allegorical and spiritual exegesis and framed in the Aristotelian terms of scholastic theology. “The Renaissance humanists,” he says, “were determined to set aside the medieval tradition of New Testament study and replace it with a brand of scholarship that aimed to recover or reconstruct the assumptions, values, and doctrines not of the Middle Ages, but of the earliest Christians” (p. 31). The pioneer in this undertaking was Lorenzo Valla, “the first westerner since the patristic age to enjoy a thorough knowledge of Greek and to apply it extensively in his study of the New Testament” (pp. 32–33). Valla used his knowledge of Greek and mastery of philology to criticize and emend the Vulgate, to propose better Latin translations of certain passages, and to attempt a sounder explanation of the literal sense of scripture.

The second step in the progress of humanist New Testament scholarship was taken in Spain, by a team of scholars at the university of Alcalá. This university had been founded by the noted reformer, Cardinal Francisco Ximénez de Cisneros, and it was Ximénez who gave the impulse to the Complutensian Polyglot Bible. He assembled a group of experts in the three biblical languages and charged them with preparing a scholarly edition of the scriptures. The editors of the Complutensian Polyglot Bible improved on Valla’s methods in some ways. They recog-

nized, as he did not, that the Greek text, like the Latin, was subject to corruption, and so it was not enough to correct the Latin to accord with the Greek. But they employed no editorial principle consistently, following now one, then another. Since they were generally guided by a desire to reaffirm the text of the Vulgate, they often chose from among variant Greek readings the one that agreed with the Vulgate. But they did not always attempt to resolve textual problems: when the six volumes of their edition were printed between 1514 and 1517, the parallel columns of text (Greek and Hebrew flanking the Latin in the Old Testament, Latin and Greek side by side in the New) often preserved unreconciled differences between the two.

The culminating achievement of Renaissance New Testament scholarship was that of Erasmus. It was Erasmus who arranged for the publication of Valla's *Adnotationes* on the New Testament (1505), who published the first edition of the Greek New Testament, with a revised version of the Vulgate in parallel columns (1516), who prepared a fresh translation of the New Testament (1505-1506) and printed it in place of the Vulgate in the second edition of his New Testament (1519), and who justified his editorial decisions with an ever-growing body of philological annotations, which by the fifth edition in 1535 filled a 783-page folio volume. He consulted a wider range of manuscripts, both Latin and Greek, than either Valla or the Complutensian scholars, and he treated those manuscripts with model philological sophistication: "in several thousand notes he evaluated a vast body of Greek and Latin textual data, considered from all angles the best Latin representation of the Greek text, and offered explanations of the Greek text sensitive to literary, historical, and philological realities" (p. 217). The result of his efforts was a text of the Greek New Testament that remained the standard until the nineteenth century.

As he tells this story, Bentley displays impressive erudition and an admirable mastery of the many languages, ancient and modern, needed to study New Testament scholarship in Renaissance Italy, Spain, France, England, and the Netherlands. What his work lacks, unfortunately, is a breadth of historical vision commensurate with its subject.

Bentley's view of history is resolutely teleological and positivistic: his aim is to recount the steady liberation of New Testament scholarship from its medieval theological concerns and its irreversible progress towards the modern acme of disinterested scientific philology, represented here by the work of Bruce Metzger. Bentley, accordingly, is not interested in how humanists in general approached holy writ, but only in the efforts of those few humanists who contributed significantly to the development of modern philology: the rest can be dismissed as voices of "stubborn conservatism" (p. 207; see also pp. 45, 110). He says little of Giannozzo Manetti's Latin translation of the New Testament (1455-1457), other than that he "fell victim to inadequate manuscript resources" (p. 46). He dismisses Marsilio Ficino's commentary on the Epistle to the Romans and John Colet's exegesis of the Pauline epistles as being more concerned with theology than philology (p. 9). He acknowledges that Guillaume Budé was a worthy philologist, but judges his observations on the New Testament too sketchy to be evaluated. He recognizes that the many works of Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples cer-



tainly demonstrate the seriousness of his interest in the New Testament, but disapproves of Lefèvre's approach: "In one issue, one controversy, one problem after another, he allowed his deep piety, his commitment to tradition, or his mystical theology to override philological considerations" (p. 11).

Bentley does not seem to appreciate why it was that Lefèvre followed the dictates of piety, tradition, and theology, rather than philology. He assumes that the New Testament is a text like any other, subject to textual corruption and philological emendation. This assumption is a perfectly reasonable one for a modern, secular philologist – but it is totally inappropriate to expect it to be shared by a Renaissance humanist. Again and again, even Bentley's heroes leave him feeling puzzled or betrayed. "In his notes to the New Testament, strange to say, Valla's attempts at the higher criticism lack the rigor and insightfulness of his efforts elsewhere" (p. 47). The Complutensian editors "declined to employ their talents except in the service of traditional Latin orthodoxy. As a result, they did not advance understanding of the scriptures as much as they might have, had they less timidly applied sound philological methods" (p. 97). Even Erasmus modified his text and reconsidered his arguments in response to the criticisms of Edward Lee, Frans Tittlemans, and Stunica – even though their criticisms "were motivated by considerations of theology" and were not "properly philological" (pp. 202, 203).

The fact of the matter was that Valla and Erasmus, Lee and Stunica, Colet and Lefèvre all recognized that the New Testament was *not* a text like any other text. They lived in an age of increasingly bitter theological controversy – controversy that in essential ways turned on how the New Testament was to be read and understood – and they all engaged in the theological and scriptural arguments of their age. By ignoring this, Bentley closes himself off from the possibility of recovering or reconstructing the assumptions, values, and doctrines of a period when *sola scriptura* became an ideological battle cry. He turns a large and important topic into a minor and peripheral one by sidestepping the theological issues and working instead towards the uninspiring conclusion that his contribution to "scholarly methods . . . was perhaps the most enduring of all the legacies Erasmus bequeathed to his cultural heirs" (p. 193). This focus on method rather than matter extends even to the index, which lists references to biblical manuscripts but not biblical passages. And so it is that the bold promise of the title, announcing a book that will explore the varied ways in which devout and troubled humanists grappled with holy writ, fades to the diminished compass of the subtitle, a monograph on New Testament scholarship in the Renaissance.

DANIEL BORNSTEIN, *University of Michigan*

Jonathan V. Crewe. *Unredeemed Rhetoric: Thomas Nashe and the Scandal of Authorship*. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982. 135 pages.

Richard A. Lanham. *The Motives of Eloquence: Literary Rhetoric in the Renaissance*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1976. Paper. 252 pages.

Rhetoric and truth are totally and hopelessly irreconcilable *systems*; the problem is solutionless. Language is always rhetoric and can never reach reality and truth, so everything anyone ever says automatically deconstructs, and all that one can, post-Derrida-enly, do, is to toss about some somewhat-paradoxes somewhat denied or re-and-dis-manufactured, with some fleetingnesses of jargon (which terms may not touch truth, by non-definition, for then they would be antirhetorical and antidestructive and hence disloyal, not to mention self-inconsistent): such jargon as "radical dislocation" "antiworld" "violent negativity" "power" "theatricality" "radically alienated" "truly sophisticated" "demonic" etc. That range of notions (more-or-less [and-more-or-less-elusively] desiderated) is opposed – quite firmly and polemically and absolutely opposed, without deconstructive or ironic reserve – to "Puritan rationalism" or "rationalistic rigor"; and opposed to "good order"; and (mostly) opposed to "decorum."

Am I parodying Jonathan Crewe's book (and not a few others)? No. I am *paraphrasing* Crewe's book, especially pages 89–90 and 111, then here and there, and drawing a few inferences. The quotations are all quotations from Crewe's.

Am I irritated and bored with such doings? Well, yes, in truth, and my style shows it. Are the irritation and boredom relevant? Well, yes, in the sense that they are decorous, that is, proper, that is appropriate and just. But since my impressions and responses are not infallible, assertion is insufficient. Some argument is in order.

Crewe writes of Shakespeare, "(To what extent is the work of Shakespeare critically accountable in terms of its responsible 'themes?' If Shakespeare is not fully accountable in such terms, what is the nature of the unreduced excess in his work?)" Everything not truth/theme as such is "unreduced excess." The simplification of that dichotomizing is total, and any book about Shakespeare instantly refutes it. There is more to talk of in Shakespeare than *that*. Theme (paraphrased or simplified or deeply complicated in style and subject) connects with other things. An elegy – which has grief for one theme – may be sad in tone. Thus tone and theme are *related*, because relatable. Some excess is reducible; some is not even excessive.

The chief principle of connection between theme and rhetoric is decorum. Crewe dismisses decorum with rapid contempt (he needs to, to maintain his dichotomy and deconstructing), attacking Rosemond Tuve's "rigid prescriptions," but then goes on to praise, as against Tuve, the richer and more flexible decorum in *The Arte of English Poesie*. Which is a fatal admission for Crewe's case. If decorum is a rich and complex concept (as it beautifully is in the criticism of Rosemond Tuve and in the English Renaissance), then Crewe's basic and



irreconcilable opposition between rhetoric and truth breaks down. The connections are real, complex (often in tensions); and therefore valid criticism is (1) difficult, (2) possible. Nor does decorum subsume all of the relations of instruction and aesthetic delight. There are many connections good critics can use to see through, with, and by.

It is not just that Crewe wrote an unfortunate parenthesizing, easily refutable. The spirit of the paragraph is permeating. Nor is it that there are not real problems involving the opposition of plain and figured style, or between rhetorical skill and moral truth, or in the relation of language and reality and truth, or in the place of metaphor(s) in discourse. Such problems exist, richly discussable and illuminable. (Aristotle and Wittgenstein and Max Black and quite a few others have valuable things to say thereon.) It is that the radical scepticism implicit in much discourse since Nietzsche's epistemological blundering, is neither necessary nor finally defensible. Such scepticism should not be simply assumed as evident-to-the-sophisticated.

Or reached by crude disjunction. Crewe tells us that certain critics and the English Renaissance writers themselves, "especially Puritan ones," have sought "a language of final order and ultimate significance." (The "Puritan" is a typical enough move of his polemics: seeking truth is Puritan, and thus Bad and Repressive), and goes on to say, "The author is always situated in a language already misappropriated, duplicitous, and subject to rhetorical exploitation," adding shortly thereafter "the mere cultural presence of rhetoric . . . 'postpones' and renders infinitely problematical the desired outcome." Either perfection or chaos. Not perfection; therefore chaos. So goes the implicit disjunctive argument, which is valid, but whose first premise is false. For better and worse writing, greater and lesser understanding, are possible, and happen. *Therefore* Crewe's premise fails. There is a middle ground we often inhabit. Were it really true that language is always and wholly "duplicitous," language would not be "duplicitous," but "infinite" and no sentence could ever get said, much less be understood or misunderstood.

Crewe, in moving the only-too-familiar counters around, adds little to the real debate and dialectic. Nor very much to the understanding and appreciation of Nashe. He tells us, up front, "I am using Nashe . . . to make a point." But how can he? How can anyone not delight in Nashe? Or not be frustrated by his brilliantly silly excesses? Nashe wrote of Gabriel Harvey, "his invention is over-weaponed." Which is surely and accumulatively true of Nashe also. Nashe is great fun to read, for a while. And has much of subtlety and pungency to say in and through his genius and over-genius of style. Where's the puzzle? How most of all – here's the real mystery – can anyone write of Nashe without praising highly and gladly the few but very great lyrics for which we owe permanent love and gratitude?

One owes Richard A. Lanham scholarly gratitude for his earlier study, the lucid *Handlist of Rhetorical Terms*, which, by examining specifically and generically and cross-classifying and sorting out, is a great help to the student of rhetoric and in the good bargain a valuable and revealing analysis of the structures and limits and confusions in Renaissance rhetoric. His book *The Motives of Eloquence* could use some of that complexity of analysis itself. Lively and wide-sweeping, it bases

all on a simple division between "serious" man and "rhetorical" man, which bears a near analogue to the division between truth and rhetoric of Crewe's scepticizings.

Crewe mostly sides with the rhetorical antitrueth convolutings: he tells us on page 8 that "rhetoric as an opposing and putatively superior *principle* to logic . . . cannot seriously be defended"; on page viii that he will take "a principle of . . . rhetoric (opposed to logic) . . . as the inalienable basis of my discussion." The contradiction is even plainer in context.

Lanham sees the serious and the rhetorical, not in balance or in resolution, because that would undo the distinction, but as vacillating randomly throughout and thus constituting Western intellectual history. But the distinctions are far too simple to carry such a huge burden. Classes overlap; these 'classes', if they can be kindly granted that name, wantonly and intricately and confusingly overlap, such overlap undercrumbling the scheme Lanham would market, and explain all by.

Serious man, we are told early, has a "central self, an irreducible identity" in relation to others and to a reality which can be known. Clarity and sincerity are consequently the central rhetorical goods. Rhetorical man, however, concentrates on the word, on memory, on the skillfully garnered and maximed, on proverbial wisdom's "decorous fit into situation." The opposition between the serious and rhetorical is irremediable and the shifting to and fro among the twain provides "sophisticated" history. But suppose some maxims can be true? or even false? Or suppose some of the decorous fitting *fits* and suppose some does not? The philosophy instantly deconstructs and we are back among the actual and intermixing complexities of rhetoric and truth, morality and self-serving (overlapping categories themselves), pleasure and duty – which help to form real human and rhetorical and philosophical history, as once Lanham well understood.

It is bothersome that Lanham, who as a student of rhetoric was one of the best at showing the complexities of rhetorical interclassification, overclassification, and misclassification, should offer such a dividing into vagued twoness.

In practice Lanham often finds the classes mixed, using that truth as a club to club Plato's Ideas (any stick will do to beat Them these days) or in praise of Shakespeare. But, since any sentence is not a sentence unless it is (1) referential – referring outside of itself, not part of an entirely enclosed system (2) in words syntactically structured, the commingling is universally present in all discourse, and cannot therefore serve as a critical standard to judge better and worse discourse. Sentences, in words syntacted, can be true or false; and some are better written than others. Language has reference and rhetoric; not all rhetoric is playful, divisive, or insidious; not all reference is solemn. Lanham's distinctions do not hold.

Lanham knows much and has responded much to a range of literature. Hence the book is often interesting, awarely reflective, witty, and such, and one can learn and enjoy from such moments. (Learning and enjoyment are not mutually exclusive). The actual rhetorical analysis in the book – the analysis of how rhetorical figures work in a given rhetorical and literary situation – is always valuable. One wishes there were more of such analysis in the book.



Yet, among the virtues of thought and livelinesses of style, one also finds some curious judgments, often intimately inveigled with the theory and trends at work. Thus Lanham writes, "high seriousness . . . requires a conception of human character as single, solid, substantial, and important." It does? What of the opening of the *Divine Comedy*? or the dark sonnets of Gerard Manley Hopkins? Lanham's strange sentence is not a casual error or misjudgment; it is central to his dichotomizing.

Here, as too often elsewhere, the twin hand puppets take center stage, and block the view.

PAUL RAMSEY, *University of Tennessee at Chattanooga*

*Le Cosmos de Dante* par James Dauphiné dans les *Classiques de l'humanisme*, Les Belles Lettres: Paris, 1984. P. 213.

Voici une nouvelle étude sur l'Homère du Trecento. Son auteur, James Dauphiné, s'est fixé pour objectif d'expliquer au sens littéral du mot la vision cosmologique de Dante telle qu'elle se révèle dans la *Divine Comédie*. En effet plus qu'une exposition philosophique du système dantesque, James Dauphiné veut montrer au lecteur la dimension poétique de la vision du poète florentin; c'est pourquoi tout en se référant ici et là aux autres ouvrages de Dante comme le *Banquet* et la *Vie nouvelle*, il a placé au centre de sa sphère d'étude l'éblouissante *Divine Comédie*. Les termes que nous soulignons caractérisent la thématique même qui soutient la vision cosmologique de Dante.

La livre de James Dauphiné est constitué de quatre parties inégales: *Les sources* (pp. 11-26), *la hiérarchie* (pp. 27-44), *le voyage* (pp. 45-93) et enfin la plus ambitieuse et de loin la plus importante, *poétique et imagination* (pp. 95-153). En outre l'auteur a cru bon d'ajouter en appendice quatre études. Les deux premières sont consacrées à des précurseurs de Dante, Restoro d'Arezzo et Bonvesin de la Riva qui tous les deux ont cherché à atteindre Dieu. Les autres appendices traitent de Dante: *Dante et la signature des étoiles* et *Dante et l'Odyssée: forme et signification*.

Il n'y a pas de mentor plus éclairé que James Dauphiné pour nous mener sur les pas de Dante dans sa quête de l'Infini. En fait ce livre est une partie de sa thèse de doctorat d'état, *Les visions poétiques du cosmos de Dante à l'aube du XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle* (1981). Nous savons aussi que James Dauphiné s'intéresse tout particulièrement à la symbolique. C'est dire que nous avons à faire à un auteur sérieux, bien documenté au fait de toutes les doctrines philosophiques et théologiques qui avaient cours à cette époque.

Dans les trois premières parties, l'auteur donne au lecteur tous les outils nécessaires pour comprendre la quête de Dante et le processus de son ascension. Il expose d'abord d'une façon exhaustive les sources utilisées par Dante puis explique le système dantesque de la hiérarchie en le comparant à celui de Denys, de Grégoire ou même à celui du *Banquet*, oeuvre précédente de Dante. C'est grâce à cette hiérarchie que Dante peut s'élever de cercle en cercle des profondeurs ténébreuses de l'enfer jusqu'à l'Empyrée le plus radieux puisqu'il n'y a pas de

cloisons étanches dans l'univers. James Dauphiné démontre comment les structures temporelles du voyage correspondent aux structures spatiales, comment la "science, poésie et mythologie se confortent, se répondent." Dante est astrologue, théologien, mystique mais surtout poète, poète-voyant. C'est ainsi qu'on le surprend à sacrifier l'exactitude scientifique au souci d'équilibre poétique.

La quatrième partie est la plus ambitieuse, la plus personnelle. Il s'agit de montrer Dante aux prises avec l'écriture: la *Divine Comédie* n'est pas une oeuvre didactique. En plus d'être une oeuvre mystique, c'est une oeuvre d'art. James Dauphiné parle d'aventure stylistique: Dante doit révéler l'extraordinaire, l'inconnaissable, Dieu, au moyen des mots. Cet extraordinaire, Dante l'a vu tant avec son oeil physique que son oeil spirituel et il est ébloui au sens fort du mot. James Dauphiné, après Pézard (*Dante sous la pluie de feu*), Tuzet (*l'imagination stellaire de Dante et le Cosmos et l'imagination*), fait de la *divine Comédie* une épopée de la lumière. Sous la protection de différents guides, dont évidemment Béatrice, Dante passe de l'absence de lumière à l'éblouissement total au paradis où la lumière est intensifiée, magnifiée grâce à des jeux de miroirs. L'auteur veut traiter de "la nature lumineuse de l'univers et les aspects de ce dernier en relation avec la thématique du nombre, du cercle et de la musique" en s'attachant particulièrement aux images, métaphores, symboles et allégories. Il expose clairement, avec autorité, le système poétique de Dante. On peut toutefois regretter des longueurs, des répétitions. Surtout il aurait fallu que James Dauphiné fût poète lui-même pour pouvoir faire ressortir la poésie de la *divine Comédie*. En effet, à l'issue de cette étude et malgré les protestations de l'auteur, on est amené à voir le poème davantage comme un oeuvre initiatique que comme une oeuvre lyrique.

Malgré ces quelques réserves, le livre de James Dauphiné, *le Cosmos de Dante* est un compagnon indispensable à tout étudiant non seulement de Dante mais de toute poésie cosmologique occidentale.

SIMONE MASER, *Université d'Ottawa*

Jenny Wormald. *Court, Kirk, and Community: Scotland 1470-1625*. University of Toronto Press: Toronto and Buffalo, 1981. Pp. viii, 216.

This recent work on the history of early modern Scotland covers the period from the reign of James III through that of James VI. Quite naturally a focal point of this book is the age of the Scottish reformation, a topic covered in four well-organized chapters. This central section dealing with a time of religious uncertainty is presented between two surveys of Renaissance Scotland.

The author provides a well-balanced account of early modern Scotland, and her analysis makes effective use of recent scholarly studies that give new insights into the complexities of internal developments in the country during an especially critical period of its history. Of the Scottish rulers of that time high praise is accorded to James VI. He is commended for his intelligence, his forceful foreign policy, and his resolute refusal to be brow-beaten by Elizabeth I. As the author points out, he did much to enhance the prestige of personal monarchy.

Scotland's history during the age of the Renaissance and Reformation is charac-



terized by the vitality and variety of its political, religious, and cultural experience. These diverse aspects are clearly delineated by the author. The book's value is further enhanced by seven and a half pages devoted to suggestions for further reading, and by a chronological table of five pages. There is also a serviceable index. This study is an important and valuable one which provides a thoughtful basis for a reconsideration of Scottish history during one of the more colourful periods of its long history.

BERNARD C. WEBER, *The University of Alabama*

Hallet Smith. *The Tension of the Lyre: Poetry in Shakespeare's Sonnets*. San Marino, CA: Huntington Library, 1981. Pp. xii, 172 pp.

Hallet Smith's *Elizabethan Poetry* (1952) is a readable and economical study still worth recommending as a judicious introduction to Tudor poetry for students just beginning their studies. The same cannot be said, unfortunately, of *The Tension of the Lyre* which is intended "to make the sonnets more accessible to various kinds of readers" (p. ix). While this latest study is readable, brief, and full of interesting observations on various aspects of the sonnets, it does not offer its "various kinds of readers" much that is new or vitally interesting.

The first of six chapters begins with a discussion of T.S. Eliot's "Three Voices of Poetry" (1953): the first is the voice of the poet "talking to himself—or to nobody. The second is the voice of the poet addressing an audience. . . . The third is the voice of the poet when he attempts to create a dramatic character speaking in verse." Smith claims to be interested in only the first two voices, although in Chapter 4 we are told that "the sonnets are in some sense dramatic" and in Chapter 2, entitled "Personae," the "I" of the sonnets is called "a *persona* with identifiable traits" (p. 23) while the poems speak, "most of the time, to a *persona*. . . . But they are poems of the second voice, poems addressed to an audience of one or more, poems to be heard and mentally responded to" (p. 41). And it seems that the dramatic rather than the lyric poet is recalled in Smith's observation that "anything important, to be fully realized must be viewed both tragically and comically" (p. 109).

Chapter 3 discusses "The Poet & the World," which is largely a courtly world, and Chapter 5 on "Order and Punctuation" rehearses and comments on the "rearrangers" of the sonnets such as J.D. Wilson (1968), T. Brooke (1936), and J.W. Lever (1956), as well as the dating of the sonnets by L. Hotson (1949) and the numerological studies by A. Fowler (1970). For Smith the theories of Laura Riding and Robert Graves (1927) are absurd, and Stephen Booth, who devotes five pages to summarizing their argument in his edition of the sonnets (1977) completely overlooks the fundamental fallacy of the Riding-Graves essay: "the punctuation of the sonnet in the quarto of 1609 is not the work of the poet, but of one of the two compositors in the workshop of Eld, the printer" (p. 125). Smith earlier admits a debt to Booth's commentary, yet seems to reject it because Booth "accepts completely William Empson's dictum that *all* suggested glosses for a passage are right" (p. x, and p. 11 n. 18). Smith admits a preference for I.A.

Richards and, as a formalist critic, Smith seems to be aware of the limitations of his method.

Smith does remind us of the value of the literary context to explicate a poem. The celebrated love of sonnet 115, for example, "exists in an environment . . . a world outside the relationship" (p. 43) which sonnet 124 seems to identify as a world of public affairs compared to the private world of the lovers, and sonnet 66 offers a catalogue of what is wrong with the world. Smith claims that we shall better understand the Dark Lady sonnets "if we bring to their reading the appropriate passages in the plays" (p. 47), which he attempts to do in broader strokes in Chapter 4, "Dramatic Poem and Poetic Plays," observing different links between the plays and the sonnets. For example, he contrasts the swearing and being forsworn in *Love Labour's Lost* (Act 4.2) with sonnet 152, and the exploitation of language (Act 5.2) with sonnet 82; in the *Merchant of Venice* the theme of misleading first appearance is compared with the Dark Lady of sonnet 141.

The concluding discussion, "Some Readers of the Sonnets," might be the best chapter in the book; it surveys the work of Leonard Digges, John Suckling, the publisher John Benson ("as a reader of the sonnets"), George Steevens, Malone, George Wyndham, Edith Sitwell and Santayana. Yet most of these names would be unknown to the student approaching the sonnets for the first time, and one wonders, then, just what audience Smith has in mind for this brief study. While he relieves many of the sonnets of the burden of others' more cumbersome glosses, Smith spends too much time discussing untenable theories of dating and reordering while seemingly suggesting some reordering of the sonnets himself. He calls sonnets 40-42 "misplaced" arguing (speciously) that they belong to the Dark Lady sonnets because they deal with the theme of sexual infidelity.

Hallet Smith has written several graceful essays that have been stretched into a book. He often illuminates our understanding of the sonnets and their relationship to Shakespeare's plays or to his times, but in the long run there is little new here. Smith enjoys reading the sonnets, but the book does not serve its intended purpose as an introduction to the sonnets for new readers, and it offers the more seasoned scholar little new to think about.

ANDREW M. McLEAN, *University of Wisconsin-Parkside*

Philip T. Hoffman. *Church and Community in the Diocese of Lyon, 1500-1789*. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1984, 239 p.

L'analyse de la tradition chrétienne, celle de la Réforme et de la Contre-Réforme—qu'une fois pour toute on devrait rebaptiser la Réforme catholique—attire de plus en plus l'attention des chercheurs intéressés à l'Ancien Régime. Le choix du diocèse de Lyon répond au besoin de fixer nettement le portrait d'une importante communauté ecclésiastique.

L'étude bien documentée du Prof. Hoffman aborde particulièrement le problème de la Réforme sur le plan social: rôle du clergé et d'une élite laïque urbaine, sollicités, après le concile de Trente, par le dynamisme d'agents multiples, convaincus de la nécessité d'une forte discipline pour maintenir un haut niveau de



piété et de participation.

Principales sources de l'enquête: les testaments, les archives municipales et communales, les dossiers des cours de justice, les archives diocésaines ou paroissiales. Documentation qui révèle le rôle prépondérant du clergé paroissial, intermédiaire culturel puissant, médiateur toujours au poste sur le plan de l'institutionnalisation de la Réforme, tant dans les villes que dans les villages. Ce que l'enquête met ici en lumière est le rôle déterminant des laïcs, tant sur le plan de la résistance à certaines formes d'expression de la culture populaire que sur celui des efforts amorcés pour imposer la nouvelle discipline tridentine.

Au cours du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle s'est consolidée la collaboration entre le clergé paroissial et l'élite urbaine de Lyon, ville de grand commerce, dominée par ses classes marchandes. Peu à peu se sont multipliées les associations de toutes sortes: guildes, fraternités, et groupes divers, dont le rôle a été très significatif dans la vie sociale et religieuse de la cité. Au niveau des petits marchands et des artisans toutefois, ce clergé, même au temps de son dynamisme le plus grand (au XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle), demeurait exclus du territoire de la culture populaire. Bien que Lyon fût un des grands centres du protestantisme français, le zèle du clergé local gardait sa vigueur, et les ordres réguliers—missionnaires capucins, jésuites, etc.—venaient répondre, à l'occasion, à la sollicitation des laïcs.

Dans les paroisses situées en dehors de la ville de Lyon, le milieu paysan avait de plus étroites relations avec le clergé paroissial. Clergé souvent issu de la localité, sans éducation ou formation théologique, mais en contact plus étroit avec le village. Dispensateur des sacrements, dans un monde plus facilement captivé par le geste et le rituel, le pouvoir étonnant d'une seule voix pouvait facilement s'enfler au gré du charisme individuel, dans un vaste espace d'ignorance, que sacralisait subtilement le tintement redoutable et bienfaisant des cloches. Aux jours de fête, très nombreuses, il est vrai, sons et couleurs répondaient au sentiment communautaire exprimé dans la fête, surtout au temps des processions.

A partir de 1560, la Réforme catholique prend son essor et bientôt manifestera son étonnante vigueur, en particulier en ce qui concerne la discipline instaurée par les décrets du concile de Trente. Hommes et femmes de grande sainteté de vie—saint Vincent de Paul et les Filles de la Charité par exemple—donnèrent l'exemple par le travail et la prière. L'intention des réformateurs était de remodeler la culture populaire. Fondations, sermons, catéchismes, visites pastorales, nouvelles associations et nouveaux séminaires, encouragés par les élites laïques, donnèrent l'élan.

Une association particulièrement vigoureuse, le Compagnie du Saint-Sacrement, patronnée par les plus hautes classes de la société, mit tout en oeuvre pour renforcer la discipline, influencer les législateurs, entraver l'expression de la culture populaire, appuyant le clergé dans son opposition aux festivals, danses, charivaris, occasions de débauches.

En fait, l'Eglise du diocèse, comme ailleurs, en Italie en particulier, cherchait, par la multiplicité des règlements, à maintenir une étroite séparation entre le sacré et le profane. D'où ces prescriptions concernant la surveillance du clergé, la musique d'église et la moralité sexuelle. On retrouve ici ce puritanisme impitoyable dont on a hérité en Nouvelle-France. Notons toutefois que l'auteur n'aborde pas le

domaine de la casuistique héritée des moralistes espagnols. Il suffit de retenir que même les autorités civiles exerçaient—à côté du clergé—un sévère contrôle social: surveillance accrue des moeurs, répression de la prostitution, du concubinage, des bains publics, de la nudité et même des festivals populaires, considérés comme sources de désordres, sinon de sédition. Promoteur de l'ordre public, la monarchie se trouvait pleinement d'accord avec ce que proposait la spiritualité tridentine.

Au cours du XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle, grâce en particulier à l'influence des curés, se multiplièrent les associations pieuses, comme celles du Rosaire, du Saint-Sacrement, des Pénitents, du Scapulaire, de la Doctrine Chrétienne. La nouvelle spiritualité catholique inspira d'importantes fondations, telles que les écoles primaires, promises à un grand avenir. Ajoutons que, dans les associations nouvelles—charités, confraternités, etc.—les femmes prenaient une part de plus en plus active, surtout dans les campagnes.

Quelques questions à approfondir: v.g. quel est le rôle de l'Eglise officielle du temps: la cour de Rome, le clergé de France (assemblées du clergé, mandements des évêques), les grands séminaires (St-Sulpice à Paris, Charles Borromée à Milan, etc.) dans la définition de la spiritualité française et dans l'aménagement de la praxis pastorale au niveau d'un grand diocèse, sans doute modèle de plusieurs autres?

ROBERT TOUPOIN, S.J., Université Laurentienne, Sudbury

Paul R. Sellin. *John Donne and 'Calvinist' Views of Grace*. Amsterdam: VU Boekhandel/Uitgeverij, 1983. Pp. 61.

Paul R. Sellin's short monograph sheds useful light on the vexing questions about Donne's notions of predestination and free will. Sellin has a specific target in his sights: an imprecise notion of "Calvinist" in Donne scholarship, which has blurred Donne's position on these crucial issues. The central claim is that Donne publically concurred with the orthodox Calvinist position of the Synod of Dort, which had met in 1618-19 to counter the Arminian challenge. Sellin claims further that the favourable response to Donne's religious prose by Lowland Calvinists suggests the same theological kinship.

Sellin focuses on two sermons delivered by Donne at The Hague in 1619. Contending that Donne scholarship inclines to paint all Calvinists in the same dark colour, Sellin argues that Donne specifically follows an infra-lapsarian, not the more radical supra-lapsarian line. "In infra-lapsarianism, election and reprobation are *subsequent* to the creation and fall, and they are acts of mercy and justice. In supra-lapsarianism, election and reprobation *precede* the creation and fall, and they are acts manifesting divine sovereignty" (p. 13). Sellin's point is that Donne's sermon deliberately brings him in line with the orthodox infra-lapsarian position pronounced at Dort.

Sellin concludes broadly that "the idea is questionable that Donne was hostile to the basic institutions and tenets of Calvinist orthodoxy as expressed in the formulations of the Synod of Dort" (p. 49). But at this point many readers will feel



that Sellin pulls up short, without addressing more specifically the nagging nature vs. Grace questions inherent in the matter. Sellin himself cites Barbara Lewalski's rendition of the Synod's five points: "total depravity, unmerited election, limited atonement (for the elect only), irresistible grace (admitting no element of human cooperation or free response), final perseverance of the saints" (*Protestant Poetics and the Seventeenth-Century Religious Lyric*, p. 20). So much in Donne's sermons seems to run against the essential grain here. For example, Donne's instinct is to extend generously, not limit the numbers of the Elect. On one occasion he stresses that God would have all men saved: ". . . Yes; God does meane, simply All" (*Sermons*, V, 53). Similarly, the notion of total depravity must be stretched uncomfortably to accommodate Donne's claim that some ancient philosophers using only natural reason "were sav'd without the knowledge of Christ" (*Sermons*, IV, 119).

By not addressing such problems in greater detail, Sellin leaves the field to those who would argue that the subtleties of Donne's infra-lapsarian position—and Sellin makes a convincing case—might not, in fact, please the orthodox Reformers at Dort. Nonetheless, Sellin's special knowledge of English-Lowland ties relating to Donne brings in invaluable perspective to crucial elements in Donne's theology.

TERRY G. SHERWOOD, *University of Victoria*

# News / Nouvelles

## Newberry Summer Institute

The Newberry Library Center for Renaissance Studies is pleased to announce its 1986 Summer Institute in the Early Printed Book, which will be directed by Professor Henri-Jean Martin, Ecole Nationale des Chartes, from June 23 to August 1, 1986.

Beginning in the late Middle Ages with the transition from the manuscript to the printed book, the institute will analyze the changing relationship between the book as a material object and its socio-cultural context through the eighteenth century. Topics will include: identities of and interactions between printers, publishers, and readers; the impact of the Government and the Church on the history of the book; methods of production; the relationship between text and image; and the history of libraries. The course will be taught in French and will focus on France, but comparative materials from other western European countries will be introduced.

There are two sources of support available for participants in the institute: (1) stipends of up to \$2,250 funded by the National Endowment for the Humanities and limited to full-time faculty, including university librarians with instructional responsibilities, employed in American institutions of higher learning, and (2) a number of additional stipends limited to faculty, research scholars and advanced graduate students at institutions affiliated with either the Newberry Library Center for Renaissance Studies or the Folger Institute of Renaissance and Eighteenth-Century Studies.

Faculty, qualified graduate students, and unaffiliated scholars not eligible for funding are welcome to apply. The application deadline is March 1, 1986. For more information and application forms, please contact the Newberry Library Center for Renaissance Studies, 60 W. Walton Street, Chicago, IL 60610, (312) 943-9090.

## Call for Papers

The Centre for Medieval and Early Renaissance Studies, S.U.N.Y. at Binghamton will hold its twentieth annual conference October 17–18, 1986. The topic will be "The Classics in the Middle Ages." The conference, which will mark the 20th anniversary of the founding of the Center for Medieval and Early Renaissance Studies at SUNY-Binghamton, will examine the influences exerted by the classical heritage on medieval life and culture from the earliest centuries to about 1400, including a variety of fields extending from literature and the arts to the sciences, social sciences, philosophy, education, theology/mysticism/spirituality, and philology.

For the variously topically organized sessions the Center for Medieval and Early Renaissance Studies cordially invites scholars to submit short papers (20-30 minutes) for consideration. The Center welcomes submissions from the various fields of medieval culture noted above. Although abstracts will be considered, completed papers will be given priority over them. Submissions must arrive by May 19, 1986. The final program for the conference will appear in September, 1986. Please submit all inquiries, papers, abstracts, and suggestions to the Conference Coordinators: Professors Aldo S. Bernardo and Saul Levin, 1986 Conference Coordinators, Center for Medieval and Early Renaissance Studies, State



University of New York at Binghamton, Binghamton, New York, 13901,  
(607) 798-2730 or 798-2130.

### **Italianist Conference**

The American Association for Italian Studies will be holding its Sixth Annual Conference at the University of Toronto on April 11-13, 1986.


The following sessions on topics of interest to Renaissance specialists will be offered: Italian influence on Medieval and Renaissance English literature; Sex and sexuality from the Middle Ages to the Baroque; Iconography and Typology in Medieval and Renaissance Art; Machiavelli; Teatro e critica testuale nel Cinquecento; Letteratura cavalleresca dal Medioevo al Rinascimento; Petrarchism and antipetrarchism in the Renaissance; Travellers to Italy and Italian travellers of the Renaissance; The Donna/Poeta of the Italian Renaissance: From Courtesan to Saint; Bandello and the short story tradition in Italy.

For further information contact the conference organizers, Prof. Giuliana Katz and Domenico Pietropaolo, AAIS 1986, Italian Studies, U of Toronto, Toronto, Ont., M5S 1A1.



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# "Men That Are Safe, And Sure": Jonson's "Tribe of Ben" Epistle in its Patronage Context

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Nearly every poet of the English Renaissance, it might be argued, was a patronage poet in some sense, because every poet was touched in some way by the system of patronage relationships so central to the social structure, literary culture, and general psychology of that period. Literary patronage was far more than a system of economic benefits or of conventional social deference; it reflected in one sphere of life the patterns of thinking, expectation, and behavior that helped define Tudor-Stuart culture as a whole. Even poets who never sought monetary reward for their writing were nonetheless caught up in the patronage system – a system that translated into practical terms (however imperfectly) the larger hierarchical assumptions of the time. Every poet had his place in the social hierarchy; every writer knew that his most important audience consisted not of the "public at large," but of those social superiors, influential equals, and wary competitors whose actions and attitudes would determine both the reception of his works and his own social standing. Whether he sought literary renown or a secure place and sense of participation in social reality or both, every author knew that his writings constituted one very important aspect of his total self-presentation. Every poem was in some sense an implicit advertisement for or statement about the writer who created it, and every poem would be scrutinized and evaluated at least partly in those terms by readers who could in some way affect one's rank or reputation. The "micro-political" pressures inherent in this literary system almost inevitably contributed to the artistic complexity of the poems the system helped generate.<sup>1</sup>

The works and careers of few other poets better illustrate the complex *literary* impact of patronage than do Ben Jonson's. Although not a patronage poet in the same ways that Sidney, Spenser, Donne, or Shakespeare were, Jonson can in many respects be seen as the quintessential



patronage poet of his time. Certainly he was one of the most successful. No other poet defined himself so explicitly *as* a poet and won such widespread acceptance and support on those terms from patrons as Jonson did. Sidney's social influence was chiefly inherited; Spenser's promotions were due as much to political service as to literary achievement; Donne won patronage less as a poet than as a divine; and Shakespeare, although a patronage poet in ways that have not yet been fully charted, wrote neither as obviously nor perhaps as self-consciously for patrons as Jonson did. Jonson's patronage success did not come immediately or easily, and one of the dangers of emphasizing his success is that it is much easier for us than it ever was for him to take that success for granted. The inevitable, inherent uncertainty and insecurity of his relations with his patrons, combined with the fact and the prospect of continuous competition for patronage support, made Jonson a far less secure and self-confident poet than he wanted to be and to seem. The lofty certitude that so often characterizes his tone is at least in part strategic: it provides a means of coping with anxieties central to his experience as a writer dependent on patronage. In one way or another, every period of his life and every poem he wrote seems to have been touched by these kinds of uncertainty and apprehension.

In one of his most famous poems, written near the height of his career, Jonson betrays the anxiety and apprehension that patronage dependency and competition bred within him. "An Epistle Answering to One that Asked to be Sealed of the Tribe of Ben" not only lashes out at Jonson's antagonists and competitors for status, but expresses deep misgivings about the good will and reliability of those superiors on whom his continued status depended. Depicting God and even Jonson himself as exemplary patrons, it thereby implicitly rebukes the superiors who he felt had failed him, while also offering them models to emulate in their own conduct towards him. It is a poem full of fury and claims to self-sufficiency, but one that also exposes in an especially memorable way the fundamental insecurity of his position.

The "Tribe of Ben" epistle comes near the end of a period of seemingly unparalleled success for the poet. Even before the folio publication of his *Workes* in 1616, Jonson had achieved a kind of prominence he could only have dreamed of in his younger days. His decision to bring out an elaborate edition of his poems, plays, and masques – the first of its kind in England – was in one sense the daring act it is often pictured as being. No poet before, particularly no dramatic poet, had ever presented himself in print quite so audaciously. Yet it is unlikely that the Folio would ever have been published had not Jonson – and, more to the point, his printer – been sufficiently confident that it would find a market among those who could afford to pay for it. The Folio is only the most palpable sign that by the second decade of James's reign Jonson had won a literally enviable status

in the Jacobean social and literary hierarchy.

In the same year the Folio was published Jonson was granted an annuity of 100 marks by the King, and in the following year was one of a number of figures listed as possible members of a proposed royal academy. In 1618 he attempted to use his influence at court on behalf of his friend John Selden, whose book on *The Historie of Tythes* had provoked the anger of powerful clerics. During his famous walking tour of Scotland, Jonson was banqueted and honored by the "noblemen and gentlemen" of the north, and not long after his return to England was made honorary Master of Arts by Oxford University. Throughout this whole period Jonson produced a steady stream of masques for the court, and his income from these, combined with his annuity and incidental patronage, freed him from any necessity to write for the stage. Between 1616 and 1626 no new play of his was performed. However, one of his masques – *The Gypsies Metamorphosed* – proved so popular with the King that it was presented three times during the late summer and early autumn of 1621. One contemporary report suggested that Jonson's annual pension had been increased from a hundred marks to a hundred pounds. Another claimed that James had intended to bestow a knighthood on the poet, concluding ambiguously that "his majesty would have done it, had there not been means made (himself not unwilling) to avoid it." In the fall of 1621 Jonson was granted the reversion to the office of Master of Revels, an honour that brought with it little immediate financial advantage but that was certainly a sign of the monarch's favour. Thus it may seem surprising to find him, probably less than two years later, writing a poem as full of insecurity, bitterness, and grim foreboding about his standing at court as "The Tribe of Ben" epistle.<sup>2</sup>

In part the mood and tone of the work reflect a very specific and recent disappointment. Early in 1623 Prince Charles and George Villiers, Marquess of Buckingham (the dashing royal favourite) slipped secretly out of London, disguised with false beards and traveling under the improbable names of Jack and Tom Smith. They journeyed only as far as Canterbury before being stopped by officials suspicious of their appearance and behaviour; revealing their true identities, they were allowed to continue to Dover, and from there set sail for the Continent. Charles had concocted the journey to expedite stalled negotiations for his marriage to the Spanish Infanta. By visiting Madrid himself he hoped to conclude an agreement quickly and, within a few months, bring his bride back to England with him. The plan was full of risks, and at first James had been reluctant to approve it. The marriage negotiations involved delicate questions of domestic politics and international diplomacy. The Infanta's Catholicism meant that a Papal dispensation permitting the marriage would be required, and both Rome and Madrid seized upon the opportunity to haggle about the



rights of English Catholics. To complicate matters further, Spain in 1620 had invaded the Palatinate, ruled by the Protestant Elector Frederick V. As a fellow Protestant prince, James was under some pressure to come to Frederick's assistance; as Frederick's father-in-law his obligation seemed to many even more obvious. Yet James hesitated, partly because he held Frederick somewhat responsible for his own predicament, partly because he hoped to play a central role in negotiating a settlement. The Spaniards, meanwhile, had done everything possible to prolong the marriage talks, thereby neutralizing James's ability to act on Frederick's behalf. Frustration with the King's inertia had been building among the English Protestants, and popular opposition to the proposed match with the Infanta had been growing. Into this quagmire, at some risk to his own reputation and personal safety, stepped Charles.<sup>3</sup>

At first, surprisingly, all seemed to go well. Charles and Buckingham were received enthusiastically in Madrid, and the prospects for an early agreement brightened. The Papal dispensation, so long delayed, was now rumored to be imminent, and by early summer James began making official preparations for a joyous arrival of Charles and his Infanta in England. On 14 June John Chamberlain wrote to his correspondent Dudley Carleton that

On Whitsun Monday the duke of Richmond, Lord Treasurer, Marques Hamilton, Lord Chamberlain, Lord Marshall, Lord of Carlile, Lord Belfast, and Master Treasurer tooke their journey towards Southampton to take order for the reception of the Infanta when she shall arrive, for lodging her and her traine, for mending the high wayes and for shewes and pageants, to which purpose Innigo Jones and Allen the old player went along with them, who alone (with two or three herbingers and such like officers) might have performed all this as well as so many prime counsaillors, but that we must show how diligent and obsequious we are in any thing that concerns her . . .<sup>4</sup>

Jonson's old rival Jones had already been very much involved in preparing for the Infanta's arrival. In his capacity as Surveyor he had been commissioned to design and supervise the construction of two new chapels for her use, and while in Southampton he received the added honour of being elected a Burgess of that town. Jonson, on the other hand – whether inadvertently or deliberately – seems to have been completely forgotten. Stung by this neglect, outraged and threatened by his rival's conspicuous success, Jonson responded passionately in the "Epistle." In the first half of the poem his satire on Jones is indirect and allusive, but no less scathing for that:

AN EPISTLE ANSWERING TO ONE THAT ASKED  
TO BE SEALED OF THE TRIBE OF BEN

Men that are safe, and sure, in all they doe,  
 Care not what trials they are put unto;  
 They meet the fire, the Test, as Martyrs would;  
 And though Opinion stampe them not, are gold.  
 I could say more of such, but that I flie 5  
 To speake my selfe out too ambitiously,  
 And shewing so weake an Act to vulgar eyes,  
 Put conscience and my right to compromise.  
 Let those that meerely talke, and never thinke,  
 That live in the wild Anarchie of Drinke, 10  
 Subject to quarrell only; or else such  
 As make it their proficiencie, how much  
 They'[h]ave glutted in, and letcher'd out that weeke,  
 That never yet did friend, or friendship seeke  
 But for a Sealing: let these men protest. 15  
 Or th'other on their borders, that will jeast  
 On all Soules that are absent; even the dead;  
 Like flies, or wormes, which mans corrupt parts fed:  
 That to speake well, thinke it above all sinne,  
 Of any Companie but that they are in, 20  
 Call every night to Supper in these fitts,  
 And are received for the Covey of Witts;  
 That censure all the Towne, and all th'affaires,  
 And know whose ignorance is more than theirs;  
 Let these men have their wayes, and take their times 25  
 To vent their Libels, and to issue rimes,  
 I have no portion in them, nor their deale  
 Of newes they get, to strew out the long meale,  
 I studie other friendships, and more one,  
 Then these can ever be; or else wish none. <sup>5</sup> 30

The effect of the poem's title and of its very opening lines is difficult to describe; in them, Jonson concocts an almost unassailable blend of self-assertion and humility, a kind of modest pride. In one sense the title's biblical allusion is seriously meant: Jonson does present himself and his followers as righteous men uncontaminated by the corruption around them. Just as members of the tribe of Benjamin are preserved from the wrath of God in the Book of Revelation, so Jonson suggests that the virtues he and his "sons" adhere to will be ultimately, if not immediately, rewarded. The allusion has the effect not only of enhancing Jonson's moral position, but of intimidating his antagonists, indirectly reminding them of one fate that may await them if they continue their vicious practices. Yet this biblical reference, and the ensuing imagery of martyrdom, might seem overweening, overblown, perhaps even blasphemous, if it were not qualified by a hint of self-conscious and humorous irony. In this poem as in



others by Jonson, irony is more than simply an aesthetic effect; it is a micro-political tactic rooted in the poem's status as self-conscious social *performance*. Jonson likens the rejection he has suffered to a "trial" that tests his mettle, and yet he also knew that this poem – his response to that rejection – was itself a kind of trial, a public testing and carefully scrutinized public display of his resiliency and strength under pressure. The "Epistle" is an "answer" in a larger sense than its title implies.

The mere fact that Jonson refers to himself as "Ben" helps undercut any sense of pretension or unlimited pride. Again and again in his later poetry he used the "Ben" persona in this self-mocking fashion – neutralizing potential criticism, turning his foibles and shortcomings to his own advantage, presenting himself as a lovable figure distanced from competitive ambition.<sup>6</sup> Indeed, the "Ben" persona is fundamentally paradoxical. On one level it reflects Jonson's sense of himself as a prominent public figure, as a personality interesting in his own right and not simply because of his writing. In this sense the persona suggests Jonson's recognized social stature and his confident acceptance of it. But in another sense the "Ben" persona reflects the inevitable insecurity of his position; its function is partly defensive. It deflects potential attack, and the good humour it implies and evokes is one tactic for coping with the essential anxiety of Jonson's condition as a courtly poet. The very image of naive ingenuousness the persona conjures up must to some extent have been self-consciously cultivated; in any event, Jonson knew when and how to employ it effectively. In this poem its use, combined with the somewhat self-mocking assertion that he disdains to "speake [himself] out too ambitiously" (1. 6), renders his position nearly impregnable to criticism. Charged with sacrilege, he could reply that his assailant had taken the biblical allusion much more seriously than it had been meant; accused of pride, he could respond that he had himself openly poked fun at this very tendency. The humour of the opening lines is one of the most effective means by which he simultaneously implies, creates, asserts, and defends his social power.

Although Jonson claims to disdain speaking ambitiously because to do so would violate his conscience and compromise his sense of right, he also indicates that to do so would be an act of weakness – one, presumably, that could easily be exploited by his enemies. His modesty here may be adopted not only or even necessarily because he finds it congenial, but also because to assert himself too vigorously might ultimately be ineffective, allowing his antagonists to take advantage of his rhetoric and use it against him. Indeed, throughout his career Jonson exhibits an obsessive concern with controlling his words, with authorizing them and imposing on them a signification that cannot be misconstrued. The dedications, prologues, and inductions to his plays, the marginalia to his masques, the self-conscious voice so common in his poems – all these suggest a need to control and con-

tain the meaning of his words. For all his belief in the power of right language to reform society and move men to virtue (one of his chief justifications for practising poetry), Jonson also feared words. Or rather, he feared the very ambiguity of language that is often at the heart of his best poetry and that he exploited so effectively to enhance his own social status. The ambiguity of language was both a source of his power and the potential cause of its loss. For Jonson, language was not an abstract issue: losing control of one's words meant losing social security. And in fact, it is not so much language that he fears as it is the ignorance or malignity of his interpreters. Language itself is neutral, but its meanings can be appropriated, stolen, re-assigned, or misinterpreted by others intent on promoting themselves. More than a tool for communication, language becomes a weapon in the struggle for power.

Jonson's expressed need not to seem to speak "too ambitiously" suggests just one of the ways in which his dependent status encouraged linguistic subtlety and indirection: self-promotion that was too obvious might also be ineffective and vulnerable. Blatant ambition could prove self-defeating. Seeming to seek too desperately the approval of others would make their approval less likely; it would reveal weakness, and weakness would breed weakness by making one less attractive as a friend, dependent, or mentor. Obvious or excessive ambition would make one appear too self-centered to be a reliable ally or trustworthy client. To realize his ambitions, Jonson had partly to disclaim them; to secure his power, he had partly to distance himself from the obvious desire for it. His references to "conscience" and "right" (1. 8) themselves function tactically; by making him appear committed to values higher than the merely political, they advance his political interests. By suggesting his self-respect and self-confidence, they solicit the respect he craved from others. His appeal to internal standards of motive and conduct helps strengthen his external standing. His public avowal that he acts not to promote his social self-interests but in accordance with his conscience functions, paradoxically, to ensure that those same interests are advanced.

Indeed, the distinction the poem attempts to draw between individual values and social ambition is for all practical purposes exceedingly difficult to sustain. However much Jonson may speak of safety and surety as character traits or personal attributes, their value for him derives precisely from the fact that his social safety and surety have been threatened. And yet Jonson knew that his safeness and sureness could not be defined purely internally, as a reflection of his own personality, but that they inevitably depended to a large extent on the reactions of others. The "Epistle" seeks to shape and guide those reactions – but it does so, ironically, partly by claiming indifference to them. The very pose of independence Jonson adopts in the opening lines is itself part of his strategy for winning accep-



tance, although it functions also as a pre-emptive tactic for dealing with the possibility of continued rejection. His contempt for "Opinion" (1. 4) cannot disguise his fear of it, and although he opens the poem by claiming his indifference to political insecurity, the "Epistle" is in fact an attempt to respond to and cope with his unease. Proclaiming his allegiance to safety and surety as personal values is thus in one sense a private consolation for social disappointment; at the same time, though, it serves publicly to assert Jonson's sense of his own social worth. As he implicitly concedes, the question can only be one of appearing to speak *too* ambitiously, not of freeing oneself from ambition completely. Although he claims that he will not compromise his conscience, the whole poem is an attempt to find a suitable compromise between adherence to a personal standard of individual integrity and the need to make and defend a place for oneself in the world.

Jonson's professed modesty and concern with conscience, his ostensible submission to a higher ideal of right, are meant to stand in clear contrast to the ensuing description of the behaviour of those he attacks. In refusing to speak himself out too ambitiously, he had used silence as a means of intimating a worth it would have been boastful to proclaim in detail. His satire aims to point up part of the difference between himself and his unspecified targets precisely by emphasizing their egotistic, self-promotional uses of language. He argues implicitly for the quality of his own words – and word – by accusing his antagonists of vacuous talk, empty protests, hypocritical praise, and self-serving satire. By mocking those "that meere ly talke, and never thinke" (1. 9), Jonson implies that his own use of words is closely wedded to reasonable thought, but the phrase also reminds us of other senses in which his language is "thoughtful" – the senses in which it is self-conscious, guarded, and politic. Earlier in the same year this poem was written, Jonson had provoked displeasure precisely by being insufficiently cautious in his use of language: he had exploited the public genre of the court masque for personal satire on the poet George Wither.<sup>7</sup> Many of those who first read Jonson's epistle may therefore have glimpsed unintended irony in his attack on others for presuming to "censure all the Towne, and all th'affaires, / And know whose ignorance is more than theirs" (11. 23-24), while anyone who recognized the subtly specific attack on Inigo Jones buried beneath the ostensibly generalized satire of this section may have smiled at Jonson's reference to those who "vent their Libels, and . . . issue rimes" (1. 26). Perhaps he felt that the best way to distance himself from such imputations was to allege them openly against others.<sup>8</sup>

Clearly, what bothers Jonson about those he attacks is not only their moral failings considered in the abstract, but their success – the fact that, despite shortcomings he regards as painfully obvious, they remain menacing competitors for social prestige and advancement. At first it might seem

that his targets are beneath the need to be attacked; he describes them as apparently inconsequential drunkards and philanderers (11. 9-15). Far more threatening, however, are those "received for the Covey of Witts" (1. 22). Indeed, the threat they pose is the direct result of their reception, their social acceptance and recognition. Their power is no more independent of society than his, and in fact the real purpose of his satire seems less to denigrate them than to influence the perceptions of those who grant them status. Despite all his disdain for "Opinion," his poem functions on one level precisely as an attempt to shape and direct it. Although reading Jonson's "Epistle" in this way may seem to locate its roots in the poet's "selfishness," from another perspective such a reading helps illustrate how utterly and inescapably *social* his concerns necessarily were.

The "Covey of Witts" Jonson attacks stands in direct opposition to the "Tribe of Ben" that the poem both celebrates and seeks to augment. In this sense the "Epistle" seems to have grown out of a kind of factionalism quite common in the political and social world of Jonson's day. Like the leader of a political faction, he knew that his appeal to others inevitably depended partly on his real social power. This is why his failure to be included in the commission to greet the Infanta must have seemed variously threatening. Because it could be interpreted as a possible sign of his loss of stature and influence, it would not only make him more vulnerable to sniping and back-biting from the sort of "Witts" he attacks here, but it would also make him less attractive as the central figure of an alternative group. Excluded from the commission, rejecting and rejected by the rival "Covey," he seems also have worried about the potential danger of more general rejection. Indeed, in an important passage to be considered later, he describes this fear almost as if he imagined a chain-reaction of renunciation (11. 51-55).<sup>9</sup>

Perhaps this is one reason why the request from the unnamed person "that asked to be Sealed of the Tribe of Ben" may have seemed so significant, so deserving of an extended and weighty answer. It allowed Jonson to advertise the attraction he still held for some, to call attention to the fact that he was still drawing allies in spite of his recent disappointment, and thus to improve his chances of drawing others into the fold. In the face of his exclusion from the welcoming commission, friendships of the sort he celebrates here must have seemed all the more important to him, not only because of the private consolation they offered, not only because they helped shore up his sense of his own social dignity and self-respect, but because they increased his chances of regaining whatever power seemed jeopardized or lost. Although he attacks the "Covey" for issuing "rimes" and for exploiting poetry tactically, his own "Epistle" perfectly exemplifies the tactical use of verse. Generalizing the threat that the "Covey" poses (they "censure all the Towne and all th'affaires" [1. 23]), he plays on the insecurity of his audience to enhance his own sense of safety. He wants



his readers to feel threatened by the same fear of exclusion and enmity, in order that they might join him in excluding the "Covey." However much he may have rejected the "Covey" personally, he realized that personal rejection was insufficient: only by influencing others could he exert any real effect.

In the second half of the poem, where Jonson presents more explicitly the differences between himself and his satiric targets, the sense of personal threat, as well as its connections with patronage concerns, becomes more pronounced:

What is't to me whether the French Designe  
 Be, or be not, to get the *Val-telline*?  
 Or the States Ships sent forth belike to meet  
 Some hopes of *Spaine* in their West Indian Fleet?  
 Whether the Dispensation yet be sent, 35  
 Or that the Match from *Spaine* was ever meant?  
 I wish all well, and pray high heaven conspire  
 My Princes safetie, and my Kings desire.  
 But if, for honour, we must draw the Sword,  
 And force back that, which will not be restor'd, 40  
 I have a body, yet, that spirit drawes  
 To live, or fall a Carkasse in the cause.  
 So farre without inquirie what the States,  
*Brunsfeld*, and *Mansfield* doe this yeare, my fates  
 Shall carry me at Call; and I'le be well, 45  
 Though I doe neither heare these newes, nor tell  
 Of *Spaine* or *France*; or were not prick'd downe one  
 Of the late Myserie of reception,  
 Although my Fame, to his, not under-heares,  
 That guides the Motions, and directs the beares. 50  
 But that's a blow, by which in time I may  
 Lose all my credit with my Christmas Clay,  
 And animated *Porc'lane* of the Court,  
 I, and for this neglect, the courser sort  
 Of earthen Jarres, there may molest me too: 55  
 Well, with mine owne fraile Pitcher, what to doe  
 I have decreed; keepe it from waves, and presse,  
 Lest it be justled, crack'd, made nought, or lesse:  
 Live to that point I will, for which I am man,  
 And dwell as in my Center, as I can, 60  
 Still looking to, and ever loving heaven;  
 With reverence using all the gifts then[ce] given.  
 'Mongst which, if I have any friendships sent,  
 Such as are square, wel-tagde, and permanent,  
 Not built with Canvasse, paper, and false lights, 65  
 As are the Glorious Scenes, at the great sights;  
 And that there be no fev'ry heats, nor colds,  
 Oylie Expansions, or shrunke durtie folds,  
 But all so cleare, and led by reasons flame,

As but to stumble in her sight were shame; 70  
 These I will honour, love, embrace, and serve:  
 And free it from all question to preserve.  
 So short you read my Character, and theirs  
 I would call mine, to which not many Staires  
 Are asked to climbe. First give me faith, who know 75  
 My selfe a little. I will take you so,  
 As you have writ your selfe. Now stand, and then,  
 Sir, you are Sealed of the Tribe of *Ben*.

The distinction Jonson had earlier attempted to draw between his own ostensibly modest use of language and the empty wordiness of his antagonists is reinforced in this section of the poem. Contrasting his plain, steadfast simplicity with their gossipy, self-indulgent speculations, he suggests that while his enemies merely talk about political affairs, he is willing to demonstrate his loyalty to the King through concrete action. His pose of political indifference is not meant to be read as apathetic, but as signalling a more fundamental loyalty; he offers his supposed disinterest in day-to-day political events as a sign of his fundamental trustworthiness, and in fact the whole poem implies that in spite of his disappointments, he is also "safe and sure" in the larger sense of being politically reliable. In the summer of 1623, when the poem was almost certainly written, such a claim was particularly significant. Indeed, seen in its immediate historical context, Jonson's pose of political indifference could itself have been read as a political – and as a carefully politic – assertion. Many of James's subjects felt at this time that the King's policies towards Spain, towards the recovery of the Palatinate, and towards the promotion of continental Protestantism were too passive; they opposed the marriage negotiations and resisted any move towards greater domestic toleration of Catholics. James himself was even suspected by some of having secret Catholic sympathies, and in general his popularity during this period was not very high. Criticism of government policies from Parliament, from the pulpit, and from other sources had become such a problem that James attempted through various means to constrain and suppress it, annoyed by what he felt was illegitimate meddling with his prerogative and unjustified challenge to his authority.<sup>10</sup>

Seen against this background, Jonson's claimed indifference to day-to-day foreign affairs and his protests of fundamental loyalty to the King are particularly intriguing. On the one hand, he seems to behave here as James hoped all his subjects would; he seems to distance himself from the kind of obsessive, intrusive interest in foreign affairs that so many of his contemporaries displayed and that vexed the King so much.<sup>11</sup> Implicitly depicting himself as a model subject, he exhibits his trust in James's judgement, praying rather generally that "high heaven conspire / My Princes safetie, and my Kings desire" (ll. 37-38). At the same time, however, his avowed



willingness to take up arms in the interests of winning back the Palatinate suggests some genuine sympathy with – or at the very least some prudent deference to – those factions at court and in the country at large who favoured a more vigorous assertion of English power. Indeed, readers of this persuasion could even have interpreted the poem as subtly endorsing their views, while the King could read it as a straightforward expression of basic loyalty. At the time Jonson probably wrote his poem, it would have been difficult for anyone to predict with confidence how the marriage negotiations would conclude, what policy would eventually be adopted towards the recovery of the Palatinate, or what attitude would finally prevail towards Spain. Jonson's lines on foreign affairs, while professing indifference, can in fact be read as intentionally ambiguous, as deliberately vague, as the cautious expression of a mind highly sensitive to the very fluidity of events he claims to have little interest in. His implicit portrait of himself as a loyal subject and as a forthright, willing patriot can be seen as reflecting an acute political consciousness. His studied indifference to the detailed exercise of state power stands in intriguing contrast to his obsession with micro-political maneuvering, but it nonetheless plays a significant tactical role in his efforts at self-promotion.

Aside from any possibly larger political significance, the narrower implications of Jonson's offer to take up his sword in defense of James's interests are complex and far-reaching. On the one hand the offer serves to remind his readers of his past bravery on the battlefield; he seems to have taken pride in his physical prowess – he boasts about it several times to Drummond – and the image of old Ben sallying forth to wage war against the King's enemies is potently attractive.<sup>12</sup> It achieves just the right mixture of appealing vulnerability and indomitable courage; in the same way that Jonson implicitly presents himself as an injured but unvanquished victim of domestic antagonists, so he wins further sympathy for his willingness to risk greater injury in selfless service. The image must have appealed to Jonson especially in its present context because it helps to emphasize, again, the implicit contrast he has been drawing between himself and Inigo Jones specifically. Previous commentators have noted how frequently and precisely Jonson alludes in the first half of this poem to his earlier epigram on "The Townes Honest Man," thus turning his attack on unidentified antagonists into a skillfully indirect assault on Jones himself. It does not seem to have been pointed out, however, that Jonson's professed willingness here to "draw the Sword" in the service of his King looks back to a line from the earlier poem, where he alleged that the Townes Honest Man would sooner "see its sister naked, ere a sword" (1. 22). Thus Jonson's avowed readiness to risk his life in his monarch's interest not only testifies to his own exemplary loyalty, but also serves to mock Jones's supposed cowardice.

Yet Jonson's purpose may have been more than simply to chide his rival. His declaration of unflagging loyalty and willingness to serve, his forthright prayer on behalf of his King and Prince, stand in suggestive contrast to the neglect or indifference he has suffered in not being "prick'd downe" (1. 47) to participate in the planned reception of Charles and the Infanta. In this as in other ways, Jonson seems to draw subtle attention to James's recent shortcomings as a patron, his failure to live up completely to the ideal of reciprocity that patronage relations should embody—in a sense, his failure fully to merit the devotion that Jonson still selflessly (but publicly) pays him. The poem makes it clear, however, that it is not only the neglect of his superiors that worries Jonson, but what that neglect might portend for his general "credit" at court (1. 52)—a word that nicely conflates concern for his standing and reputation and, more subtly, for his financial security. Since his security to a large extent depended upon the protective support and intimidation provided by friendly superiors, any loss of such protection left him immediately more exposed. The language Jonson uses to depict the imagined consequences of such exposure mixes poetic metaphor and blunt realism. He portrays himself as a "fraile Pitcher" that must be kept "from waves, and presse; / Lest it be justled, crack'd, made nought, or lesse" (11. 57-58). The last two verbs seem too abstract to fit the metaphor, but in a sense they confront more directly and concretely than the earlier language Jonson's real fears of loss and humiliation. Although he claims to have "decreed" what to do with himself in order to combat those fears (1. 57), this very word, with its overtones of sovereign power, reminds us of his real dependence on others.

Nowhere does Jonson clearly reproach the King for the neglect he feels he has suffered, but he does offer examples of other associations between superiors and inferiors against which his relationship with James can be measured and evaluated. Thus, after detailing the practical hardships he fears he is likely to endure as a result of having been slighted, he turns to his relationship with God for consolation and comfort. That relationship is ideally one of purest reciprocity; to the extent that it falls short of the ideal, the fault by definition can only be attributed to the neglect and indifference of the suitor, never to any carelessness on the Patron's part. Jonson has already reminded his readers through his title that God can be relied upon to reward his true servants; here he declares his intention to love heaven (and thus merit heaven's love) in part by using "With reverence . . . all the gifts then[ce] given" (1. 62). His relationship with God (he implies) gives him a sense of internal security, stability, and well-being that his life at court and relationship with his earthly King cannot really provide, and to which it functions in part as an alternative. Yet God's love and concern for his servants also function in the poem as an object lesson for mortal patrons—an ideal they can never, of course, really achieve, but ought nevertheless



to aspire towards. The consolation of God's patronage invoked here could, in everyday social terms, be only a partial one for Jonson: he had still to function and survive in a system far from heavenly perfection. Even his introduction of God into the poem can be seen to have tactical implications for promoting Jonson's interests within that system. By invoking the example of his celestial Patron he simultaneously comforts himself, evinces his sincerity and displays an attractive integrity, intimidates his antagonists, and offers the King a model to emulate.

But God is not the only alternative model Jonson offers. In his own relationship with the poetic son who sues for admission into the tribe of Ben, Jonson himself behaves in ways one might expect of an exemplary patron. For while he ostensibly addresses his suitor as a friend, it is clear from the tone of the poem that their relationship is not one between exact equals. This is not the sort of poem Jonson would have been likely to address to Camden or Selden or Donne. Perhaps because of a difference of age, there is a tone of good-natured dignity, even a touch of formality, in those portions of the poem where Jonson most clearly addresses its recipient. Indeed, the very last lines ("Now stand, and then, / Sir, you are Sealed of the Tribe of *Ben*") not only pun on the word "stand" to exalt the ideal of ethical stability and moral stasis that is at the heart of so much of Jonson's laudatory verse, but also call to mind the public act by which a King might create a new knight. Indeed, the double meaning of "stand" suggests, in nicely paradoxical fashion, a kind of firmness and fixity that is also a kind of ascent. In the same way that God functions as an alternate and in some ways more reliable patron than James, so Jonson's tribe – supposedly bound in free, cooperative, yet permanent association – ostensibly functions as an alternative to the world of courtly competition. The ideal of friendship the poem advocates contradicts the very atmosphere in which Jones allegedly thrives, an atmosphere in which, through the King's neglect or his sudden change of attitude, a loyal servant of the Court need worry about losing all his standing there – not only his favour with aristocrats, but his protection from the machinations of rivals and social equals.

The incident that apparently provoked Jonson's poem – his failure to be included in the arrangements for the Infanta's reception – may seem slight in itself, and his reaction to it may seem excessive. But his reaction is all the more intriguing precisely because it is so powerfully and deeply felt. It suggests that despite his years of unprecedented success at court – despite his pension, despite his regular and lucrative employment as an author of holiday masques, despite all the other signs of the King's favour – Jonson never really did (never really could) feel entirely secure about his social status or his future. Indeed, the more closely associated he became with the court – the more he sought for, won, and accepted its largess and approval – the more financially and psychologically dependent upon it he became.

The pride he took in his social prominence – as when he boasts in the epistle that his fame is at least as great as Jones's – seems to have co-existed with an ever-present sense that that prominence was inherently unstable, and could vanish overnight. The pension that had been given could be revoked or left unpaid, the masque commissions could suddenly halt, old friends and patrons could lose interest should the poet – for whatever reasons – lose royal favour. All of these losses would involve more than financial deprivation, important as that might be to the aging Jonson. They would involve, just as significantly, a loss of social prestige, and would deny the poet important forums in which to achieve a sense of public purposefulness and self-validation. Jonson's reaction to the neglect referred to in the "Tribe" epistle, then, seems less a reaction to a single incident or event as a boiling over of anxieties more deeply felt and more tenaciously rooted. The poem suggests in startling and memorable fashion how vulnerable he could feel even during a period when he would seem to have enjoyed far more security than at any other time in his career, certainly far more than other practising poets of his social background.

It also suggests just how ambivalent his attitude towards the court could be – the contempt he could feel for it and for the demands that participating in it imposed upon him, and yet his inability (even his reluctance) to break free. However much the poem satirizes the court and courtiers, it never entirely rejects either. However often the court is described by Jonson and by others as an environment of artificiality and pretense, it was also to a great degree the centre of social and psychological *reality* during this period; to be cut off or excluded from it was to experience a profound sense of alienation – a sense likely to be all the stronger in someone, like Jonson, who had tasted its appeals and become accustomed to them. Thus, although the epistle speaks of Jonson withdrawing within the circle of himself, this very poem is part of an attempt to extend and strengthen the circle of his influence. Ostensibly written to approve the admission of a petitioner into the "Tribe of Ben," the epistle in another sense constitutes Jonson's application for admission (or re-admission) into a larger and more important social grouping. Jonson tells the young man that he approves him "As you have writ your selfe" (1. 77) – a clever phrase that suggests the possibility of inscribing one's character, of re-presenting one's essence on paper, and that thereby implies an ideal that supposedly animates the present poem. In the same way, Jonson seems to hope to be accepted as he presents himself (and his self) in the epistle. One of its functions, indeed, is to reassert his importance in courtly society – by calling the King's "neglect" (1. 54) to his own and to others' attention, by offering an attractive image of the poet, and by embarrassing or attacking actual or potential antagonists. The reference to the "Christmas Clay / And animated *Porc'lane* of the Court" (11. 52-53), for instance, has the effect not only of satirizing the



unnamed aristocrats who may already have rejected him, but, perhaps more importantly, of intimidating those who might. To reject the poet once this satire was circulated might leave one open to the appearance of bearing out Jonson's own assessment of the character and motives of his rejectors, might make it seem that that assessment was personally applicable to oneself. Paradoxically, whatever real social power Jonson's satire possesses derives from its subjects' concerns for their own reputations in a courtly context. Of course, the satire would exert a different kind of power, a different sort of appeal to other courtiers, for other reasons: uncomfortable with the anxieties, compromises, fears, and inevitable pretense dictated by their participation at court, they could, by approving the satire, disinfect and distance themselves from a milieu they could never completely reject. Moreover, their approval of Jonson's apparently forthright and principled allegiance to higher values would provide a means of characterizing themselves and of promoting their own images and competitive interests.

The "Tribe of Ben" epistle is fascinating precisely because it is written near the apparent height of Jonson's career. Reminiscent, in the profound sense of insecurity it conveys, of the much earlier epistle to the Countess of Rutland (*Forrest*, XII), which had been composed more than twenty years before, the poem suggests that the competitive tensions Jonson felt then, when he was just beginning as a patronage poet, had neither disappeared nor diminished with time. In this poem as in that one, Jonson seems to be bothered less by the success of his rival than by the neglect that fact seems to suggest on the patron's part. Jonson knew that Jones was no threat to him unless the King – inadvertently or deliberately – allowed the threat to exist, and while in both poems his frustration is most obviously directed at his rival, there is in both an undercurrent of disappointment with his benefactors. In each poem there seems an implicit sense of betrayal, as if Jonson feels he deserves better treatment from his superiors than he has received. Paradoxically, while Jonson could infallibly depend upon the hostility and ill-will of his rivals, he could be much less reliably certain of the motives or continuing encouragement of his patrons. Any apparent lack of consideration on their parts, however innocent or unintentional, could seem far more worrisome than the machinations of an antagonist. Jonson seems to have been less afraid of his rivals than of the effects they might have on his standing with his patrons.

In the "Tribe of Ben" epistle, Jonson's relationship with his unnamed young friend – who symbolizes, partly because he *is* unnamed, *all* of the poet's virtuous friends – ostensibly functions as an alternative to the highly competitive, highly insecure world of the court. Jonson's poems praising friends and friendship supposedly celebrate relations rooted not in power or self-concern but in shared ideals, shared assurance, and mutual regard. Yet he realized that the support of his friends was not enough, that the re-

spect accorded him by other writers and intellectuals was insufficient to promote and protect the kind of career and standing he desired. Indeed, as analysis of the "Tribe of Ben" epistle has already suggested, even Jonson's poems to friends cannot be entirely divorced from patronage concerns. The mere fact that friendship could be an alternative to and relief from courtly competition is itself significant. But in addition, Jonson's poems to friends are often poems to friends who, because of their own influence or influential connections, could help promote his social advancement. It may seem cynical to point this out, although no cynicism is intended. Nor does the fact imply anything in particular about Jonson's own conscious intentions, which obviously we cannot know for certain. That he not only probably cared deeply and genuinely for his friends but also found his friendships variously useful is, after all, neither very startling nor unique. It is the attempt to make human relationships seem less complicated than they are – to idealize and thus simplify them – that helps prevent a more truly comprehensive analysis of Jonson's works. But it is also this very instinct that suggests the need for and legitimacy of such analysis.

Whether or not all the friends Jonson addressed were in a position to help him, the more important fact remains that any poem he wrote functioned inevitably as self-presentation and therefore potentially as self-promotion. His poems to friends, like his poems to patrons, allow him to present to the world an attractive image for inspection and approval. When he writes a poem attacking courtly corruption and asserting his own Stoic independence, he fashions an image for himself no less than when he extols the wonders of the King. He could never stand entirely separate from the appeal and power of the court, from the dangers of competition or from the desire for prestige. All his poems suggest – at one level or another – aspects of his involvement in the contemporary patronage system.

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#### Notes

I thank the Whiting Foundation, the Newberry Library, and the American Council of Learned Societies / National Endowment for the Humanities for fellowships in support of my research.

- 1 Throughout this paper, I use "patronage" as an adjective, as in "patronage poet." Although somewhat awkward, this usage seems preferable not only to "poet dependent on patronage" but also to "patronized poet," both of which stress economic dependency in a way that simplifies the true complexity of patronage relations.

On literary patronage in the English Renaissance, see, for instance, Phoebe Sheavyn, *The Literary Profession in the Elizabethan Age*, ed. J. W. Saunders, 2nd ed. (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1967) or Daniel Javitch, *Poetry and Courtliness in Renaissance England* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1978). The recent interdisciplinary collection of papers on *Patronage in the Renaissance*, ed. Guy Fitch Lytle and Stephen Orgel (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1981), not only suggests the pervasiveness of patronage relations but also surveys much of the best recent or relevant scholarship. On political patronage a good short treatment remains the article by



Wallace T. MacCaffrey, "Place and Patronage in Elizabethan Politics," in *Elizabethan Government and Society: Essays Presented to Sir John Neale*, ed. S. T. Bindoff, et al. (London: Univ. of London, The Athlone Press, 1961), pp. 95-126. See also Linda Levy Peck, *Northampton: Patronage and Policy at the Court of James I* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), and in particular the first chapter of Conrad Russell's *Parliaments and English Politics, 1621-1629* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979). A fine sense of the comprehensiveness of artistic patronage is communicated by James N. O'Neill, "Queen Elizabeth I as Patron of the Arts," Diss. Univ. of Virginia, 1966. On music see, for example, David C. Price, *Patrons and Musicians of the English Renaissance* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1981); on painting, William Gaunt, *Court Painting in England from Tudor to Victorian Times* (London: Constable, 1980). One of the finest treatments of church patronage remains Christopher Hill's *Economic Problems of the Church* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956).

On more general issues of power and literature in the Renaissance, see for instance Stephen Greenblatt, *Renaissance Self-Fashioning* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1980); Jonathan Goldberg, *James I and the Politics of Literature* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1983); and Jonathan Dollimore, *Radical Tragedy* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1984). Although my approach to some of the issues dealt with in these books often differs in significant ways from the approaches taken there, all have proven stimulating in various ways. For further discussion of these general questions, see for instance various recent essays by Louis Adrian Montrose, a number of essays published in recent issues of the journal *Representations*, several of the essays included in the Spring 1983 issue of *New Literary History*, and the collection of essays edited by Stephen Greenblatt, *The Power of Forms in the Renaissance* (Norman, OK: Pilgrim Books, 1982). An exceptionally provocative discussion of the place of the poet in the English Renaissance is offered by Richard Helgerson in his book *Self-Crowned Laureates* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1983). Although Helgerson devotes a chapter to Jonson, most of his attention is focused on the dramas, and the issue of patronage is a significant but not a central concern of the book. Don E. Wayne offers a highly focused but broadly suggestive study of the connections between poetry and power in Jonson's work in *Penshurst: The Semiotics of Place and the Poetics of History* (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1984).

On connections between patronage, patriarchy, and the broader world view, see for instance Peter Laslett's *The World We Have Lost*, 2nd ed. (New York: Scribner's, 1971), especially the first chapter. See also Gordon J. Schochet, *Patriarchalism in Political Thought: The Authoritarian Family and Political Speculation and Attitudes Especially in Seventeenth Century England* (New York: Basic Books, 1975), esp. pp. 54-84. Ann Jennalie Cook usefully summarizes a great deal of pertinent sociological information in her study *The Privileged Playgoers of Shakespeare's London, 1576-1642* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1981). See also Keith Wrightson, *English Society 1580-1680* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1982).

- 2 On this period of Jonson's life, see the biographical discussion included in the standard edition of his works, *Ben Jonson*, ed. C. H. Herford and Percy and Evelyn Simpson, 11 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1925-52), I, 86-88. All subsequent references to Jonson's works are to this edition, cited by title, volume, and page number.

On the report (by John Chamberlain) that Jonson's pension had been increased to £100, see *Ben Jonson*, X, 614. The figure mentioned in N. E. McClure's edition of Chamberlain's letters is in fact £200 (*The Letters of John Chamberlain* [Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1939] II, 404), and the same figure is cited in the *DNB*. The *DNB* reports the figure, indeed, as a matter of fact; but stronger evidence suggests that Jonson's pension was not increased from 100 marks until 1630 (see *Ben Jonson*, I, 96; 245-48). Still, the fact that such rumors were circulating about Jonson's good fortune is itself revealing. Jonson does seem to have been paid the generous sum of £100 by Buckingham for *The Gypsies Metamorphosed* (see *Ben Jonson*, X, 612-13).

The evidence concerning Jonson's near-knighthood is open to different interpretations. The only report of the possibility occurs in a letter from the Reverend Joseph Mead to Sir Martin Stuteville dated 15 September 1621. The relevant passage reads: "A friend told me, this fair-time, that Ben Jonson was not knighted, but escaped it narrowly, for that his majesty would have done it, had not there been means made (himself not unwilling) to avoid it." See *The Court and Times of James the First*, ed. Thomas Birch (London: H. Colburn, 1849), II, 275. Herford and the Simpsons, in reporting the incident, comment that the "king's favours were apt to compromise the dignity of the

recipients. Jonson's dignity, when he stood by it, was not easily compromised . . ." (*Ben Jonson*, I, 87). It is unclear why Jonson, who so sedulously pursued other forms of patronage, would have sought to avoid a knighthood. Perhaps he felt that the worth of the honour had been cheapened; a passage in *Eastward Ho!* that mocks the trafficking in titles during the Jacobean period, for instance, jokes about "thirty pound knights" (*Ben Jonson*, IV, 582). Marchette Chute, in her excellent biography *Ben Jonson of Westminster* (New York: Dutton, 1953), offers a more pragmatic explanation: "Knighthood was an expensive honour and one that Jonson almost certainly could not afford" (p. 269).

C.J. Sisson suggests that Jonson, to supplement his income after his return from Scotland, may have been lecturing at Gresham College, and that his MA from Oxford may have been connected with his assumption of this academic position. See "Ben Jonson of Gresham College," *TLS*, 21 September 1951, p. 604.

John Aubrey's notes on Jonson record a story concerning Jonson's exercise of a different kind of influence at court then he was able to exercise in Selden's case. "B. Jonson had 50 [pounds per] annu[m] for . . . yeares together to keepe off Sr W. Wiseman of Essex from being Sheriff; at last K. James prickt him, & Ben: came to his Ma[jesty] & told him he had prickt him to the heart. & then explaind himselfe, innuendo Sr W. W. being prickt Sheriff: & gott him struck off." See *Ben Jonson*, I, 181.

Another incident recorded by Aubrey suggests how familiar Jonson's relationship with the King could be during this period and – if Aubrey's report can be trusted – how spontaneous and lavish James's patronage could sometimes prove. He cites the following poem by Jonson and then comments on its biographical significance:

A Grace by Ben: Johnson. extempore. before King James.

Our King and Queen the Lord-God blesse,  
The Paltzgrave, and the Lady Besse,  
And God blesse every living thing,  
That lives, and breath's, and loves the King.  
God blesse the Councill of Estate  
And Buckingham the fortunate.  
God blesse them all, and keepe them safe:  
And God blesse me, and God blesse *Raph*.

"The K. was mighty enquisitive to know who this Raph was; Ben told him 'twas the Drawer at the Swanne-taverne by Charingcrosse who drew him good Canarie. for this Drollery his Matie gave him an hundred pounde." (*Ben Jonson*, I, 180)

Herford and the Simpsons, in their note to this poem, remark that a "clue to the date is given in the second and seventh lines." They point out that the Princess Elizabeth married the Palsgrave in 1613, and note that George Villiers became Earl of Buckingham in 1617; they assume that the poem was therefore written sometime "shortly after he obtained his earldom" (*Ben Jonson*, XI, 162). The strongest piece of evidence for the poem's date, however, is one that they do not explicitly mention: the reference to Queen Anne in the first line. Since she died in 1619, the poem must have been written sometime after Buckingham's elevation but before her death – i.e., between 1617 and early 1619. In 1618 Buckingham, already an Earl, was created a Marquis; the poem may not necessarily, then, refer to his initial promotion, as Herford and the Simpsons assume, but seems certainly to have been written in this early period of his influence at court.

The fact that Jonson acknowledges Buckingham's influence so explicitly is intriguing. As Herford and the Simpsons imply, the omission from the poem of any reference to Prince Charles may itself be significant: their note does not make explicit, however, that during these early years of Buckingham's prominence, relations between the Prince and the favourite were extremely poor, with James often siding dramatically with the favourite (for details, see G.P.V. Akrigg, *Jacobean Pageant: or The Court of King James I* [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1962] pp. 207-08; and David Harris Willson, *King James VI & I* [New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1956], 406-07). The incidents are touched on very briefly by Roger Lockyer in his recent biography, *Buckingham: The Life and Political Career of George Villiers, First Duke of Buckingham 1592-1628* [Lon-



don: Longman, 1981], pp. 33-34).

It is perhaps important to emphasize that the easy-going friendliness displayed by James in Aubrey's anecdote existed side-by-side with a very clear sense of his own importance, so that a man of Jonson's rank could never feel securely familiar even with so gregarious a king. The story helps to illuminate, though, how the humorous and somewhat self-mocking persona Jonson adopted in some of his poems to patrons could also prove attractive and beneficial in his day-to-day dealings with them.

3 For the details of this episode, see Akrigg, *Jacobean Pageant*, pp. 345-60; and Willson, *King James VI & I*, 430-40.

4 *The Letters of John Chamberlain*, II, 501.

5 The fullest discussion of the poem is offered by Richard S. Peterson in *Imitation and Praise in the Poems of Ben Jonson* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1981), pp. 112-57. Peterson's emphasis on the intellectual and literary traditions behind the poem differs from the approach taken here, which stresses instead the poem as a response to specific contemporary pressures and insecurities.

Hugh Maclean writes that in this poem, "Jonson draws his view of friendship between individuals together with a statement on the obligation of friends to the body politic. The poem suggests that Jonson regarded the Tribe, his own band of brothers, not at all as an association 'formed for pleasure's sake . . . or merely company,' but as a dependable nucleus of virtuous companions, secure in self-knowledge and the wit to eschew triviality, upon whom the state might rely in all honourable causes." See "Ben Jonson's Poems," in William R. Keast, ed., *Seventeenth Century English Poetry: Modern Essays in Criticism*, rev. ed. (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1971), p. 180. See also the fine discussion by William E. Caine in "Self and Others in Two Poems by Ben Jonson," *SP*, 80 (1983), 163-82.

The approach taken here emphasizes instead the tensions and anxieties the poem embodies, the implicit recognition it suggests that the ideal friendships it praises are insufficient to guarantee one's status and importance in society, that however dependable and virtuous one might prove and however willing and ready to serve, the state – acting through the individual patrons who control it – might by chance or design turn its back.

6 For a wide-ranging discussion of Jonson's use of "The Poet as Character," see Alexander Leggatt, *Ben Jonson: His Vision and His Art* (London: Methuen, 1981) pp. 199-232.

7 John Chamberlain's letter to Dudley Carleton for 25 January 1623 reports in connection with the masque *Time Vindicated to Himself*, and to *His Honours* that "Ben Johnson they say is like to heare of yt on both sides of the head for personating George Withers a poet or poetaster as he termes him, as hunting after fame by beeing a cronomastix or whipper of the time, which is become so tender an argument that yt must not be touched either in jest or earnest . . ." See *The Letters of John Chamberlain*, II, 473.

8 For the tissue of allusions in this poem to Jonson's earlier satire on Jones, *Epigrammes cxv* ("On the Townes Honest Man"), see Ian Donaldson's note in his edition of *Ben Jonson: Poems* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1975) pp. 207-10.

9 Did Jonson have in mind any particular group when he attacked this "Covey of Witt"? It is possible – although this possibility cannot be explored fully here – that his satire was aimed at George Wither and his circle of admirers and favourers, whom Jonson had attacked extensively only a few months earlier in *Time Vindicated* in terms strikingly similar to those employed in the "Tribe" epistle. I hope to develop this suggestion in more detail elsewhere; the identification, however, is not crucial to the kind of argument I am making in this paper.

10 For a good brief summary of the political unrest at this time and of James's attempts to deal with it, see, for instance, Margot Heinemann, *Puritanism and Theatre: Thomas Middleton and Opposition Drama under the Early Stuarts* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1980), pp. 153-55.

11 In the masque *Time Vindicated*, performed on 19 January 1623, Jonson seems to reprehend quite explicitly unbridled, licentious political commentary. When several of the characters express an interest in talking about such subjects as "the King," "the State," and "the World," and when they even raise the possibility of censuring "the Counsell, ere they censure us," the character Fame rebukes them: "They that censure those / They ought to reverence, meet they that old curse, / To beg their bread, and feele eternall Winter. / Ther[e]s difference 'twixt liberty, and licence" (*Ben Jonson*, VII, 662). The masque concludes with an endorsement of Jacobean pacificism.

12 For an interesting discussion of Jonson's presentation of himself as a warrior, see E. Pearlman, "Ben Jonson: An Anatomy," *ELR*, 9 (1979), 364-94.

# L'écriture de l'échange économique dans les Regrets de Du Bellay

FRANÇOIS PARE

C'est entre 1450 et 1550 environ que s'est affermi dans toute l'Europe commerciale et intellectuelle un système d'appropriation des biens et des personnes basé sur l'utilisation de monnaie réelle (pièces métalliques surtout) et fiduciaire (soldes, crédits, lettres de change et comptes de dépôt). Dans son ouvrage posthume sur l'histoire monétaire de l'Europe, Marc Bloch nous fait suivre l'évolution de la monnaie: de l'introduction de pièces métalliques au treizième siècle jusqu'au Sommet de Medina del Campo en 1497 sur la standardisation des monnaies nationales, et jusqu'à l'établissement de systèmes de référence stables de la valeur monétaire en 1726.<sup>1</sup> Bloch n'étudie guère le seizième siècle, mais on sait fort bien que l'Europe des années 1500 à 1550 était très préoccupée par la comptabilité d'échanges à valeurs fixes et la réciprocité normative des monnaies.

Il est difficile et certainement aléatoire de retracer l'impact de préoccupations économiques aussi concrètes sur la pensée symbolique et le monde littéraire à la Renaissance. On peut penser cependant que les intellectuels français du seizième siècle ont été motivés par les nouveaux types d'échanges économiques mis en place et par l'atmosphère d'incertitude et de spéculation qui en a découlé. Car il s'agissait de l'établissement de normes symboliques circulatoires desquelles tous les individus étaient appelés à convenir. Au fond, si les poètes de la Pléiade, en particulier, ont choisi de promouvoir le français comme langue véhiculaire de l'intellect nouveau vers 1550, c'était peut-être dans le but de promouvoir la recherche d'une monnaie normative, linguistique celle-là, capable d'exprimer des échanges métaphoriques et stylistiques encore inédits. Il ne faut pas s'étonner après tout que le sonnet, comme complète unité d'échange sémantique, ait lui-même fait l'objet de réformes à visées standardisatrices à cette époque cruciale.

La littérature, tout comme la monnaie, tombe dans le champ d'exercice de la valeur symbolique. Or, c'est dans la deuxième moitié de la Renaissance que ce rapport a été profondément établi et interrogé. Au seizième



siècle, "... la quantité," écrit Frédéric Mauro, "a pris dans la pensée la place qu'occupait la qualité. Dans les sciences humaines, avec Machiavel par exemple ou avec Bodin, la notion de force, donc de quantité, se substitue à celle de vertu, donc de qualité."<sup>2</sup> Notion de force, bien entendu, mais aussi et surtout notion de nombre. En effet, une bonne partie de la littérature française après 1550 rend compte de ce glissement de la qualité vers le quantitatif dans l'établissement de la valeur symbolique et la formulation de la vérité. Le rêve rabelaisien de l'Abbaye de Thélème n'est significatif que parce qu'il est nostalgie d'une communauté fondée sur l'héritage aristocratique de la qualité. Montaigne ne fait que répéter l'affaîssement de l'arbre qualitatif, prétentieux à ses yeux, au prix d'une circulation complexe de la quantité dans les *Essais*.

Plusieurs sonnets des *Regrets* de Du Bellay évoquent en termes très clairs également la perte de l'étalon qualitatif stable dans le processus de l'écriture. S'opposant à la tradition pétrarquiste, Du Bellay fait figure de remarquable innovateur. La *Deffence et Illustration de la Langue Françoise*, les *Antiquitez de Rome* et les *Regrets* énoncent toutes la disparition d'un modèle stable, assez dignifié par sa qualité et son unicité, pour produire le discours d'assurance de la vérité. L'oeuvre de Du Bellay offre donc à elle seule les trois faces de cet affaîssement: linguistique dans la *Deffence*, culturel dans les *Antiquitez* et surtout économique dans les *Regrets*. Dans cette dernière oeuvre, il est question avant tout de la figure monétaire et de la monétarisation du monde européen. Le texte est une monnaie et la monnaie est un texte, démontre en substance Marc Shell dans une très belle étude. Le texte nous parle linguistiquement et culturellement, alors qu'il est en même temps vecteur interne et externe d'échanges économiques. "The early poet-coinmakers, who impressed verbal symbols into monetary symbols, wrote about coins and . . . they sometimes personified coins so that the coins could speak about themselves."<sup>3</sup> Tierce richesse, richesse de référence qui parle en elle-même, le poème est souvent après 1550 au coeur de l'échange incessant des valeurs statutaires ou modèles. Et de tous les poèmes-monnaies, les sonnets des *Regrets* de Du Bellay sont certes les plus éclairants.

Mais déjà dans la *Deffence et Illustration de la Langue Françoise*, Du Bellay n'avait-il pas tenté de substituer au modèle romain la nouvelle matrice linguistique du français? Peu à peu, pourtant, le champ d'application de la langue s'étend à toute la structure socio-politique dont le Roi de France, par son provoquant rayonnement, devient l'élément nourricier et la logique même.

Le tens viendra (peut estre), & je l'espere moyennant la bonne destinée Françoise, que ce noble & puyssant Royaume obtiendra à son tour les resnes de la monarchie, & que nostre Langue (...) qui commence encor' à jeter ses

racines, sortira de terre, & s'elevera en telle hauteur & grosseur, qu'elle se pourra egaler aux mesmes Grecz & Romains. . . .<sup>4</sup>

Au début de la *Deffence*, la culture et la langue finissent par se confondre. L'argument de Du Bellay repose d'abord sur la prétendue ignorance et la "barbarie" des premiers Gaulois qui ne pouvaient véritablement concurrencer le "si grande multitude d'écrivains" du monde antique. Mais le chapitre III de la *Deffence* marque une rupture importante, car Du Bellay y introduit spécifiquement la clause linguistique. "Et si nostre Langue n'est si copieuse & riche que la Grecque ou Latine, cela ne doit estre imputé. . . ." Cette clause permettra au poète de faire émaner tout changement révolutionnaire de l'évolution proprement dite de la langue française. Il est évident déjà que les premières métaphores, celle de la végétation en particulier, conduisent Du Bellay à rejeter l'élaboration du sens comme moteur de changement politique et social.

Cette transformation linguistique dans la *Deffence* remet en question la formulation traditionnelle de la valeur littéraire et la nature même du pouvoir politique, fruits ici non plus de qualités intrinsèques, mais d'un processus général de traduction. Le déni du latin et du grec modélaires consacre le poète à la défense de sa langue, bien sûr, mais en même temps celle de son inscription dans tous les échanges transactionnaires qui fondent la culture française vers 1550. Il faut à Du Bellay la langue du nouvel échange économique. La poésie y pourra-t-elle quelque chose? Quel est donc son rapport avec l'échange constant des valeurs morales, culturelles, linguistiques, monétaires ou autres? C'est sans doute pour faire écho à ces questions que les *Regrets*, comme près de deux cents jetons frappés et numérotés, s'articulent en 1558-1559 sur la dissolution des cultures modélaires dans le nouvel échange économique.

Il n'est pas toujours question que d'argent dans les *Regrets*. Mais l'argent est très certainement une préoccupation récurrente dans les 191 sonnets qui forment ce recueil. Du sonnet 11 où la question surgit pour la première fois jusqu'au sonnet 170 et les suivants consacrés à l'éloge de la reine Marguerite, Du Bellay confie à son public lecteur sa crainte de manquer de ressources financières, son dégoût devant les tractations douteuses dont il est le témoin durant son séjour à Rome et sa volonté de situer l'écriture poétique hors de cette trame économique qui, nous assure-t-il, conduit à l'hypocrisie et à la corruption.

Du Bellay affirme à ses interlocuteurs que la poésie ne rapporte aucun profit pécuniaire et mène à une dévaluation générale de soi. Ecrire ne paie pas du tout, dit Du Bellay à ses collègues Ronsard, Magny, Gordes, Scève et les autres. Chaque sonnet est un échange qu'il faut croire à perte, dans lequel le destinataire s'en sort fatalement appauvri. On citera à ce sujet le sonnet 45, un exemple parmi plusieurs:



Et quel profit en ay-je? Ô belle récompense!  
 Je me suis consumé d'une vaine despence,  
 Et n'ay fait autre acquest que de mal & d'ennuy.  
 L'estranger recueillist le fruit de mons service,  
 Je travaille mon corps d'une indigne exercice,  
 Et porte sur mon front la vergongne d'autrui.

Or cette non-valeur de la poésie trouve sa première expression au sonnet II; Du Bellay annonce d'emblée ici que le sonnet-monnaie n'a dans la société contemporaine aucune valeur d'échange économique:

Bien qu'on ne paye en vers l'oeuvre d'un artisan,  
 Bien que la Muse soit de pauvreté suivie. . . .

Cette tournure de la concession laisse entrevoir un geste d'écriture qui naîtra *malgré* la pauvreté appréhendée, avec cette pauvreté en position centrale; mais Du Bellay se préoccupe d'abord de jeter les bases économiques des *Regrets*. Il établit que non seulement son oeuvre est démunie et sans éclat, mais qu'elle le conduit, lui, l'auteur, à l'indigence. C'est ainsi qu'aux sonnets 14, puis 15 et 17, Du Bellay réitère cette image d'inutile pauvreté de la poésie qui, insiste-t-il, n'a rien à voir avec les exigences pécuniaires de son existence quotidienne.

Demandes-tu (Boucher) dequoy servent les vers,  
 Et quel bien je reçois de ceux que je compose? (14)

De Bellay opte bien, lui que l'argent inquiète, pour une activité non lucrative. Il n'y aura pas d'argent dans cette affaire, en fait nulle inspiration également. La pauvreté monétaire dont l'auteur des *Regrets* dit souffrir affecte négativement la qualité de son oeuvre. Il ne s'excuse pas seulement de ne rien retirer de ces sonnets inutiles, mais il s'accuse d'être sans inspiration, auteur d'une poésie dont les Muses pléiadiennes sont absentes.

Et les Muses de moy, comme estranges, s'enfuient. (6)

Ainsi donc, le modèle créateur, troué, désuni, s'est appauvri à tous les niveaux. Rien n'a pu en être sauvé dans ces années 1550. Cette pauvreté s'est installée dans l'écriture poétique qui s'est alors vidée de sa substance sémantique. Du Bellay répète qu'il n'a plus rien à dire:

Ores je suis muet, comme on voit la Prophete  
 Ne sentant plus le Dieu, qui la tenoit sujette,  
 Perdre soudainement la fureur & la voix. (7)

Pourquoi donc une telle invocation au silence?

Parce qu'en fait, tout se vend. Le modèle s'est appauvri au moment où il s'est paré des couleurs numéraires de l'argent, au moment où tout, du corps des femmes au corpus de l'écriture, a été jeté sur la place marchande. Or, comment, issu du modèle appauvri, le poème est-il lui-même marchandé? Il l'est, en réalité, de deux manières. D'abord, dans la *Deffence*, Du Bellay avait fait un éloge assez ambigu de la traduction. Et il est permis de croire qu'en 1558, Du Bellay avait pressenti l'échec du premier manifeste. Une fois arrivé en Italie, l'équilibre des valeurs modélaires change, de sorte que traduire devient proprement trafiquer: non pas le jeu enrichissant auquel le poète était en droit de s'attendre, mais le plus pauvre et le plus accessoire des échanges.

D'abord traduction, le texte est en outre à son tour un objet qu'on achète et qu'on vend, et surtout un étalon par lequel la valeur s'achète et se vend. Le poème de la mi-Renaissance est ainsi une faveur que l'on fait, une source de bénéfices aux deux interlocuteurs en cause, la louange et le "louage" de soi-même. Pour Du Bellay, le sonnet n'est pas tant un message chargé de sens, mais un sorte de messenger entre deux rives, entre le modèle décimé et soi. La poésie est "une nef percée," une messagère sans message, peut-être, c'est-à-dire sans autre message que l'affirmation d'une transition absente.

Il n'y a pas lieu d'insister davantage sur cette articulation. Tout cela survient au moment où l'espace est irréparablement scindé et où Du Bellay se voit forcé de partir pour l'Italie, lui qui venait de faire la défense du français, nouvelle langue de l'intellect. Il n'y a pas de doute que cette scission de l'espace est à l'origine des *Regrets*, mais elle est surtout ce qui permet à l'oeuvre d'accueillir et de refléter dans sa structure tous les traits de l'échange économique. Car l'économie exige un tel dépaysement. Par elle, nous réconcilions symboliquement à chaque occasion de la vie courante deux espaces antinomiques.

D'une part, donc, les sonnets 16, 17, 19, 26, 27 et beaucoup d'autres relatent la difficulté de vivre à Rome et le désir de retrouver le pays natal. Les mots "rives" et "rivages" omniprésents, la présence du nautonier, attestent dans l'ensemble d'un passage transitoire entre deux espaces et deux états. Mais, d'autre part, Du Bellay se déclare inapte à transiger entre les deux états. Parti pour écrire dans cette langue française du nouvel intellect, Du Bellay vogue vers l'Italie plus démunie que jamais, car la monnaie linguistique défendue plus tôt n'a plus vraiment cours dans cette culture étrangère.

Ainsi, le voyage du poète vers l'Italie s'offre avant tout comme une mystification fondatrice. On peut dire sans se tromper que les vingt-cinq premiers sonnets des *Regrets* visent à susciter et à maintenir aux yeux des lecteurs cette mystification. De quoi s'agit-il exactement? Du Bellay nous dit (et dit à ses interlocuteurs) que l'Italie, pays de sa résidence et de son



écriture, est aussi un endroit de perdition, dominé par la fausseté des transaction financières. A l'inverse, le pays natal (le fameux petit Liré) est donné comme pastoral, permanent et surtout à l'écart des échanges incessants et des masquarades politiques de la Rome nouvelle.

Du Bellay s'est du reste appauvri à l'instant où il s'est installé dans la mouvance de l'argent. Il est d'autant plus pauvre à Rome que cette ville est, à son dire, le centre de la circulation des valeurs monétaires. Mais l'antithèse ne s'arrête pas là, car elle est en quelque sorte inversée. Rome, c'est en outre le modèle de l'Antiquité latine dans sa supposée permanence, la garantie de la qualité poétique décrite dans la *Deffence*. Dans les *Regrets*, ce modèle a sombré apparemment dans une sorte de carnaval bouffon, dont on trouve plusieurs descriptions, aux sonnets 80 et 120 en particulier. Et alors ce qui appauvrit le poète à l'entrée des *Regrets*, ce qui est si nouveau dans cette oeuvre, c'est l'indigence même du modèle qualitatif que devait représenter Rome. Ainsi, pacte quantitatif, frappé comme une monnaie linguistique qui n'a plus cours, le sonnet des *Regrets* ne comporte plus l'assurance d'originalité annoncée dans le premier manifeste de 1549. Le va-et-vient discrédite le poète, lui qui est simple signe indésirable entre deux rivages antinomiques, caractérisés par le manque et l'indigence.

Je cognois que je seme au rivage infertile,  
Que je veux cribler l'eau, & que je bas le vente,  
Et que je suis (Vineux) serviteur inutile. (46)

Ce que Du Bellay dénonce dans la partie centrale des *Regrets*, c'est la disparition du pouvoir réel derrière la circulation des valeurs monétaires. Le sonnet était jadis un exercice de louange politique; mais comme les louanges s'achètent et que la détermination de la valeur dépend d'un langage concurrent, la poésie ne fait que répéter et contester la perte de son domaine exclusif d'expression. Si le poème des *Regrets* est pauvre, c'est qu'il participe du même ordre symbolique que la monnaie. Il est la monnaie du pauvre, la louange du pauvre. Le sonnet 80 est d'une clarté remarquable à ce sujet:

Si je monte au Palais, je n'y trouve qu'orgueil,  
Que vice desguisé, qu'une cerimonie,  
Qu'un bruit de tabourins, qu'une estrange armonie,  
Et de rouges habits un superbe appareil:  
Si je descens en banque, un amas & recueil  
De nouvelles je treuve, une usure infinie,  
De riches Florentins, une troppe banie,  
Et de pauvres Sienois un lamentable dueil:  
Si je vais plus avant, quelque part ou j'arrive,  
Je treuve de Venus la grand'bande lascive  
Dressant de tous costez mil appas amoureux:

Si je passe plus oultre, & de la Rome neuve  
 Entre en la vieille Rome, adonques je ne treuve  
 Que de vieux monuments un grand monceau pierreux.

Ici, l'entrée au palais, lieu de pouvoir politique et de l'ascendant social, constitue la descente dans le non pouvoir. Tout le sonnet restitue, de verset en verset, cette descente. Or le rapport avec l'argent ne peut être plus visible puisque, de la même manière, "en Banque," les Florentins et les Siénois pourrissent dans l'usure et les profits illicites. La perte du pouvoir politique et la circulation appauvrissante des valeurs monétaires renvoient enfin à la sexualité débridée du premier tercet (perte des valeurs morales) et, au dernier tercet, à la chute de la culture romaine modélaire (perte des valeurs culturelles). Circulation du métal ou circulation des mots: toute la question de l'identité est transformée. Les *Regrets* attestent d'une nouvelle pensée européenne, quantitative, transformative, calquée sur le standard de l'argent; et d'une écriture poétique désormais associée métaphoriquement à la pauvreté et à la non valeur.

Il faudrait, avant de conclure, souligner très brièvement un dernier aspect. Plusieurs commentateurs des *Regrets* ont noté avec raison le caractère épistolaire des sonnets. En effet, chacun des textes a son destinataire clairement identifié et agit un peu comme une lettre laissée sans réponse. Dans un sens, l'épistolarité des *Regrets* confirme évidemment la scission de l'espace et la nécessité d'un échange de type économique. C'est pourquoi ces sonnets-échanges persistent même après le retour de Du Bellay en France, probablement au sonnet 130.

De tous les correspondants de Du Bellay, Ronsard est nommément le plus significatif. Les *Regrets* l'absorbent, en lui rendant hommage plus d'une fois.

Si mes escripts (Ronsard) sont semez de ton loz,  
 Et si le mien encor tu ne dedaignes dire,  
 D'estre encloz en mes vers ton honneur ne desire,  
 Et par là je ne cherche en tes vers estre encloz. (152)

Du Bellay met donc Ronsard dans sa poche, si l'on peut dire. Si le sonnet est la monnaie de la nouvelle pauvreté culturelle, issue de la fin de la Rome modélaire, Du Bellay et Ronsard en sont tour à tour les deux faces janusiennes, la face ancienne et nouvelle de cette écriture. Le rapport avec la circulation monétaire peut paraître superflu, mais c'est Du Bellay lui-même qui le remarque dans la suite du sonnet 152:

Noz louanges (Ronsard) ne font tort à personne:  
 Et quelle loy defent que l'un à l'autre en donne,  
 Si les amis entre eulx des presens se font bien?  
 On peult comme l'argent trafiquer la louange,



Et les louanges sont comme lettres de change,  
Dont le change & le port (Ronsard) ne couste rien. (152)

Chaque sonnet s'offre comme la pièce métallique à deux faces, symbolisant la non valeur entre deux espaces antinomiques et deux interlocuteurs nommés. Le sonnet épistolaire des *Regrets* mime l'échange économique en cela qu'il remplace par une symbolique de la non valeur l'appropriation réelle des biens et des personnes. Approprié par le sonnet du pauvre, Ronsard ne se trouve-t-il pas démuné à son tour?

Floyd Gray avait déjà remarqué le mercantilisme de la poésie de Du Bellay et avait relié cette caractéristique certaine au simple rejet du code lyrique traditionnel.<sup>5</sup> Mais il faut convenir que la circulation monétaire est l'anti-modèle où s'inscrivent la plupart des sonnets des *Regrets*. Du Bellay se fait le témoin de l'indigence de la poésie (celle de la cour, en particulier) devant l'émergence d'une culture européenne basée sur la circulation symbolique de signes métalliques ou fiduciaires qui ne portent plus que les effigies de la valeur. Chez Du Bellay, l'argent parle et la poésie se met à jouer le rôle du pauvre.

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#### Notes

- 1 Marc Bloch, *Esquisse d'une histoire monétaire de l'Europe* (Paris, Armand Colin, 1954), pp. 30 ssq.
- 2 Frédéric Mauro, *Le xvi<sup>e</sup> siècle européen: Aspects économiques* (Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1970), p. 318.
- 3 Marc Shell, *The economy of Literature* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), p. 66.
- 4 Nous nous référons aux éditions suivantes pour les textes de Du Bellay: *La Deffence et Illustration de la Langue Francoyse*, texte établi par Henri Chamard (Paris: Didier, 1948) et *Les Regrets. . .*, texte établi par M.A. Screech (Paris-Genève: Droz, 1966).
- 5 Floyd Gray, *La poétique de Du Bellay* (Paris, Nizet, 1978), p. 150.

# The Rhetoric of Deviation in Lorenzo Valla's *The Profession of the Religious*\*

OLGA Z. PUGLIESE

Once known mainly as a controversial figure whose bold attacks on the Church of Rome made him a favourite among later Protestant Reformers, Lorenzo Valla (1407-57) has also been acclaimed in the world of scholarship both for his contribution to the development of philology and for the determining role he played in reviving classical rhetoric in the fifteenth century. His interest in rhetoric is evident in the theoretical pronouncements he made in a number of his writings and also in the structure of the treatises he wrote on various topics. Much modern scholarship has aimed at establishing exactly how rhetoric functions in Valla's major works, especially *The Falsely-Believed and Forged Donation of Constantine* (*De Falso Credita et Ementita Constantini Donatione*), *On Free Will* (*De Libero Arbitrio*), and *On the True Good* (*De Vero Bono*).<sup>1</sup> However, *The Profession of the Religious* (*De Professione Religiosorum* (c. 1439-42), published in the Latin original as late as the last century, and only now available in English translation, still requires such attention.<sup>2</sup>

Although monographs on Valla and studies on the religious thought of the Renaissance have dealt with the audacious message of Valla's *The Profession*, and with the anti-ecclesiastical influence Valla probably underwent in the employ of the King of Naples, who was a bitter enemy of the Pope,<sup>3</sup> little attention has been given to the treatise's more literary properties. In fact, one critic has denied that it possesses very many.<sup>4</sup> An article by Remo L. Guidi does make some inroads in the direction of a more comprehensive analysis of the text,<sup>5</sup> but the rhetorical implications inherent in the treatise require further investigation. For, in addition to illustrating how Valla's theory and practice of rhetoric are based on classical precepts, *The Profession* offers what is perhaps a distinctive use of verbal strategies made by the humanist – one that heightens deviation, ambiguity, and ironic discrepancies which, according to modern theorists, are essential elements of rhetoric.<sup>6</sup>

\* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the joint meeting of the Canadian Society for Renaissance Studies and the Canadian Society for the History of Rhetoric, held at the University of Ottawa in June 1982.



A devoted student of Quintilian, Valla practically memorized the *Institutio Oratoria*,<sup>7</sup> finding in it a comprehensive treatment of the art of oratory. In an early work of his that is no longer extant, he openly declared his preference for Quintilian over Cicero who was deemed by most Renaissance *literati* to be the chief master of eloquence. Valla's unorthodox choice indicates quite clearly how, for him, the Ciceronean ideal of harmonizing eloquence and wisdom,<sup>8</sup> of giving more or less equal weight to the two terms, was inadequate. In his view, rhetoric was undeniably supreme, and philosophy should be made to occupy a subordinate position in the hierarchy of disciplines.<sup>9</sup>

The type of rhetoric Valla advocated in his *Disputations on Dialectics* (*Dialecticae Disputationes*) owed much to Quintilian:<sup>10</sup> incorporating dialectic, it sought argumentation from probabilities based on common-sense reasoning, as well as verbalization in ordinary language. Valla felt a strong dislike for the abstract terminology and intellectualized discourse characteristic of Scholasticism. But what he accomplished may amount to more than a rejection of mediaeval dialectic and a restoration of the cultural values of antiquity. According to some scholars, he appears to have substituted, for the traditional dualistic concept according to which language follows thoughts, the modern idea that the word is the thing itself as man views it, and that, in a sense, the word shapes human perceptions of reality.<sup>11</sup>

Whether or not Valla can accurately be classified alongside modern linguistic thinkers, it is certainly true that words are of utmost significance for him. All knowledge is based on language, he insists, in the prefaces to his *The Elegance of the Latin Language* (*Elegantiae Linguae Latinae*). As a philologist, he constantly analyzed established *verba* in order to grasp the *res*, thereby solving such urgent questions as the forgery of the document alleging the donation of Constantine. As a rhetorician in the classical tradition, he elaborated verbal constructs that encourage action and change (or at least the modification of attitudes), thus making a direct impact on reality through the persuasive power of the word.<sup>12</sup>

His success in handling the verbal medium is evident in his *De Professione Religiosorum*, a treatise that calls into question the traditional doctrine that gave members of religious orders special status as Christians. Valla takes these so-called "religious" to task for their arrogant claims to superiority and to such distinctive privileges as greater rewards from God merely for having taken vows but without necessarily having shown greater virtue than persons operating in the secular world. He attempts to convince his readers that the piety of laymen, if founded on inner religious fervour and on active works of charity, according to Gospel teachings,<sup>13</sup> is at least equal to, and perhaps even more laudable than, religion practised, sometimes perfunctorily or under constraint, by friars and monks who slavishly

follow the Rule of their Order. Valla may well be responding to the views expressed by St. Thomas Aquinas, for example, who had argued that doing good in fulfillment of a religious vow made the action more meritorious and that the profession of vows was a religious act in itself. Valla responds to the mediaeval theologian's belaboured analysis of the modalities of vows, from twelve points of inquiry (*Summa Theologica* II<sup>2</sup>, Question 88), with a carefully wrought dialogue steeped in rhetorical tactics.

Near the beginning of his work, Valla voices his concern for rhetoric and effective expression in general. He stresses that what determines the value of all literature (be it poetry or prose, history or theology) is not the theme treated, but the writer's manner of expression or, in short, using Quintilian's term (II, xvi, 10 and *passim*) the author's *facundia*,<sup>14</sup> that is, his "eloquence" (p. 18). Valla makes use of a number of vivid analogies to contrast good and bad styles of composition: excellent works, he says, even if they treat of such lowly subjects as Virgil's sheep, dogs and bees, soar on high like eagles, and swim in the deep sea like whales. Weak writing can be compared to birds that fly about the bushes or to fish that swim near the shore. Continuing with spatial imagery suggesting verticality and dynamism, Valla states that an eloquent style creates the impression of flight and appears to treat of stars, whereas bad writing seems to creep and to deal with little flowers. Quintilian, too, had used metaphors of movement in discussing eloquence: eloquence, he wrote, must range over open fields, not restrict itself to narrow tracks; flow like mighty rivers, not like streams through narrow pipes (*Inst.* V, xiv, 31).

Dissatisfied with mediaeval theology, Valla recommends again, near the conclusion of his text, that religious and ethical tracts be composed "in the style of oratory, according to ancient custom, rather than that of philosophy" (p. 54). In other treatises, for example *On Free Will*, he criticizes the attempts made by Scholastics like Boethius to reconcile faith and reason, insisting that man must rely on faith alone; he must love God, as Saint Paul taught, rather than try to understand Him intellectually. The models Valla constantly upholds, as in his oration *In Praise of Saint Thomas Aquinas* (*Encomium Sancti Thomae Aquinatis*), are the eloquent works of the Church Fathers.

Evidence for Valla's having designed his treatise, *The Profession*, in accordance with the principles of oratory can be found in the marginal headings that mark off certain sections of the arrangement (*dispositio*) of the work. Although only the narration (*narratio*) and refutation (*refutatio*) are thus labelled, the peroration is mentioned in the body of the text, and the other parts are clearly distinguishable too, all displaying the features prescribed by Quintilian. The introductory section, including the exordium and narration (pp. 17-21), opens with an address to the judge to whom the work will eventually be sent (cf. *Inst.* IV, i, 63); it attempts a



modest concealment of the author's eloquence (IV, i, 9) when Valla says he does not mean to place himself in the category of skillful writers; and it provides the basic information on the characters and the setting (IV, ii, 2), as well as a summary of the main justification for the claims made by members of religious institutions (IV, ii, 49). Moreover, the first-person narrator utters a personal denunciation of the treacherous and impious friars – a brief exclamatory phrase permitted in Quintilian's scheme (III, viii, 10 and IV, ii, 120).

But it is in the core of the treatise, which constitutes the proof (*confirmatio*), and which is structured as a debate between Laurentius and an unnamed Friar, that Valla's adherence to the religion of rhetoric emerges in more subtle ways. Laurentius, the protagonist, is an obvious projection of the author's sentiments: he bears Valla's own Christian name and he acquires heroic proportions when several references are made (pp. 46, 53) to the deacon St. Lawrence, a favourite of the author's,<sup>15</sup> one of the early martyrs active in the charitable distribution of Church funds, who achieved sainthood status for his defence of the Church's principles. By contrast, the Friar who acts as spokesman for the doctrines privileging members of religious orders is left unidentified, either in order not to offend him personally, as Valla seems to imply, or, as the critic Guidi has suggested, for the sake of objectivity,<sup>16</sup> or simply, perhaps, in order that Laurentius's stature might be further magnified in the debate. The roles assigned to the two are also revealing: the Friar is described as "a particularly learned individual who has studied both philosophy and theology extensively" (p. 19), and it might have been expected that, being the more erudite of the two interlocutors, he would play the Socratic master. Ironically, it is Laurentius who plays the leading role,<sup>17</sup> although the Friar refuses to act the part of the pupil, unlike the secondary interlocutor in *On Free Will*, who humbly seeks the opinion of another Laurentius.

In spite of the fact that he can boast no impressive credentials, just like Valla himself who had not attended university although he eventually held chairs of eloquence, and who dared to deal with lofty subjects even though he held no degrees – as his critics often reminded him – the character Laurentius dominates the discussion, mustering to his cause a wide variety of tactics: he asks leading questions to disprove the Friar's arguments and to induce his opponent to make concessions in a few areas concerning meritorious actions (p. 28); he also changes the subject or postpones the examination of certain issues when it suits him – for the sake of logic, he cleverly claims. On the other hand, the Friar's is a weak performance: unequal to Laurentius in the sophistications of debating methods, he becomes confused and admits he is baffled (p. 31). His powers of inventiveness (*inventio*) appear rather impoverished as he advances scholastic-type hairsplitting with an arbitrary distinction between conditional and uncon-

ditional vows (p. 34) – a tactic that is foiled promptly by his adversary. Arguing in circles, the Friar repeats the same point, which Laurentius identifies as an argument from contraries (p. 27), a type of enthymeme discussed by Quintilian, for one (V, x, 1-2), but which the Friar uses illogically. It runs as follows: “Since a more severe punishment awaits us [religious] if we sin, there will be a more generous reward if we refrain from sin” (p. 26). Laurentius responds to this single point, on which the Friar dwells stubbornly, with an overwhelming number of proofs. Following Quintilian’s advice (V, x, 55), it would seem, Laurentius displays considerable philological dexterity as he clarifies the terminology pertinent to the discussion at hand. In the semantic and etymological analysis of such words as the noun *religious*, he discards mediaeval usage in favour of the original meanings. Thus truly religious persons are not only those who live in convents, but all pious or God-fearing individuals, as signified by the classical Latin lexeme *religiosus*. Moreover, he strengthens his case by citing carefully selected passages from the Bible and from ancient sources – literary, historical, and philosophical, as indicated in Quintilian (V, xi, 36). To these the Friar is unable to offer counter proof, as he might have, with weighty quotations of his own.<sup>18</sup> Through his errors of omission, consequently, he is made to look foolish and, on the subject of vows, he is called outright ignorant by his adversary. The speeches and paradoxical roles of the principal actors, then – one a trained theologian who is unable to argue his case convincingly, the other a relative amateur who has the upper hand – constitute a deviation from tradition. They suggest that the disciplines to which the Friar has devoted his time, namely philosophy and theology, are futile without the support of the inventive, structural, and stylistic force of rhetoric.

As they give their proof, such as it is in the case of the Friar, both speakers assert that they adhere to common belief (pp. 30, 37; cf. Quintilian, V, xi, 37). Yet a fundamental difference exists between their two modes of argumentation. In fact, the treatise is as much a study of the art of persuasion as it is an investigation into the piety of laymen and friars. Laurentius maintains that he is opposing the Friar’s line of reasoning, not his membership in a religious community (pp. 29, 30, 31). For, whereas the Friar has recourse to doctrines that have the stamp of authority for particular groups only, Laurentius draws more artfully upon analogies from everyday experience that have a greater universality and appear to conform more closely to Quintilian’s precept of proving the uncertain by reference to the certain (I, vi, 4). It is useless, Laurentius proposes, to take vows, or to add oaths to promises already made to God, since one can not “make healthier that which is healthy . . . or more perfect what is perfect” (p. 36). To destroy the Friar’s basic argument by contraries on the question of punishment and reward, Laurentius effectively presents (and repeats for



his supposedly forgetful opponent) the analogy of doctors, who receive great praise for curing difficult diseases, but little praise in easy cases. Consequently, the religious, even though they are punished severely if they sin, do not receive any special consideration from God for keeping their promise to live virtuously.

Medical imagery such as this abounds in Valla's text, at times as a subtle expression of criticism of friars. It is implied that the medicine provided by vows may be needed, but only if the brothers have some latent illness or weakness that needs to be corrected. Other instances of offensive innuendo emerge from figurative language when, quoting Terence, Laurentius accuses the obdurate Friar of being "stuck in the same quagmire" (p. 30).<sup>19</sup> The Friar takes offence, and with good reason, remarking that his opponent is casting the religious into the mud. In like manner, Laurentius uses the uncomplimentary simile of a snake when he dismisses the Friar's triadic division (*partitio*) of his essentially single argument: "Indeed it seems to me that you have wanted to embellish that distinction with a greater array of arguments and even to frighten me with their number, like a serpent who thrusts out a single tongue that has the semblance of three" (p. 26). At times the satire is more direct: Laurentius notes, for example, using a typical antithetical parallelism, that many who enter convents as thin doves subsequently turn into fat pigeons (p. 45). Not only these allusions to creatures from the natural world, but even a comparison with philosophers is transformed into insult, as Laurentius likens the numerous religious orders to the sects that abound in the field of philosophy. Coming from someone like Valla who finds philosophers insufferable because they reserve for themselves exclusively the appellation of "wise men," when in fact legislators, rulers, and orators too are wise (p. 23), this is no attempt at flattery.

The strategy of rhetorical questions, too, is implemented in different ways. While the Friar can only ask petulantly whether his beliefs are valid ones ("And do obedience, poverty, and chastity not count at all?" p. 39), Laurentius, in order to show the absurdity of the view that poverty is a virtue peculiar to members of religious orders, asks with maximum rhetorical effect whether kings, then, should be forced to wear hoods and sackcloths (pp. 45-46) – truly a non-question that permits no doubt at all and requires no response.

These rhetorical techniques which underlie Laurentius' discourse all have their blessing from Quintilian (cf. V, xi, 22 and V, xiv, 34 on similes and metaphors; IX, ii, 7-9 on rhetorical questions), and they allow him to speak with *enargeia* – a kind of vividness, described by Quintilian as "something more than mere clearness," which "thrusts itself upon our notice" and "makes us seem not so much to narrate as to exhibit the actual scene" (VIII, iii, 61 and VI, ii, 32). In addition, by means of impersonation

(III, viii, 51-54), the protagonist twice assumes the authoritative *persona* of an ancient theologian (pp. 34, 35), resurrected for the purpose of directing some words of admonishment against the erring Friar. The fictitious theologian himself delivers a more passionate tirade, brief as it is, than the ineffectual pronouncements of the official spokesman for religion. In this dialogue within a dialogue, it is again ironically the layman who, as he lends his voice to the ancient, proves to be more conversant with patristic traditions.

Historical examples too, recommended by Quintilian (III, viii, 66), allow the protagonist to wax eloquent at the Friar's expense and much to his chagrin. Laurentius cites the expedient devised by Demosthenes, who overcame an unbecoming nervous twitch by hanging a lance dangerously over his shoulder, and he compares it to Marius's intrinsic self-restraint – a principle virtue in Valla's scheme – when he underwent leg surgery without allowing himself to be tied down. These actions, recorded by the classics,<sup>20</sup> are intended to represent two ways of achieving religious goals: through fear, as do members of orders, or out of will-power, as do laymen. Contrasting the latter's self-reliant manner of reaching God to that of friars who need to be constrained by rules, Valla effects an unusual adaptation of alimentary imagery, which had traditionally signified intellectual and spiritual nourishment:<sup>21</sup> religious life, Laurentius states, may be more elaborate like cooked food, but the life of devout laymen, similar to plain raw food, can be more wholesome (p. 39). In accordance with the thesis worked out by Levi-Strauss, which equates cooking with advanced civilization, and raw food with nature,<sup>22</sup> Valla's metaphor, although it appears to be used quite casually, indicates perhaps the desire to have religion return to its purer origins. There may be, moreover, some expression of distaste for the culinary process by which his namesake St. Lawrence was sacrificed on the gridiron.

One deceptively simple *exemplum* involves Anaximenes of Lampsacus.<sup>23</sup> Laurentius narrates (pp. 51-52) how Alexander the Great, as he was about to attack the city of Lampsacus, was consternated to see Anaximenes appear. Fearing his former master would dissuade him from carrying out the assault, he immediately burst forth with the declaration that he would *not* do what his master was about to ask of him. However, Anaximenes (the rhetorician to whom is attributed the original division of rhetoric into three basic genres: judicial, deliberative, and epideictic) outwits the great conqueror with the brief statement: "I am asking you to destroy Lampsacus." This historical anecdote, which occupies a significant place at the centre of the text, encapsulates the basic structure of Valla's treatise, signalling as it does not only the power of rhetoric, but the discrepancy between superficial and superliteral meaning, the sort of gap that is inherent not only in individual figures of rhetoric, but indeed also in the underlying shape of



rhetoical compositions. Many instances of this sort of polysemy offer themselves to the reader of Valla's *The Profession*, first of all in the description of the setting, in both its temporal and spatial dimensions.

In keeping with his preference for the concreteness of history over the abstractions of philosophy, Valla is careful to give his work a semblance of historical accuracy: reference is made to a conspiracy against the king – a plot involving some friars (it is their scandalous participation that sparks the central debate) – and an evil omen is identified as having occurred when two wolves appeared in town just two days before the conspiracy was discovered. Yet this account does not correspond to any historical event recorded for the period in which Valla composed his treatise. The author is clearly engaging in pseudo-history, and the analogy he draws with the Trojan horse affair suggests devious insinuation rather than truthfulness. Although the locale for the discussion is a wide space in the public hall adjacent to the square, where a group of persons, all men of learning, meet to discuss current events, what the text paints is actually a more restricted courtroom scene where a forensic battle is being waged.

Other anomalies emerge as well: the case being presented in the trial appears to be, on the surface, an oratorical defence occasioned by the exaggerated claims of members of religious orders. Indeed, in his declamatory summing up, the self-fashioned victim Laurentius stresses that his purpose has been “to act as the defender, not the assailant” (p. 54). Yet because it is he and his companion who utter the very first gibes against the conspiratorial friars (pp. 19–20), the work is a veritable act of aggression presented in the guise of self-defence. Laurentius is determined to emerge the victor, despite his protestations of friendship and good will. The military images (perhaps of Quintilianesque origin) that recur in his speeches reveal his veiled intentions: e.g. “I want to refute, wound, and overthrow you with another type of weapon” (p. 27); “Who ever asks the enemy the reasons why he has drawn up his line of battle in a certain way?” (p. 31). His verbal thrusts are especially sharp because his opponent is a living, albeit unnamed person, unlike the target of attack in Valla's *On Free Will*, which is Boethius and his *Consolation of Philosophy*, a dead author and his text.

Suddenly toward the end of the debate, however, Laurentius, echoing Quintilian's phrase (X, i, 29), describes himself as a soldier who “stands ‘in line of battle’” (p. 46) not for the cause of the secular world, but for religion, for the Church, for good friars and monks – a sort of Pauline soldier of Christ.<sup>24</sup> In this modified role he declaims a lengthy peroration consisting of a hymn to friars – a long, passionate piece (pp. 54–55) which none of the other characters dares to interrupt, astonished as they probably all are at this unexpected reversal. Laurentius' laudatory comments include the following: “Friars are those who truly support the tottering temple

of God . . . , those who . . . turn men and women away from sin, freeing them from false beliefs and leading them to piety and knowledge."

Through these epideictic elements of praise, which counterbalance the criticisms heaped on the friars heretofore, Valla may wish to show that he is equipped to argue on both sides of the question (cf. Quintilian V, xiii, 44). They are reminiscent, furthermore, of the ambiguous oration Valla delivered supposedly as an encomium to Saint Thomas Aquinas, but which in essence censured the saint indirectly by bestowing lavish praise on the Fathers of the Church instead. However, the fundamental structure of the debate being that of judicial not demonstrative oratory, some critical assessment and a definitive decision are required. The bystanders who are present during the discussion remain doubtful, since Laurentius, their favourite throughout, ends his discourse with the unexpected paean. The bilateral debate between Laurentius and the Friar is not resolved from within either. Their conflicting viewpoints are never reconciled, not even in the form of an eclectic compromise such as the one that brings *On the True Good* to an end. Both speakers retain their convictions rigidly. The unyielding Friar, although he can not be master, refuses the role of disciple or initiate. At this point, therefore, Laurentius chooses to bring the discussion to a halt with the words "faciamus pares," an Italianate phrase meaning "let's call it a draw" (p. 53). And because the friar, who has requested time out for reflection, leaves and then fails to return on a second specified day to continue the discussion, the question remains open.

This unsettled dispute should allow the spectator-reader to judge for himself. Indeed, Valla explains at the outset that he is eliminating the direct intervention of the narrative voice in the body of the text (following the examples of Plato, Cicero, and Petrarch, in all likelihood<sup>25</sup>) so that "those who read it may think not that they are reading an author, but that they are watching and listening to two disputants" (pp. 20-21). Nevertheless, the author-narrator reveals that the audience he envisages does not include readers alone. Addressing a split receptor, he announces that a transcript of the proceedings is to be "brought for examination to the designated authority" (p. 55). Suddenly the dialogue that has been presented as a fluid conversation turns into a definitive text, which is to be sent to a judge. The search for a decision is to continue, because there is no theological arbiter present, as in Augustine's *Answer to Skeptics*, to guide the young disputants and win their assent, or, as in Valla's *On the True Good*, to provide a syncretist solution. The sentence is pending and the judge is absent. The identity of this absent judge has suggestive connotations too: Baptista Platamon, a highly respected magistrate in King Alfonso's court, is a secular figure called upon here to pass judgment on what is essentially a religious topic. By contrast, a bishop is the recipient of the treatise *On Free Will*. Certainly this choice, desired and approved by all the charac-



ters in *The Profession*, is meant to direct the audience's sympathy towards the protagonist Laurentius. Indeed, the open ending is only an illusion: the judge has yet to be consulted, but his opinion can already be foreseen.

A further and rather unusual type of discrepancy relates to the title of the work. The official title, prefixed to the text, is neutral, and it contrasts sharply with the discarded one suggested to Laurentius as he turns scribe. The suggestion is made when one of the participants denounces the laudatory tribute Laurentius has paid to friars because it results in logical incoherence and reveals moral weakness on the part of the discussant. So he dares Laurentius, who, he says, should have brought his speech to a climax with a forceful denunciation of friars, to transcribe the disputation exactly as it took place and to entitle the text "On the False Name and Privilege of the Religious." Laurentius dismisses his critic's challenge and rejects what he calls that "terrible title although it is perhaps an accurate one" (p. 55), adopting instead the innocuous one that has come down to us. However, by means of the figure of ironical negation (*paraleipsis*, *praeteritio*, or *antiphrasis*, as Quintilian terms it, IX, ii, 47-48), the memory of the original contentious title is made to linger in our minds, as Valla paradoxically includes in the text what he says he has decided to exclude.

Indeed, there is considerable ambiguity in the text, in spite of the fact that at the beginning of the dialogue Laurentius asserts his intention "to remove all trace" of ambiguity (p. 21), and the fact that he then proceeds to engage in philological distinctions and logical analyses, cites the Bible (p. 36) to create the impression that there is no room for uncertainty ("let your communication be, Yea, yea; Nay, nay; for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil," Matthew 5:37), and makes the claim (p. 19) that he is speaking frankly, as did the ancient Greek and Latin writers.

This ambivalence heightens the self-reflexive quality of the work. Like many humanist compositions (e.g. Poggio Bracciolini's treatise on avarice, Leonardo Bruni's dialogues for Vergerio, and other works by Valla himself), *The Profession of the Religious* includes, in the introduction framing the dialogue, explicit theoretical declarations by the author-narrator on questions of literary form. But in addition, *The Profession* encompasses within its textual boundaries critical responses, negative and positive, on certain specific aspects of the text: on the peroration, on the title, and on the selection of the arbiter. These comments, together with the more subtle ambiguities, ultimately produce a very complex work – one that demands more than a unidimensional interpretation on the part of the reader. Consideration must be given to the deviations from the superficial letter that inhere at all levels of the text. In the work's generic identity, we have seen that praise is tantamount to blame, and that what is declared during the judicial trial to be a draw implies a victory for one side. There is irony of *ethos* as the interlocutors play reversed and ambiguous roles – a common

feature in humanist dialogues, as Marsh shows – and of *pathos* too, since the split audience addressed is, at the same time, the general reader and a specific judge named Platamon. What is supposed to be presented objectively to both has in fact been prejudiced to evoke precise reactions. And, finally, irony of *logos* is created, as terminological precision obscures the more fundamental haziness of meaning, and the verbal whole, apparently a live dialogue, reveals its other side as a fixed construct of persuasive words.

The presence of such resonant discrepancies leads us to conclude that the treatise may no longer be dismissed lightly, for, upon close analysis, it proves to mean much more than it narrates. Not simply a straightforward tract on the merits and demerits of those who profess religion, or on the various ways to reach God (as Fois, for one, maintains<sup>26</sup>), *The Profession of the Religious* is also a work about rhetoric. While confirming with specificity Valla's well-known debt to Quintilian (a subject treated by Camporeale), and illustrating Valla's successful re-establishment of rhetorical theology based on persuasion rather than demonstration (as Trinkaus stresses), the work reveals in what a complex and compelling manner Valla adapts and manipulates the standard rhetorical medium, and to what a high degree he emphasizes the discrepancy and deviation factors that constitute its inner mechanisms.

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#### Notes

- 1 Specific studies include the following: Hanna H. Gray, "Renaissance Humanism: The Pursuit of Eloquence," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 34 (1963), 497-514 (rpt. in *Renaissance Essays*, eds. P. O. Kristeller and P. P. Wiener [New York: Harper & Row, 1968]); Vincenzo De Caprio, "Retorica e ideologia nella *Declamatio* di Lorenzo Valla sulla donazione di Costantino," *Paragone*, 338 (1978), 36-56; Victoria Kahn, "The Rhetoric of Faith and the Use of Usage in Lorenzo Valla's *De Libero Arbitrio*," *The Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies*, 13 (1983), 91-109; Vincenzo Santangelo, "Retorica e letteratura nel *De Vero Bono* di L. Valla," *Giornale italiano di filologia*, 16 (1963), 30-45; Jerrold E. Seigel, chapter entitled "Lorenzo Valla and the Subordination of Philosophy to Rhetoric" in *Rhetoric and Philosophy in Renaissance Humanism: The Union of Eloquence and Wisdom, Petrarch to Valla* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1968); David March, chapter entitled "Lorenzo Valla and the Rhetorical Dialogue" in *The Quattrocento Dialogue: Classical Tradition and Humanist Innovation* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1980).
- 2 Lorenzo Valla, *De Professione Religiosorum*, ed. J. Vahlen, in *Sitzungsberichte der Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften* (Vienna), Philosophisch-Historische Classe, 62 (1869), 99-134 (photostatically reproduced in Valla, *Opera Omnia*, ed. Eugenio Garin, Vol. 2 [Turin: Bottega d'Erasmus, 1962], pp. 287-322; Lorenzo Valla, "The Profession of the Religious" and the Principal Arguments from "The Falsely-Believed and Forged Donation of Constantine", tr. and ed. with an introd. by Olga Zorzi Pugliese (Toronto: Centre for Reformation and Renaissance Studies, 1985). All subsequent page references will be to this edition and will be provided in the text.
- 3 e.g. Mario Fois, S. I., *Il pensiero cristiano di Lorenzo Valla nel quadro storico-culturale del suo ambiente* (Rome: Libreria Editrice dell'Univ. Gregoriana, 1969); Giovanni di Napoli, *Lorenzo Valla: filosofia e religione nell'Umanesimo italiano* (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1971); Charles Trinkaus, "In Our Image and Likeness": *Humanity and Divinity in Italian Humanist Thought* (London: Constable, 1970).



- 4 Rocco Montano, "Lorenzo Valla," in *Letteratura italiana, I minori*, Vol. 1 (Milan: Marzorati, 1961), p. 581.
- 5 Remo L. Guidi, *Aspetti religiosi nella letteratura del Quattrocento*, Vol. 1 (Rome-Vicenza: LIEF, 1973), pp. 79-123.
- 6 Marsh contrasts the clear balance of Ciceronean dialogues with the ambiguity and ironic discrepancies that characterize humanist dialogues. See Paul Ricoeur, *The Rule of Metaphor: Multi-disciplinary Studies on the Creation of Meaning in Language* (Toronto and Buffalo: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1977), on the neo-rhetorical concept of deviation, based originally on Aristotle's definition of figures of speech as instances of deviation from the ordinary usage of words (*Poetics*, 1458a-b), and Paul de Man, chapter entitled "Semiology and Rhetoric" in *Allegories of Reading* (London: Yale Univ. Press, 1979), esp. pp. 9-10, on the discrepancy between the mutually exclusive literal and figurative meanings in rhetorical texts.
- 7 Valla makes this claim in his invectives against B. Fazio: "... Quintil. quem prope ad verbum teneo ...", *Opera*, Vol. 1, p. 477.
- 8 Cicero, *De Inventione*, I, 1: "wisdom without eloquence does too little for the good of states, but ... eloquence without wisdom is generally highly disadvantageous and is never helpful," tr. H. M. Hubbell (London: William Heinemann & Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1949), p. 3.
- 9 Cf. Quintilian, *Institutio Oratoria*, XII, xi, 30: "let us seek with all our hearts that true majesty of oratory, the fairest gift of god to man, without which all things are stricken dumb and robbed alike of present glory and the immortal record of posterity ...," tr. H. E. Butler, Vol. 4 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press & London: William Heinemann, 1979 [1922]), p. 513. All subsequent references will be to this translation.
- 10 Salvatore I. Camporeale, *Lorenzo Valla: umanesimo e teologia* (Florence: Istituto Nazionale di Studi sul Rinascimento, 1972) provides a detailed study of Valla's theory of rhetoric, as does Cesare Vasoli, *La dialettica e la retorica dell'Umanesimo: "invenzione" e "metodo" nella cultura del XV e XVI secolo* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1968).
- 11 Hanna-Barbara Gerl, *Rhetorik als Philosophie: Lorenzo Valla* (Munich: Fink, 1974); Nancy S. Streuver, "Vico, Valla and the Logic of Humanist Inquiry," in *Giambattista Vico's Science of Humanity*, eds. Giorgio Tagliacozzo and D. P. Verene (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1976); R. Waswo, "The 'Ordinary Language Philosophy' of Lorenzo Valla," *Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance*, 41 (1979), 255-271.
- 12 Quintilian, II, xviii, 2-3, states that rhetoric is mainly concerned with action.
- 13 James 1:26-27 is the Biblical passage that he quotes as the mainstay for his idea of religion.
- 14 The term appears in the Latin text in *Opera*, p. 288.
- 15 Saint Lawrence is mentioned affectionately in Valla's *On Free Will*, trans. Charles E. Trinkaus, in *The Renaissance Philosophy of Man*, ed. E. Cassirer et al (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago, Press, 1959), p. 157.
- 16 Guidi, p. 119.
- 17 Marsh, pp. 6, 55, refers to the Socratic method adopted in Valla's treatise.
- 18 Fois, p. 277, points out that the Friar might have quoted Acts 18:18, according to which vows appear to be acceptable.
- 19 Terence, *Phormio*, Act V, Scene 2, line 15 (= v. 780).
- 20 The sources for the two tales are, respectively, Quintilian, XI, iii, 130 and Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations*, II, xxii, 53; II, xv, 35.
- 21 For instance, in Book III of the *Confessions*, Augustine speaks of having hungered after God and he compares good food to divine truth, bad food to falsehood. For a survey of the *topos*, see Ernst Robert Curtius, *European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages*, tr. W. R. Trask (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), pp. 134-136.
- 22 Claude Lévi-Strauss, *The Raw and the Cooked* (New York: Harper & Row, 1969).
- 23 This event is narrated in Valerius Maximus, *Anecdotes*, VII, iii, 4.
- 24 Cf. Ephesians 6:16-17.
- 25 Plato, *Theaetetus*, 143c; Cicero, *De Amicitia*, I, 3; Petrarch, *Secret*, Preface.
- 26 Fois, pp. 280, 291.

## Book Reviews/Comptes Rendus

Alexander Brome. *Poems*. ed. Roman R. Dubinski. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982. \$75.00

Among the poets who responded to England's decades of civil turmoil, Alexander Brome wrote numerous and various reactions to the seventeenth-century crisis. Though literary historians usually associate his poems with the ballads and songs of Lawrence Price and Martin Parker rather than with the more significant satires of Cleveland and Marvell, Brome merits serious attention as a loyalist caught up in the era's conflicting allegiances. From the early 1640s to the first years of the Restoration his often direct and uncomplicated modes sustained the Cavalier spirit. To his contemporaries Brome appeared another "English Anacreon," a sack-inspired writer whose "familiar strain" and "sharp wit" lifted the drooping spirits of the royalists during their bleakest moments. But as Roman R. Dubinski suggests in the first modern edition of the poems, Alexander Brome gives dimension to the literary and historical stereotypes of the Cavalier sensibility. The carefully edited and handsomely produced two-volume *Poems* published by the University of Toronto Press provides a welcome opportunity to reassess a popular, even seminal voice among the lesser-known Caroline and Interregnum poets.

The *Poems* uses as its copy-text the 1661 edition of *Songs and Other Poems*. Brome authorized the manuscript of 210 poems his brother Henry published in the first of three editions, and he seems to have been responsible for the inclusion of thirteen new poems in the 1664 edition as well as the four additional poems in the posthumous 1668 edition. Major collections of the poems in a Bodleian and a Folger manuscript provide collateral verifications of the 1661 text, and Professor Dubinski also considers variations of individual poems found in some twenty-five manuscripts and fourteen miscellanies and song books. The final sections of the edition add a number of largely dedicatory poems Brome had written for his contemporaries and two poems of uncertain authorship. The scholarly edition does not include the play Brome apparently wrote entitled *The Cunning Lovers*, nor does it contain the twenty-five poems he translated for the first complete edition in English of *The Poems of Horace*. The ballads, satires, songs, epistles, translations, and paraphrases in Dubinski's painstakingly edited collection fall generally into the three categories the sensitive and sensible introduction labels "Love Poems," "Wine and the Happy Life," and "Political Satire."

Though none of his contemporaries describes Brome as another "natural, easy Suckling," their commendatory poems and Professor Dubinski's introductory



comments on the love poetry value an unstrained, lively directness. Manuscript versions and allusions within the poems convincingly date the majority of them in the 1640s, a period during which an unusual number of love poems were published. Like their more famous authors, Brome develops a protean voice equally at ease celebrating the conventional tributes of the beloved and mocking the established romantic notions. He does at times support the "Cavalier trinity" Douglas Bush once described as "beauty, love, and loyal honour," and he often echoes the studied poses the Caroline wits affect, but Brome develops his most interesting voice in a series of poems reminiscent of Suckling. Besides obvious imitations of specific songs, the love poems appropriate Suckling's notion (and label) of the wise lover. Its wary, somewhat cynical, and decidedly solipsistic attitude proclaims supreme the power of the poet and his fancy. The wise lover, Brome repeatedly insists, knows that fancy determines both beauty and pleasure; he also realizes that wealth often creates love. His awareness of money's power stresses a materialism not found in Suckling's poetry and accentuates a pragmatism central to Brome's vision. Together with the psychological realism Dubinski justly emphasizes in the love poems, this worldly-wise attitude underlines and even qualifies the commitments made in the drinking and political poems.

Although the introduction considers these poems in separate categories, they are integral parts of the same vision. Poems in the vein of Anacreon scorn riches, minimize cares, and laud drinking as desirable responses to a mutable, mad world. In their most carefree moods the drinking songs value only rounds of sack; wealth has importance only as a means to more drink, and the fancy found in brimmers sustains illusions of well-being. The Anacreontic indifference to the troubled times complements the Horatian desire for the safe estate Dubinski finds central to Brome's poetry. With a full bowl and close friends, the speakers in these poems often turn away from a society they cannot change. The security and pleasure they extol in the honest mind and moderate life provide more than content; from their vantage the secure can scorn those caught up in the frantic and rapacious rebellion. Brome not only laughs at the times and their folly; as the introduction suggests, he often dramatizes its shortsightedness in a variety of personae. Levellers, troopers, Scots, and royalists reflect in their own concerns the common desire to succeed at any cost. The satiric portraits imply if not always support a commitment to a moderate government of monarchy and parliament, but they become increasingly sensitive to the reality that war and reform are merely a trade. By dating many of the poems Professor Dubinski enables readers to trace a growing bitterness particularly noticeable in the pieces written near the time of Charles' execution and again at the restoration of the monarchy. Besides the traditional evils of pride and lust Brome's speakers reveal either in themselves or in their ridicule an all-consuming greed. Might makes right, money determines merit, and inconstancy governs behaviour. Poems that look back upon the twenty-years of civil upheaval cynically dismiss lip service to principles and sardonically recognize that the unscrupulous will always flourish. For his own part, Brome admits in a series of epistles presumably written *in propria persona*, "I've been for th'midle twenty years." Though he also counsels his friends to "Stick to the strongest side, and think, and laugh" and scorns those who turn with the times, he also realizes right is

not easily determined "When *Charles* with himself did fight." His poems remain a valuable record of the struggles he and other contemporaries underwent in search of this balance.

Unfortunately little is known for certain about the man who wrote them. A seventeenth-century account notes, "He was Eminent in the worst of Times for Law, and Loyalty, and yet more for Poetry," but biographical details are sketchy. Professor Dubinski acknowledges his indebtedness to the specifics J. L. Brooks documented in an unpublished dissertation: born in Dorset around 1620, Brome may not have attended either Oxford or Cambridge before he began a successful legal career in London about 1640. In the absence of substantial information, the introduction avoids undue speculation about the poet's London years. Brome's commendatory pieces in the Cartwright and Beaumont/Fletcher editions lead Dubinski to conclude he must have been a poet of some stature among royalists, but the introduction and notes are cautiously conservative about spelling out relationships. Despite P. W. Thomas' central study of this period, literary and social relationships among the London loyalists are largely conjectural, and many of the initials in Brome's poems defy identification. Still it would be interesting to consider whether Brome's marriage about 1650 to the widow of a bookseller who possessed all or parts of 126 copy rights (Brooks, p. 43) affected Brome's own decision to write commendatory pieces or to edit Richard Brome's plays. And it is tempting to note the irony that the poet who complains about time-serving and parasitic opportunists was also a lawyer who pledged his loyalty to the ruling powers and gained some wealth during this most litigious period.

The volume of notes does, however, establish a sound context for the poems. Besides finding classical precedents, the extensive annotations list many useful parallels with other contemporary poems. The citations include a number of minor poets not generally known, and they are particularly helpful in noting relationships both with the large body of popular satires and among the other poems in Brome's canon. Readers interested in more direct relationships will also not be misled by the attempts to clarify personal references. Professor Dubinski does not hastily conclude, for example, that I. B. must be Joseph Beaumont or that T. S. could be the Thomas Sturges mentioned in Brome's will; when adequate proof cannot be offered, references remain unidentified. Instead the notes sensibly discuss possible literary associations, such as those among the royalists gathered at Oxford in 1656, and establish chronological continuities. In the tradition of Allan Pritchard's Toronto edition of Cowley's *The Civil War*, the annotations also clarify extremely well the poems' historical backgrounds. Seventeenth-century primary sources and current modern research form the basis for a thorough yet not pedantic discussion of the complex events surrounding the changing royalist fortunes.

The thoroughness of the notes, indeed, raises the only minor reservations about the edition. Curiously the section on dubia includes no discussion of authorship. The *Short-Title Catalogue* and the catalogue of the John Henry Wrenn library list a number of attributions, and it may well be, as Brome's friend Valentine Oldis suggests, that contemporaries granted him the authorship of many pieces, "Such reputation has thou gain'd." Some attention to the question of attribution would, in any case, complement the edition's laudable standards without affecting its pre-



sent design. The comprehensiveness possible in the two-volume format, in fact, creates its own drawback. Certainly the publishers carefully weighed the advantages and disadvantages of publishing the poems in one 393-plus page volume and the notes in a second 144-plus page volume. A single volume would have made the notes less cumbersome and awkward to use, and it might have made the poems still more accessible by lowering the price of \$75.00.

And Alexander Brome deserves to be more widely known. His poems offer, as Professor Dubinski contends, an interesting index to loyalist concerns during the decades of great upheaval. By dating many of the poems and placing them in their literary and historical contexts, the edition provides a valuable opportunity to trace in detail the search for both meaning and survival in the destructive course of civil war. The struggles the poems record call into question C. V. Wedgwood's influential view of the disheartened and disillusioned "Vanquished." Though Brome's songs and catches often praise the solace of sack, his calculated stances reveal neither escapism nor "the rotting away of a cause." His is a Cavalier sensibility attuned to the realities of rebellion and determined to endure a period of national madness. His varied responses capture the altering moods of revolution with a complexity and authentically readily apparent in Roman R. Dubinski's thoughtful, judicious edition.

RAYMOND A. ANSELMANT, *University of Connecticut*

David Quint. *Origin and Originality in Renaissance Literature: Versions of the Source*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1983. \$20.00.

It would be a mistake if scholars would only read the chapters of Quint's splendid study relevant to their own specialties. It requires and deserves a careful reading from beginning to end because it cogently and stylishly examines the central critical question posed by the Renaissance epic in theory and in practice: "the literary text's claims to allegorical truth in light of a new Renaissance awareness of history and human creativity." This tension is textually focused on the figure of the source, the mythic origin of the rivers of the earth, a commonplace found in the Aristaeus-Orpheus epyllion in Virgil's *Fourth Georgic*. In its narrowest scope, Quint demonstrates, in the manner of E. R. Curtius, how Renaissance authors rang the changes on the topos, although the nearer paradigm might be John Freccero's profound and resonant study of the Jordan image in *Inferno* II. This focus on the source topos produces some remarkable local insights, such as Quint's detection of the allusion to Matthew 23:35 in the opening chapter of the *Pantagruel*, a crucial echo overlooked by generations of Rabelaisian specialists, but the deeper value of his book lies in his discernment of the larger issues that hover around the appearance of the source topos and that give particular shape not merely to the commonplace, but to the individual epic as a whole.

If the overall tendency of the Renaissance was to replace the nostalgia for the source, emblematic of the traditional imposition of a closed form upon the claim of experience, with relativistic historicism and originality, whereby value is separated from priority, Quint, to use his own categories, eschews a linear historical

treatment in favor of an "allegorical" approach which begins with the thematic and emblematic self-consciousness of Erasmus and Virgil. In a brilliant rereading of the *Praise of Folly*, Quint shows that this major "source" book for the Renaissance moves from a historicist, philological analysis of an idolatrous culture blithely unaware of its own historicity to an allegorical mode that reaches outside itself to an original and privileged dispensation of divine meaning, a shift that is not to be had without a loss of Folly's distinctive voice for more conventional language. Quint's convincing allegorization of the satire shows that Erasmus not only set forth, but embodied the tension between autonomy and authority. But the *Praise of Folly* is a highly problematic, teasing text. It might be said as well that Folly allegorizes human folly by articulating the self-consciousness (and authority) it presumably lacked, while she historicizes the humanist and Evangelical tradition by pointing out the self-conscious humility (and ambiguity) of its utterances, for if Erasmus had an Evangelical heir in Rabelais, who, for Quint, best synthesizes the claims of autonomy and authority, he also had skeptical and humanely tolerant heirs in Montaigne and Molière. A problematic air also surrounds the Fourth Georgic, which, as Quint convincingly demonstrates, offers the figure of Proteus, the *vates* whose language is adequate to represent the truth, and the poetry of Orpheus, the fragmented poet who symbolizes the displacement of human language from truth. This being so, it would seem clear that the Renaissance predicament, the history of which Quint so skillfully traces, is not historically unique, but an inevitable allegory of literary self-consciousness in general.

Most satisfying, because most expansive and ultimately symmetrical, are Quint's central chapters on Sannazaro and Tasso. Jacopo Sannazaro's poetic itinerary moves from Orpheus to Proteus, the historical evasions of the pastoral *Arcadia* (1504) to the epic *De partu Virginis* (1526) in which "pastoral fictions come true in the context of the Nativity." Whereas the themes of pastoral point to an "intratextual" poetics of autonomy, which cannot absorb the larger themes of desire, history and death, the *De partu Virginis*, by making its meaning absolutely dependent upon the divine Word, and by its timid academic classicism, transcends the confines and conventions of the pastoral, but at the expense of poetic individuality.

Ariosto, by contrast, in his account of Astolfo's voyage to the moon in the *Orlando furioso* exemplifies the rejection of allegory as a means to recover meaning. While the extraterrestrial journey should give a privileged view of things below as in the *Commendia*, the circular, self-referential landscape of Ariosto's moon serves only to indict all literature, even sacred texts, of bad faith, and indulgent relationship between patron and poet. Despite Ariosto's deconstruction of allegory as textually generated, he is able to sustain major epic fiction.

Although the visit to the Magus of Ascalon in the *Gerusalemme liberata* parallels the voyage to the moon, and the Virgilian archetype, the cave of the Magus is not in Tasso the source of primal truth, but a figure of natural magic, human philosophy unilluminated by Revelation. The source of truth is above, not below, and the divine presence is separate from, but works through, natural processes. Yet Tasso's fundamental commitment in the *Liberata* is to the poet's



autonomy and the freedom of human action, with all its attendant confusion and pathos, until it is perfected by Providential inspiration. The ongoing movement in the *Liberata* is from autonomy to external authority and this is intensified in the revisions that culminated in the *Gerusalemme Conquistata* of 1593 where the figure of the source is overlaid with learned typology which nevertheless fails in giving deeper significance to human events. Tasso's inability to wed securely divine meaning and human history reaches its inevitable culmination in his *Mondo creato*, which depicts natural unity before the fall.

The oscillation between the material and spiritual, figured by the River Thames which flows back upon itself, that Quint finds in Giordano Bruno's *De gli eroici furori* (1585) offers a way out of Tasso's dilemma, as do the multiple levels of allegory in Spenser's *Faerie Queene*. But for Quint, the most successful and original of synthesis between poetic autonomy and authority is represented by Rabelais's great comic prose epic. It is not the least of Quint's achievements that he has found a framework broad and powerful enough to include Rabelais's work among the great continental Renaissance epics, whereas too often it is treated as *sui generis*, formally and thematically too dissimilar from its Italian analogues. Taking his departure from the central Pantagruelion episode of the *Tiers Livre*, emblematic of human knowledge moving towards a divine goal, Quint sees the action of Rabelais's work as an unfolding of salvation history from Pentecost to the Apocalypse, an optimistic trajectory qualified by a sense of present history and typified by the open-endedness of the Rabelaisian books which return us to the realm of contingency despite the ultimate confidence in Redemption. As Quint shows, the ebullient, transgressing autonomy of Rabelais' *copia* is checked by an allegorical impulse that reaches not only back to scriptural authority but out to an interpretative community. Interpretation is then akin to a sacramental hermeneutics, catholic, but Evangelical in the manner of Erasmus, in which each reader-believer receives according to his or her own spiritual light. Interpretation is continually thematized in the book, particularly in the "paroles degelées" episode, which Quint plausibly reads as a reenactment of the interpretative process in history, an allegory of the impossibility of fixing allegorical meaning within a disparate and evolving human community. Quint links Panurge's bondage to the Judaic letter to an unwillingness to trust in the historical process and to desire to seek the inauthentic closure of certitude. The constant failure of his interpretative quest is what fuels the last Rabelaisian books and the refusal of the Dive Bouteille to offer definitive meaning could serve as a measure of the authenticity of the *Cinquième Livre*.

In an all too brief epilogue, Quint demonstrates how Milton's return to the original story underlying the fictions of his predecessors paradoxically establishes both the poet's originality and authoritativeness and reduces all prior texts to secondary imitations. Satan's appearance by the Edenic fountain is at once symbolic of his desire to usurp divine meaning and an emblem of the poem's own assertion of originality. What Quint says of Milton might be said of his own very satisfying study, that he simultaneously establishes his originality and authority, and that in tracing the history of the Renaissance epic, he discovers the allegory of its own emerging consciousness of itself as text.

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Charles Trinkaus. *The Scope of Renaissance Humanism*. Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan, 1983. Pp. xxvii, 479. \$28.50.

Renaissance historiography has undergone some major changes in emphases in recent decades, and none has been more significant than the reevaluation of the religious thought of the humanists, especially the Italian humanists. This is not simply a rejection of the old theories about the "paganism" of the humanists, but a serious reconsideration of the content of humanist thought on religious topics. Among the scholars writing in English no one has been more active in changing the way we judge the humanists as religious thinkers or has produced more fruitful lines of research than Charles Trinkaus. Culminating in his magisterial study, *In our Image and Likeness: Humanity and Divinity in the Italian Renaissance* (Chicago, 1970), he has consistently sought to demonstrate that the Renaissance humanists were not empty rhetoricians when they turned to religious questions. Rather they seriously, if on occasion idiosyncratically, desired to deal with the vital questions of faith and knowledge, of morality and sin within the Christian tradition, and offered their audience the means to act morally. While *In our Image and Likeness* is his most important statement on this question, it did not exhaust what Trinkaus had to say on the relationship between humanism and religious thought as indicated by his more recent study on Petrarch, *The Poet as Philosopher: Petrarch and the Formation of Renaissance Consciousness* (New Haven, 1979).

The book under review is a collection of Trinkaus' essays stretching from his early work to his most recent. It is valuable both because it expands certain aspects dealt with in *In our Image and Likeness*, and also because it gives us a clear picture of his own development as a Renaissance historian. These essays have a further interest since Trinkaus' career has paralleled the development of Renaissance studies in North America. Trinkaus studied with Lynn Thorndike at Columbia University before World War II and was taught the anti-humanist and anti-Renaissance attitude that was typical of American medievalists and that the late Wallace Ferguson so aptly called "the revolt of the medievalists." His thesis and first book, *Adversity's Nobleman: The Italian Humanists on Happiness* (New York, 1940), reflected this orientation and partly modified it. To study "pessimism" in Renaissance humanism strikes one as especially medieval in inspiration. When he reissued the book in 1965 Trinkaus accurately noted that "Renaissance studies in America were at a low point in 1940, but now they are flourishing with a much more expert and sophisticated scholarly community engaged in their pursuits. They have experienced their own Renaissance" (p. v). While Trinkaus' statement might seem overly optimistic today, it did reflect the state of Renaissance studies at the time. If there has been a renaissance of Renaissance studies, then it is greatly due to the work of men like Trinkaus and Paul O. Kristeller whose writings so happily complement Trinkaus'.

The essays in this collection show that Trinkaus from the outset of his career as an historian has been concerned with certain fundamental themes and problems in Renaissance and Reformation intellectual history and has basically continued to deal with them in a variety of contexts and with ever-growing sophistication. This



is not a case of a man merely redoing the same topic, but of his early centering on the essential questions in his field and working through them carefully, work requiring much time and effort and ever finer differentiations.

These eighteen essays are divided into three equal sections. The first entitled "Renaissance Humanism, Its Character and Influences," consists of essays in which Trinkaus defines what he sees as the basic characteristics of humanism as a unique intellectual movement. Here much of his emphasis is to respond to the criticisms of men like Thorndike who denied that there was a distinct character to humanism, or at least any serious content. The section lays special stress on the rhetorical aspects of humanism. Trinkaus gives an especially close reading to the rhetorical and literary writings of the humanist Bartolommeo della Fonte as an example of the rhetorical and literary foundations of humanism. The topics covered are very broad, and Trinkaus relates humanism to Renaissance art and the sciences as well as ancient moral philosophical thought. Especially useful are the surveys of the history of Renaissance humanism included in the treatments of art and the natural sciences. These pieces would be useful to students trying to understand the variety in humanist thought.

The second series of essays is grouped around the topic of "Renaissance and Reformation." It concerns the relationship between humanist thought and Christian theology in general, and with medieval and Protestant Reform ideals in particular. In their treatment of medieval monastic models, Trinkaus shows that the humanists offered to their readers a special religious consolation that reflected their readers' secular needs. They were as perplexed by the problems of justification and salvation as any professional theologian but did not offer the same metaphysical answers. Rather the humanists stressed the rhetorical basis of their thought as a means of dealing with Christian dilemmas. They did not cast their special brand of theology, the so-called *theologia rhetorica* or rhetorical theology, in opposition to medieval ecclesiastical establishment in general, but felt that they were returning to the theology of the Church Fathers who has stressed rhetoric as a means of making Christian truth immediate. Yet their rhetorical theology did separate them from the dogmatic theology of the Protestant Reformers.

The final section concentrates on the topic most closely related to Trinkaus' scholarship, one which has been the centre of his work from its earliest period, the "Renaissance Philosophy of Man," especially the "dignity of man." He shows that the growth of the fundamental idea of man's dignity stemmed from humanism's special view of the human condition and anthropology. Humanists were aware of the limits of the human condition and did not ignore its misery. They discovered the basis for man's special character by exploiting both ancient pagan philosophy and the Christian ideals represented in Augustinian Trinitarianism, which sees man as a reflection of the Trinity. For all its theoretical aspects, humanism was very much aware of the urban environment of its Italian readers and it emphasized the active element in man's life, a theme that concurred with its rhetoric. The humanist theme of man's dignity, and its accompanying paradoxes, had similarities with medieval Nominalism but also significant differences with it and with Protestant theology.

Read either independently or as a supplement to Trinkaus' major writings, these

essays have a wealth of ideas that touch a variety of questions fundamental to Renaissance humanism. Their value is enhanced by what they show of the scholarly growth of a major interpreter of humanism. They are a valuable index of the development of Renaissance studies in North America, one that amply justifies Professor Trinkaus' optimistic vision of the field in his statement of 1965.

JOHN D'AMICO, *George Mason University*

Paolo Brezzi and Maristella Lorch, eds. *Umanesimo a Roma nel Quattrocento*. Rome: Istituto di studi romani; New York: Barnard College, Columbia University, 1984. Pp. 349.

This interesting collection of essays constitute eighteen of the papers on the theme of humanism in Rome in the Fifteenth Century delivered to a conference held in New York in 1981. The contents are divided into four sections discussing the political, economic and cultural environment of Rome in the fifteenth century, Rome and the papal court, Rome and the arts, and humanists and Rome.

Paolo Brezzi begins the volume and the first division by providing a general, chronologically organized review of the condition of Rome from approximately 1420, the year Martin V repatriated the Holy See to the city, to 1527, the year of the terrible sack by the soldiers of Charles V. Thereafter follows a series of papers ranging from the interpretation of the restoration of classical statues by Sixtus IV, through the role played by cardinals' entertainments, to a study of certain aspects of the book trade in Renaissance Rome.

The next section, dealing with the papal Curia, contains essays on humanism and individual humanists in the services of the popes, the *studium urbis* between 1473 and 1484, and a trio of papers on Lorenzo Valla and his works.

*Rome e le arti* has just three articles on art and architecture, whereas *Umanisti e Roma*, the final division, enjoys five contributions on a wide variety of subjects, including studies on the theme of decline and rebirth in Bruni and Biondo, a survey of the extant manuscripts of the latter's *Italia illustrata*, Pier Candido Decembrio and Rome, Ancient Theology in Annus of Viterbo and a synoptic concluding address by P. O. Kristeller on "La cultura umanistica a Roma nel quattrocento."

As with any collection of conference proceedings, the selections presented here vary in quality, style and character. Some are very abstract and directed to a more specialized audience (such as Savarese's "Filosofia di un nuovo comportamento umano nel *De voluptate* di Lorenzo Valla"); some are useful contributions to specific, limited subjects (e.g., Lombardi's "Aspetti della produzione e circolazione del libro a Roma nel XV secolo," or Lee's "Humanists and the *Studium Urbis*, 1473-84"); some are bibliographical (such as White's "Towards a Critical Edition of Biondo Flavio's *Italia illustrata*: A Survey and Evaluation of the Manuscripts"); and some are provocatively exploratory (e.g. Hersey's "The Classical Orders of Architecture as Totems in Vitruvian Myth").

In short, this collection offers a wide variety of insight and scholarship on the broadly defined theme of humanism in all of its manifestations as applied to the city and idea of Rome and the papacy in the fifteenth century. The rich material of



this volume and the excellent quality of the illustrations provide a comprehensive survey of the subject for any reader concerned with either humanism or Rome in the quattrocento. The significance of the city and all of its complex associations in the ancient, ecclesiastical and Renaissance worlds, and the significance of the period – the years in which the values and ideals of humanism were incorporated into the restored city and Church after the Babylonian Captivity and the Schism – are such that any study of them is welcome. However, the editors, Brezzi and Lorch, have succeeded in welding together a singular vision of their subject in a creative and inclusive way, making this volume an example of how conference proceedings can be edited and shaped to conform to a coherent but broad theme.

KENNETH R. BARTLETT, *Victoria College, University of Toronto*

William F. Hansen. *Saxo Grammaticus and the Life of Hamlet: A Translation, History, and Commentary*. Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1983. Pp. xvi, 202. \$17.95.

This is most definitely not the story of a man who could not make up his mind. Witness Saxo's version of how Hamlet disposed of Polonius: "He cut up the body, cooked the pieces in boiling water, and dumped them through the hole of the outhouse for the swine to eat, strewing the putrid refuse with the wretch's limbs" (p. 102). The excerpt shows how refined and intellectualized a Hamlet Shakespeare gives us, compared with the Prince's earlier Scandinavian avatars. It also shows what a clear, lively translation William F. Hansen has produced in this admirable book, which discusses and interprets the evolution of Hamlet's legend as well as translating and elucidating Saxo's account.

The story of Hamlet reaches far back into Scandinavian history. Although there is no evidence that Hamlet (or Amleth, as Saxo calls him) was an historical character, the traditional oral tales in which he features probably date from the early tenth century; by 1000, he was a familiar enough figure to be alluded to by an Icelandic poet. When Saxo Grammaticus gave a more permanent literary form to the oral story in his *Gesta Danorum* (c. 1200), he was able to draw on both Danish and Icelandic traditions, and so his *Vita Amlethi* rests on a deliberate collation of information from several sources.

What kind of information? By himself collating Saxo's tale with the *Ambales Saga*, an independent analogue first given literary treatment at about the same time Shakespeare was writing his version, Hansen isolates what seem to be the essential plot elements. The story begins with the murder of a king by his jealous brother, who then assumes the throne and weds or attempts to wed the widowed queen. Her son, the hero, saves his neck by pretending to be a simpleton, and carefully plans his revenge while the villain puts him to three tests. In the first, his conduct with a young woman (Ophelia's prototype) is observed; in the second, the king's spy hides in the queen's room to overhear her conversation with the hero, and consequently experiences the meat processing referred to above; the hero survives the third test by altering a letter of reference written by the villain to a foreign king, and winds up marrying the king's daughter. After a time, he returns home and

accomplishes his revenge by setting fire to a banquet hall in which he has trapped the villain and his entire court. The hero is then proclaimed king.

Shakespeare's rather more noble Dane stands at two removes from the oral legend, and Hansen explores in fascinating detail the composition of each step. The first step was the shorter, when Saxo imposed the format of a literary text on an oral tale. As Hansen shows, Saxo's attempted metamorphosis did not succeed completely because his story's shape was in places inextricably related to the demands of oral narrative. Indeed, looking at the particular demands that Hansen describes, one might conclude that the primary result of this step was to preserve in the chrysalis of written form some essential attributes of an oral performance, attributes that Shakespeare's dramatic performance would liberate from the chrysalis in a much more successful metamorphosis; but more about this below. The second step in the legend's evolution was really the fulfilment of Saxo's move away from the archetypal mistiness of folklore towards the clear particularity of historical narrative. In this step, the following crucial changes occur: Hamlet's inner life materializes, with the rich complications and contradictions we associate with him (— what he calls "conscience" may make cowards of us all, but it gives Hamlet an identity apart from his actions); the world around the hero becomes more historically detailed and unfolds in a more clearly sequential manner; and finally, these subjective and objective worlds are manoeuvred into a problematical dialogue with each other. Hansen's discussion is deeply sensitive to this last aspect, especially to the relation between Hamlet and the other characters: "It is as though his mind has been analysed into its component parts, which are then personified, intensified, and set free to haunt him and taunt him" (p. 74). Belleforest, who retold Saxo's story in the *Histoires tragiques* (1570) with which Shakespeare was most likely familiar, was responsible for a small though significant number of the changes (he invented the ghost and the melancholic disposition, for instance); the rest belong to Shakespeare and whoever wrote the lost *Ur-Hamlet* of the 1580s.

Chapter Four ("The Shakespearean Transformation") is devoted to a thorough, fascinating discussion of these changes, and it also examines the important technical features that mark Shakespeare's near abandonment of the trappings of oral narrative. *Hamlet* is characterized by: the disappearance of the narrator — a natural step in any dramatization; a more compressed and concise treatment of time than any legend requires; an expansion of the number of characters per scene, since drama allows a more complex scenic perspective than a storyteller or his listeners can manage; and a departure from the somewhat self-contained episodes of the narrative, resulting in extended story-lives for many of the characters. Such features are essential to the identity and success of Shakespeare's play, and Hansen's emphasis on their importance is warranted. However, what struck me as I read Chapter Three ("Legend and Literature") was how many of the features of oral storytelling survived to become dramatic strengths in *Hamlet*. As the close ties between traditional folktales and many Elizabethan plays demonstrate, the one form translates readily into the other. For instance, the oral emphasis on the present moment, and its relative freedom from the chains of connectives that one finds in a sophisticated literary work like *The Faerie Queene*, is a characteristic of



good drama. Similarly, the fact that “readers dealing with orally inspired literature have a habit of putting together things that listeners perceive separately” (p. 52) calls attention to an audience response that is particularly appropriate to *Hamlet*. And the oral tale’s absence of reference to the physical appearances of the characters or to their customary habits of dress – relying instead on an expression of character through action – underlines an approach that Aristotle as well as the Elizabethans found inherently dramatic. These are not connections that Hansen makes, but they come easily as a result of his clear, stimulating presentation of the intrinsic qualities of both play and legend.

I have spent most of this review on the aspects of *Saxo Grammaticus and the Life of Hamlet* that should be of greatest interest to students to Shakespeare; this group will doubtless be providing Hansen with the majority of his readers, who will be enjoying and profiting from the book for many years. However, the book’s merits are broader than any group’s special interests. In fact, Hansen has given us one of the best book bargains around, compressing into this volume a first-rate translation, an exhaustively researched and illuminating commentary on Saxo’s work, a timely investigation of the form and implications of oral narrative, and a new study – with much fresh information – of how Shakespeare adapted his source material. And the book’s style is throughout so clear and lively that it merits the final judgment usually given to that modern descendant of *Hamlet*, the classic murder mystery: the reviewer could hardly put the book down while he was reading it, and did so with reluctance when it was finished.

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Kevin Brownlee. *Poetic Identity in Guillaume de Machaut*. Madison and London: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984. Pp. x, 268.

Dans cette étude sobre et fort intéressante, Kevin Brownlee se penche sur les aspects du “je” poétique chez Guillaume de Machaut, nous offrant une révision de sa thèse doctorale (université de Princeton), laquelle est exclue de sa bibliographie, me citant que des titres publiés.

On a longtemps reconnu Machaut comme le meilleur compositeur français du quatorzième siècle, maître technicien en vers, grand “faiseur” pour qui les exigences du rondeau et de la ballade ne semblent poser que des problèmes mineurs.

A Brownlee de démontrer que le faiseur peut être à juste titre reconnu comme “poète” (c’est son élève Deschamps qui l’avait baptisé ainsi), c’est-à-dire dans le sens d’un créateur conscient de son identité à l’égard d’un ensemble poétique unifié, qu’il a d’ailleurs présenté comme tel, étant le premier à publier ses poèmes dans un ordre préalablement établi et sa musique sous forme de recueil. Insertion du moi qui va beaucoup plus loin si l’on regarde les textes de près, car le poète s’intègre et se re-présente dans sa création d’une façon plus complexe qu’on ne l’aurait imaginé. L’étude présente, approfondissant les travaux de Calin, Uitti, Kelly et Poirion en particulier, nous révèle un narrateur qui se complait à manipuler plusieurs identités selon les niveaux de narration. Ces processus, avec leurs dédoublements et modulations d’orientation, sont explicités dans l’analyse

méthodique de sept *dits amoureux*, suivant l'ordre du manuscrit A (sigle de Hoepffner, B.N. f.fr. 1584), qui semble correspondre aux intentions de l'auteur.

C'est surtout dans le *Voir-Dit* (histoire vraie) que nous apercevons les finesses de la technique de narration-composition. Et cette technique fait penser non seulement à la filiation littéraire qui amène au 'je suis moy-mesmes la matière de mon livre' de Montaigne ou aux propos ironiques des personnages de Cervantes sur leur auteur, mais aussi aux jeux subtils de Gide, notamment dans les *Faux-Monnayeurs* et la *Symphonie pastorale*, où il s'agit d'événements évoluant dans un plan de réalité qui s'approche chronologiquement d'un autre. Mieux encore, car cette fois c'est comme si l'auteur avait lui-même composé la symphonie: la bien-aimée de Machaut-participant reçoit non seulement des rondeaux de la part de 'Guillaume' mais aussi la musique. Ajoutons que notre poète ne lésine pas toujours sur sa propre valeur et n'oublie pas de commenter très favorablement ses propres vers. Le tout à être considéré sous l'optique du prologue dans lequel le faiseur se constitue être exclusif: ("Je, Nature . . . Vien ci a toy, Guillaume, qui fourme / T'ay a part, pour faire par Toy fourmer / Nouviaus dis amoureux plaisans").

Le *Livre du voir-dit* (chapitre III de la présente étude) a pour thème l'histoire d'un amour et la genèse d'un livre. Le narrateur se présente sous plusieurs formes: celle d'amant, de clerc et de poète. L'examen détaillé de la combinaison de ces aspects démontre une fois pour toutes que la majorité des questions concernant la 'réalité' biographique du *Voir-dit* (un homme d'au moins soixante ans aurait-il vraiment vécu cette aventure amoureuse?) ne sont que d'une importance secondaire. En premier lieu le voir-dit fait partie d'un service amoureux dont les grandes lignes sont traditionnelles. Histoire sans véritable drame, car nous en connaissons déjà la fin — seul un amour heureux puisse engendrer la poésie . . . Le poète crée un Guillaume anti-"macho," pour ainsi dire, petit, peu courageux, sans noblesse ni vigueur, dont l'amour ne se justifie que par la composition du livre. Si la louange de sa Toute-Belle reste fidèle aux stéréotypes, ce sont les structures de leur communication qui sont tout à fait nouvelles. Au début, l'amant se trouve dans un *locus amoenus* obligatoire, cependant, à l'inverse du *Roman de la Rose*, le narrateur est vieux et triste, l'absence d'amour lui ayant enlevé l'inspiration poétique. Il faut la livraison d'un rondeau de Toute-Belle ("Celle qui onques ne vous vit, / Et qui vous aime loi-aument") pour le ranimer. Il envoie son rondeau-réponse et nous entamons une suite d'échanges littéraires, y compris quarante-sept lettres en prose. Comme Rémy de Gourmont l'a suggéré, Toute-Belle est une Laure qui se crée en s'attachant au Pétrarque français. Notons ici que Brownlee, qui fournit à l'intention des lecteurs non-spécialisés des traductions littérales de toutes les citations en français, aurait eu intérêt à souligner le parallélisme chronologique entre la carrière de Machaut et celle de son contemporain italien qui, lui, se reconnaissait ouvertement comme *poeta*.

Quant au *Voir-dit* et la déclaration du narrateur (vv. 425-32) qu'il n'a pas menti dans son histoire, nous savons qu'un tiers des poèmes apparemment inspirés par sa dame ont été composés avant ce livre. La circulation des poèmes individuels de Machaut nous autorise à croire que sons public a dû interpréter la réalité de l'histoire dans un sens particulier. L'authenticité visée est celle d'un jeu réciproque de



realités internes: les mêmes événements se répètent dans les octosyllabes de la narration, les morceaux à formes fixes que l'on s'envoie et la prose des lettres. Ainsi garantit-on l'authenticité poétique d'un récit qui se déroule selon les normes avec rêves et losengiers. Guillaume joue un rôle quasi-fixe d'amant couart, donc il incombe à Toute-Belle à faire toutes les démarches dont le poète s'inspire pour chanter un amour d'humble clerc non-courtois. En se re-crétant par le moyen de points de vue multiples, Machaut parvient à combiner allégorie (rencontre d'Espérance dans la forêt) et actualité (pilleurs de la Grande-Compagnie qui menaçaient les voyageurs entre 1360 et 1365).

Pour Brownlee la deuxième partie du récit n'est nullement inférieure à la première, bien que la critique ne s'est pas montrée très enthousiaste envers ce qui semble être une fragmentation peu dramatique de la trame narrative. Guillaume annonce qu'il est en train de composer un livre et l'évolution du texte devient le mobile de l'histoire. Il se met à apprécier "leur" expérience d'une façon de plus en plus érudite. Dans un rêve, il recontre le roi Charles, ce qui lui permet de jouer les rôles de poète, amant, amant bafoué, clerc, spectateur ironique de lui-même et commentateur des maux du pays. Les paradoxes se multiplient quand le roi observe qu'il ne faut pas croire aux songes et la réalité s'interroge quand le poète-narrateur envoie le texte inachevé de son livre à sa bien-aimée, en la priant de corriger ce qui bon lui semble afin que l'histoire de leur amour ne s'éloigne pas de la vérité. Lorsque Péronne (son nom maintenant révélé) déménage pour être plus près de son amant, c'est l'activité littéraire qui s'intensifie, Guillaume se trouvant en proie aux médisants et aux problèmes de déplacement pour un homme âgé et peu robuste. Il préfère les voyages à l'intérieur de son propre oeuvre et remplace la sortie sous la pluie par l'excursus intertextuel et la visite des lieux communs. Quand les amants sont enfin reconciliés, nous ne nous intéressons plus au *gradus amoris*. Le livre est devenu *factum* ou cinquième degré.

Pour faire son livre du livre du voir-dit et participer dans ce jeu subtil de niveaux d'expérience, Brownlee se sert des lumières de Genette, Benveniste et Weinrich sans trop se fourvoyer dans une forêt terminologique qui risque toujours de se mettre elle-même en abyme. Son voyage ouvrira bien d'autres sentiers dans un vaste domaine qui reste largement inexploré. C'est un travail soigné, muni d'amples notes. Regrettons qu'il n'ait pas porté la même attention rigoureuse à son style qui pêche trop souvent par des répétitions et une pléthore de "problematize," "valorize" et de 'OF' (à la page neuf on compte vingt "of" et cinq "OF" du genre).

The clerkly narrator figure is an essential component of both OF hagiography and OF romance narrative. . . .

Mais l'étude ne s'en trouve pas pour autant trop "devalorized." Nous attendons avec impatience la suite de ce voyage et ceux d'autres explorateurs pour voir si les jeux d'approche narrative se retrouvent dans l'illustration des manuscrits et surtout dans la musique de Machaut.

JOHN HARE, *Memorial University of Newfoundland*

Mark U. Edwards, Jr., *Luther's Last Battles: Politics and Polemics, 1531-46*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1983. 254 pp.

Like the author's first book, *Luther and the False Brethren* (Stanford University Press, 1975), which dealt with Luther's attacks on his evangelical opponents, this new work contributes significantly to our understanding of Luther by examining his activity as a polemicist. The focus here is on the older Luther's treatises, written in the period 1531-46, attacking the papacy, papal councils, the Jews, the Turks, and an assortment of Catholic princes. Although the book is not, and does not claim to be, an exhaustive account of the controversies that produced Luther's polemics, the author nevertheless provides a great deal of interesting information about those controversies, which get little attention in most standard biographies and histories.

Luther's later polemics have always been a stumbling-block for biographers and historians because their contents and their style are difficult to integrate into the picture of Luther that emerges from an examination of his early, 'heroic' struggles against the papacy and its allies. In some of the later treatises Luther seems to abandon positions of principle established in his earlier writings (e.g., on obedience to secular authority); in others he participates in a nasty gutter-dispute between rival princes (Saxony/Hessen vs. Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel) seemingly unworthy of a theologian of his stature. And some of the polemics are so shockingly vulgar and violent that they offended contemporaries and continue to give offence to this day. The most notorious of these are the anti-Jewish tracts of 1543, but others, such as *Against Hanswurst* (1541), aimed at Duke Henry of Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel, and *Against the Papacy at Rome, Founded by the Devil* (1545) are just as bad or worse.

Scholars have conventionally sought the explanation for these polemics either in Luther's theology or, where plausible theological motives could not be found, in the effects of ill health and old age. Edwards finds these explanations to be, at best, incomplete. The weaker of the two is that based on ill health and old age. Luther did indeed suffer much from poor health in his later years, and this doubtless made him more irascible than he might otherwise have been. However, the connection between this and the offensive rhetoric of the later polemics is extremely tenuous because, as the author repeatedly demonstrates, the violence and the vulgarity were turned on or off according to Luther's purposes at the moment. They were a deliberate tactic, not the uncontrolled ravings of a sick old man.

Edwards finds more merit in the argument from theological motives. Theology was always important to Luther and none of his later polemics is wholly devoid of theological content. Moreover, the author, pursuing a theme already developed in *Luther and the False Brethren*, argues that Luther's apocalyptic world view is crucial to an understanding of the later polemics. Luther saw himself as a participant in a great struggle between the true and the false church which was approaching its apocalyptic climax in his own day. Thus his polemics were not aimed at ordinary individuals, who might deserve moderate and charitable treatment, but at agents of Satan, upon whom it was both necessary and legitimate to heap the worst abuse one could muster.



Important as this theological explanation of Luther's later polemics is, however, it has, in the author's view, two principal shortcomings. The first is that it ignores or undervalues the historical circumstances surrounding those polemics. By the 1530, Edwards argues, the Reformation was no longer a revolutionary movement made up primarily of theologically committed individuals but was, rather, a conservative movement led by territorial rulers whose leadership and support were vital to the survival of the movement but those policies were frequently not those recommended by Luther or the other theologians. This development had two important results. First, most of Luther's later polemics were addressed to his own supporters. The aim was no longer to win converts but to defend the righteous cause against numerous foes. Luther's apocalyptic view of those foes as agents of Satan led them to denounce them with emotional and abusive rhetoric that was useful to the movement's leaders and reassuring to its followers. Second, politics played a much larger role in Luther's later polemics than in the earlier ones. Most of the later polemics were, in fact, politically significant (those against the Jews being the chief exception) and many were written at the specific request of political authorities, usually the Saxon government, which wanted Luther's vast store of invective put to use in support of its policies or those of the Schmalkaldic League. Since compliance with such requests gave Luther the opportunity to heap abuse upon the pope and papists, he readily complied, even when his motives and views were not the same as those of the authorities (as on the questions of attendance at a papal council, armed resistance to the emperor, the seizure of the bishopric of Naumburg, and the war against Henry of Wolfenbüttel). Luther's denunciation of the enemy served the rulers' purposes despite his personal reservations about their policies for dealing with the enemy. For example, his blistering denunciation of papal councils (a denunciation that employed substantial historical, scriptural, and logical arguments as well as liberal verbal abuse) justified the decision of the Schmalkaldic Leaguers never to send a delegation to such a council even though Luther thought that one should be sent to bear witness to the truth.

The second shortcoming of the exclusively theological explanation of Luther's later polemics is closely related to the first. It is the failure to understand that, in general, Luther's inflammatory rhetoric conveyed to his readers, most of whom could not follow his theological arguments, a meaning independent of those arguments. On occasion, as in the case of his *Warning to his Dear German People* (1531), theology and rhetoric actually seemed to work at cross-purposes. On the one hand, Luther's intricate argument indicated that he still harboured grave doubts about the legitimacy of armed resistance to the emperor and that he was unwilling to counsel such resistance. But what impressed contemporary readers, Edwards argues, was not Luther's theological caution but rather his vehement denunciation of the "unspeakable wickedness" of the "murderous and blood-thirsty papists" and his grim satisfaction at the thought that they would meet with resistance, whether licit or not. Luther's rhetoric encouraged armed resistance to attack from the emperor – both friend and foe perceived this – even though he had not yet formulated an adequate theological defence of such resistance.

In his epilogue, Edwards draws the general conclusion that the meaning of

Luther's polemics "is not exhausted by a statement of his intentions, much less a statement of his *theological* rationale. The historian must also evaluate the meaning the polemics had for Luther's contemporaries . . . [and] such an evaluation must include a consideration of the rhetorical force of Luther's treatises as well as their specific content." He argues, moreover, that Luther's earlier writings (e.g., those associated with the Peasants' War and with the emergence of the Lutheran state church) must also be reassessed on this basis, although he gives little indication of what new insights such a reassessment might lead to.

The author informs us in his preface that this book was written, edited, and typeset on a computer. Unfortunately, it shows. *Luther's Last Battles* is not nearly as well written as *Luther and the False Brethren*, nor is the material as well organized. As a result, the argument is often difficult to follow. To give just one example: Edwards waits until the very last page of Chapter Six before indicating how the treatises against the Jews, which do not really fit under the subtitle *Politics and Polemics*, are linked to the other polemics of Luther's later years (i.e., by the independent force of their rhetoric and by their apocalyptic context). Moreover, the text of the book is littered with the sort of blunders that should have been eliminated by careful revision and competent editing. There are numerous grammatical solecisms. We are repeatedly informed, for example, that "the vulgarity and the violence [of Luther's polemics] *was* intention." There are sentences that, because of faulty syntax, have to be pondered at length for one to discover their intended meaning (see lines 1-3 on p. 95, for example). The author's translations of original texts are often bewilderingly unidiomatic and sometimes embarrassingly inaccurate. On pp. 60-1, for example, we are told that Luther wrote a *Brief Reply to Duke George's Next Book*, whereas, in fact, he replied to the duke's "most recent" (*newest*) book. While the text contains relatively few purely typographical errors, there is a huge one on p. 17, where three whole lines in paragraph two have been accidentally displaced by three lines from the following paragraph. In the preface, the author dutifully accepts responsibility for all these errors. But the Cornell University Press cannot be let off that easily. It was the duty of the press's readers and editors to spot the errors and correct them. That they did not do so is a great pity and a disgrace.

That said, however, the fact remains that, despite all, the author's message comes through and is, on the whole, persuasive. This is an important and stimulating book by one of the best Luther's scholars active today.

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Franco Catalano, *Francesco Sforza*. Milan: Dall'Oglio, 1983.

Early in 1984 there appeared on the shelves of the bookstores of Milan a new biography of one of the city's most famous figures – its fifteenth-century ruler, Francesco Sforza. Sforza has always attracted the attention of Italian historians, not least because he provides the most conspicuous example of the Renaissance success story: a soldier of fortune rising to become the ruler of a powerful state solely through his military and political prowess. Thus, Francesco can be re-



garded as an illustration of the supreme importance of the ability or "virtù" so extolled by contemporary humanists, and which subsequently became, in the Burckhardtian tradition, a distinguishing characteristic of the "Renaissance man."

Franco Catalano's biography lies securely within this historiographical tradition, which sees in the Renaissance a period when the full development of human capacities was achieved in such exceptional individuals as Leon Battista Alberti or Francesco Sforza himself. Taking his cue from the humanists themselves, Catalano determines that chance or "fortune" (a major cause of events in humanist historiography) had little to do with Francesco's success. Instead, it was his personal virtues that allowed Sforza to win and retain the Duchy of Milan: not merely his military skill but the exceptional prudence, moderation and humanity which he displayed, and with which he triumphed over the more brutal and violent tendencies of the age. Ultimately, Catalano sees the measure of Francesco's personal value not merely in his conquest of Milan or in his contribution to the period of relative peace that followed, but, more particularly, in his far-sighted insistence on preventing foreign intervention in the Italian peninsula. As the success of this policy provided the tranquil conditions in which the Renaissance could achieve its full flowering, Sforza here receives a major share of the credit for promoting the climax of culture Italy experienced during the fifteenth century.

Catalano's view of Sforza depends, then, on his interpretation of the Renaissance and, to a degree, on his sense of value of the culture that the period brought forth. It is also influenced by the image of Sforza presented by the Duke's contemporary biographers, on whom Catalano heavily and quite rightly relies. However, often humanists in Sforza employ, these writers tended to depict Francesco as the wise, magnanimous and virtuous prince, and, while Catalano recognises the eulogistic element in their work, he does little to counterbalance it.

Despite the eulogistic element, there is much truth in this presentation of Sforza as the wise and prudent ruler. Like his friend Cosimo de' Medici, Francesco was noted for his good sense, his moderation and willingness to compromise, his desire to conciliate rather than employ high-handed methods, as he also was for his decision, strength of purpose, patience and reliability once he had determined on a course of action. However, to concentrate on such personal qualities as motives of action is often to obscure the more pragmatic bases of Sforza's policies. Much of his moderation and humanity were, as they were with Cosimo, the result of his recognition of the insecurity of his position, as a ruler whose claim to Milan rested ultimately on conquest by force. While Catalano is fully aware of this, he tends to ignore the implications in favour of his more "humanist" approach to his subject. Thus, for example, he attributes Sforza's unduly optimistic conclusions regarding a particularly difficult piece of diplomatic bargaining to the Duke's confidence in man's capacities and virtues when, in reality, it is a typical example of Sforza's unwillingness to arouse hostility that might ultimately prove dangerous to himself. Similarly, Sforza's policy of keeping the foreigner out of Italy, while certainly a long-term commitment, was based on Francesco's fear of foreign claims to his Duchy rather than on any idealist considerations. It is quite possible therefore that, if pressed to extremities as he was during the early 1450s, he might again abandon this principle in favour of seeking foreign support for his own survival.

Thus, Catalano's depiction of Sforza as the virtuous Renaissance prince, while it does provide a thematic unity for the work, leads to certain distortions in interpretation. In addition, it affects the author's selection of his subject matter. Catalano has time, for example, to treat such broad questions as the humanist conception of "nature" and "mystery," but little to devote to such fundamental issues as Sforza's administration of his Duchy, the social bases of his support, or economic developments during his rule. When these subjects are raised, the coverage is at best superficial. Thus, Catalano interprets certain of Sforza's actions immediately following his acquisition of Milan as proof of a permanent change in his policy towards the towns and the nobility. However, he does not seek further evidence to support this conclusion nor try to trace later shifts in Francesco's internal policies.

Catalano's failure to deal with social and economic questions, like his presentation of Sforza as the Renaissance prince, are typical of an earlier epoch of historiography. It is therefore illuminating, if a little shocking, to discover that *Francesco Sforza* is not really a recent work. Rather, it is an almost verbatim reprint of the section of volume VI of the monumental Treccani degli Alfieri *Storia di Milano* which the same author wrote some thirty years ago. Since his goal was then to produce a political history of Milan during the Sforza period, it was comparatively easy to convert part of this into a biography of the first Sforza Duke. This transformation explains why the biography takes the form of a political narrative rather than a real analysis of Sforza's policies or an evaluation of his accomplishments as the ruler of Milan. It also explains why the work has no real conclusion: in the original volume, the narrative merely continued with little interruption to an account of the accession of Francesco's son. Catalano did, it is true, add a brief introduction to cover the years prior to 1450, when his section of the *Storia* began. However, as this is drawn solely from published biographies and secondary sources rather than from the wide archival material available, it adds little of new interest for the historian. Even the footnotes remain almost unchanged from the earlier work, and thus the reader is deprived of the benefit of new studies in Milanese history that had been published during the last thirty years.

All this is not, however, to say that *Francesco Sforza* is devoid of historical value. As it shares in the limitations of the *Storia di Milano*, so it possesses its advantages, not least of which is its extremely thorough documentation. The compilers of the *Storia* had at their disposal the extraordinarily rich collections of the Visconti and Sforza archives, and, if they did not always exploit to the full the material regarding the internal affairs of the Duchy, they did dig deeply into the diplomatic correspondence. As a result, this biography is a mine of information concerning the positions and policies – indeed, at times the very words – of the participants in the principal political events in Italy between 1450 and 1466. The reader therefore receives a very precise and accurate view of events, in particular from the Milanese point of view and in those areas in which the Milanese archives shed a clear light. Obviously, given the original object of the study, much less effort has been made to search out relevant material in other Italian repositories. Despite this, the wealth of documentation and the accuracy of the narrative make *Francesco Sforza*, like its predecessor, an invaluable contribution to the literature on



the period.

However, those who were hoping to find in this most recent volume on Sforza a definitive biography will inevitably be disappointed. No such result was possible from a work that was written with very different aims in view. A definitive biography of Sforza therefore awaits a diligent historian with the patience to sift through the vast documentation available for the internal as well as the external history of the Sforza Duchy. Only then would it be possible to supply an in-depth study of Francesco Sforza rather than this hastily-compiled production presumably put together under pressure from a publisher for consumption by a wider audience than that served by the *Storia di Milano*.

PAULA CLARKE, *Memorial University of Newfoundland*

John F. D'Amico. *Renaissance Humanism in Papal Rome: Humanists and Churchmen on the Eve of the Reformation*. Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1983. Pp. xviii, 331. \$24.00.

This book fills a major gap in the history of Renaissance humanism. Professor D'Amico views Roman humanism not as an adjunct or footnote to Florentine humanism, but as a unique entity, indebted to Florence but developing themes and interests that grew out of its Roman ambience. D'Amico's analysis, which is based on a thorough reading of primary and secondary sources, begins in 1420, when Pope Martin V entered Rome after the Great Schism. At that time Roman humanism was but a "fragile transplant" in a cultural backwater. By the period 1475-1520, however, humanism triumphed in Rome, which had become a centre of Italian intellectual activity. This development leads D'Amico to conclude that "Roman humanism stands out as a spectacularly successful example of the accommodation of Renaissance intellectuals to their political and social surroundings . . ." (xvi).

In Part I of this rich and detailed study, D'Amico discusses the growth of humanism at Rome, analyzing the nature of Roman society, the careers of numerous humanists, and the opportunities open to them in the city. Unlike Florentine society in the fifteenth century, which was republican and secular, Roman society was authoritarian, hierarchical, clerical, and exclusively male oriented. In order to integrate with Roman society, humanists had to adapt their life-styles and scholarly interests. For example, the predominance of the clergy encouraged lay humanists employed in the Roman administration or Curia to delay marriage until late in life or to accept minor orders for career purposes (p. 6). Roman humanists found employment in a number of areas. They were retained in the households of popes, cardinals, and bishops. The most sought-after positions, however, were in the Curia. D'Amico describes the judicial, financial, and administrative offices of the Curia, noting that only a minority of employees were humanists. Within the Curia, the Chancery, responsible for drafting papal letters and bulls, offered the best opportunities for advancement to humanists, who possessed broad literary skills rather than university degrees in law or theology. A number of humanists rose beyond simple Curial posts to bishoprics and even to the cardinalate. Among

these, D'Amico mentions the careers of Niccolò Perotti (1429-1480), Giannantonio Campano (1429-1477), and Adriano Castellesi (1458-1522?), noting that in appointments to the ecclesiastical hierarchy humanistic talents trailed other factors such as political considerations, family ties, and service to religious orders.

Humanists were drawn to Rome by more than the possibility of employment. The city represented an ideal, inspiring humanists through its association with classical greatness and through its ruins. To realize in full the inspirational value of the city, the humanists required contact with one another. Since encounters at work were only passing and infrequent, the humanists developed informal academies to exchange and develop their ideas. D'Amico devotes Chapter 4 of his study to an examination of the academies of Pomponio Leto (1427-1498), Paolo Cortesi (1465-1510), Mario Maffei (1463-1537), Angelo Colocci (1484-1549), and Johannes Goritz (d 1527). He notes that academies were not unique to Rome, citing the most famous example of the academy of Marsilio Ficino in Florence. What separated the Roman academies from Ficino's was the fact that, while the Florentine academy followed the neo-Platonic philosophy, the Roman academies were not dedicated to one philosophical school. The Roman academies were dedicated to Latin classicism, which exhibited itself in many forms: commentaries on Latin authors, neo-Latin poetry, Latin oratory, and the study of architecture.

The Roman humanists, according to D'Amico, saw the Latin language as the force uniting humanist culture and the Curia, and papal Rome as the cultural continuation of the Roman empire. D'Amico refers to this view as a "new ideology" which gave the Roman humanists a sense of worth and integration within Roman society. This new ideology culminated in the first decades of the sixteenth century in a strident Ciceronianism, involving the exclusive use of Ciceronian vocabulary and periodic sentence structure. Ciceronianism was not unique to Rome, but D'Amico argues that the fervour and intensity of Ciceronianism at Rome ran parallel to the authoritarian tendencies in Roman society and set it apart from Ciceronianism in other Italian cities.

One characteristic of Roman humanists, long neglected by historians influenced by the myth that the Renaissance assumed a "pagan" character at Rome, was that they did not stop with classicism but went on to the study of theology, which they felt was essential to them as members of the ecclesiastical government. In Part II of this book, D'Amico examines the attempts of Paolo Cortesi, Adriano Castellesi, and Raffael Maffei (1451-1522) to reformulate theology along humanist lines. Cortesi's *In quattuor libros Sententiarum* (1504) was an attempt to apply Ciceronian standards to scholastic theology, for example, by referring to the church not as *ecclesia* but as *senatus*. Although scholars have viewed this "blending of classical language and Christian meaning" as either a paganization or a trivialization of Christianity, D'Amico argues that it was an attempt to make theology appealing and intelligible to humanists and non-theologians. It was the logical outgrowth of the Ciceronianism of the Roman humanists.

Cardinal Castellesi's *De vera philosophia* (1507) represents a different line of attack. Unlike Cortesi, Castellesi rejected scholastic theology and all attempts to



uncover Christian truth through reason. He asserted the primacy of the Scripture in Christian belief, and called for a return to patristic studies.

Raffaello Maffei's *De institutione christiana* (1518) and *Stromata* (1519-1521) followed a more moderate approach than the works of Cortesi or Castellesi. Maffei rejected the excesses of the scholastics, but used scholastic theology as a foundation for his work. His main inspiration, however, was Basil the Great (330-379), who had been educated in classical and Christian traditions, and presented a moral ideal for Christians. Maffei reviewed classical, patristic, and scholastic opinions on a variety of topics in order to provide the non-expert with basic arguments and ideas for leading a Christian life.

D'Amico concludes with an examination of the ideas for reform of Cortesi, Maffei, and other humanists of the early sixteenth century. While they criticized abuses in the church, they were too closely tied to the papacy and the Curia to propose radical solutions to the problems.

D'Amico's conclusions are provocative yet carefully weighed. He recognizes the limitations as well as the accomplishments of the Roman humanists, for example, noting the rigidity of Ciceronianism and the inability of the Ciceronians to defend their ideology adequately against the attacks of Erasmus of Rotterdam. Their intellectual conservatism and attachment to the Curia made it impossible for them to respond to the new challenges of the Protestant Reformation, or for their ideology to survive the trauma of the Sack of Rome in 1527. The greatest strength of D'Amico's work, however, is his ability to relate intellectual history to its social and political background. His book will occupy an important place in future Renaissance bibliographies.

THOMAS DEUTSCHER, *St. Thomas More College, University of Saskatchewan*

Terry G. Sherwood. *Fulfilling the Circle: A Study of John Donne's Thought*. Toronto Buffalo and London: University of Toronto Press, 1984. Pp. 231. \$25.00.

Fulfilling the circle of Donne's thought is an ambitious undertaking, fraught with critical difficulties. The diversity of Donne's generic experiments, the imprint of his personality upon all of his work, the physical and spiritual intensity of his worldview make overall patterns difficult to trace. Most critics suspect that Donne's later works illuminate his earlier ones and that Donne's own consciousness clearly animates them all, but are reluctant to apply these assumptions to a critical assessment of his works as a whole. Sherwood is an exception, and the result is a book that allows him to speak in a deliberate, unapologetic way of religious concerns in the secular poetry and of Donne himself as the consciousness informing these works. Such criticism is refreshingly constructive.

Sherwood's book is divided into two main parts, in addition to an introduction and a conclusion. The introduction establishes Sherwood's critical approach, offering an "introduction to Donne's epistemology and psychology" through "essential metaphysical principles expressed in the religious prose"(4). He begins by defining "the polar opposition between creation and annihilation at the

heart of [Donne's] thought" (4) and "Donne's vivid . . . awareness" (10) that the human experiences that resist annihilation must occur within the difficult medium of time. Most significantly, he focuses on three main principles that can be discovered in all of Donne's work, although articulated most directly in the sermons. These are "Donne's conviction of reason's dominant powers" (15), the rational soul's keen awareness of its interdependence with the body, and "human suffering, [as] the essential condition of earthly life" (17) that shapes this awareness.

Discussion of these as unifying principles in Donne's work comprises Part 1. According to Sherwood, Donne believes that despite earthly distortions, reason "remains the primary agent for achieving knowledge and for assessing the soul's full experience" (16), an insight that is particularly illuminating in the light of critical arguments that have attempted to prove both Donne's skepticism and fideism. Moreover, Sherwood demonstrates how Donne's reason is informed by an Augustinian rubric, though not the neo-Platonized, excessively spiritualized Augustine of the Renaissance. For both Donne and Augustine, Sherwood argues, reason's limits, although constantly demarcated, cannot detract from its integral relationship with the spiritual life: "man as a rational creature must reason before and after belief. Donne's 'common Reason' is the Augustinian *ratio*, necessary for knowledge that obeys and aids wisdom, the domain of *intellectus*" (44). For both Donne and Augustine "saving 'knowledge' can only outdistance reason by using it" (57).

Sherwood also carries his discussion of reason beyond this source to reassess critical views of the Reform influence on Donne. He states clearly that "Donne was not sympathetic to Reform denigration of the reason. Rather, he entrusted to reason a virile co-operation with Grace, while embracing the Reform emphasis upon the Spirit's role" (44). What is most interesting is Sherwood's assessment of how Donne adapts this influence to his own theological and spiritual temperament, producing a curiously Augustinian and Calvinistic notion "of saving knowledge that fulfils the human soul by engaging its full capacities," by "uniting reason and the Spirit" (49). The knowledge that the soul gains, "which outruns reason's own comprehension, depends upon reason's own vigilant guidance and tough-minded applications" (62).

The chapter on Bodies builds upon this discussion of the primacy of reason by demonstrating how "knowledge of the body is richly articulated in Donne's thought by a system of correspondences that mutually implicate the body, the community, and the physical world in the experience of the soul" (71). Sherwood sees a "guiding sense of physical existence in a physical world" (69) all through his works, an "elemental bodily consciousness" (71). By way of illustration he looks briefly, but incisively, at a wide range of Donne's works. He argues, for example, that the love poetry displays an "absorbed attention to the body" (71) and that "the naturalistic and libertine love poems conspicuously dramatize . . . the consequence of separating the body's experiences from spiritual control" (72). The verse letters and their touching "insistence on the communal Body" (80) reaffirm that "virtue cannot be abstracted from its human embodiment in overt actions" (80). The *Anniversaries* depict "the paradoxical intercourse between heaven and earth" (93), the gravitational pull, underestimated by many readers of Donne, that draws the soul to fulfillment in earthly time. The sermons adapt yet another



source, the Bernardine vocabulary of digestion and assimilation, to describe spiritual experience in bodily terms. As with reason, Sherwood argues that, for Donne, bodies are the "essential physical medium of God's earthly influence" (101).

In the next chapter, Sherwood concludes his delineation of Donne's epistemological and psychological contexts by examining suffering as the most basic bodily consciousness, as "the pervasive and inescapable condition of temporal life" (102). This chapter traces Donne's growing awareness of personal pain, of public grief, and finally of affliction and conformity with Christ's exemplary pain as the fulfillment of a truly human existence. Sherwood argues that "Throughout his works Donne assumes that suffering, whether in love of humans or God, encourages the psychological tenderness necessary for spiritual fullness" (103). This anatomy of suffering prepares for Part 2 in which these principles are applied to specific works covering the whole of Donne's career: "A Valediction: Of Weeping," the *Holy Sonnets*, "Good Friday, 1613: Riding Westward," and the *Devotions*. The book concludes with an analysis of *Deaths Duell* as "a coherent and fulfilling conclusion to his life and thought" (193).

The strengths of this analysis are many. Most important, it illuminates the whole of Donne's work by focusing coherently on reason, bodies, and suffering as consistent and related human concerns. As a consequence, Sherwood's analysis of individual works is original and, on the whole, persuasive, providing succinct, direct insights to balance the philosophical cast of his arguments. Donne's sense that physical events can be emblems of spiritual realities and his ironic drawing upon hermetical materials in "A Valediction: Of Weeping," for example, shows us how "in the events of his grief, the speaker . . . finds emblematic evidence that a more spiritual emphasis is necessary to control the destructive grief caused by sexual preoccupation" (134). "Parting forces these lovers to recognize the danger of not keeping the body in its place as the servant of the soul; that is, sexual love, ironically characterized with alchemical terminology, cannot do what alchemy claims to do – transform matter into a higher form" (134).

In the next chapter, Sherwood goes on to argue that in adapting Petrarchan attitudes in the *Holy Sonnets*, Donne records the spiritual frustration caused by the speaker's human failure in his penitential struggle "to reform idolatrous love in accordance with divine pattern" (156). Sonnet XIV, in particular, shows him adapting the language of Petrarchan convention to his own experiences of frustration, helplessness, and betrayal. Accepting the way of corrective affliction sought in *Holy Sonnet XIV* becomes the focus of the Good Friday poem which demonstrates that Donne's request "for punishing corrections, to be humbled in the pattern of the suffering Christ, is the ultimate means of dissolving [the] tension between *aversio* and *conversio*" (172) that characterizes the fallen believer: "He must continually seek a penitential conversion ever incomplete in a mortal world: for, although his westward movement will reach the East at his death, it expresses paradoxically the *aversio* in this life toward the nothingness of sin" (171).

From this discussion, Sherwood moves to the *Devotions* which emphasize more than ever that "God communes directly to the whole man" (189) through his afflictions, and that conformity to Christ's suffering, a broken heart, also reaffirms man's participation in a social Body. The book concludes with the "dying Donne,

vividly manifested in the pulpit for *Deaths Duell*" (190). In this concluding chapter, Sherwood argues that in this sermon as much as in the death effigy in St. Paul's, Donne manifests the calling that fulfilled his life. In his physical conformity to the suffering of Christ, Sherwood claims, Donne continues to leave his spiritual imprint and to embolden the problems of mortality and time for his hearers then and now.

However, the strengths of Sherwood's philosophical approach are also its weaknesses. The material is often too abstract, the language of the arguments too condensed to be forceful, particularly where Sherwood is summarizing. Three brief, but characteristic, examples will suffice. The first is taken from the introduction, where Sherwood is discussing the tension between being and nothingness in Donne's thought: "To recapitulate briefly, Donne's mature thought coheres through relationships of imprinted likeness between the Creator and participating creatures" (9-10). Later, in a discussion of Donne's similarities with Bernard, Sherwood explains that "For both Donne and Bernard, digestion into fullness describes participation in God through erected human faculties" (97). Or again, in a discussion of the libertine love poems, "Donne's judgment against naturalism is instructed by a coherent sense of the body's place in the fulfillment of Creation and as a book of the soul to guide other men in a shared community" (79).

This last quotation reveals a related difficulty. The abstract style of Sherwood's arguments often has the effect of dulling the works he is discussing. The secular poems, in particular, seem to lose their dramatic immediacy, their living quality, and even when Sherwood reminds us of it, they do not fully recover. For example, at the end of his discussion of "A Valediction of Weeping," he feels compelled to add that "A concluding word can usefully remind us that the poem dramatizes the very human grief of parting. The lovers' tears – whatever else they become in the poem – express a recognizable anguish" (142). But he muffles the directness of this assertion by the explanation that the principles of Donne's thought this situation dramatizes "are clearly realities of being in time" (142). Similarly, an exciting analysis of the Bernardine language of chewing, swallowing, and digesting in a verse letter to Edward Herbert as the embodiment of virtue leads to the dry conclusion that "For Donne, fulfilment of both body and soul requires erected actions that inform the community" (86).

In the end, however, the beginning becomes clear; the threat of annihilation gives way to the real fruits of Sherwood's creation and the circle is completed. *Fulfilling the Circle* offers to all students, if not to all readers, of Donne a philosophically coherent, logical, and intelligent approach to the human concerns that shaped Donne's life as well as his work.

JEANNE SHAMI, *University of Regina*

Ronald Hutton. *The Royalist War Effort, 1642-1646*. New York: Longman, Inc., 1982. First paperback edition, 1984. \$18.50.

In recent years knowledge of the English Civil War has been greatly enriched by the proliferation of local studies taking the view that the assumption that the only



things that matter in English history are those happening in and around London is narrowly blinkered. Since 1965 monographs have appeared dealing with Kent, Cheshire, Somerset, Sussex, Essex, Yorkshire, to mention just a few, which have caused historians to modify the generalisations they had tended to make about the religious, social, economic or political causes of the Civil War. Broadly speaking, what the local historians have said about their individual countries is that circumstances vary so much from county to county and, indeed, within each county, that the generalisations about social class or broad economic factors that were rampant in the 1960's are disconcertingly hollow. From all of these local studies, perhaps, one conclusion has been drawn: in virtually every county examined in detail, only a small minority was actively committed to either side in late 1642, the great majority having to be coerced into supporting the Parliamentarians or the King. By implication, the role played by political or religious factors in what is still often referred to as the "English Revolution" has inevitably become muted, a viewpoint that is more consistent with the "neo-conservatism" of the 1980's than it would have been with the prevailing ideology twenty years ago.

Generally speaking, the local studies have shared with the traditional national interpretations a tendency to concentrate on the activities and resources of the ultimate winners, the Parliamentarians. This is so partly because the sources for studying the Parliamentarians at the local level have survived much more fully than those for the Royalists, and partly because there is a natural disposition for historians, even local historians, to follow history's winners rather than its losers. Whatever the reason, it is the case that a good deal more is known about the activities of the Parliamentarians, at both the national and the local levels, than about those of the Royalists. Ronald Hutton's study of *The Royalist War Effort, 1642-1646*, is designed to help fill this gap.

Like many local studies, Hutton's book contains a great deal of detailed information, and part of it needs to be read with a large-scale map of Wales and the West-midlands, as he describes the complexities of manoeuvres by Royalist and Parliamentary armies, regiments, detachments and garrisons. One would also benefit from a *Dramatis Personae*, as there are literally hundreds of names, few of them of the household variety, who enjoy their few seconds of immortality and then vanish into the obscurity whence they came. Unfortunately there is neither a sufficiently large-scale map nor a list of main characters, so it is difficult to avoid being submerged by the abundance of detail.

Unlike some local studies, however, this one also has a sharply etched argument. While the leaves seem sometimes to dominate, the author periodically draws the readers' attention to the wood from which they hang. As he establishes his argument, furthermore, Hutton engages in debate with a number of eminent historians, some as long-deceased as Clarendon, others in their prime, like John Morrill and David Underdown.

Essentially, Hutton has written a study of the way the King first sought, then maintained and finally lost support in Wales, the Welsh Marches and the West Midlands, the heartland of the Royalist Party. In the beginning, he argues, when the King issued his Commissions of Array, the response in most places was one of "indifference or hostility" (p. 201). His armies in 1642 tended to be raised by pro-

minent individuals who, very often using their own financial resources, attracted recruits by offering them 4s.4d. per week, "to border farmers, a princely sum" (p. 28). The outbreak of actual fighting, notably the Battle of Edgehill in October, 1642, brought home the economic and military realities of the Civil War to all inhabitants of the individual local communities whose preference for neutralism was overcome by force. During the first half of the war, Charles I respected the sensitivity of local communities to threats from an outside centralising force by appointing as Lieutenant-Generals for the four regions of the larger area men who were "great aristocrats and amateur soldiers, men who would command respect by virtue of their inherent status in the community rather than by powers conferred upon them by war" (p. 52). Militarily and administratively, this policy was disastrous as these "grandeens" were neither effective in the field nor able to harness the support of their communities, which withheld their taxes and other support.

It was only when, in 1644, the King abandoned his policy of appointing locally prominent gentlemen-officers and adopted a more professional attitude to war that he was able to field an effective force drawn from "a military empire covering all Wales, the Marches and western England" (p. 142). This was the army, he says, that "almost won the Civil War for the King" (p. 145). Because the Royalists failed to win the war, however, they acquired a new and more formidable opponent even than the Parliamentarians. Provincialism, which had in 1642 expressed itself in terms of indifference to the King's cause, reappeared in the form of hostility to the war itself. Occurring first in the aftermath of Marston Moor, militant neutralism, the force behind the various Clubmen movements, was initially suppressed by the King's "Warlords," but, following the debacle at Naseby, it rapidly became the dominant force that led to the monarch's surrender. As Hutton concludes, perhaps a little rhetorically, "by the last analysis it was the local community, not Parliament, which defeated Charles I, not from hatred of his cause but from hatred of the war itself" (p. 203).

In the course of establishing his argument Hutton takes issue with a number of positions that earlier historians had tended to take as read. In the first place, he challenges directly the Earl of Clarendon's account of almost the entirety of the Royalist campaigns in the West. In the first place he accuses Clarendon of misrepresenting an episode in the Forest of Dean in February, 1643, by characterising a Parliamentary force as "a rabble of country people, being got together, without order or an officer of name," when indeed they were a "body of regulars, under a Colonel Berrow" (p. 54). This, says Hutton, is typical of Clarendon who was forever downgrading the social status of the Parliamentarians and associating the Royalist cause with prominent local gentry for reasons that have less to do with historical accuracy and are more related to the propaganda purposes of his entire *History*. Second, and the two points are obviously related, Hutton attacks Clarendon for his portrayal of the King's nephew, Prince Rupert, as a "rough, blunt soldier with contempt for the opinions of any civilians from Clarendon downwards" (p. 129). To Hutton, Prince Rupert was a brilliant general who was also responsible for a "genuine revolution in war-time administration" (p. 142). Far from being the cause of the Royalist failure in the West, as Clarendon asserted, Hutton believes that it was only Prince Rupert's professionalism, combined with a



sensitivity to local interests that permitted the King to field a credible force. In Hutton's view, Clarendon's distorted portrayal of the social character of the Royalists is of a piece with his unfair and false condemnation of the military professionalism brought to the King's cause by Prince Rupert and his kind.

Hutton also takes issue with two more recent historians. He is critical of David Underdown's treatment of the various Clubmen movements in the Welsh Marches and in the West Midlands. Like most local historians, Hutton is reluctant to explain outbursts of "militant neutralism" in terms of a "general hypothesis" (p. 180) on the grounds that such an explanation "ignores the factor of experience" (p. 181). If it is true, as J. H. Hexter once said, that historians are either "lumpers" or "splitters," then it is clear that Hutton is to be placed among the "splitters."

While Hutton's whole study takes its departure from John Morrill's *The Revolt of the Provinces* (1976), he does correct Morrill at a number of points. Whereas Morrill had argued that there were real and substantial differences between Royalist and Parliamentary war-time administrations, for instance, Hutton is inclined to play down the contrasts. At the local level, Hutton writes, "virtually all the differences between Royalist and Parliamentary administration disappear" (p. 107).

Ronald Hutton has undoubtedly written a valuable book which throws light on areas of the English Civil War that were hitherto in the shadows. He has by no means, however, solved all of the problems. He has explained *how* the Royalists organised themselves between 1642 and 1646 but has left more puzzling than before *why* they organised themselves. If, as he says, in these areas "the Civil War did not arise inevitably, from any fundamental social, economic, religious or even political cleavage within local society" (p. 201), then how is it to be explained? For an historian who sees "experience" as so much more important a factor in explanation than "general hypotheses," and who bombards the reader with hundreds of names of persons and places, he has not done wonderfully well to characterise the kind of "experience" that made so many of these Royalists lay down their lives in a losing, but Royalist, cause.

MICHAEL G. FINLAYSON, *University of Toronto*

Maryann Cale McGuire. *Milton's Puritan Masque*. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1983. Pp. xiv, 210. \$20.00.

William B. Hunter, Jr. *Milton's Comus: Family Piece*. Troy, N.Y.: Whitston, 1983. Pp. xvi, 102. \$15.00

Puritan, according to Owen Feltham writing in 1628, is a name "so new, that it hath scarcely yet obtain'd a *definition*: nor is it an *appellation* derived from one *mans* name, whose *Tenents* we may finde, digested into a volume: whereby wee doe erre in the application." Indeed, "Absolutely to defin him, is a worke, I thinke, of difficulty; such I knowe that rejoyce in the name; but sure they be such, at least *understand* it" (*Resolves*, 3rd ed. [1628], pp. 10-11). The argument of Maryann McGuire's study, despite the careful acknowledgement that Puritan is a "slippery

label" (p. 1), proceeds on the implicit rejection of Feltham's difficulties. Though far too wise to offer any simple definition of Puritan, McGuire consistently uses the term as though it had one. She does this because her use of the term is primarily rhetorical, the antithesis of Royalist, one of the two necessary poles in the binary opposition through which she thinks out her thesis – that in 1634 Milton was "a Puritan, or more properly a Puritan in the making" (p. 1) who set out to appropriate the masque, a "Royalist form," for Puritans: by "revising its conventions of form and thought," he determined "to make it answerable to Puritan concerns" (p. 167).

The problem inherent in such a sharply focused formulation is that the more extensive the evidence McGuire produces to demonstrate the Puritan quality of a work written as early as *Comus* the more slippery the Puritan label becomes. On the basic issue of chastity, for instance, while she makes a powerful case for distinguishing the conception of chastity fashionable in the court masques from the conception of chastity in *Comus*, chastity as a "version of charity" (p. 138), she also introduces a considerable degree of ambivalence over the 'Puritanness' of Milton's understanding of virtue in general. If virtue, as Luther and Calvin maintain, is utterly dependent on God's grace, if virtue is "a gift of God" (p. 139), then it is difficult to see any distinctively "Puritan message" (p. 6) in Milton's moral "that God helps those who help themselves" (p. 160). Even though by "help themselves" McGuire means "good men" seeking out the natural conduits of grace available to them, such a moral still implies that virtue may operate independently of grace. This is important, among other reasons, because it is over the role of virtue that discussion of the theological stance of *Comus* has traditionally revolved. According to Woodhouse, for instance, what if anything may determine 'Puritanness' is the "principle of segregation" (*UTQ*, 11 [1942], 49), that is, the sense of absolute discontinuity between the orders of nature and grace, the sense of segregation out of which belief in the complete dependence of virtue on grace arose. It is from the feeling that *Comus* denies this principle that Woodhouse argues his Christian humanist reading of the masque, and from the feeling that *Comus* affirms it that, most recently, Georgia Christopher has argued the reverse – that in *Comus* "there is enmity between nature and grace and that virtue is extrinsic to man and nature" (*ELH*, 43 [1976], 480; *Milton and the Science of the Saints* [1982], pp. 31-58). Nowhere is McGuire's ambivalence over virtue more evident than in the way she both rejects and follows these writers. She rejects Christopher's "extended examination of *Comus* as a Puritan work of art" for "too rigid a conformity on Milton's part to Protestant orthodoxy" (p. 6), but, at the same time, in her treatment of *Comus*'s character, she follows Christopher's "demonstration" that *Comus* signifies the belief of Reformed theology in the depravity of the flesh, that is, the depravity of the fallen order of nature (p. 81). Similarly, she rejects Woodhouse's ascending scale of particular virtues (p. 149), but, at the same time, in her treatment of the Lady's chastity, she follows Woodhouse in insisting that Milton does not repudiate nature: "In the Lady's view, nature is not depraved, as Calvinists held" (p. 158). What McGuire finally arrives at is a position not that dissimilar from Woodhouse's, a position in which grace comes not to destroy nature but to fulfill it: "the divine help available to the vir-



tuous" "works through natural means" and these means "mediate . . . between the realms of nature and grace" (p. 152). This is perfectly reasonable, but if it is meant to indicate a peculiarly Puritan stance on the doctrine the masque most centrally seeks to teach, then the term has been stretched to breaking point: it has come to include the beliefs of almost all, save those who most rejoiced in the name of Puritan.

The usefulness of the term comes into doubt on other issues – when, for instance, McGuire concedes that even after Prynne, who acknowledged Puritan as "an honourable nickname for Christianity and grace" (*Histriomastix* [1633], p. 827), had been brutally punished for calling "Women-actors" "notorious whores" (ibid., index), Milton was writing the Lady's part for Alice Egerton, a 'woman-actor' who had appeared in precisely the kind of royal entertainment, Townshend's *Tempe Restor'd*, most reviled by Prynne.

The general method of exposition McGuire adopts to make her case is contextual, that is, she examines *Comus* in a series of four contexts: the debate over the morality of recreation on Sundays and entertainment in general; the conventional approach of the court masque to character and plot; the debate over the relative value of spectacle and speech in the court masque; and the tension between rival understandings of chastity. While the conclusions she draws are always constrained by the need to demonstrate the "Puritan" direction of Milton's innovations, her presentation of these contexts is consistently illuminating, making the extent to which Milton departed from court practice clearer than ever. In this and in suggesting something of the complexity of the attitudes of the commonwealth's future supporters towards the theatre, McGuire's book is a valuable addition to such revisionary works as Margot Heinemann's *Puritanism and Theatre* and Martin Butler's more recent *Theatre and Crisis*. Though the book is written with skill and care, there is a curious pattern of documentary errors, perhaps the most interesting of which is the way the index attributes Ben Jonson's commonplace book, *Discoveries*, to Inigo Jones (p. 206).

The context in which William Hunter sets out to examine *Comus* is that of the private concerns of the Earl of Bridgewater's family: "The variety of ways in which Milton responded to the family commission is indeed remarkable, his knowledge of the family, its background, and its interests being more extensive and more influential on *Comus* than has ever been recognized" (p. 44). Despite this claim what Hunter actually offers proves disappointing. Much of what is best in the study has been published long since either in Hunter's own or other people's notes, and much of the information is in any case only of peripheral interest, especially the Livingston Lowes-like attempt to explain the manuscript use of "Daemon" by way of the family connection with the Isle of Man and Plutarch's *Moralia* which "Perhaps for some reason the family had recently been reading" (p. 43). The centrepiece of Hunter's thesis is a rehearsal of Barbara Breasted's account of the Castlehaven scandal (*Milton Studies*, 3 [1971], 201-24), because the sexual outrages of Bridgewater's kinsman allow Hunter to suggest a family explanation for what he considers *the* "problem of *Comus*," that is, Milton's choice of "so unusual a subject" (p. 7) as chastity for an inaugural entertainment. Besides being unoriginal, this position is vulnerable from a number of directions.

First, chastity was hardly an unusual subject for an aristocratic entertainment in the early 1630's, inaugural or otherwise. Second, chastity for Milton means something rather more than the rape prevention technique which Hunter first alleges and then finds "downright embarrassing to discuss seriously" (p. 2). And third, as John Creaser has persuasively argued (*Notes & Queries* [September 1984], 307-17), the Bridgewater family appears to have been far more concerned not to draw attention to the scandal than to have wanted to act out a public defense of the family honour.

PAUL STEVENS, *University of Richmond, Virginia*

Diana Benet. *Secretary of Praise: The Poetic Vocation of George Herbert*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1984. Pp. 207.

Richard Strier. *Love Known: Theology and Experience in George Herbert's Poetry*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1983. Pp. xxi, 277.

Since mid-century a number of generally good book-length studies of George Herbert's poetry have appeared. Their quality is due in no small part to the recognition, prevailing since Joseph Summers published *George Herbert: His Religion and Art* in 1954, that Herbert is "one of the best English lyric poets," that poetry and religion are "intimately and inextricably interrelated in *The Temple*," and that its "relations . . . to its conceptual framework and to history" are essential to an understanding of the poetry (Summers, pp. 7, 11). In fact, one could say that their quality tends to be in proportion to such recognition. Both Strier and Benet continue in this healthy tradition of modern Herbert scholarship; specifically, both deal at length with many individual poems as poetry, and both seek to illuminate the work by bringing to it the light of appropriate historical and religious knowledge.

That said, there are important differences between these books, starting with the different orientation correctly suggested by their full titles. Strier's somewhat longer book "argues for the centrality of a single doctrine to George Herbert's poetry and theology: the doctrine of justification by faith" (Strier, p. xi); Benet's focuses mainly on a single poetic sequence in the poems, one dealing with poetic vocation, "by reference to grace and charity as two of the major themes of *The Temple*" (Benet, p. 2).

Although *Secretary of Praise* was published later, Benet apparently had no opportunity to read Strier's book before going to press (she does cite two of his articles). *Secretary* is on the whole lucidly written, and often marked by a good sensitivity to the poetry, as in the treatment of "Longing," a "robust and uncereemonious prayer" that Benet sees as "one of the most powerful poems in *The Temple*" (pp. 55, 56). She brings excellent critical resources to this reading, with due attention to metrics, metaphor, and allusion. Her own language is usually careful as well as vivid, but her term "commands" (p. 56) to describe the poet's anguished pleas to God is a little excessive. Here and elsewhere Benet usefully glosses some difficult passages. A good graduate student of mine, new to Herbert, found *Sec-*



retary a helpful book.

After first considering "The Poet and His Religion," Benet continues with a chapter emphasizing the "intimate and personal" yet not "private" nature (pp. 32, 34) of the Christian life depicted in *The Temple*. Next comes a treatment of "Self-Observation and Constant Creation," giving some attention to a short linked sequence of poems on the latter topic, as a preliminary to the main sequence on poetic vocation, dealt with in the remaining three chapters. The sixth chapter, "The Priest and the Poetry," seems to me the best in the book, insightful in itself and effective in drawing together the whole argument.

While one of Benet's virtues is responsiveness to Herbert's lyrics, there are some points at which her response seems dubious or even obviously wrong. I object to "the Master rejects the unattractive man" (p. 67) as a reading of Herbert's "where thou dwellest all is neat"; the poet is saying nothing negative about God here, only that God's presence brings neatness. Unlike Benet, I do not find any "underlying resentment against God" in the first twelve lines of "The Size" (p. 68), and I feel she misreads the tone elsewhere, seeing "dejection" and "despondency" (pp. 139-40) in the positive opening stanzas of "Employment" (II), and "disanimated resignation" (p. 71) instead of a rather vigorous balance in "Mans medley." Surely not everyone will agree that "The Temper" (II) has a "lukewarm effect" (p. 87). The point of "The Thanksgiving" is not the "impossibility" of grieving for Christ (p. 116) but its inevitable inadequacy – after all, "preventest" in the third line also means "goest before."

Coleridge was wrong when he said that to appreciate *The Temple* one must be not only a "zealous," "orthodox," and "devout" Christian, but also a "dutiful child of the Church [of England]," but he was right about the importance of suspending one's disbelief (if any), and having the right sort of sympathy with this author. Benet generally has such sympathy, but it lapses, I think, when (in "The Sacrifice") she finds it "difficult to reconcile Christ's love with his deliberate enumeration of man's faults or sins" (p. 107); Christ is, of course, "speaking the truth in love" (Eph. 4:15), in the prophetic tradition of confronting actual problems in order to deal with them.

Along with a number of writers on Herbert, Benet has some real difficulty in coming to terms with his theology. That it is not enough to recognize it is Protestant, A.D. Nuttall's *Overheard by God* unintentionally demonstrates; one must be attuned to it – as Strier is. In an understandable desire to emphasize the poet's charity, Benet is driven to blindness: she asserts that "Herbert does not write of hell and damnation" (p. 141). My concordance tells me that hell is mentioned fifteen times in *The Temple* and that "damnation" appears just as often (three times each) as the word "charitie." Benet ignores one of the occurrences of "damnation" (in "The Water-course") when she claims that Herbert is not to be associated with Calvin's doctrine of election (p. 22).

Herbert (and Donne) shared much more with Calvin than Benet acknowledges or recognizes in her account (pp. 21-26) of this somewhat complicated matter. It is ultimately unhelpful to quote Calvin out of the wider context of his writings. Benet shows no awareness that Calvin, too, objected to regarding God as the originator of sin, and that he counselled a charitable, non-judgmental attitude toward ex-

pelled church members (*Inst.*, I.xv.1, IV.xii.9). Hales' jibe, that "Nobody would conclude another man to be damned if he did not wish him to be so," (quoted with apparent approval, p. 21), is itself uncharitable, and presumably excludes the author of I Corinthians 13 from charity. Donne had a high opinion of Calvin, and attached unfavourable aspects of the doctrine of irresistible grace to the "School" – i.e., the late medieval scholastics – while admitting that "There is some truth in the thing, soberly understood" (cited in Benet, p. 22). To argue that pulpit exhortations are inconsistent with strict Calvinism (p. 23) is to misunderstand this paradoxical teaching; Calvin (and St. Paul before him, the source of much predestinarian teaching) exhorted with the best of them. For a more accurate picture of Herbert's church, Benet should look harder at the Georges' book, *The Protestant Mind of the English Reformation* (to which she refers elsewhere) and consult as well Nicholas Tyacke and others cited in my article, "Recharting the *Via Media* of Spenser and Herbert," (*Renaissance and Reformation*, 20 [1984], 21-25). And to develop some appreciation for the ways in which the teachings of Calvin and Luther are relevant to Herbert's poetry, she should read *Love Known*.

To move from Benet to Strier is to go from a moderately good book to an outstanding one. *Love Known* is not only a work of acute literary analysis; it is the first really thoroughgoing study of the theology underlying *The Temple* and will, for many readers, bring a new perspective on the poems. Strier claims much – that Herbert fully identifies with the "central doctrine of the Reformation," and that "the great majority of Herbert's finest lyrics express and flow from this center" (p. xiv) – but the claims are carefully articulated and qualified. Much in the book helps demonstrate that "Justification by faith alone is an extraordinarily rich and powerful theological doctrine, one that means to transform the religious consciousness" (p. xii).

Unlike some writers on Herbert and his contemporaries, Strier has an excellent command of Protestant theology – and what A.D. Nuttall and Alan Sinfield seem to lack, an appropriate respect for what is good in it. While Benet cites a few proof texts out of Calvin and leans too heavily on anthologies like More and Cross's *Anglicanism*, Strier proves himself more than adequately familiar with the Reformers, Herbert's contemporaries, and related modern scholarship. He is able, as others have not been, to see the real significance of Rosemond Tuve's fine but somewhat misleading essay "George Herbert and *Caritas*," because he can correctly identify (pp. xviii-xix) the theology Tuve perceives in Herbert but obscures by incorrect labeling. Perhaps it is significant that Benet emphasizes "charity," the term derived from the medieval "caritas," while Strier in his title and Herbert in his poetry prefer the word "love." It is possible that Strier does not sufficiently recognize the communal element in Protestantism and in Herbert, but to make the case one would need Strier's rather than Benet's degree of theological knowledge.

A welcome feature of *Love Known* is its deliberate combining of background and foreground in all its chapters. Benet's (or Summers') dealing with background first seems more methodical and orderly, but can be less-interesting. Strier launches into a reading of Herbert poems at the very beginning, and we never lose sight of them. His first three chapters (after a brief but valuable introduction) deal with a topic prominent in Herbert but skirted by many critics – sin. Treatments of the com-



plete denial of "merit," the psychological and intellectual nature of sin, and a response to Stanley Fish's readings of Herbert are followed by a fourth chapter in which Strier elucidates *The Temple's* rejection of the covenant theology current among some puritans. The fifth chapter takes up conversion (another significant but neglected topic), and the book concludes with chapters on inwardness and individualism, the role of emotion, and the limits Herbert and the Protestants saw for that role.

Strier is an excellent reader, with the tools and the gifts this poetry requires. He deals well and thoroughly with over sixty poems, always showing sensitivity, always shedding light. Only once, in the reading of "The Temper" (I) (pp. 227-31), does the interpretation seem a little arbitrary to me. A few sexual readings (as in notes on pp. 48, 49) appear unnecessary though not impossible. While giving individual poems their due, Strier repeatedly places them also in the context of *The Temple*, making interesting and sound generalizations. Fully cognizant of Herbert criticism, Strier refers to a considerably wider range of it than Benet does, and usually offers the reader evaluation of a comment rather than a mere citation. (As an avid reader of good footnotes, I am pleased to note that in both books the notes are placed at the foot of a page, not in a ghetto later in the book.) Strier's learning is fully compatible with a lively, clear style.

In conclusion, both Benet and Strier have made worthwhile contributions to Herbert criticism, and both books are enjoyable reading; but for thoroughness, accuracy, and brilliance *Love Known* excels (bears the bell, in Herbert's phrase), and ought to be recognized as indispensable reading for anyone seriously interested in Herbert.

DANIEL W. DOERKSEN, *University of New Brunswick*

*William Camden. Remains concerning Britain.* R.D. Dunn, editor. Toronto University of Toronto Press, 1984. \$75.

William Camden (1551-1623) flourished during the period of the great Elizabethan intellectual revival and was part of the same culture which produced Shakespeare and Ben Jonson. Indeed, to many he is best remembered as Jonson's greatly respected teacher at Westminster School. His own work often seems too diffuse, too rambling, too 'antiquarian' for modern taste. In particular, the *Remains concerning Britain* has regularly been dismissed as nothing more than a scrapbook companion to the more carefully organized *Britannia*. In his new edition of the *Remains* Robert Dunn sets about to dispel this misconception: "This edition is intended to restore Camden's book to its rightful place within that (the great Elizabethan) tradition, and to clarify its relation to Camden's other work, notably the *Britannia* . . ." Dunn suggests that in spite of Camden's articulated nonchalance about the work the *Remains* did have a tight structure with a patterned development from edition to edition.

As the base text for the present edition Dunn takes the 1605 version—the closest to the spelling and punctuation found in the manuscripts – and incorporates authorial revisions from the 1614 and 1623 editions – he also normalizes spelling

to some degree and makes a variety of other minor editorial changes. The result is an attractively printed, easily accessible, highly readable text, which will definitively replace earlier editions. Significant variants, moreover, are conveniently located at the bottom of the page. Dunn provides translations for the large chunks of Latin embedded in the *Remains* in an appendix and also gives a fairly long commentary, primarily devoted to the important question of sources. As Dunn himself points out, one of his chief difficulties was to keep the commentary down to a reasonable size. Much of the interest in the *Remains* lies with Camden's use of source material and some of the medieval manuscripts he saw and from which he took information may well have since disappeared. Dunn has spent many years tracking down sources and has made good use of a variety of methods, including the academic grapevine – and this reviewer well remembers being handed a large list of unidentified quotes compiled by Dunn for circulation at the Centre for Medieval Studies as early as 1973. Dunn has pieced together the commentary judiciously and, if those who are specialists in particular fields can here and there supplement references to specific unidentified items, Dunn's research as a whole has been impressive and his comments apt. On occasion, as might be expected, one is tempted to quibble with individual points, especially when Dunn's enthusiasm for Camden leads to slight hyperbole. Almost a generation before Camden, for example, both John Leland and John Bale were appreciating medieval Latin poetry (see p. xxvii). Dunn decided not to include a separate bibliography to supplement the commentary, partly because of restraints of space: it would, however, have been very useful, particularly since not all references are fully cited and since the index is not altogether complete – Lord Howard of Naworth (p. xxiii), for example, and William of Malmesbury's *De Antiquitate glastoniensis ecclesiae* (p. 363) do not turn up in the index.

The introduction to the text is succinct and well presented – the general introduction, on the other hand, seems a little too compact. It would have been helpful if Dunn had provided a discussion of the *Remains* in the context of other works of a similar nature being produced during the period. In particular, to what degree is this text an outgrowth of John Leland's methods (or lack thereof) in the *Collectanea*? Leland did not live to draw order out of his collected notes: in what sense are the *Remains* more fully structured even with Camden's various revisions from edition to edition. At times, *pace* Dunn, it is still tempting to see the *Remains* in the manner Camden himself described it: "the rude rubble and out-cast rubbish . . . of a greater and more serious work."

JAMES P. CARLEY, *York University*



## News / Nouvelles

### **Renaissance & Reformation – Special Issue**

The first issue of *Renaissance and Reformation/Reformation et Réforme* for 1986 (XXII,1) will be entirely devoted to publishing the proceedings of the conference "The Language of Gesture in Renaissance," held at the University of Toronto in November 1983.

### **Renaissance et Réform – Un Numéro Spéciale**

Le premier numéro de *Renaissance and Reformation/Reformation et Réforme* de l'année 1986 (XXII,1) sera entièrement consacré à la publication des Actes du colloque "The Language of Gesture in Renaissance," à l'Université de Toronto en novembre 1983.

### **CSRS – Annual Meeting at the Learned**

The Canadian Society for Renaissance Studies will meet in Winnipeg May 29–31, 1986. Topics for sessions are: Rhetoric in the Renaissance, Local History in the Renaissance, Pageantry and Public Display, Art History and open topics. Members will be receiving full programmes. For further information contact L. Lieblein, Department of English, McGill University, 853 Sherbrooke Street W., Montreal, P.Q. H3A 2T6.

### **PNRC – New Executive**

The new Executive Board of the Pacific Northwest Renaissance Conference for 1986–87 has been elected; its members are as follows:

- President: Nathan F. Cogan (Portland State Univ.)
- Past President: Jean MacIntyre (Univ. of Alberta)
- Treasurer (Canada): David Atkinson (Univ. of Lethbridge)
- Treasurer (USA): Janet L. Knedlik (Seattle Pacific Univ.)
- Members at Large: Joseph Gaven (Campion College, Regina)
- Raymond Mentzer (Montana State Univ.)

The conference for 1987 will be in Calgary, and the organizers, Ronald Bond (Univ. of Calgary) and Jean MacIntyre (Univ. of Alberta). In 1988 the conference will be held at the University of Oregon.

### **Center for Medieval & Early Renaissance Studies Conference**

On the occasion of its 20th anniversary the Centre for Medieval and Early Renaissance Studies at the State University Center at Binghamton, New York is sponsoring a conference on "The Classics in the Middle Ages" on October 17-18, 1986. Plenary session speakers will include Janet Bately (London), Giuseppe Billanovich (Milan), Marcia Colish (Oberlin), Phillip Damon (Berkeley), Richard Rouse (UCLA), Aldo Scaglione (North Carolina), and Edward Synan (Toronto). Toronto's PLS will present a performance of an appropriate drama. Specialized papers will be considered until March 15th. Conference Coordinators are Profs. Aldo S. Bernardo and Saul Levin. Center for Medieval and Early Renaissance Studies SUNY at Binghamton, Binghamton, NY 13901.

### **Folger Summer Institute**

The Folger Institute is pleased to announce its summer institute in the German archival sciences for 1986. The program will be directed by Thomas A. Brady, Jr. of the University of Oregon and take place at the Folger Shakespeare Library from July 1 to August 9, 1986. For further information and for application forms, please write Lena Cowen Orlin, Executive Director of the Folger Institute, Folger Shakespeare Library, 201 East Capitol Street, S.E., Washington, DC 20003, or call (202) 544-4600.

### ***Renaissance Drama* 1987 – Call for Papers**

The 1987 issue of *Renaissance Drama*, volume XVIII, will have an open topic. We are seeking essays on any subject relating to Renaissance drama, including, but not limited to, the impact of new forms of interpretation on the study of Renaissance drama; the relationship of the drama to society and history; and the reconsideration of texts and performance of Renaissance plays. The deadline for receiving essays is September 15, 1986. Please send your manuscript with a self-addressed, stamped return envelope to Mary Beth Rose, The Newberry Library, 60 West Walton St., Chicago, IL 60610.

### **German St. Louis Edition of Luther's Complete Works in Reprint**

A complete edition of Luther's Works, together with a supplementary volume with recently discovered writings of Luther. The text is German, with the Latin works literally translated into readable German.

For detailed information and a free brochure, write to: Heinrich Bühring d.J., Luth. Theol. Hochschule, Altkönigstr. 150, D-6370 Oberursel, West-Germany.



### Call For Papers

The Center for Medieval and Early Renaissance Studies, S.U.N.Y. at Binghamton will hold its twentieth annual conference October 17-18, 1986. The topic will be "The Classics in the Middle Ages." The conference, which will mark the 20th anniversary of the founding of the Center for Medieval and Early Renaissance Studies at SUNY-Binghamton, will examine the influences exerted by the classical heritage on medieval life and culture from the earliest centuries to about 1400, including a variety of fields extending from literature and the arts to the sciences, social sciences, philosophy, education, theology/mysticism/spirituality, and philology.

For the variously topically organized sessions the Center for Medieval and Early Renaissance Studies cordially invites scholars to submit short papers (20-30 minutes) for consideration. The Center welcomes submissions from the various fields of medieval culture noted above. Although abstracts will be considered, completed papers will be given priority over them. Submissions must arrive by May 19, 1986. The final program for the conference will appear in September, 1986. Please submit all inquiries, papers, abstracts, and suggestions to the Conference Coordinators: Professors Aldo. S. Bernardo and Saul Levin, 1986 Conference Coordinators, Center for Medieval and Early Renaissance Studies, State University of New York at Binghamton, Binghamton, New York, 13901, (607) 798-2730 or 798-2130.

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**Note:** The following item was inadvertently omitted from the "Authors" section of the Index for Vol. XX, 1984:

DOERKSEN, Daniel W. *Recharting the Via Media of Spenser and Herbert*, 215.













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